II. _Comparison of the Originals._ Prior to the publication of Sir

William Blackstone’s great work, extraordinary confusion seems to have

prevailed concerning the various Charters of Liberties. Not only was

John’s Magna Carta confused with the various re-issues by Henry; but

these latter were known only from an official copy of the Charter of

1225 contained in the confirming statute of the twenty-eighth year of

the reign of Edward I., known as an “Inspeximus,” because of the opening

word of the King’s declaration that he had seen the document of which he

gave a copy. Neither Madox[296] nor Brady[297] was aware of the

existence of any one of the four originals; and no mention is made of

them in the first edition of Rymer’s _Foedera_, which appeared in 1704.

Mr. Tyrrell indeed seems to have known of the second original copy in

the British Museum and also of the Salisbury version.[298] Mr. Care[299]

showed no clear knowledge of the various manuscripts, though he

mentioned the existence of several. Even Sir William Blackstone in 1759

collated only the two Cottonian copies, since he failed to find that of

Salisbury, and was unaware of the existence of the Lincoln

manuscript.[300]

-----

Footnote 296:

Thomas Madox, _Firma Burgi_ (1726). On p. 45, Madox refers only to the

_Inspeximus_ of Edward I.

Footnote 297:

Robert Brady, _Complete History of England_, p. 126 of Appendix to

Vol. I. (1685), takes his text of the Charter from Matthew Paris,

“compared with the manuscript found in Bennet College Library.”

Footnote 298:

James Tyrrell, _History of England_ (1697-1704). In p. 9 of Appendix

to Vol. II. p. 821, Tyrrell prints a text of John’s Charter founded on

that of M. Paris, collated with those two originals.

Footnote 299:

Henry Care, _English Liberties in the Freeborn subjects’ inheritance;

containing Magna Charta_, etc. (1719), p. 5. The first edition, with a

somewhat different title, is dated 1691.

Footnote 300:

Strangely enough, Sir Thomas Duffus Hardy, so recently as 1837, in

publishing his _Rotuli Chartarum_ (Introduction, p. ii. note 5)

declared that no original of John’s Charter existed. Many copies, he

knew, had been "made and deposited, for the sake of perpetuation, in

all the principal religious houses in the kingdom. However,

notwithstanding all the care taken by multiplication of copies, it is

singular that no contemporary copy of King John’s Magna Carta has yet

been found." The Lincoln MS. he dismissed as “certainly not of so

early a date,” while he confuses the only one of the British Museum

MSS. known to him with the Articles of the Barons. He further

reasserts the fallacy, so clearly exposed by Blackstone eighty years

earlier, that John had issued a separate _Carta de Foresta_.

-----

As these four versions are practically identical in their substance—the

variations being merely in the use of contractions or in other verbal

changes of a trivial character—no important question seems to be

involved in the discussion as to whether any one of them has greater

value than the others. The Record Commissioners considered that the

Lincoln copy was the first to be completed (and therefore that it

possessed special authority), because, unlike the two Cottonian copies,

it contained no insertions at the foot of the instrument. Yet it seems

more plausible to argue that this very immunity from clerical errors, or

from additions made after engrossment, proves that it was of later and

less hurried execution than the others, and therefore of less authority,

if any distinction is permissible. Mr. Thomson has much ground for his

contention in speaking of the fire-marked version in the British Museum

that “the same circumstances may probably be a proof of its superior

antiquity, as having been the first which was actually drawn into form

and sealed on Runnymede, the original whence all the most perfect copies

were taken.”[301]

-----

Footnote 301:

Thomson, _Magna Charta_, 422.

-----

In all printed texts of Magna Carta, the contents are divided into a

preamble and sixty-three chapters, and each chapter is numbered and

treated in a separate paragraph by itself. There is no warrant for this

in any one of the four originals, all of which run straight on from

beginning to end, like other feudal charters, and contain no numbers or

other indication where one provision ends and another begins. Strictly

speaking, Magna Carta has thus no chapters: these are a modern

invention, made for convenience of reference.

III. _The Articles of the Barons._ Of hardly inferior historical

interest to these four original copies of the Great Charter is the

parchment which contains the heads of the agreement made between John

and the rebels on 15th June, 1215, from which the Charter was afterwards

expanded. The parchment containing these heads, known as the Articles of

the Barons, is now in the British Museum, cited officially as “Donation

MSS. 4838.” The seven centuries which have passed over it have left

surprisingly few traces; it is quite legible throughout, and still bears

the impression of John’s great seal in brown wax. It is probable that

this document may have passed with other English records into the hands

of Prince Louis during the civil war which followed close on the

transaction at Runnymede; that it was handed over to the Regent William

Marshal in terms of the Treaty of Lambeth concluded in September, 1217;

and that thereafter it was deposited in Lambeth Palace, where it

remained until the middle of the seventeenth century. Archbishop Laud

seems to have been aware of its historical interest, as he placed it

among the more precious documents in his keeping. When threatened with

impeachment by the Long Parliament, he thought it prudent to set his

papers in order; and on 18th December, 1640, he dispatched for that

purpose to his episcopal palace, his friend Dr. John Warner, Bishop of

Rochester.

There was indeed no time to lose; a few hours later, Laud was committed

to the custody of Black-Rod, and an official messenger was sent by the

House of Lords to seal up his papers. Bishop Warner had, however,

escaped with the Articles of the Barons before this messenger arrived;

he kept it till he died, and at his death it passed to one of his

executors named Lee, and from him to his son Colonel Lee, who presented

it to Gilbert Burnet, afterwards Bishop of Salisbury and author of the

famous _History of His Own Time_. When the Salisbury Magna Carta

disappeared, Burnet was suspected of appropriating it to his own uses.

The grounds which gave some apparent weight to the misrepresentations of

his political opponents were that special facilities had been granted to

him to search public records in the prosecution of his historical

labours, and that as matter of fact he actually had in his

possession—quite lawfully, as we now know—the Articles of the Barons,

which was confused by the carelessness of early historians with Magna

Carta itself. The calumny was so widely spread that Burnet thought it

necessary formally to refute it, explaining that he had received the

Articles as a gift from Colonel Lee. “So it is now in my hands, and it

came very fairly to me.”

Bishop Burnet left it as a legacy to his son Sir Thomas Burnet; and on

his death it passed to his executor David Mitchell, whose permission to

print it Blackstone obtained in 1759. Shortly thereafter it was

purchased from Mr. Mitchell’s daughter by another great historian,

Philip, second Earl of Stanhope, and by him it was presented to the

British Museum in 1769. It is now exhibited to the public along with the

two Cottonian copies of Magna Carta. The Record Commissioners have

reproduced it in facsimile in _Statutes of the Realm_ in 1810, and also

in the _New Rymer_ in 1816.[302]

-----

Footnote 302:

Reproductions of it, as well as of the second Cottonian version of the

Charter, are sold by the authorities of the British Museum at the

price of 2s. 6d.

-----

The document begins with this headline: “_Ista sunt Capitula quae

Barones petunt et dominus Rex concedit._” Then the articles follow in 49

paragraphs of varying length, separate, but unnumbered, each new chapter

(unlike the chapters of Magna Carta, which run straight on as befits its

character as a charter) beginning a new line. The numbers which

invariably appear in all printed editions have no warrant in the

original.

A blank space sufficient for two lines of writing occurs between

paragraphs 48 and 49, indicating perhaps that the last chapter, which

contains the revolutionary provision for the appointment of the

twenty-five Executors, had been added as an after-thought. Chapters 45

and 46 are connected by a rude bracket, and a clause is added in the

same hand as the rest, but more rapidly, modifying the provisions of

both in the King’s favour. This, at least, is clearly an

after-thought.[303]

-----

Footnote 303:

_Cf. supra_, p. 47, and Blackstone, _Great Charter_, xvii.

-----

IV. _The so-called “unknown Charter of Liberties.”_ Among the French

archives there is preserved the copy of what purports to be a charter

granted by King John, but irregular in its form. This document is

preserved among the _Archives du Royaume_ in the _Section Historique_

and numbered J. 655.[304] A copy of this copy was discovered at the

Record Office in London by Mr. J. Horace Round in 1893, previous to

which date it seems to have been practically unknown to English

historians, although it had been printed by a French writer thirty years

earlier.[305] Mr. Round communicated his discovery of this “unknown

charter of liberties” to the _English Historical Review_, in the pages

of which there ensued a discussion as to its nature and validity,

inaugurated by him. Three theories were suggested: (_a_) Mr. Round

maintained that the document was a copy, in a mangled form perhaps, of a

charter actually granted in the year 1213 by King John to the northern

barons, containing concessions which they had agreed to accept in

satisfaction of their claims.[306] (_b_) Mr. Prothero preferred to view

it, not as an actually executed charter, given and accepted in

settlement of the various claims in dispute, but rather as an abortive

proposal made by the King early in 1215 and rejected by the barons.[307]

(_c_) Mr. Hubert Hall dismissed the document as a forgery, and described

it as "a coronation charter attributed to John by a French scribe in the

second decade of the thirteenth century"—probably between November,

1216, and March, 1217, when King Philip desired to prove that John had

committed perjury by breaking his promises, and had thereby forfeited

his right to the Crown of England.[308]

-----

Footnote 304:

See the account given by Mr. Hubert Hall, _English Historical Review_,

IX. 326.

Footnote 305:

Alexandre Teulet, _Layettes du Trésor_, I. p. 423 (1863).

Footnote 306:

_Engl. Hist. Rev._, VIII. 288-294.

Footnote 307:

_Ibid._, IX. 117-121.

Footnote 308:

_Ibid._, IX. 326-335.

-----

Mr. Hall describes the method of procedure adopted by the compiler of

this supposed forgery. Placing in front of him copies of Henry I.’s

Charter of Liberties and of Henry III.’s charters issued in 1216-17, he

proceeded to select from these sources whatever suited his purpose, and

thereafter “either by design or carelessness, or ignorance of English

forms, he altered the wording of both his originals so as to produce the

effect of a paraphrase interspersed with archaisms.” This extremely

ingenious theory is not entirely convincing. Not to insist on the number

of unproved inferences on which it is based, it seems to have one grave

defect—it ignores the absurdity of attempting to obtain credence for

such a clumsy composition, especially when it was well known that John

had never granted a coronation charter at all. Even if a skilful forger

could have utilized the document as the basis for a completed charter,

this would still have required the impress of John’s great seal to give

it validity. Such an imposture could not be seriously intended to impose

on any one.

A fourth theory may be suggested very tentatively, namely, that the

document in question is a copy of the actual schedule drawn up by the

barons previous to 27th April, 1215. That such a schedule existed we

know from the express declaration of Roger of Wendover,[309] who informs

us that it was sent to the King with the demand that his seal should be

forthwith placed to it, under threat of civil war. From this, it is safe

to infer that the schedule, as it left the barons’ hands, was ready for

execution; but lack of experience in drawing up Crown charters would

prevent them from producing an entirely regular instrument. They would

assuredly take as their model the charter of Henry I., which had helped

to give definiteness of aim to all their efforts. It would be necessary,

however, to bring this up to date, by additions which we might _a

priori_ expect to resemble the provisions afterwards adopted with more

elaboration in the agreement made at Runnymede. This schedule, then,

rapidly thrown together, would be likely to contain many of the

characteristics actually discovered by Mr. Hall in the document under

discussion. Such an identification of the “unknown Charter of Liberties”

with the schedule of 27th April, 1215, would explain all the features

emphasized by Mr. Hall—the archaisms, the erroneous style, and the

employment, first of the third person singular, and then of the first

person singular, instead of using throughout the first person plural

invariably used by John. It would also explain why the first half of the

parchment on which the “unknown charter” is written, contains a copy of

Henry I.’s charter, and why the two possess so many features in common.

-----

Footnote 309:

R. Wendover, III. 298, and _cf. supra_, p. 40.

-----

It would clearly be inadvisable to found any conclusions upon the terms

of a document, the nature and authenticity of which form the subject of

so many rival theories; but even if further investigation proves it to

be a forgery, a forgery of contemporary date may throw light on

otherwise obscure passages in genuine charters. One or two instances of

this will be found in the sequel.

II. Previous Editions and Commentaries.

Every general history of England and almost every book which has ever

appeared on English law has had something to say by way of commentary on

Magna Carta. It is perhaps for this very reason that exceedingly few

treatises have been devoted exclusively to its elucidation. While

edition after edition of the text of the Charter, or of its re-issues,

have appeared, few of these have been accompanied by explanations

however brief. The paucity of attempts to explain the meaning of the

Charter is almost more remarkable than the frequency with which the text

has been reproduced. Magna Carta is a document often printed, but seldom

explained.

I. _Printed Editions of the Text of Magna Carta._ Previous to 1759 even

the best informed writers on English history laboured under much

confusion in regard to the various charters of liberties. Few of them

seem to have been aware that fundamental differences existed between the

original charter granted by John and the re-issues of Henry III. Much of

the blame for this confusion must be borne by Roger of Wendover, who, in

his account of the transactions at Runnymede, incorporated, in place of

John’s Charter, the text of the two charters granted by Henry.[310]

-----

Footnote 310:

R. Wendover, III. 302-318.

-----

The early historians were content to rely either on this version or on

that contained in the _Inspeximus_ of Edward I. Thus, in all early

printed collections of statutes, the text which professes to represent

the original Charter follows in reality the words of Henry’s third

re-issue. The very earliest printed edition of Magna Carta seems to have

been that published on 9th October, 1499, by Richard Pynson, the King’s

printer,[311] and a contemporary of Wynkyn de Worde. This was not, of

course, John’s Charter, but followed Edward’s _Inspeximus_ of Henry’s

Charter of 1225.

-----

Footnote 311:

This date is given by Bémont, _Chartes_, lxxi., but Robert Watt in his

_Bibliotheca Britannica_, Thomson, _Magna Charta_, 450, and Lowndes,

_Bibliographer’s Manual_, 1449, all give the date of the earliest

edition as 1514. Bémont, lxxi., and Thomson, 450–460, Watt, and

Lowndes furnish details of the various editions of Pynson, Redman,

Berthelet, Tottel, Marshe, and Wight, from 1499 to 1618. All of these

are now superseded by the _Statutes of the Realm_, published by the

Record Commission in 1810.

-----

Since the middle of the eighteenth century, many editions of the text of

John’s Great Charter have been published, either alone or along with the

text of the various re-issues of the reign of Henry III.; but it seems

unnecessary to mention more than four of these.

(1) In 1759 appeared Sir William Blackstone’s scholarly work entitled

_The Great Charter and The Charter of the Forest_, containing accurate

texts of all the important issues of the Charters of Liberties carefully

prepared from the original manuscripts so far as these were known to

him.[312]

-----

Footnote 312:

The substance of this admirable edition, now unhappily scarce, has

been reproduced in the same author’s _Tracts_ (1762).

-----

(2) In some respects the Record Commissioners have improved even on

Blackstone’s work in their edition of the _Statutes of the Realm_,

published in 1810. A special section of the volume is devoted to

Charters of Liberties, where not only the grants of John and Henry III.,

but also the charters which led up to them, and their subsequent

confirmations, have received exhaustive treatment.

(3) A carefully revised text, _Magna Carta regis Johannis_, was

published by Dr. Stubbs in 1868; and the various charters are also to be

found, arranged in chronological order, in his well-known volume, first

published in 1870, entitled _Select Charters and other illustrations of_

_English Constitutional History_, a convenient collection easily

accessible to all students of law and history.

(4) For the continuous study of the sequence of charters, the best book

of reference is _Chartes de Libertés Anglaises_ by M. Charles Bémont

published in 1892, in the pages of which the various editions of John’s

and Henry’s charters will be found in a form convenient for comparison

with each other, and with previous and succeeding documents.

II. _Commentaries and Treatises._ It is doubtful whether any good

purpose would be served by the preparation of a list of all the books

which contain casual references to Magna Carta or to its provisions; and

it is clear that the task would be an extremely burdensome one. There is

no difficulty, however, in naming the few treatises of outstanding merit

which have been exclusively or mainly devoted to the exposition of the

Great Charter. Of these only nine require special mention.

(1) The mysterious medieval lawbook known as the _Mirror of Justices_

contains a chapter upon Magna Carta which has some claims to rank as a

commentary, although it represents the opinions of a political

pamphleteer rather than those of an unbiassed judge. The date of this

treatise is still the subject of dispute. It has been usual to place it

not earlier than the years 1307-27, mainly because it makes mention of

“Edward II.” Prof. Maitland, however, dates it earlier, maintaining on

general grounds that it was “written very soon after 1285, and probably

before 1290.”[313] He explains the reference to “Edward II.” as applying

to the monarch now generally known in England as Edward I., but

sometimes in his own reign known as Edward II., to distinguish him from

an earlier Edward, still enshrined in the popular imagination, namely,

Edward Confessor. Mr. Maitland is not disposed to treat this work of an

unknown author too seriously, and warns students against “his ignorance,

political bias, and deliberate lies.”[314]

-----

Footnote 313:

See _The Mirror of Justices_ (edited for the Selden Society by Prof.

Maitland), _Introd._, xxiii. to xxiv.

Footnote 314:

_Ibid._, xxxvii. _Cf._ xlviii.

(2) Dismissing the _Mirror_, then, as a dangerous and possibly

disingenuous guide, the earliest serious commentary known to exist is

that of Sir Edward Coke, formerly Lord Chief Justice. This elaborate

treatise, forming the second of Coke’s four _Institutes_, was published

in 1642 under direction of the Long Parliament, the House of Commons

having given the order on 12th May, 1641.[315]

-----

Footnote 315:

See _Dictionary of National Biography_, XI. 243.

-----

Although this commentary, like everything written by Coke, was long

accepted as a work of great value, its method is in reality entirely

uncritical and unhistorical. The great lawyer reads into Magna Carta the

entire body of the common law of the seventeenth century of which he was

admittedly a master. He seems almost unconscious of the great changes

accomplished by the experience and vicissitudes of the four eventful

centuries which had elapsed since the Charter had been originally

granted. The various clauses of Magna Carta are thus merely occasions

for expounding the law as it stood, not at the beginning of the

thirteenth century, but in his own day. In the skilful hands of Sir

Edward, the Great Charter is made to attack the abuses of James or

Charles, rather than those of John or Henry, which its framers had in

view. In expounding the _judicium parium_, for example, he carefully

explains many minute details of procedure before the Court of the Lord

High Steward, and describes elaborately the nature of the warrants to be

issued prior to the arrest of any one by the Crown; while, in the clause

of Henry’s Charter which secures an open door to foreign merchants in

England “unless publicly prohibited,” he discovers a declaration that

Parliament shall have the sole power to issue such prohibitions,

forgetful that the regulation of trade was an exclusive prerogative of

the Crown with which Parliament had no right to interfere for many

centuries subsequent to the reign of Henry III.

(3) In 1680 Mr. Edward Cooke, barrister, published a small volume

entitled _Magna Charta made in the ninth year of King Henry III. and

confirmed by King Edward I. in the twenty-eighth year of his reign_.

This contained a translation of Henry’s Magna Carta with short

explanatory notes founded mainly on the commentary of Sir Edward Coke.

In his Preface, Mr. Cooke declared that his object was to make the Great

Charter more accessible to the public at large, since, as he said, “I am

confident, scarce one of a hundred of the common people, know what it

is.”

(4) Sir William Blackstone’s _Introduction_ to his edition of the

charters, published in 1759, as already mentioned, contains valuable

information as to the documents he edits; but he explicitly disclaims

all intention of writing a Commentary. He is careful to state “that it

is not in his present intention, nor (he fears) within the reach of his

abilities, to give a full and explanatory comment on the matters

contained in these charters.”[316]

-----

Footnote 316:

Introduction, p. ii.

-----

(5) The Hon. Daines Barrington published in 1766 his _Observations upon

the Statutes from Magna Charta to 21 James I._ This book contains some

notes on the Charter also founded chiefly upon Coke’s _Second

Institute_; his original contributions are not of outstanding value.

(6) In 1772 Prof. Francis Stoughton Sullivan gave to the public his

course of lectures previously delivered in the University of Dublin

under the title _An Historical Treatise on the Feudal Law, with a

Commentary on Magna Charta_. The author’s own words give a sufficiently

accurate conception of its scope and value: “I shall therefore proceed

briefly to speak to _Magna Charta_, and in so doing shall omit almost

all that relates to the feudal tenures, which makes the greatest part of

it, and confine myself to that which is now law.”[317]

-----

Footnote 317:

See p. 375 of the work cited.

-----

(7) Mr. John Reeves’ invaluable _History of English Law_, the first

edition of which appeared in 1783-84, marked the commencement of a new

epoch in the scientific study of the genesis of English law. Treating

incidentally of Magna Carta, he shows wonderful insight into the real

purport of many of its provisions, but the state of historical knowledge

when he wrote rendered many serious errors inevitable.

(8) In 1829, Mr. Richard Thomson published an elaborate edition of the

charters combined with a commentary which contains much useful

information, but makes no serious attempt to supplement the unhistorical

explanations of Sir Edward Coke by the results of more recent

investigations in the provinces of law and history. His work is a

storehouse of information which must, however, be used with caution.

(9) In many respects, the most valuable contribution yet made to the

elucidation of the Great Charter is that contained in M. Charles

Bémont’s preface to his _Chartes des Libertés Anglaises_, published in

1892. Although he has subjected himself to the severe restraints imposed

by the slender size of his volume and by a rigid desire to state only

facts of an undisputed nature, leaving theories strictly alone; he has,

nevertheless, done much to help forward the study of the charters. In

particular he has performed an important service by insisting upon the

close mutual connection between the various Charters of Liberties, from

that of Henry I. down to the confirmations of Edward I., and of

subsequent kings. It is doubtful, however, whether by this very

insistence upon the gradual process of development which may be traced

in this long series, he does not lay himself open to the misconception

that he takes too narrow a view of the scope and relations of the

Charter. Magna Carta’s points of contact with the past and future

history of English liberties and English laws and institutions must not

be narrowed down to those occurring in one straight line. Its

antecedents must not be looked for exclusively among documents couched

in the form of charters, nor its results merely in their subsequent

confirmations. It is impossible to understand it aright, except in close

relation to all the varied aspects of the national life and the national

development. Every Act appearing on the Statute Rolls is, in a sense, an

Act amending Magna Carta; while such enactments as the Statute of

Marlborough and the Statute of Westminster I. have as intimate a

connection with John’s Great Charter as the _Confirmatio Cartarum_ or

the _Articuli super Cartas_ have. This is a truth which M. Bémont

undoubtedly recognizes, though the scheme of his book led him rather to

emphasize another and, at first sight, contradictory aspect of his

subject. His object was not to explain the numerous ways in which the

Charters of Liberties are entwined with the whole of English history,

but merely to furnish a basis for the accurate study of one of their

most important features. His book is indispensable, but is not intended

to form, in any sense, a commentary on Magna Carta.

It would thus appear that only two serious attempts have been made to

produce treatises forming, explicitly and exclusively, commentaries on

the Great Charter, namely the _Second Institute_ of Coke and the

laborious and useful work of Mr. Richard Thomson. Since Mr. Thomson’s

_Magna Charta_ appeared, three-quarters of a century have passed,

marking an enormous advance in historical and legal science; yet the

results of modern research, so capable of throwing light on the

subject-matter of the Great Charter, have never been systematically

brought to bear upon it. Dr. Stubbs, from whom such a work would have

been especially welcome, contented himself with giving a paraphrase or

abstract of the Charter, rendering into English equivalents as literally

as possible the actual words of his Latin text—a cautious course, which

cannot lead his disciples astray, but leaves them to the guidance of

their own ignorance rather than of his knowledge. The reason given by

Dr. Stubbs for keeping silence is rather the excess than the absence of

information. “The whole of the constitutional history of England,” he

tells us, “is little more than a commentary on Magna Carta.”[318] It is

for this reason, presumably, that he refrains from all explanations and

confines himself to an abstract of its main provisions. While thus many

invaluable hints may be obtained from the pages of the three volumes of

his history, and from his other works, Dr. Stubbs has not in any of his

published writings contributed anything of the nature of a direct

commentary upon John’s Great Charter. In this policy, he has been

followed by the members of the great modern school of English historians

of which he is the founder.[319]

-----

Footnote 318:

See _Const. Hist._, I. 572, and cf. _Select Charters_, 296.

Footnote 319:

One of the most brilliant members of that school, Mr. Prothero, whose

power of rendering difficult subjects both lucid and interesting would

specially have qualified him for the task of explaining Magna Carta,

declines the task partly upon the ground that it would be impossible

"to throw any new light on a subject exhausted by the ablest

writers."—_S. de Montfort_, p. 14.

-----

Many valuable hints may be obtained from other writers such as Dr.

Gneist, Sir Edward Creasy, Mr. Taswell Langmead, Dr. Hannis Taylor, Miss

Norgate, and Sir James Ramsay,[320] but their efforts to explain the

meaning of the Great Charter take the form of disconnected notes, rather

than of exhaustive commentaries.[321]

-----

Footnote 320:

The works of these and other authors are mentioned in the Appendix.

Footnote 321:

It is unnecessary to do more than mention _A Historical Treatise on

Magna Charta_ by Mr. Boyd C. Barrington, of the Philadelphia Bar

(1899), of which the author says (p. ii.): “No claim is made for

originality, but solely for research, which has been exhaustive in

every line I can pursue.” It is dismissed by his distinguished

fellow-countryman, Dr. Gross (_Sources and Literature of English

History_, p. 348), as “of little value.”

-----

TEXT, TRANSLATION, AND COMMENTARY.

MAGNA CARTA.

PREAMBLE.[322]

Johannes Dei gratia rex Anglie, dominus Hibernie, dux Normannie et

Aquitannie, et comes Andegavie, archiepiscopis, episcopis, abbatibus,

comitibus, baronibus, justiciariis, forestariis, vicecomitibus,

prepositis, ministris et omnibus ballivis et fidelibus suis salutem.

Sciatis nos intuitu Dei et pro salute anime nostre et omnium

antecessorum et heredum nostrorum, ad honorem Dei et exaltationem sancte

Ecclesie, et emendacionem regni nostri, per consilium venerabilium

patrum nostrorum, Stephani Cantuariensis archiepiscopi tocius Anglie

primatis et sancte Romane ecclesie cardinalis, Henrici Dublinensis

archiepiscopi, Willelmi Londoniensis, Petri Wintoniensis, Joscelini

Bathoniensis et Glastoniensis, Hugonis Lincolniensis, Walteri

Wygorniensis, Willelmi Coventriensis, et Benedicti Roffensis

episcoporum; magistri Pandulfi domini pape subdiaconi et familiaris,

fratris Aymerici magistri milicie Templi in Anglia; et nobilium virorum

Willelmi Mariscalli comitis Penbrocie, Willelmi comitis Sarresburie,

Willelmi comitis Warennie, Willelmi comitis Arundellie, Alani de

Galeweya constabularii Scocie, Warini filii Geroldi, Petri filii

Hereberti, Huberti de Burgo senescalli Pictavie, Hugonis de Nevilla,

Mathei filii Hereberti, Thome Basset, Alani Basset, Philippi de

Albiniaco, Roberti de Roppeleia, Johannis Mariscalli, Johannis filii

Hugonis et aliorum fidelium nostrorum.

-----

Footnote 322:

The division of Magna Carta into a preamble and sixty-three chapters

is a modern device, for convenience of reference, for which there is

no warrant in the Charter itself. Cf. _supra_, 200. No title or

heading precedes the substance of the deed in any one of the four

known originals, but on the back of the Lincoln one (cf. _supra_, 197)

these words are endorsed;—“_Concordia inter Regem Johannem et Barones

pro concessione libertatum ecclesie et regni Anglie_.” The form of the

document is discussed _supra_, 123-9. The text is taken from that

issued by the Trustees of the British Museum founded on the Cottonian

version No. 2. Cf. _supra_, 196.

John, by the grace of God, king of England, lord of Ireland, duke of

Normandy and Aquitaine, and count of Anjou, to the archbishops,

bishops, abbots, earls, barons, justiciars, foresters, sheriffs,

stewards, servants, and to all his bailiffs and liege subjects,

greeting. Know that, looking to God and for the salvation of our soul,

and those of all our ancestors and heirs, and unto the honour of God

and the advancement of holy Church, and for the reform of our realm,

[we have granted as underwritten][323] by advice of our venerable

fathers, Stephen, archbishop of Canterbury, primate of all England and

cardinal of the holy Roman Church, Henry archbishop of Dublin, William

of London, Peter of Winchester, Jocelyn of Bath and Glastonbury, Hugh

of Lincoln, Walter of Worcester, William of Coventry, Benedict of

Rochester, bishops; of master Pandulf, subdeacon and member of the

household of our lord the Pope, of brother Aymeric (master of the

Knights of the Temple in England), and of the illustrious men,[324]

William Marshall, earl of Pembroke, William, earl of Salisbury,

William, earl Warenne, William, earl of Arundel, Alan of Galloway,

(constable of Scotland), Waren Fitz Gerald, Peter Fitz Herbert, Hubert

de Burgh (seneschal of Poitou), Hugh de Neville, Matthew Fitz Herbert,

Thomas Basset, Alan Basset, Philip of Albini, Robert of Ropesle, John

Marshall, John Fitz Hugh, and others, our liegemen.

-----

Footnote 323:

The sentence is concluded in chapter one (see _infra_)—the usual

division, here followed, being a purely arbitrary one.

Footnote 324:

The phrase “_nobiles viri_” was not used here in any technical sense;

the modern conception of a distinct class of “noblemen” did not take

shape until long after 1215. Cf. what is said of “peerage” under cc.

14 and 39.

-----

The Great Charter of John opens, in the form common to all royal

charters of the period, with a greeting from the sovereign to his

magnates, his officials, and his faithful subjects, and announces, in

the pious legal formula used by impious and pious kings alike, that he

had made certain grants by the advice of those counsellors whom he

names. Three features of this preamble call for comment.

I. _The King’s Title._ Some points of interest are suggested by the form

of the royal style adopted by John, which is connected by an unbroken

thread of development with that of William I. on the one hand, and of

His Majesty, Edward VII., on the other. John’s assumption of the royal

plural “_Sciatis Nos_” reads, in the light of subsequent history, as a

tribute to his arrogance rather than to his greatness, when compared

with the humbler first person singular consistently used by his more

distinguished father. In this particular, however, Richard, not John,

had been the innovator on the usage of Henry II.[325] For a further

alteration in the royal style John was alone responsible. To the titles

borne by his father and brother, John invariably added that of “lord of

Ireland,” a reminiscence of his youth. When the wide territories of

Henry II., had been distributed among his elder sons, the young John

(hence known as “John Lackland”) was left without a heritage, until his

father bestowed on him the island of Ireland, recently appropriated; and

this brought with it the right to style himself “_dominus Hibernie_.”

This title of his younger days was not unnaturally retained by him after

he had outlived all his brothers and inherited their wide lands and

honours.

-----

Footnote 325:

Coke (_Second Institute_, pp. 1-2) is here in error; he makes John the

innovator.

-----

John began his reign in 1199 as ruler over the undivided possessions of

the House of Anjou at their widest stretch, extending without a break,

other than the waters of the Channel, from the Cheviots to the Pyrenees.

These lands were held by John, as by his father, under a variety of

titles and conditions. Anjou, the original home and fief of the

hot-blooded Plantagenet race, still carried with it only the modest rank

of count. In addition to this paternal title, Henry II. had, at an early

age, become duke of Normandy in his mother’s right, and thereafter duke

of Aquitaine by marriage with Eleanor, its heiress. These three great

fiefs were held by Henry and his sons under the king of France as their

lord paramount. Long before 1215, John’s bad fortune or incompetence had

lost to him these wide continental dominions except the most distant of

them all, his mother’s dowry of Aquitaine. His ancestral domains of

Anjou and Normandy had been irretrievably lost, but he still retained

their empty titles; and in this his son Henry III. followed him,

grasping the shadow long after the substance had fled. Entries relating

to Gascony frequently appear on the Rolls of Parliament of Edward I.;

and the kings of England were styled dukes of Aquitaine, dukes of

Guienne, or dukes of Gascony (the three descriptions being used

indifferently) until Edward III. merged all these titles in a wider one,

when he claimed the throne of France.

England alone, of John’s possessions, real and nominal, was held by the

higher style of “_Rex_,” implying strictly sovereign rule, independent

of any overlord, and retained by John in 1215 in spite of his recent

acceptance of Innocent III. as feudal overlord. Of Ireland, John was

still content to describe himself, as formerly, “lord,” not king. The

exact meaning of the word “_Dominus_” in medieval charters, particularly

in those of Stephen, has been made the subject of much learned

controversy; which has not yet resulted in a consensus of opinion as to

the technical meaning, if any, borne by the word.[326] “_Dominus_,”

indeed, seems to have been loosely used wherever something of substance

or of ceremonial was lacking from the full sovereignty implied in the

more specific name of king. In this connection much stress was laid on

the solemn sacrament of coronation, implying among other things formal

consecration by the church.[327]

Footnote 326:

Various theories will be found in Round’s _Geoffrey de Mandeville_,

70; Dr. Rüssler’s _Matilde_, 291–4; and Ramsay’s _Foundations of

England_, II. 403.

Footnote 327:

Cf. _supra_, p. 119.

-----

John’s connection with England, then, is expressed in two simple words,

“_Rex Anglie_,” no explanation being vouchsafed of how he had acquired

this title. Such vindication, indeed, was not called for, as this was no

coronation charter, John having already reigned for fifteen years

without any serious rival—the claims of Arthur, the son of his elder

brother Geoffrey, never having been taken seriously in England.[328] The

simple words, “_Dei gratia rex Anglie_,” may be contrasted with the

detailed titles set out in the coronation charters of Henry I. and

Stephen respectively. Henry I. in 1100 had emphasized his relationship

to preceding kings, describing himself as “_Filius Willelmi regis post

obitum fratris sui Willelmi, Dei gracia rex Anglorum_”;[329] while

Stephen in April, 1136, in his second and more deliberate charter, used

an entirely different formula, “_Dei gracia assensu cleri et populi in

regem Anglie electus, et a Willelmo Cantuarensi archiepiscopo et sancte

Romane ecclesie legato consecratus, et ab Innocentio sancte Romane sedis

pontifice postmodum confirmatus_,”[330] the laboured nature of which

betrays the consciousness of weakness.

-----

Footnote 328:

Geoffrey’s daughter Eleanor was in 1215, a prisoner in Corfe Castle.

See _infra_, c. 59.

Footnote 329:

See Appendix.

Footnote 330:

See Appendix.

-----

Thus Henry I. and Stephen each laid stress on the strong points of his

title and ignored its defects. These two claims of kingship express, in

a crude form, two rival theories of the title to the English Crown—(1)

hereditary succession, and (2) election. Neither of these is an accurate

reflection of the full theory and practice of the twelfth century, which

blended both principles in proportions not easy to define with accuracy.

Professor Freeman has pushed to excess the supposed right of the

Witenagemot to elect the king, and has transferred wholesale to the

Norman _Curia_ (which, in some respects, took its place) all the powers

enjoyed by its forerunner. A recent German writer, Dr. Oskar

Rössler,[331] has gone equally far in the opposite direction, flatly

denying that the Normans ever admitted the elective element at all. The

theory now usually held is a mean between these extremes, namely that

the Norman _Curia_ (or the chief magnates who usually composed it) had a

limited right of selecting among the sons, brothers, or near relations

of the last king, the individual best suited to succeed him. Such a

right, never authoritatively enunciated, gradually sank to an empty

formality. Its place was taken, to some extent, by the successful

assertion by the spiritual power (usually represented by the archbishop

of Canterbury), of a claim to give or withhold the consecrating oil

which accompanied the church’s blessing. Without this no _dominus_ could

be recognized as _rex_. On this theory the descriptions of their own

titles given by Henry I. and Stephen were alike incomplete: each ignored

the facts which did not suit him. John, on the contrary, secure in

possession, condescends on no particulars, but contents himself with the

terse assertion of the fact of his kingship: “_Johannes, dei gratia, Rex

Anglie_.”

-----

Footnote 331:

_Matilde_, _passim_.

-----

II. _The Names of the Consenting Nobles._ It was natural that the

Charter should place formally on record the assent of those counsellors

who attended John when he made terms with his enemies, of those magnates

who remained in at least nominal allegiance, and were therefore capable

of acting as the mediators by whose good offices peace was for a time

restored.[332] The leading men in England during this crisis may be

arranged in three groups: (1) the leaders of the great host openly

opposed to John at Runnymede; (2) the agents of John’s oppressions,

extreme men, mostly aliens, many of whom were in command of royal

castles or of mercenary levies ready to take the field; and (3) moderate

men, mostly churchmen or John’s ministers or relations, who, whatever

their sympathies might be, remained in allegiance to the king and helped

to arrange terms of peace—a comparatively small band, as the paucity of

names recited in Magna Carta testifies.[333] The men, here made

consenters to John’s grant of Magna Carta, are again referred to, though

not by name, in chapter 63, in the character of witnesses.

-----

Footnote 332:

Dr. Stubbs, _Const. Hist._, I. 582, gives the motive of thus naming

them as “the hope of binding the persons whom it includes to the

continued support of the hard-won liberties.” Those named were all

moderate men. M. Paris (_Chron. Maj._ II., 589) describes them as

“_quasi ex parte regis_,” while Ralph of Coggeshall (p. 172) narrates

how “by the intervention of the Archbishop of Canterbury, with a few

of his bishops and some barons, a kind of peace was made.” Cf. _Annals

of Dunstable_, III. 43. The neutrality of the prelates is proved by

other evidence. (_a_) C. 62 gave them authority to certify by letters

testimonial the correctness of copies of the Charter. (_b_) The 25th

of the Articles of the Barons left to their decision whether John

should enjoy a crusader’s privileges; while c. 55 gave Langton a

special place in determining what fines were unjust. (_c_) The Tower

of London was placed in the custody of the archbishop as a neutral man

whom both sides could trust. (_d_) Copies are preserved of two

protests on different subjects by the prelates in favour of the king.

See Appendix.

Footnote 333:

Cf. _supra_, 43–4, and for biographical information see authorities

there cited.

-----

III. _The Reasons of the Grant._ The preamble contains also a statement

of what purport to be John’s reasons for conceding the Charter. These

are quaintly paraphrased by Coke:[334] "Here be four notable causes of

the making of this great charter rehearsed. 1. The honour of God. 2. For

the health of the King’s soul. 3. For the exaltation of holy church, and

fourthly, for the amendment of the Kingdom." The real reason must be

sought in another direction, namely, in the army of the rebels; and John

in after days did not scruple to plead consent given under threat of

violence, as a reason for voiding his grant. The technical legal

“consideration,” the _quid pro quo_ which John received as the price of

this confirmation of their liberties was the renewal by his opponents of

the homage and fealty which they had solemnly renounced. This

“consideration” was not stated in the charter, but the fact was known to

all.[335]

-----

Footnote 334:

_Second Institute_, 1, n.

Footnote 335:

Cf. _supra_, 41.

-----

CHAPTER ONE.

In primis concessisse Deo et hac presenti carta nostra confirmasse, pro

nobis et heredibus nostris in perpetuum, quod Anglicana ecclesia libera

sit, et habeat jura sua integra, et libertates suas illesas; et ita

volumus observari; quod apparet ex eo quod libertatem electionum, que

maxima et magis necessaria reputatur ecclesie Anglicane, mera et

spontanea voluntate, ante discordiam inter nos et barones nostros motam,

concessimus et carta nostra confirmavimus, et eam obtinuimus a domino

papa Innocencio tercio confirmari; quam et nos observabimus et ab

heredibus nostris in perpetuum bona fide volumus observari.[336]

Concessimus eciam omnibus liberis hominibus regni nostri, pro nobis et

heredibus nostris in perpetuum, omnes libertates subscriptas, habendas

et tenendas eis et heredibus suis, de nobis et heredibus nostris.

-----

Footnote 336:

Some editions of the Charter place here the division between c. 1 and

c. 2.

In the first place we have granted to God, and by this our present

charter confirmed for us and our heirs for ever that the English

church shall be free, and shall have her rights entire, and her

liberties inviolate; and we will that it be thus observed; which is

apparent from this that the freedom of elections, which is reckoned

most important and very essential to the English church, we, of our

pure and unconstrained will, did grant, and did by our charter confirm

and did obtain the ratification of the same from our lord, Pope

Innocent III., before the quarrel arose between us and our barons, and

this we will observe, and our will is that it be observed in good

faith by our heirs for ever. We have also granted to all freemen of

our kingdom, for us and our heirs forever, all the underwritten

liberties, to be had and held by them and their heirs, of us and our

heirs forever.

This first of the sixty-three chapters of Magna Carta here places side

by side, bracketed equal as it were, (_a_) a general confirmation of the

privileges of the English national church, and (_b_) a declaration that

the various civil rights to be afterwards specified in detail were

granted “to all freemen” of the kingdom and to their heirs for ever. The

manner of this juxtaposition of the church’s rights with the lay rights

of freemen, suggests an intention to make it clear that neither group

was to be treated as of more importance than the other. If the civil and

political rights of the nation at large occupy the bulk of the Charter,

and are defined in their minutest details, the church’s rights, of which

no mention whatever had been made in the Articles of the Barons, receive

here a prior place.[337] A twofold division thus suggests itself.

-----

Footnote 337:

Cf. _supra_, p. 50.

-----

I. _The rights of the National Church._ A general promise that the

English church should be free was accompanied by a special confirmation

of the separate charter recently granted guaranteeing freedom of

canonical election. (1) _Quod Anglicana ecclesia libera sit._ This

emphatic, if vague declaration, which has no counterpart in the Articles

of the Barons, is repeated twice in Magna Carta, each time in a

prominent position, at the beginning and the end respectively. If the

work of the barons showed no special tenderness for churchmen’s

privileges, Stephen Langton and his bishops were careful to have that

defect remedied in the formal document by which John expressed his final

consent. In extorting this promise of a “free” English church, the

prelates seem to have been satisfied that they need ask for nothing

more; the other particulars in which the Charter differs from its draft

show no trace of clerical bias. The phrase used, indeed, was deplorably

vague and elastic; it scarcely needed stretching to cover the widest

encroachments of clerical arrogance. Yet the formula was by no means a

new one; Henry I. and Stephen had successively confirmed the claim of

holy church to its freedom.[338]

-----

Footnote 338:

See these charters in Appendix.

Henry II. was careful to avoid making any such promises: his whole reign

was an effort, not unsuccessful in spite of the terrible disadvantage at

which he was placed by the murder of Becket, to deprive the church of

what her leaders considered her legitimate “freedom.” John in 1215,

however, receded from the ground occupied by his father, confirming by

the Great Charter the promise given by the weakest of his Norman

predecessors, in a phrase repeated in all subsequent confirmations.

It by no means follows that “freedom of the church,” as promised by

Stephen, meant exactly the same thing as “freedom of the church”

promised by John and his successors.[339] The value to be attached to

such assurances varied in inverse ratio to the strength of the kings who

made them, and this is well illustrated by a comparison of the charters

of Henry I., Stephen, and John. Henry qualifies the phrase by words

which illustrate if they do not limit its application. God’s holy church

was to be free “_so that_ I shall neither sell nor let to farm, nor on

the death of archbishop, bishop, or abbot, accept anything from the

demesne of the church or from its tenants, until his successor has

entered into possession.”[340] This suggests a somewhat narrow

interpretation of the church’s freedom—exemption mainly from the

iniquities of Rufus. Stephen’s charter, on the contrary, explains or

supplements the same phrase by definite declarations that the bishops

should have sole jurisdiction over churchmen and their goods, and that

all rights of wardship over church lands were renounced, thus making it

a “large and dangerous promise.”[341]

-----

Footnote 339:

It is perhaps worthy of note that while the charters of Henry I. and

Stephen spoke only of “holy church,” John speaks of the “English

church.” This change suggests a growth of patriotism among the

prelates, led by Stephen Langton.

Footnote 340:

Cf. _supra_, 117.

Footnote 341:

Cf. Pollock and Maitland, I. 74.

“Freedom of the church” had thus come in 1136 to include “benefit of

clergy” in a specially sweeping form, and much besides.[342] It is easy

to understand why churchmen cherished an elastic phrase which, wide as

were the privileges it already covered, might readily be stretched

wider. Laymen, on the contrary, contended for a more restrictive

meaning; and the Constitutions of Clarendon must be viewed primarily as

an attempt to arrive at definite conclusions on disputed points of

interpretation. Henry II. substantially held his ground, in spite of his

nominal surrender after Becket’s murder. Thanks to his firmness, "the

church’s freedom" shrank to more reasonable proportions, so that the

well-known formula, when repeated by John, was emptied of much of the

content found in it by Stephen’s bishops. If it still implied “benefit

of clergy” that phrase was now read in a more restricted sense, while

wardship over vacant sees was expressly reserved to the Crown by John.

Chapter 18 of Magna Carta accepted, apparently with the approval of all

classes, the principle that questions of church patronage (assizes of

darrein presentment)[343] should be settled before the King’s Justices,

a concession to the civil power inconsistent with the more extreme

interpretations formerly put by churchmen on the phrase.[344]

-----

Footnote 342:

Cf. _supra_, 120–1.

Footnote 343:

For explanation see _infra_, c. 18.

Footnote 344:

On the other hand c. 22, which lays down special rules for the

amercement of beneficed clerks, to that extent confirmed class

privileges of the clergy.

-----

In later reigns the pretensions of the church to privileged treatment

were gradually reduced to narrow bounds, and the process of compression

was facilitated by that very elasticity on which the clergy had relied

as being favourable to the expansion of their claims. It was the civil

government which benefited in the end from the vagueness of the words in

which Magna Carta declared _quod Anglicana ecclesia libera sit_.[345]

-----

Footnote 345:

Mr. J. H. Round (_Geoffrey de Mandeville_, 3), speaking of Stephen’s

“oath” to restore the church her “liberty,” describes this as “a

phrase the meaning of which is well known.” If “well” known, it was

known chiefly as something vague, something which baffled definition,

because churchmen and laymen could never agree as to its contents,

while it tended also to vary from reign to reign. Mr. Round attempts

no definition. Sir James Ramsay (_Angevin Empire_, p. 475), writing of

the phrase as used in John’s Charter, is less prudent. "It would

relieve the clergy of all lay control, and of all liability to

contribute to the needs of the State beyond the occasional scutages

due from the higher clergy for their knights’ fees." This definition

assuredly would not have satisfied Henry I., as a legitimate

interpretation of the words as used by him in his Charter of

Liberties.

(2) _Canonical election._ A separate charter to the national church had

been granted on 21st November, 1214, and re-issued on 15th January,

1215.[346] Its tenor may be given in three words, “freedom of election.”

In all cathedral and conventual churches and monasteries, the

appointment of prelates was to be free from royal intervention for the

future, provided always that licence to fill the vacancy had first been

asked of the king. Now, _in words_, this was no new concession, but

merely a confirmation of the Concordat arrived at long before between

Henry I. and archbishop Anselm as a solution of the rival claims of

Church and State in the election of bishops and abbots.[347] The essence

of that arrangement had been to vest solely in the canons of the chapter

of the vacant diocese the nominal right to appoint the new bishop,

subject, however, to the actual election taking place in the royal court

or chapel—so that the king, being present, might endeavour to prevent

the appointment of any churchman he objected to. The result had not been

what Anselm and the papal court expected; Henry I. and his successors

strenuously used or abused the influence thus reserved to them: none but

royal favourites were ever appointed, and the nominally free canonical

election became a sham. Churchmen had long desired to remedy this:

Langton saw his opportunity, and on 21st November, 1214, secured from

King John, so far as mere words could secure anything, that the right of

election by the canons of the chapter should henceforth be transformed

from a pretence into a reality. The bishops present at Runnymede used

their influence to have a distinct confirmation of this recent

concession inserted in the very forefront of Magna Carta.

-----

Footnote 346:

Cf. _supra_, p. 39. The text will be found in _Statutes of the Realm_,

I. 5, and in _New Rymer_, I. 126-7. It was confirmed by Innocent on

30th March, 1215. See Potthast, _Regesta pontificum romanorum_, No.

4963.

Footnote 347:

Cf. _supra_, p. 22.

-----

Their forethought was insufficient permanently to prevent royal

influence from bending canonical election to its will. Henry III.,

indeed, in his reissues was made to repeat the phrase _quod Anglicana

ecclesia libera sit_, but omitted all reference alike to canonical

election and to the charters of 21st November, 1214, and 15th January,

1215. Later in his reign, he took advantage of this, with the Pope’s

connivance or support, to reduce again the rights of cathedral chapters

in the appointment of bishops to the sinecure they had been before.

It is true that Henry III. was prone, alike by nature and from policy,

to lean on the papal arm, and that the _Curia_ at Rome rather than the

_Curia Regis_ for a time dominated the appointment to vacant sees. Henry

and Innocent IV. indeed formed a tacit alliance for dividing all fat

livings among their respective creatures, king’s men or pope’s men, who

had little interest in England or its welfare. Edward I., impatient of

foreign dictation as he was, had to submit to a partial continuance of

“provisions” for hangers-on of the papacy in his insular domains; but

the national church had little to gain. The canons elected the nominee

of king or pope, as each was, for the moment, in the ascendant.[348]

-----

Footnote 348:

Cf _supra_, p. 167.

-----

An interesting, if purely academic, question might be raised as to how

far the rights guaranteed by Magna Carta to the English church were

meant to imply freedom from papal as well as from royal interference. It

is clear that the movement which culminated in the charter of 21st

November, 1214, originated in England, not at Rome; and apparently

Nicholas, the papal legate at that date, opposed the endeavours of

Stephen Langton to obtain it. The archbishop indeed looked upon the

legate as the chief obstacle to the reform by the king of the grievances

of the national church.[349] In spite of Magna Carta, then, the

independence of the national church retrograded, rather than advanced,

during the long alliance between Henry III. and the successive occupants

of the papal throne.[350]

-----

Footnote 349:

See Miss Norgate, _John Lackland_, p. 208, and authorities there

cited.

Footnote 350:

Cf. Prothero, _Simon de Montfort_, p. 152. “The English church was

indeed less independent of the king in 1258 than in 1215, and far less

independent of the Pope than in the days of Becket.”

-----

II. _Civil and Political Rights._ After providing thus briefly for the

church, chapter one proceeds to give equal prominence, but at greater

length, to the grant or confirmation of secular customs and liberties.

This takes here the form of a general enacting clause, leaving details

to be specified in the remaining sixty-two chapters of the Charter. Some

of the more important points involved have already been discussed in the

Historical Introduction—for example, the feudal form of the grant,

better suited, according to modern ideas, to the conveyance of a

specific piece of land, than to the securing of the political and civil

liberties of a mighty nation; and the vexed question as to what classes

of Englishmen were intended, under the description of “freemen,” to

participate in these rights.[351]

-----

Footnote 351:

See _supra_, pp. 128-9 and 141-2. For the meaning of “freeman” and

Coke’s inclusion of villeins under that term for some purposes but not

for others, see _infra_, cc. 20 and 39.

-----

Another interesting point, though of minor importance, calls for

separate treatment. John does not state that his grants of civil and

political rights had been made spontaneously. Whether deliberately or

not, there is here a marked distinction between the phraseology applied

to secular and to ecclesiastical rights respectively. While the

concessions to churchmen are said to have been granted “_mera et

spontanea voluntate_,” no such statement is made about the concessions

to the freemen. John may have favoured this omission as strengthening

his contention that the Great Charter had been sealed by him under

compulsion. In the third re-issue of Henry III. (1225) this defect was

remedied—the words “_spontanea et bona voluntate nostra_” being used in

its preamble.[352] Some importance seems to have been attributed to this

addition, which formed the essence of a concession bought by the

surrender of one-fifteenth of the moveable property of all estates of

the realm.

-----

Footnote 352:

Cf. _supra_, p. 181.

-----

CHAPTER TWO.

Si quis comitum vel baronum nostrorum, sive aliorum tenencium de nobis

in capite per servicium militare, mortuus fuerit, et cum decesserit

heres suus plene etatis fuerit et relevium debeat, habeat hereditatem

suam per antiquum relevium; scilicet heres vel heredes comitis de

baronia comitis integra per centum libras; heres vel heredes baronis de

baronia integra per centum libras; heres vel heredes militis de feodo

militis integro per centum solidos ad plus; et qui minus debuerit minus

det secundum antiquam consuetudinem feodorum.

If any of our earls or barons, or others holding of us in chief by

military service shall have died, and at the time of his death his

heir shall be of full age and owe “relief,” he shall have his

inheritance on payment of the ancient relief, namely the heir or heirs

of an earl, £100 for a whole earl’s barony; the heir or heirs of a

baron, £100 for a whole barony; the heir or heirs of a knight, 100s.

at most for a whole knight’s fee; and whoever owes less let him give

less, according to the ancient custom of fiefs.

All preliminaries concluded, the Charter at once attacked what was, in

the barons’ eyes, the chief of John’s abuses, his arbitrary increase of

feudal obligations. The Articles of the Barons, indeed, had plunged at

once into this most crucial question without a word by way of pious

phrases or legal formulae, such as were necessary in a regular Charter.

I. _Assessment of Beliefs._ Each “incident” had its own special

possibilities of abuse, and the Great Charter deals with each of these

in turn. The present chapter defines the reliefs to be henceforth paid

to John.[353] The vagueness of the sums at first was a natural corollary

of the early doubts as to whether the hereditary principle was

absolutely binding or not. The heir with title not yet recognized was

keen to come to terms. The lord took as much as he could grind from the

inexperience or timidity of the youthful heir; the heir tried to profit

from the good nature or temporary embarrassments of the lord. All was

vague; and such vagueness favoured the strongest or most wily.

-----

Footnote 353:

Cf. _supra_, p. 73.

-----

A process of definition, however, was early at work; and progressed,

though slowly. Public opinion set limits of variation, to go beyond

which was considered unreasonable or even indecent. Some conception of a

“reasonable relief” was evolved. Yet the criterion varied: the Crown

might defy rules binding on others. Henry I., indeed, when bidding

against duke Robert in 1099 for the throne showed himself willing, in

words if not in practice, to accept the limits set by contemporary

opinion. His Charter of Liberties promised that all reliefs should be

_justa et legitima_—an elastic phrase no doubt, and one in after days

liberally interpreted by the exchequer officials in their royal master’s

favour. By the end of the twelfth century, when Glanvill wrote, the

exact sums which could be taken by mesne lords had been fixed; although

the Crown remained free to exact higher rates. _Baroniae capitales_, he

tells us, were charged relief, not at a fixed rate, but at sums which

varied _juxta voluntatem et misericordiam domini regis_.[354]

-----

Footnote 354:

Glanvill’s words (IX. c. 4) are unfortunately ambiguous. He

distinguishes three cases: (_a_) the normal knight’s fee, from which

100s. was due as relief (whether this extends to fees of crown tenants

does not appear); (_b_) socage lands, from which one year’s rent might

be taken; and (_c_) “_capitales baroniae_,” which were left subject to

reliefs at the king’s discretion. Now “barony” was a loose word:

baronies, like barons, might be small or great (cf. _infra_, c. 14);

all crown fiefs being “baronies” in one sense, but only certain larger

“honours” being so reckoned in another. Glanvill leaves this vital

point undetermined, but evidence from other sources makes it probable

that even smaller crown holdings should for this purpose be classed

under his _capitales baroniae_, and not with knights’ fees held from

mesne lords. Two passages from the _Dialogus de Scaccario_ (II. x. E.

p. 135 and II. xxiv. p. 155) clearly support the distinction between

all crown tenants (small as well as great) on the one hand, and

tenants of mesne lords on the other: only the latter had their reliefs

fixed, while the former were at the king’s discretion. (The second

passage shows how the exchequer officials held the onus of proof to

lie on the heir to a crown fief to show that he was worthy to succeed

his father, and suggests rich gifts to the king as the best form of

proof.) Madox (I. 315-6) cites from the Pipe Rolls large sums exacted

by the crown. Usually the number of knights’ fees paid for is not

specified, but in one case a relief of £300 was paid for six fees—that

is, at the rate of £50 per fee, or exactly ten times what a mesne lord

could have exacted. (See Pipe Roll, 24 Henry II., cited by Madox,

_ibid._) There is further evidence to the same effect: where a barony

had escheated to the crown, reliefs of the former under-tenants would

in future be payable directly to the crown; but it was the practice of

Henry II. (confirmed by c. 43 of Magna Carta, _q. v._) to charge, in

such cases, only the lower rates exigible prior to the escheat. A

similar rule applied to under-tenants of baronies in wardship; see the

case of the knights of the see of Lincoln in the hands of a royal

warden in Pipe Roll, 14 Henry II. (cited by Madox, _ibid._). It would

thus appear that all holders of crown fiefs (not merely _barones

majores_) were in Glanvill’s day still liable to arbitrary extortions

in name of reliefs. The editors of the _Dialogus_ (p. 223) are also of

this opinion. Pollock and Maitland (I. 289), however, maintain the

opposite view—namely, that the limitation to 100s. per knight’s fee

was binding on the crown as well as on mesne lords.

Every year, however, made for definition; and custom pointed with

increasing authority towards 100s. per knight’s fee, and £100 for a

barony. Two entries on the Pipe Roll of 10 Richard I. amusingly

illustrate the unsettled practice. A sum of £100 is described as a

“reasonable relief” for a barony, and immediately this entry is

stultified by a second entry of a considerable additional payment by way

of “fine” to induce the king to accept the sum his own roll had just

declared “reasonable.”[355] John was more openly regardless of reason.

The Pipe Roll of 1202 shows how an unfortunate heir failed to get his

heritage until he paid 300 marks, with the promise of an annual

“acceptable present” to the king.[356]

-----

Footnote 355:

Madox, I. 316.

Footnote 356:

Madox, I. 317.

-----

If John could ask so much, what prevented him asking more? He might name

a prohibitive price, and so defeat the hereditability of fiefs

altogether. Such arbitrary exactions must end, so the barons were

determined in 1215; custom must be defined, so as to prevail henceforth

against royal discretion. The first demand of the Articles of the Barons

is, “that heirs of full age shall have their heritage by the ancient

relief to be set forth in the Charter.” Here it is, then, duly set forth

and defined in chapter 2 of Magna Carta as £100 for an "earl’s barony,"

£100 for "a baron’s barony," 100s. for a knight’s fee, and a

proportional part of 100s. for every fraction of a knight’s fee. This

clause produced the desired effect. These rates were strictly observed

by the exchequer of Henry III., as we know from the Pipe Rolls of his

reign. Thus, when a certain William Pantoll was charged with £100 for

his relief on the mistaken supposition that he held a “barony,” he

protested that he held only five knight’s fees, and got off with the

payment of £25.[357] The relief of a barony was subsequently reduced

from £100 to 100 marks. The date of this change, if we may rely on

Madox,[358] lies between the twenty-first and thirty-fifth years of

Edward I.[359]

-----

Footnote 357:

_Ibid._, I. 318.

Footnote 358:

_Ibid._, I. 321.

Footnote 359:

The first of the long series of charters and confirmations which

contains it seems to be the _Inspeximus_ of 10th October, 1297, which

in all probability merely recognized officially a rule long demanded

as simple justice by the barons and public opinion. (See Madox, I.

318, Pollock and Maitland, I. 289, and Bémont, _Chartes_, p. 47.)

-----

Apparently all who paid reliefs to the king were mulcted in a further

payment (calculated at 9 per cent. of the relief) in name of "Queen’s

Gold," a contribution to the private purse of the Queen Consort, and

collected by an official specially representing her at the

exchequer.[360]

-----

Footnote 360:

See note by editors of _Dialogus_, p. 238. The Petition of the Barons

in 1258 (_Sel. Charters_, 382) protested against this, and the

practice was discontinued.

The Charter deals only with tenure by knight’s service; nothing is said

of other tenures. The explanation of the omission may possibly be

different in the cases of socage and of serjeanty respectively.[361]

(_a_) _Socage._ The barons were not so vitally interested in socage,

that being, in the normal case, the tenure of humbler men.[362] In later

reigns the king, like an ordinary mesne lord, contented himself with one

year’s rent of socage lands in name of relief. (_b_) _Serjeanty._ The

barons cannot have been indifferent to the fate of serjeanties, since

many of them held great estates by such tenures. Possibly they assumed

that the rules applied to knights’ fees and baronies would apply to

serjeanties as well. The Crown, however, acted on a different view;

large sums were frequently extorted by Henry III. By the reign of Edward

I., however, the practice of the exchequer was to limit itself to one

year’s rent (a sufficiently severe exaction)[363] for serjeanties, which

thus fell into line with socage.[364]

-----

Footnote 361:

Cf. _supra_, pp. 66-9.

Footnote 362:

It is possible to argue that the custom as to socage was already too

well settled to require any confirmation. Glanvill (IX. c. 4) stated

the relief for socage at one year’s annual value. It is not absolutely

clear, however, whether this restriction applied to the crown.

Further, no custom, however well established, was sufficiently safe

against John’s greed, to make confirmation unnecessary.

Footnote 363:

See Littleton, _Tenures_, II. viii., s. 154, and Madox, I. 321, who

cites the case of a certain Henry, son of William le Moigne, who was

fined in £18 for the relief of lands worth £18 a year held "by the

serjeanty of the King’s Lardinary."

Footnote 364:

Cf. _supra_, p. 69.

-----

II. _Units of Assessment._ Some explanation is required of the three

groups into which crown estates were thus divided—knight’s fees, barons’

baronies, and earls’ baronies.

(1) _Feodum militis integrum._ The origin of the knight’s fee is

obscured by a network of conflicting theories. A thread of connection is

sometimes traced between it and the mysterious five-hide unit of

Anglo-Saxon times; other authorities would ascribe its introduction into

England to a definite act of some great personage—either William the

Conqueror, according to Selden, who founds on a well-known but

untrustworthy passage in Ordericus Vitalis, or Ranulf Flambard,

according to Freeman, Stubbs, and Gneist. It seems probable that the

Normans, here as elsewhere, pursued their policy of avoiding an open

rupture with the past, and that the Conqueror adapted as far as possible

the existing system of land tenure to his own needs. There is little

doubt, in light of the evidence accumulated by Mr. Round in his _Feudal

England_, that William I. stipulated verbally for the service of a

definite number of knights from every fief bestowed by him on his Norman

followers. A knight’s fee or _scutum_ thus became a measure of military

service, and of feudal assessment; _servitium unius militis_ was a

well-known legal unit. But a difficult problem arises when it is asked

what definite equation, if any, existed between land and service. Three

answers have been given: (_a_) A definite ratio exists between amount of

service and extent of ground. In other words, the knight’s fee contains

a fixed area of land; every five hides sent one warrior, thus preserving

the old Anglo-Saxon unit.[365] (_b_) The ratio lies not between service

and extent, but between service and value. An estate of £20 annual

rental sends one knight to the king’s wars; the normal knight’s fee

contains 20 librates of land.[366] (_c_) Other authorities deny that any

proportion exists at all: William the Conqueror exacted from each of his

grantees precisely as much or as little knight’s service as he saw fit.

-----

Footnote 365:

C. Pearson, _Hist. of Engl._, I. 375, note 2.

Footnote 366:

J. H. Round, _Feudal England_, 295.

-----

Is it not possible to reconcile these divergent conclusions? Undoubtedly

the Conqueror held himself bound by no fixed rules, but made exceptions

where he pleased: some favoured foundations were exempt from all service

whatsoever.[367] Yet, if he distributed estates at his own free will, he

did not necessarily distribute them irrationally or at random. He

demanded service of knights in round numbers, 5 or 10 or 20, as he saw

cause, and in normal cases he was guided by some loose sense of

proportion. Where there was no reason either for preferential treatment

or for special severity, service would be roughly proportionate either

to the area or to the value. This rule was William’s servant, not his

master, and was made to yield to many exceptions, which would amply

account for the existence in later days of knight’s fees varying from 2

hides to 14 hides, instead of the normal 5.[368] Each such fee, whatever

its acreage or its rental, owed the service of one knight, and paid

relief at 100s.

-----

Footnote 367:

_E.g._ Gloucester and Battle Abbeys: see Round, _ibid._, 299.

Footnote 368:

See Round, _Feudal England_, 294, and Pollock and Maitland, I. 235.

-----

(2) _Baronia integra._ The word “barony” cannot be easily defined, on

account of the many changes it has undergone.[369] A “barony” at the

Norman Conquest differed in almost every respect from a “barony” at the

present day. The word _baro_ was originally synonymous with _homo_,

meaning, in feudal usage, a vassal of any lord. It soon became usual,

however, to confine the word to king’s men; “_barones_” were thus

identical with "crown tenants"—a considerable body at first; but a new

distinction soon arose between the great men and the smaller men among

their number (between _barones majores_ and _barones minores_). The

latter were usually called knights (_milites_), while “baron” was

reserved for the holder of an “honour.”[370] For determining what

constituted an “honour,” however, it was impossible to lay down any

absolute criterion. Mere size was not sufficient: a magnate once classed

as a full “baron” might successfully claim to be only a “knight,” thus

lightening some of his feudal burdens, for example this one of

“reliefs.” Chapter 14 of Magna Carta helped to stereotype the division,

since it stipulated that each _major baro_ should receive an individual

writ of summons to the Council, leaving the _barones minores_ to be

convened collectively through the sheriff. As the one point of

certainty, where everything else was vague, these writs came to possess

an exaggerated importance, and it was finally held (at a date long

subsequent to Magna Carta) that the mere receipt of a special summons,

if acted upon, made the recipient a baron, and entitled his heirs, in

all time coming, to succeed him in what was fast hardening into a

recognized title of dignity. The “barons” in 1215 knew nothing of all

this; they desired merely to have the reliefs due by them taxed at a

fixed rate. Each “barony” should pay £100, a sum afterwards reduced to

100 marks.

-----

Footnote 369:

See Pollock and Maitland, I. 262, and authorities there cited. “An

honour or barony is thus regarded as a mass of lands which from of old

have been held by a single title.” An exact definition is, perhaps,

impossible: the term was first applied in early days without any

technical meaning; in later days each “honour” had separately

established its position by prescriptive usage. See also Pike, _House

of Lords_, pp. 88-9, on the difficulty of defining “an entire barony.”

Footnote 370:

This change was not complete in 1215, but Magna Carta, when it uses

“_barones_” alone, seems to refer to “_barones majores_” only (see cc.

2, 21, 61). In c. 14, “_barones majores_” are contrasted with

“_barones minores_.”

-----

Relief was thereafter a fixed sum, while the size of the barony varied

in each case. As the same holds true of the knight’s fee, it is doubly

ridiculous to attempt to discover an equation between the knight’s fee

and the barony founded upon the ratio of the sums payable. Coke,

however, was guilty of this absurdity.[371]

-----

Footnote 371:

See Coke on _Littleton_, II. iv. s. 112, and _ibid._ _Second

Institute_, p. 7. Founding on the later practice of the exchequer,

which exacted one hundred marks of relief from a barony, and one

hundred shillings from a knight’s fee, he assumed the false equation

"1 barony = 13⅓ knight’s fees." If he had known of the earlier

practice, which followed the rule of John’s Charter, he might have

jumped to another equation, equally false, namely that "1 barony = 20

knight’s fees." There is, in reality, no fixed proportion between the

two, either as to extent or value.

-----

(3) _Baronia comitis integra._ A peculiar phrase is used in the text, an

"earl’s barony" appearing where “earldom” might be expected.[372] The

reason is that “earldom” originally implied the holding of an office and

not the ownership of land, whereas relief was payable for the earl’s

lands or “honour,” not for his office. The Charter, therefore, uses

words well fitted to make its meaning clear. The earl (or _comes_) was

the successor of the ealdorman as local governor of a county or group of

counties. His title was official, not tenurial, or even, in early times,

necessarily hereditary.

-----

Footnote 372:

In the _Inspeximus_ of Edward I., however, the word _comitatus_

(earldom) displaces the _baronia comitis_ of the text. See _Statutes

of Realm_, I. 114.

-----

Some of the ideas most intimately connected with a modern earldom were

signally inappropriate to the Norman earls. At the present day an

earldom is one of several “steps in the peerage,” a conception that did

not then exist. At the present day it carries with it a seat in the

House of Lords, whereas no instance is recorded until long after the

Norman Conquest of any earl or other great man demanding as a right to

be present in the king’s council: the custom of summoning all crown

tenants became stereotyped only in the reign of Henry II. and was not

formally recognized previous to chapter 14 of Magna Carta. At the

present day, again, the hereditary principle is the chief feature of an

earldom, whereas William did not admit that the office necessarily

passed from father to son.[373]

-----

Footnote 373:

See Pike, _House of Lords_, 57.

-----

The policy of the Conqueror had been to bring each county as far as

possible under his own direct authority; many districts had no earls,

while in others the connection of an earl with his titular shire was

reduced to a shadow, the only points of connection being the right to

enjoy “the third penny” (that is, the third part _pro indiviso_ of the

profits of justice administered in the county court) and the right to

bear its name. It is true that in addition the earl usually held

valuable estates in the shire, but he did this only as any other

landowner might. For purposes of taxation the whole of his lands,

whether in his own county or elsewhere, were reckoned as one unit, here

described as _baronia comitis integra_, the relief on which was taxed at

one hundred pounds.

Very gradually in after ages, the conception of an earldom suffered

change. The official character gave way before the idea of tenure, and

later on the modern conception was formulated of a hereditary dignity

conferring specific rank and privileges. The period of transition when

the tenurial idea prevailed is illustrated by the successful attempt of

Ranulf, earl of Chester and Lincoln, in the reign of Henry III. to

aliene one of his two earldoms—described by him as the _comitatus_ of

Lincoln.[374] Earls are now, like barons, created by letters patent, and

need not be land-owners. Thus the words “barony” and “earldom,” so

diverse in their origin and early development, were closely united in

their later history.

-----

Footnote 374:

See Pike, _House of Lords_, 63. This term _comitatus_ was a word of

many meanings. Originally designating the “county” or “the county

court,” it came to mean also the office of the earl who ruled the

county, and later on it might indicate, according to context, either

his titular connection with the shire, his estates, his share of the

profits of justice, or his rank in the peerage.

-----

III. _Liability of Church Property to “Relief.”_ The Great Charter of

John, unlike the Charter of Henry I. makes no mention of the lands of

vacant sees in this connection, probably because the main question had

long been settled in favour of the church. The position of a bishopric

was, however, a peculiar one. Each prelate was a crown tenant, and his

fief was reckoned a “barony,” entitling its owner to all the privileges,

and saddling him with all the feudal obligations of a baron.[375]

-----

Footnote 375:

This was specially affirmed in 1164 by article 11 of the Constitutions

of Clarendon, which stipulated that each prelate should hold his lands

_sicut baroniam_, merely a restatement of existing law.

-----

It was not then unnatural that, when a prelate died, the Crown should

demand “relief” from his successor, in the same way as from the heir of

a dead lay baron. Such demands, when made by William Rufus and his

minister Flambard, met with bitter opposition. The Crown in consequence,

unwilling to forego any of its feudal dues, endeavoured to shift their

incidence from the revenues of the see to the shoulders of the feudal

under-tenants. After bishop Wulfstan’s death on 18th January, 1095, a

writ was issued in William’s name to the freeholders of the see of

Worcester, calling on each of them to pay, as a relief due on their

bishop’s death, a specified sum, assessed by the barons of the

exchequer.[376]

-----

Footnote 376:

_Sicut per barones meos disposui._ The writ is given in Heming’s

_Cartulary_, I. 79-80, and reprinted by Round, _Feudal England_, 309.

-----

In revenge for such extortions from church lands and tenants, the

historians of the day, all necessarily recruited from the clerical

class, have heartily recommended Rufus and Flambard to the opprobrium of

posterity. Anselm compelled Henry I. to promise amendment in his

coronation Charter, which undertook to exact nothing during vacancies

either from the demesne of the church or from its tenants.[377] No

corresponding promise was demanded from John, a proof that such

exactions had ceased. The Crown no longer extorted relief from church

lands, although wardship was, without protest, enforced during

vacancies.

-----

Footnote 377:

See Appendix.

-----

CHAPTER THREE.

Si autem heres alicujus talium fuerit infra etatem et fuerit in

custodia, cum ad etatem pervenerit, habeat hereditatem suam sine relevio

et sine fine.

If, however, the heir of any one of the aforesaid has been under age

and in wardship, let him have his inheritance without relief and

without fine when he comes of age.

The Crown is here forbidden to exact relief where it had already enjoyed

wardship. It was hard on the youth, escaping from leading-strings, to be

met, when he “sued out his livery,” with the demand for a large relief

by the exchequer which had already appropriated all his available

revenue. The same event, namely, the ancestor’s death, was thus made the

excuse for two distinct feudal incidents.[378]

-----

Footnote 378:

Where there had already been a wardship, the relief was thus the price

paid by the heir in order to escape from the heavy hand of the king,

and was therefore known as “_ousterlemain_.” Mr. Taswell-Langmead

(_Engl. Const. Hist._, p. 51, n.) states the amount at half a year’s

profits. He cites no authorities for this, and is probably in error.

The _Dialogus_, II. x. E., p. 135, forbids relief to be taken, when

wardship had been exercised _per aliquot annos_.

-----

Such double extortion had long been forbidden to mesne lords; Magna

Carta was merely extending similar limitations to the king. The

grievance complained of had been intensified by an unfair expedient

which John sometimes adopted. In cases of disputed succession he

favoured the claims of a minor, enjoyed the wardship, and thereafter

repudiated his title altogether, or confirmed it only in return for an

exorbitant fine. The only safeguard was to provide that the king should

not enjoy wardship until he had allowed the heir to perform homage,

which constituted the binding tie of lord and vassal between them,

prevented the king from challenging the vassal’s right, and bound him to

“warrant” the title against all rival claimants. This expedient was

actually adopted in the revised Charter of 1216.[379]

-----

Footnote 379:

See chapter 3 of 1216, which stipulates that no lord shall have

wardship of an heir “_antequam homagium ejus ceperit_.” Cf. Coke,

_Second Institute_, p. 10.

-----

The alterations in that reissue were not altogether in the vassal’s

favour. Another addition made a reasonable stipulation in favour of the

lord, which incidentally illustrates the theory underlying wardship. The

essence of tenure in chivalry was the grant of land in return for

military services. Only a knight was capable of bearing arms; hence it

was that the lord held the lands in ward until the minor should reach

man’s estate. Ingenious attempts had apparently been made to defeat

these legitimate rights of feudal lords by making the infant heir a

“knight,” thus cutting away the basis on which wardship rested. The

reissue of 1216 prevented this, providing that the lands of a minor

should remain in wardship, although he was made a knight.[380]

Incidentally, the same Charter of Henry declared twenty-one years to be

the period at which a military tenant came of age, a point on which

John’s Charter had been silent.

-----

Footnote 380:

Coke, _ibid._, p. 12, makes a subtle, and apparently unwarranted,

distinction to depend on whether the minor was made a knight before or

after his ancestor’s death. The proviso, he argues, does not apply to

the former case, because the word used is “_remaneat_,” and lands

cannot “remain” in wardship if they were not in it before. Such

reasoning is puerile.

-----

In one case, exceptionally, wardship and relief might both be exacted on

account of the same death, though not by the same lord. Where the dead

man had formerly held two estates, one of the Crown and one of a mesne

lord, the Crown might claim the wardship of both, and then the

disappointed mesne lord was allowed to exact relief as a solatium for

his loss.[381]

-----

Footnote 381:

See _Coke on Littleton_, Book II. c. iv. s. 112; and cf. _infra_, cc.

37 and 43 for the “prerogative wardship” of the Crown.

-----

CHAPTER FOUR.

Custos terre hujusmodi heredis qui infra etatem fuerit, non capiat de

terra heredis nisi racionabiles exitus, et racionabiles consuetudines,

et racionabilia servicia, et hoc sine destructione et vasto hominum vel

rerum; et si nos commiserimus custodiam alicujus talis terre vicecomiti

vel alicui alii qui de exitibus illius nobis respondere debeat, et ille

destructionem de custodia fecerit vel vastum, nos ab illo capiemus

emendam, et terra committatur duobus legalibus et discretis hominibus de

feodo illo, qui de exitibus respondeant nobis vel ei cui eos

assignaverimus; et si dederimus vel vendiderimus alicui custodiam

alicujus talis terre, et ille destructionem inde fecerit vel vastum,

amittat ipsam custodiam, et tradatur duobus legalibus et discretis

hominibus de feodo illo qui similiter nobis respondeant sicut predictum

est.

The guardian of the land of an heir who is thus under age, shall take

from the land of the heir nothing but reasonable produce, reasonable

customs, and reasonable services, and that without destruction or

waste of men or goods; and if we have committed the wardship of the

lands of any such minor to the sheriff, or to any other who is

responsible to us for its issues, and he has made destruction or waste

of what he holds in wardship, we will take of him amends, and the land

shall be committed to two lawful and discreet men of that fee, who

shall be responsible to us for the issues, or to him to whom we shall

assign them; and if we have given or sold the wardship of any such

land to someone and he has therein made destruction or waste, he shall

lose that wardship, and it shall be transferred to two lawful and

discreet men of that fief, who shall be responsible to us in like

manner as aforesaid.

This chapter and the next treat of wardship,[382] a much hated feudal

incident, which undoubtedly afforded openings for grave abuses. It is a

mistake, however, to regard its mere existence as an abuse: it seems to

have been perfectly legal in England from the date of the Norman

Conquest, although some writers[383] consider it an innovation devised

by William Rufus and Flambard, without precedent in the Conqueror’s

reign. The chief argument for this mistaken view is that Henry I., in

promising redress of several admitted inventions of Rufus, promised also

to reform wardship. This may show that wardship was abused, but does not

prove it an innovation.

-----

Footnote 382:

The nature of wardship is more fully explained _supra_, pp. 75-7.

Footnote 383:

_E.g._ Mr. Taswell-Langmead, _Engl. Const. History_, p. 51, n.

-----

The Charter of Henry committed him undoubtedly to drastic remedies,

which would have amounted to the virtual abolition of wardship

altogether. Chapter 4 of that document removed from the lord’s custody

both the land and the person of the heir, and gave them to the widow of

the deceased tenant (or to one of the kinsmen, if such kinsman had, by

ancient custom, rights prior to those of the widow).[384] This was only

one of the many insincere promises which the “lion of justice” never

kept, and probably never meant to keep. Wardship continued to be exacted

from lay fiefs throughout the reigns of Henry I. and Stephen. Article 4

of the Assize of Northampton (1176) merely confirmed the existing

practice when it allowed wardship to the lord of the fee.[385] The

barons in 1215 made no attempt to alter this, or to revert to the

drastic remedies of the Charter of Henry I., although the evils

complained of had become worse under John’s misgovernment.

-----

Footnote 384:

“This, it would seem, was the old English rule”; see Ramsay,

_Foundations of England_, II. 230.

-----

It must be remembered that “wardship” placed the property and person of

the heir at the mercy of the Crown. Even if the popular belief as to the

fate met by Prince Arthur at his uncle’s hands was unfounded, John was

by no means the guardian to inspire confidence in the widowed mother of

a young Crown tenant whose estates the king might covet for himself.

Further, the king might confer the office, with the delicate issues

involved, upon whomsoever he would. When such a trust was abused it was

difficult to obtain redress. In 1133 a guardian, accused _de puella quam

dicitur violasse in custodia sua_, paid a fine to the crown, if not as

hush money, at least in order to obtain protection from being sued

elsewhere than in the _Curia Regis_.[386] It is easy to understand how

thoroughly this feudal incident must have been detested in England and

Normandy, all the more so if, as Hallam contends, it was not recognized

as a feudal due in other parts of Europe.[387]

-----

Footnote 385:

It is a common error to suppose that this Assize restores wardship to

the lord.

Footnote 386:

See _Pipe Roll_, 29 Henry II., cited Madox, I. 483.

Footnote 387:

Cf. _supra_, p. 78.

Guardians were of two kinds. The king might entrust the lands to the

sheriff of the county where they lay (or to one of his bailiffs), such

sheriff drawing the revenues on the Crown’s behalf, and accounting in

due season at the exchequer. Alternatively, the king might make an

out-and-out grant of the office, together with all profit to be derived

from it, to a private individual, either some royal favourite or the

bidder of the highest price. Commentators of a later date[388] apply the

word “committee” to the former type of guardian, reserving “grantee” for

the latter. This distinction, which is mentioned by Glanvill,[389]

obtains recognition in this passage of the Charter. Neither was likely

to have the interests of the minor at heart. Both would extort the

maximum of revenue, the one for the king, the other for himself. They

had always strong inducements to exhaust the soil, stock, and timber,

uprooting and cutting down whatever would fetch a price, and replacing

nothing. The heir found too often a wilderness of impoverished lands and

empty barns.

-----

Footnote 388:

_E.g._ Coke, _Second Institute_, p. 13.

Footnote 389:

VII. c. 10.

-----

The remedies proposed by Magna Carta were too timid and half-hearted;

yet something was effected. It was unnecessary to repeat the recognized

rule that the minor must receive, out of the revenues of the land,

maintenance and education suited to his station; but the Crown was

restrained by chapter 3 from exacting relief where wardship had already

been enjoyed; chapter 37 forbade John to exact wardship in certain cases

where it was not legally due; while here in chapter 4 an attempt was

made to protect the estate from waste.

The promised reforms included a definition of “waste”; punishment of the

wasteful guardian; and protection against repetition of the abuse. Each

of these calls for comment. (1) _The definition of waste._ The Charter

uses the words “_vastum hominum vel rerum_” (a phrase which occurs also

in Bracton).[390] It is easy to understand waste of goods; but what is

"waste of men"? An answer may be found in the words of the so-called

“unknown Charter of Liberties,”[391] which binds guardians to hand over

the land to the heir “_sine venditione nemorum et sine redemptione

hominum_.” Clearly, to enfranchise villeins was one method of “wasting

men.” The young heir, when he came to the enjoyment of his estates, must

not find his praedial serfs emancipated.[392] The words of the “unknown

Charter” may be used to illustrate the text, even if it be a forgery,

since a consensus of opinion holds it to be either contemporary or of

slightly later date.[393]

-----

Footnote 390:

II. folio 87.

Footnote 391:

See Appendix.

Footnote 392:

Another way of “wasting” villeins was by tallaging them excessively.

(For meaning of tallage cf. _infra_ c. 12.) Thus Bracton’s _Note Book_

reveals how one guardian _destruxit villanos per tallagia_ (_v._ case

485); how another exiled or destroyed villeins to the value of 300

marks (case 574); how a third destroyed two rich villeins so that they

became poor and beggars and exiles (case 632). Cf. also case 691.

Daines Barrington, writing towards the middle of the eighteenth

century, went too far when he inferred from this passage “that the

villeins who held by servile tenure were considered as so many negroes

on a sugar plantation” (_Observations_, p. 7.). For a definition of

“villein” see _infra_ c. 20.

Footnote 393:

Cf. _supra_, pp. 202-5.

-----

(2) _The punishment of wasteful guardians._ The Charter provides a

distinct but appropriate form of punishment for each of the two types of

guardian. John promises to take “amends,” doubtless of the nature of a

fine, from the “committee” who had no personal interest in the property;

while the “grantee” is to forfeit the guardianship, thus losing a

valuable asset for which he had probably paid a high price, sufficient

punishment, perhaps, without the exaction of damages.

Subsequent statutes did not, however, take so lenient a view. While the

Statute of Westminster[394] merely repeated the words of Magna Carta,

the Statute of Gloucester[395] enacted that the grantee who had

committed waste should not only lose the custody, but should, in

addition, pay to the heir any balance between the value of the wardship

thus forfeited and the total damage. More severe penalties were found

necessary. Statute 36 Edward III. chapter 13 enacted that the king’s

Escheators (officers who first became prominent towards the close of the

reign of Henry III., and who acted in the normal case as guardians of

Crown wards), when guilty of waste, should “yield to the heir treble

damages.” If the boy was still a minor, his friends might bring a suit

on his behalf; or after he was of full age he might bring it on his own

account.[396]

-----

Footnote 394:

3 Edward I. c. 21.

Footnote 395:

6 Edward I. c. 5.

Footnote 396:

Coke, _Second Institute_, p. 13, enunciates a doctrine at variance

with this statute, holding that the heir who suffered damage could

not, on coming of age, obtain such triple damages, or indeed any

damages at all, if the king had previously taken amends himself. Coke

further maintains that even after waste had been committed, the person

of the heir was left in the power of the unjust guardian, explaining

that when the Charter took away the office “this is understood of the

land, and not of the body.” There seems, however, to be no authority

for such statements.

-----

(3) _Provision against a recurrence of the waste._ It was only fair that

reasonable precautions should be taken to prevent the heir who had

already suffered hurt, from being similarly abused a second time. John,

accordingly, promised to supersede the keeper guilty of waste by

appointing as guardians two of the most trustworthy of the free-holders

on the heir’s estate. These men, from their local and personal ties to

the young heir, might be expected to deal tenderly with his property.

The “unknown Charter,” already referred to, proposed a more drastic

remedy. Whenever the Crown’s right to a wardship opened, the lands were

to be entrusted to four knights of the fief without waiting until damage

had been done. This suggestion, if carried out, would have protected the

king’s wards, without injury to the legitimate pecuniary interests of

the Crown.

CHAPTER FIVE.

Custos autem, quamdiu custodiam terre habuerit, sustentet domos, parcos,

vivaria, stagna, molendina, et cetera ad terram illam pertinencia, de

exitibus terre ejusdem; et reddat heredi, cum ad plenam etatem

pervenerit, terram suam totam instauratam de carrucis et waynagiis,

secundum quod tempus waynagii exiget et exitus terre racionabiliter

poterunt sustinere.

The guardian, moreover, so long as he has the wardship of the land,

shall keep up the houses, parks, places for live-stock,[397]

fishponds, mills, and other things pertaining to the land, out of the

issues of the same land; and he shall restore to the heir, when he has

come to full age, all his land, stocked with ploughs and implements of

husbandry, according as the season of husbandry shall require, and the

issues of the land can reasonably bear.

-----

Footnote 397:

_Vivarium_ in strictness means a place for keeping live-stock, but

probably included the animals also. By Coke, in the _Statutes at

large_, and elsewhere, it is translated “warren”; but that word has

its Latin form in _warrena_. Stubbs’ Glossary to _Select Charters_ (p.

551) renders it as “a fish pond,” but _stagnum_ has that meaning. The

Statute Westminster II. (c. 47) speaks of _stagnum molendinæ_ (a

mill-pond). The Statute of Merton (c. 11) refers to poachers taken _in

parcis et vivariis_; while Westminster I. (c. 1) forbids _ne courge en

autri parks, ne pesche en autri vivers_, which suggests a change of

connotation. Cf. _ibid._, c. 20.

-----

These stipulations form the complement, on the positive side, of the

purely negative provisions of chapter 4. It was not sufficient to

prohibit acts of waste; the guardian must see that the estates were kept

in good repair.

I. _The Obligations of the Warden of a Lay-fief._ It was the duty of

every custodian to preserve the lands from neglect, together with all

houses, “parks” (a term explained under chapter 47), fishponds, mills,

and the other usual items of the equipment of a medieval manor. All

outlays required for these purposes formed, in modern language, a first

charge on the revenues of the estate, to be deducted before the balance

was appropriated by the “grantee,” or paid to the exchequer by the

“committee.” It was the guardian’s duty, moreover, to restore the whole

to the heir in as good condition as the produce of the land might

reasonably permit. Henry’s Charters directed that the guardian should

redeliver the land stocked with ploughs “and with all other appointments

in at least as good condition as he received it.”[398]

-----

Footnote 398:

Blackstone, _Great Charter_, lxxviii. considers this “an indulgence to

guardians, by only directing them to deliver up the land ... in as

good condition as they found it, not in as good as it would bear.”

Sometimes, the heir after coming of age, could not recover his lands

at all. The Statute of Marlborough (c. 16) gave such a ward a right to

a _mort d’ancestor_ (cf. _infra_, p. 325) against a mesne lord, but

apparently not against the Crown. The Statute of Westminster I. (c.

48) narrates that heirs were often carried off bodily to prevent them

raising actions against their guardians.

-----

Magna Carta did not attempt to abolish wardship, which continued in full

force for many centuries, with only a few of its worst abuses somewhat

curtailed. The whole subject was regulated in 1549 by the Statute 32

Henry VIII. c. 46, which instituted the Court of Wards and Liveries, the

expensive and dilatory procedure of which caused increasing discontent,

until an order of both Houses of Parliament, dated 24th February, 1646,

abolished it along with “all wardships, liveries, _primer seisins_, and

_ouster les mains_.”[399] This ordinance was confirmed at the

Restoration by the Statute 12 Charles II. c. 24.

-----

Footnote 399:

See S. R. Gardiner, _Documents_, p. 207.

-----

II. _Wardships over Vacant Sees._ The church had its own grievances,

although these took a different form. The Constitutions of

Clarendon[400] had stipulated that each great prelate should hold his

Crown lands _sicut baroniam_; and this view ultimately prevailed. It

followed that all appropriate feudal burdens affected church fiefs

equally with lay fiefs. The lands which formed the temporalities of a

see were, however, in a peculiar position, being the property, not of an

individual, but of an undying corporation (to use the definite language

of a later age). When one bishop or abbot died, a successor of suitable

age and worth had at once to be appointed. A minority was thus

impossible, and therefore, so it might be argued, wardships could never

arise. Rufus objected to what he thought an unfair exemption from a

recognized feudal incident. Flambard devised an ingenious substitute for

ordinary wardships by keeping sees long vacant, and meantime taking the

lands under the guardianship of the Crown. Such practices formed the

original ground of quarrel between Anselm and Rufus. Henry I., while

renouncing by his Charter all pretensions to exact reliefs, retained his

right of wardship, promising merely that vacant sees should neither be

sold nor farmed out. Stephen went further, renouncing expressly all

wardships over church lands; but Henry II. ignored this concession, and

reverted to the practice of his grandfather. In his reign the wardship

of the rich properties of vacant sees formed a valuable asset of the

exchequer. During a vacancy the Crown drew not only the rents and issues

of the soil, but also the various feudal payments which the

under-tenants would otherwise have paid to the bishop. The Pipe Roll of

14 Henry II.[401] records sums of £30 and £20 paid into the exchequer by

two tenants of the vacant see of Lincoln for six and four knight’s fees

respectively.[402]

-----

Footnote 400:

Article 11: see _Select Charters_, 139.

Footnote 401:

Cited by the editors of the _Dialogus_, p. 223.

Footnote 402:

Cf. under c. 43 _infra_.

-----

The practice of Henry of Anjou was followed by his sons. John was

careful specially to reserve wardships over vacant sees even in that

very accommodating charter, dated 21st November, 1214, which surrendered

the right of canonical election to the national church. Stephen Langton

had either failed to force John to relinquish wardships or else

considered such a concession unnecessary now that the king renounced his

right to veto church appointments, since wardships over church lands

would become unprofitable if elections were never unduly delayed.

Whatever the reason, the charter of 1214 did nothing to guard against

the abuse of wardships over church lands, and John’s Great Charter was

equally silent.[403] The omission was supplied in 1216, when it was

directed that the provisions already made applicable to lay fiefs should

extend also to vacant sees, with the added proviso that church wardships

should never be sold. The charter of Henry III. thus reverted to the

exact position defined by the charter of Henry I. The lands of vacant

sees might be placed under a “committee,” but never given to a

“grantee,” to use Coke’s terms.

-----

Footnote 403:

C. 46 (see _infra_) confirmed _barons_, who had founded abbeys, in

their rights of wardship over them during vacancies.

-----

These provisions were further supplemented by later acts. An Act of 14

Edward III. (stat. 4, cc. 4 and 5) gave to the dean and chapter of a

vacant see a right to the pre-emption of the wardship at a fair price.

If they failed to exercise this, the king’s right to appoint escheators

or other keepers was confirmed, but under strict rules as to waste. This

is a distinct confirmation of the king’s right to “commit” church lands,

although the prohibitions against selling them or farming them out

remained still in force.

CHAPTER SIX.

Heredes maritentur absque disparagacione, ita tamen quod, antequam

contrahatur matrimonium, ostendatur propinquis de consanguinitate ipsius

heredis.

Heirs shall be married without disparagement, yet so that before the

marriage takes place the nearest in blood to that heir shall have

notice.

The Crown’s right to regulate the marriages of wards had become an

intolerable grievance. The origin of this feudal incident and its

extension to male as well as female minors have been elsewhere

explained.[404] John made a regular traffic in the sale of wards—young

maids of fourteen and aged widows alike. No excuse would be accepted.

The Pipe Roll of John’s first year[405] records how the chattels of a

certain Alice Bertram were taken from her and sold because she refused

“to come to marry herself” at the summons of the king. Only two

expedients were open to those who objected to mate for life with the men

to whom John sold them. They might take the veil, become dead in law,

and forfeit their fiefs to escape the burdens inherent in them. Only the

cloister could afford them shelter; nowhere in the outer world were they

safe. The other way of escape was to outbid objectionable suitors. This

was not always possible, for John was predisposed to favour the suit of

his foreign gentlemen of fortune, thus befriending his creatures while

adding to the slender number of personally loyal tenants-_in-capite_.

John’s greed was insatiable, and brief entries in his Exchequer Rolls

condense the story of many a tragedy. In the first year of his reign the

widow of Ralph of Cornhill offered 200 marks, with three palfreys and

two hawks, that she might not be espoused by Godfrey of Louvain, but

remain free to marry whom she chose, and yet keep her lands. This was a

case of desperate urgency, since Godfrey, for love of the lady or of her

lands, had offered 400 marks for her, if she could show no reason to the

contrary. It is satisfactory to learn that in this case the higher bribe

was refused, and the lady escaped.[406]

-----

Footnote 404:

See _supra_, 75–8.

Footnote 405:

Cited Madox, I. 565.

Footnote 406:

See _Rotuli de Oblatis et Finibus_, p. 37, and _Pipe Roll_, 2 John,

cited by Madox, I. 515.

-----

Sometimes John varied his practice by selling, not the woman herself,

but the _right_ to sell her. In 1203 Bartholomew de Muleton bought for

400 marks the wardship of the lands and heir of a certain Lambert, along

with the widow, to be married to whom he would, yet so that she should

not be disparaged.[407]

-----

Footnote 407:

_Pipe Roll_, 4 John, cited by Madox, I. 324.

Great stress was naturally placed on exemption from "disparagement"—that

is, from forced marriage with one who was not an equal. When William of

Scotland, by the treaty of 7th February, 1212, conferred on John the

right to marry Prince Alexander to whom he would, the qualification was

expressly stated, “but always without disparagement.”[408] Such a

proviso was understood where not expressed, and formed apparently the

only restriction admitted by the Crown upon this prerogative. It is not

surprising, then, to find it specially confirmed in Magna Carta.

The Articles of the Barons had, indeed, demanded a further

protection—namely, that a royal ward should only be married _with the

consent_ of the next of kin. In our text this is softened down to the

mere intimation of an intended marriage. The opportunity was thus

afforded of protesting against an unsuitable match. Insufficient as the

provision was, it was entirely omitted from the reissues of Henry’s

reign. The sale of heiresses went on unchecked.

-----

Footnote 408:

See _infra_, c. 59.

-----

Magna Carta made no attempt to define disparagement, but the Statute of

Merton[409] gave two examples,—marriage to a villein or to a burgess.

This was not an exhaustive list. Littleton, commenting on this

statute,[410] adds other illustrations:—“as if the heir that is in ward

be married to one who hath but one foot, or but one hand, or who is

deformed, decrepit, or having an horrible disease, or else great and

continual infirmity, and, if he be an heir male, married to a woman past

the age of child-bearing.” Plenty of room was left for forcing on a ward

an objectionable husband or wife, who yet could not be proved to come

within the law’s definition of “disparagement.” The barons argued in

1258 that an English heiress was disparaged if married to anyone not an

Englishman by birth.[411]

-----

Footnote 409:

20 Henry III. c. 6.

Footnote 410:

_Tenures_, II. iv. s. 109.

Footnote 411:

See Petition of Barons (_Sel. Charters_, 383). Gradually the

conception of disparagement was expanded, partly from the natural

development of legal principles and partly from the increased power

the nobility obtained of enforcing their own definitions upon the

king. Coke commenting on Littleton (Section 107) mentions four kinds

of disparagements: (1) _propter vitium animi_, _e.g._ lunatics and

others of unsound mind; (2) _propter vitium sanguinis_, villeins,

burgesses, sons of attainted persons, bastards, aliens, or children of

aliens; (3) _propter vitium corporis_, as those who had lost a limb or

were diseased or impotent; and (4) _propter jacturam privilegii_, or

such a marriage as would involve loss of “benefit of clergy.” The last

clause had no possible connection with the law as it stood in the

thirteenth century, but was founded on the fact that marriage with a

widow or widower was deemed by the Church in later days an act of

bigamy, and therefore involved loss of the benefit of clergy, until

this was remedied by the Statute 1 Edward VI. c. 12 (sect. 16).

Was it in the power of the far-seeing father of a prospective heiress by

marrying her during his own life-time to render nugatory the Crown’s

right to nominate a husband? Not entirely; for the Charter of Henry I.

(even when renouncing the more oppressive practice of Rufus) reserved

the king’s right to be consulted by the barons before they bestowed the

hand of female relations in marriage. Magna Carta is silent on the

point, and the presumption is that the existing law was to be

maintained.

Bracton[412] explains that law:—No woman with an inheritance could marry

without the chief lord’s consent, under pain of losing such inheritance;

yet the lord when asked was bound to grant consent, if he failed to show

good reasons to the contrary; he could not, however, be compelled to

accept homage from an enemy or other unsuitable tenant. The Crown’s

rights in such matters were apparently the same as those of any mesne

lord.[413]

-----

Footnote 412:

II. _folio_ 88.

Footnote 413:

For further information on the age at which marriage could be tendered

to a ward, and the penalties for refusing, see Thomson, _Magna

Charta_, pp. 170-1.

-----

CHAPTER SEVEN.

Vidua post mortem mariti sui statim et sine difficultate habeat

maritagium et hereditatem suam, nec aliquid det pro dote sua, vel pro

maritagio suo, vel hereditate sua quam hereditatem maritus suus et ipsa

tenuerint die obitus ipsius mariti, et maneat in domo mariti sui per

quadraginta dies post mortem ipsius, infra quos assignetur ei dos sua.

A widow, after the death of her husband, shall forthwith and without

difficulty have her marriage portion and inheritance; nor shall she

give anything for her dower, or for her marriage portion, or for the

inheritance which her husband and she held on the day of the death of

that husband; and she may remain in the house of her husband for forty

days after his death, within which time her dower shall be assigned to

her.

Magna Carta: A Commentary on the Great Charter of King John With an Historical Introduction · 第 6 / 13 章