THE PURSUIT OF VILLENEUVE
For a little over a year Francis Austen was Flag-Captain in the
_Canopus_. This ship, which had been captured from the French at the
Battle of the Nile, had originally been called _Le Franklin_, and was
one of the best built vessels in the Navy of that day, carrying eighty
guns.
On March 29, 1805, Rear-Admiral Louis hoisted his flag in the
_Canopus_, and soon afterwards became second in command to Nelson.
Perhaps few, even among British captains of that day, were engaged in
search of French fleets across the Atlantic twice within a twelvemonth,
but the story in the log-book of the _Canopus_ for that year tells of
the chase of Villeneuve before Trafalgar, of the second cruise and of
the battle of St. Domingo, followed by the return voyage to England
with three French line-of-battle ships as prizes.
The subtle strategy of the Emperor Napoleon, with the counter-strokes
of Nelson and the British Admiralty, have been often described; but
the history of those months, told day by day in the log-book of the
_Canopus_, has a freshness of detail which gives reality to such stock
phrases as “contrary winds” or “strange sails,” and makes one recognise
that it was the men at sea who really did the work.
The escape of Villeneuve’s fleet from Toulon begins the series of
events in 1805 which led up to the Battle of Trafalgar. Napoleon’s
original plan has since become well known.
Villeneuve was to be joined in the West Indies by the combined fleets
under Ganteaume from Brest, and Missiessy from Rochefort. The force
thus gathered was to cross the Atlantic, gain possession of the narrow
seas by overpowering the Channel fleet, and then the long-threatened
invasion of England was to be attempted by the Grand Army, embarked in
the Boulogne flotilla.
The plan was so far forward that the fleet from Toulon was already at
sea, and the Rochefort squadron had reached the West Indies. It only
remained to get the Brest fleet out of harbour. This was, however,
exactly where the plan failed. The blockading force was not to be moved
and could not be eluded. False news of troubles in India and false
declarations of intentions were all unavailing; and even the bluff in
the French papers that, so far from waiting till the British would
let them go, the French fleet could and would sail whenever it was
convenient, did not effect the withdrawal of a single British ship
from Ushant. At the same time the fact that the Toulon fleet was at
large was enough to cause anxiety to Nelson, especially as it was quite
impossible to tell what might be Villeneuve’s orders. Nelson supposed
him to be making for Egypt, and took up a position accordingly midway
between Sardinia and Africa.
The fleet with Nelson at this time is recorded in the log of the
_Canopus_ as follows:
100 _Victory_ Rt. Honble. Lord Viscount Nelson, K.B.,
Vice-Admiral of the White, &c. &c.
Rear-Admiral George Murray, Capt. of the Fleet.
Captain Thomas Hardy.
100 _Royal Sovereign_ Sir Richard Bickerton, Baronet, Rear-Admiral
of the Red.
Captain John Stuart.
80 _Canopus_ Thomas Louis, Esq., Rear-Admiral of the Blue.
Captain F. W. Austen.
74 _Superb_ ” Richard G. Keats.
74 _Spencer_ ” Honble. Robert Stopford.
74 _Swiftsure_ ” Mark Robinson.
74 _Belleisle_ ” William Hargood.
74 _Conqueror_ ” Israel Pellew.
74 _Tigre_ ” Benjamin Hallowell.
74 _Leviathan_ ” H. W. Baynton.
74 _Donegal_ ” Pulteney Malcolm.
ORDER OF BATTLE AND OF SAILING
REPEATING FRIGATES
{NO. SHIPS’ NAMES. CAPTAINS.
{ 1. _Canopus_ { Rear-Admiral Thomas }
{ Louis }
{ { Captain Francis Wm. }
{ Austen }
{ 2. }
VAN { 3. }
SQUADRON { 4. _Superb_ Richard Goodwin Keats }
{ 5. }
{ { The Commander-in-Chief}
{ 6. _Victory_ { Rear-Admiral George }
{ Murray }
{ { Captain Thomas Hardy }
{ 7. _Donegal_ Pulteney Malcolm }
{ 8. }
{ 9. _Spencer_ Hon. R. Stopford }
{10. }
} STARBOARD
{ 1. } DIVISION
{ 2. }
{ 3. _Tigre_ Benjamin Hallowell }
{ 4. }
CENTRE { 5. _Royal Sovereign_ { Rear-Admiral Sir }
SQUADRON { { Richard Bickerton }
{
{ { Captain John Stuart }
{ 6. }
{ 7. _Leviathan_ Henry Wm. Baynton }
{ 8. }
{ 9. }
{10. }
}
{ 1. }
{ 2. } LARBOARD
{ 3. } DIVISION
{ 4. }
{ 5. }
REAR { 6. }
SQUADRON { 7. _Excellent_ Frank Sotheron }
{ 8. _Belleisle_ William Hargood }
{ 9. _Conqueror_ Israel Pellew }
{10. _Swiftsure_ Mark Robinson }
To FRANCIS AUSTEN, ESQ. Dated on board the
Captain of His Majesty’s Ship _Canopus_ _Victory_, in PALMA BAY,
_March 26, 1805_
(_Signed_) NELSON AND BRONTE
The _Royal Sovereign_ was found unfit to make the voyage across the
Atlantic, and went home from Lagos in May for thorough repairs, which
were so effective that she carried Collingwood’s flag into action,
before any other of the fleet, at Trafalgar.
The narrative begins at the Bay of Palma in Sardinia, amid general
preparations throughout the fleet.
On the 4th of April the Admiral signalled “to prepare for action,
as the enemy’s fleet from Toulon is at sea.” After this the fleet
cruised for some days between Sardinia and Sicily, waiting for news of
the enemy’s movements. If, as was thought possible, they were bound
for Egypt, the position taken up by Nelson was a strong one. There
were daily consultations of the admirals and captains on board the
_Victory_. After about a fortnight of this uncertainty, “intelligence
is gained” that the sixteen French ships of the line were spoken on
the 7th of April, off Cartagena, going west. On the 18th this news was
confirmed, with the addition that they had passed Gibraltar on the
9th, and were joined by five Spanish two-deckers, and had continued
westward with fair winds. Now ensued an anxious time. The enemy were
well started ten days in advance, with the wind behind them, while
the British fleet were still battling with adverse winds in the
Mediterranean. Every breeze is carefully noted in the log, and the slow
progress evidently gave the greatest concern.
On the 22nd and 23rd of April, the distance made was only fifteen miles
in all: “Extremely variable baffling winds and squally weather, tacking
or wearing every two or three hours, the squadron very much dispersed.”
Ordinarily the _Victory_ was within half a mile, “but now four or six
miles away.” Majorca was in sight at one time, and the African coast
at another, but the progress towards Gibraltar must have been scarcely
perceptible. The Rock was seen for the first time on the 2nd May,
still twelve leagues away, and on the 4th they anchored in Tetuan Bay.
Here was hard work to be done in getting fresh water and provisions on
board. At Gibraltar on the 6th the _Canopus_ did not even anchor, as
the wind was at last fair, and their stay was only for four hours.
On May 9th, the _Victory_ signalled “to prepare demands to complete
provisions for five months,” which was accomplished off Lagos in
Portugal by the morning of the 11th. Then the Admiral made telegraph
signal, “Rendezvous Barbadoes,” and the whole fleet made sail for the
West Indies.
With fair winds and a straight course, the distance of 3200 miles was
accomplished by the 4th of June.
The sailing order of the squadron was:
FRIGATES ON
WEATHER LINE. LEE LINE. VICTORY’S WEATHER BEAM.
100 _Victory._ 80 _Canopus._
74 _Superb._ 74 _Leviathan._
74 _Donegal._ 74 _Belleisle._ 32 _Amphion._
74 _Spencer._ 74 _Conqueror._ 38 _Amazon._
74 _Tigre._ 74 _Swiftsure._ 26 _Decade._
There is very little in the log to indicate the intense expectation
that must have been present as they made their entries of the
diminishing distance.
“_May 15._--Island of Barbadoes S. 64.46 W., dist. 877 leagues.
“_May 22._--S. 70.15 W., dist. 589 leagues.”
The careful comparison of observations with the vessels of the weather
line, repairs to spars and sails, and general preparation for what
might happen on arrival, seem to fill up the days, while the north-east
trade winds gave them fine and clear weather.
“Oh, the wonder of the great trade wind! All day we sailed and all
night, and all the next day, and the next, day after day, the wind
always astern and blowing steadily and strong. The schooner sailed
herself. There was no pulling and hauling on sheets and tackles, no
shifting of topsails, no work at all for the sailors to do except to
steer. At night, when the sun went down, the sheets were slackened; in
the morning when they yielded up the damp of the dew and relaxed, they
were pulled tight again--and that was all. Ten knots, twelve knots,
eleven knots, varying from time to time, is the speed we are making.
And ever out of the north-east the brave wind blows, driving us on our
course two hundred and fifty miles between the dawns.”
These words, taken from one of our popular modern novels,[1] give us
some idea of what sailing was in those days.
The usual record every twelve hours is “_Victory_ north one mile.”
Sometimes the flagship is rather more distant, and occasionally the
“Admiral (Louis) went on board the _Victory_.” Doubtless the impatience
and excitement was not all on Nelson’s part. Every man in the fleet
must have felt that a battle was not far off. All this time the three
frigates were almost daily out in chase, but no enemy was sighted, and
it was not until June 3 that the Admiral signalled that the French and
Spanish squadrons were at Martinique, “having gained this intelligence
from two English letters of marque.”
Next day they arrived at Barbadoes, where the Admiral gave orders
to embark troops. Nine regiments had been sent out from England in
the spring, but had not arrived in time to prevent Missiessy and his
squadron from Rochefort from doing much as they chose during his
stay among the islands. His troops had taken possession of Dominica,
excepting a fort held by General Prevost’s force, and he had laid under
contribution Montserrat, Nevis and St. Kitt’s.
Missiessy had then departed, according to the Emperor’s instructions,
for France, crossing Villeneuve’s fleet in Mid-Atlantic. Thus
Napoleon’s grand scheme of combination fell through. The fleets from
Toulon and Rochefort missed each other, instead of meeting at the
West Indies, and the Brest fleet did not succeed in getting past the
British blockade. The _Canopus_ log of July 17 records the return of
Missiessy’s squadron. “Five sail of the line and four frigates arrived
at Rochefort, on May 21. Vessels dismantled and remained.”
The troops embarked by the squadron at Barbadoes were some of those
despatched hither in the spring. There is a record of a characteristic
order on June 3:
“Admiral made telegraph signal--‘Troops to be victualled at whole
allowance of provisions.’” The practice of the day was that soldiers at
sea received smaller rations than the ship’s company--just the sort of
unreasonable orders which it would delight Nelson to set aside.
Early on the 5th the squadron was again under weigh, the _Victory_
leading and the _Canopus_ astern; but in consequence of wrong
information received they were on a southerly course, and hourly
increasing their distance from the combined enemy’s fleet, which was
still among the islands, but to the northward of Martinique. The signal
at three o’clock “to prepare for battle” was not to be followed by any
immediate action.
On the 7th the Gulf of Paria, in Trinidad, was reached, but still no
news of the enemy was obtained. The log merely mentions anchoring there
for the night and sailing for the northerly islands next morning. The
careful records of barometer and temperature are here interrupted, as
“barometer taken down in clearing for action.”
All through June 10, 11 and 12 the smaller craft were constantly
detached to the various islands for intelligence, and finally they all
anchored at Antigua.
ORDER OF BATTLE AND OF SAILING
REPEATING FRIGATES
{NO. SHIPS’ NAMES. CAPTAINS.
{ 1. _Canopus_ { Rear-Admiral Louis }
{ { Captain Francis W. Austen }
{ 2. }
VAN { 3. }
SQUADRON { 4. _Superb_ Richard G. Keats }
{ 5. }
{ { The Commander-in-Chief }
{ 6. _Victory_ { Rear-Admiral Murray }
{ { Captain Thomas Hardy }
{ 7. _Donegal_ Pulteney Malcolm }
{ 8. }
{ 9. _Spencer_ Hon. R. Stopford }
{10. }
} STARBOARD
{ 1. } DIVISION
{ 2. }
{ 3. _Tigre_ Benjamin Hallowell }
{ 4. }
CENTRE { 5. _Northumberland_ { Rear-Admiral Hon. A. }
SQUADRON { { Cochrane }
{ { Captain George Tobin }
{
{ 6. }
{ 7. _Leviathan_ Wm. Henry Baynton }
{ 8. }
{ 9. }
{10. }
{ 1. }
{ 2. } LARBOARD
{ 3. } DIVISION
{ 4. }
{ 5. }
REAR { 6. _Belleisle_ William Hargood }
SQUADRO { 7. _Excellent_ Israel Pellew }
{ 8. _Swiftsure_ W. G. Rutherford }
{ 9. _Spartiate_ Sir Francis Laforey, Bart. }
{10. }
To FRANCIS WILLIAM AUSTEN, ESQ. Dated on board the _Victory_
Captain of His Majesty’s Ship _Canopus_ in CARLISLE BAY, BARBADOES,
_June 5, 1805_
(_Signed_) NELSON AND BRONTE
“_June 12._--Admiral made signal to prepare letters for England. At
eight o’clock the _Curieux_ brig parted company for England.”
This brig had a history of some interest. She had been captured from
the French on February 3, 1804. She was cut out by the _Centaur_ from
the harbour of Martinique, just after the Diamond Rock had been seized
and garrisoned by the same man-of-war. The story is pathetically told
by M. Cheminant, the only French officer who survived the action.
“ON BOARD THE _Curieux_, CAPTURED BY THE ENGLISH,
“_Pluviose 14, Year 12_.
“The only officer remaining of those who commanded the crew of
the _Curieux_, I owe you a faithful report of the cruel tragedy
which has delivered us up to the enemy.
“On the 13th instant, before one o’clock in the morning I
was on deck with a midshipman and twenty men, according to
the orders given by Captain Cordier. The weather was of the
darkest, especially in the northern direction. Sentries were
placed abaft at the ladder and forward. Our boarding nettings
were triced up. We had hardly perceived the English boats
before they boarded by the stern and the main shrouds. We had
only time to discharge two guns with grape shot, one swivel and
a wall piece, when the enemy were on board, and forced us to
have recourse to the sabre, pike and musketry.”
Lieutenant Bettesworth took a chief part in the attack, and was
eventually rewarded with the command of the brig, which had been one of
the best vessels of its kind in the French navy.
It was an important mission which was now entrusted to Captain
Bettesworth. He was to sail for England with despatches from Lord
Nelson for the Admiralty, steering a certain course in the hope that he
would sight the enemy’s fleet. Nelson was right in his conjecture, and
Captain Bettesworth reached England with the news that Villeneuve was
on the return voyage.
The _Curieux_ anchored at Plymouth on July 7, and the Captain reached
the Admiralty at 11 P.M. on the 8th, too late, in the officials’
opinion, for the First Lord to be disturbed. Lord Barham, a sailor
himself, knew well the value of time in naval matters, and was much
annoyed at the loss of so many precious hours. Though over eighty
years of age his judgment was rapid and accurate. Early on the 9th
Admiralty messages were on the way to Portsmouth and Plymouth. Admiral
Cornwallis, off Ushant, received his orders on the 11th to detach the
squadron blockading Rochefort and send it to join Calder westward off
Cape Finisterre, while he himself was to cruise south of Ushant. To
the amazement of Napoleon, only eight days after the arrival of the
_Curieux_, Sir Robert Calder was ready with fifteen ships off Ferrol.
There Villeneuve met him, and an action took place which should
have been decisive, but by reason of excessive caution on the part
of Calder, only caused loss of ships and men to both sides without
advantage to either. Calder joined Cornwallis off Ushant, while
Villeneuve went into Vigo Bay and afterwards into Ferrol.
Nelson’s squadron began the voyage back from the West Indies on June
15, and we have again in the log of the _Canopus_ the matter-of-fact,
day-to-day record of routine work, vessels spoken, “no intelligence,”
small prizes, rigging out of gear, and so forth, behind which was the
background of suppressed excitement, of unremitting watch, and of
constant readiness. As the months went on and the situation developed,
the excitement increased, and reached its climax only with Trafalgar
Day.
One entry gives an idea of the difference in the conditions of warfare
then and now. “On June 19, an English merchant vessel was spoken by
the _Amphion_ frigate. They signalled--‘Have English papers to the 3rd
of May. Interesting debates.’ Admiral asked--‘Who is First Lord of
the Admiralty?’ Answer--‘Lord Barham.’ Knowing so little as they did
of affairs at home, they could not be sure that all might not be over
before they got back.
“_June 29._--The _Amazon_ at daylight was seen to be towing a captured
Spanish _Tartan_, from La Guayra. The people on board did not know of
the war.” This was undoubtedly an extreme case, and one feels some
sympathy for the “people on board,” who were captured before they knew
that they were fighting.
The winds were naturally less favourable for the return voyage, but by
taking a course near Bermuda, and to the Azores, they made much better
headway than Villeneuve had managed to do, and reached Gibraltar on
July 17. After a few days here they gained intelligence of the doings
of the _Curieux_ brig, and sailed northwards to join Admiral Cornwallis
off Ushant.
“_August 15._--Off Ushant. Lord Nelson saluted Admiral Cornwallis with
fifteen guns, returned with thirteen.--Joined the Channel Fleet of
twenty-four sail of the line. Answered our signal to follow orders of
Admiral Cornwallis in the _Ville de Paris_.”
“_August 16._--Thirty-five sail of the line in company. _Victory_ and
_Superb_ parted company for England.”
We read from a contemporary writer that Nelson arrived “filled
with mortification, which those who first conversed with him after
his arrival state to have amounted almost to anguish, at his
disappointment” at having missed Villeneuve in the West Indies.
“_August 17._--_Ville de Paris_ made signal to _Prince of Wales_ (Sir
R. Calder) to part company, on service previously denoted. Made sail
(southwards) in company with squadron of nineteen sail of the line.”
“On 20th _Naiad_ brought intelligence that the French fleet had sailed
from Ferrol on the 13th.”
“On 22nd, off Peninsular coast, Admiral Calder signalled ‘Prepare for
battle.’”
This was almost on the very spot of his indecisive fight of July
23. Calder’s “order of battle” gives very full details on various
contingencies, making a sharp contrast with those signed “Nelson and
Bronté,” in which the ships’ stations only are set down, the rest of
the orders being given in the plan of attack well known as the “Nelson
Touch.”
In the log of 24th “the enemy’s fleet of twenty-eight sail of the line
were off Cape St. Vincent on the 18th, when they fell in with and
destroyed four sail of merchantmen, under convoy of the _Halcyon_,
which narrowly escaped capture. In the afternoon, the _Euryalus_, with
despatches from V. A. Collingwood, reported that the combined fleet
anchored in Cadiz on the 21st, making in all thirty-four sail of the
line.”
With the enemy in Cadiz the only thing to be done was to wait until
they came out. On the 30th the log records: “Joined Vice-Admiral
Collingwood’s squadron of five sail of the line.” The fleet wore
and stood off, while _Canopus_, _Spencer_, _Tigre_, _Leviathan_ and
_Donegal_ were ordered to cruise in sight of Cadiz. This plan of
keeping a squadron close in shore was followed throughout September,
while the fleet awaited the arrival of Nelson from England, and the
enemy watched for an opportunity to get out, either to meet the British
fleet or to pass them on the way into the Mediterranean.
An extract from the _Naval Chronicle_ shows something of popular
feeling in England at this juncture. The remarks on Nelson as
contrasted with those of a few months later, after Trafalgar had been
fought and won, are more amusing than instructive.
“The arrival of Lord Nelson and Sir Robert Calder’s action are the
principal events of the last month which have occupied the public
mind. It has been said that the former, with Sir Sydney Smith, is soon
to embark on some desperate project against the enemy, and we most
sincerely wish to see his lordship employed at the present moment in
the defence of our own shores. Should the mad project of invasion ever
be attempted, the public would feel additional security from having
the Hero of the Nile off our own coast. But we greatly lament that
ill-judged and over-weening popularity which tends to make another
demigod of Lord Nelson at the expense of all other officers in the
Service, many of whom possess equal merit and equal abilities and equal
gallantry with the noble Admiral.
“Sir Robert Calder has not yet, even to the Admiralty, given that
explanation of his conduct which his country expects and his character
demands. With his character and its failings we are well acquainted,
but we only wish to regard his talents. The French fleet did certainly
not run away; owing to the particular manœuvres of the action, they
may be said even to have pursued us, and this may, perhaps, have been
occasioned by some feint of our Admiral in order to attack the French
to greater advantage. But the whole is at present merely conjecture,
until some further explanation of the action has taken place. The
account which the French have published in the _Moniteur_, allowing for
their natural boasting and vanity, contains a greater portion of truth
than usual.”
Villeneuve’s letter will give an idea of what that account was. “The
battle then began almost along the whole line. We fired by the light of
the enemy’s fire, almost always without seeing them. The fog did not
abate during the remainder of the evening. At the first peep of dawn I
made signal to bear down upon the enemy, who had taken their position
at a great distance, and endeavoured by every possible press of sail to
avoid renewing the action. Finding it impossible to force them to an
engagement, I thought it my duty not to remove further from the line of
my destination.”
In consequence of this Sir Robert Calder was recalled and tried by
court-martial at Portsmouth in the following December, when he was
severely reprimanded for an “error in judgment.” The severity of tone
of the _Naval Chronicle_ towards those who were fighting the country’s
battles finds its parallel in the French newspapers of the date.
Villeneuve was deeply stung by a sneering remark in the _Moniteur_ upon
what the conduct of the French fleet might be if commanded by a man of
ability--so much so as to induce him to disregard Napoleon’s wishes
that he should go to Toulon, collecting forces on the way, and to lead
him to come to close quarters with our fleet as soon as a convenient
opportunity offered. Of that opportunity and the Battle of Trafalgar to
which it led we will speak in the following chapter.