The detachment received permission on the 10th of August to use any
standing tentage which it could find, and it was thoroughly under
shelter an hour after this permission was received. The climate of Cuba
was not so disagreeable when one could look at it through the door of a
tent, but we were not destined to enjoy our tentage very long. On the
15th, at two o’clock, orders were received to go on board the _Leona_
at Santiago, bound for Montauk Point, and at half-past five o’clock
men, guns, and equipment were duly stowed for the voyage home.
It was much more agreeable than the one to Cuba, The transport was not
crowded, the men had excellent hammocks, which could be rolled up
during the day, thus leaving the whole berth deck for exercise and
ventilation, and the _Leona_ was a much better vessel than the
_Cherokee_.
The detachment finally disembarked at Montauk Point on the 23d, passed
through the usual detention camp, and was assigned a camping-place. It
was disbanded per instructions from headquarters, Montauk Point, on the
5th of September, the members of the detachment returning to their
respective regiments, well satisfied with the work they had done and
with each other.
In concluding this memoir the author desires to pay a personal tribute
of admiration and respect to the brave men composing the detachment,
both individually and collectively. Some of them have figured more
prominently in these pages than others, but there was not a man in the
detachment who was not worthy to be called the highest term that can be
applied to any man—a brave American soldier.
The End.
APPENDIX I.
Headquarters U. S. Troops, Santiago de Cuba, July 19, 1898.
_General Orders No. 26._
The successful accomplishment of the campaign against Santiago de Cuba,
resulting in its downfall and surrender of Spanish forces, the capture
of large military stores, together with the destruction of the entire
Spanish fleet in the harbor, which, upon the investment of the city,
was forced to leave, is one of which the Army can well be proud.
This has been accomplished through the heroic deeds of the Army and its
officers and men. The major-general commanding offers his sincere
thanks for their endurance of hardships heretofore unknown in the
American Army.
The work you have accomplished may well appeal to the pride of your
countrymen and has been rivaled upon but few occasions in the world’s
history. Landing upon an unknown coast, you faced dangers in
disembarking and overcame obstacles that even in looking back upon seem
insurmountable. Seizing, with the assistance of the Navy, the towns of
Baiquiri and Siboney, you pushed boldly forth, gallantly driving back
the enemy’s outposts in the vicinity of La Guasimas, and completed the
concentration of the army near Sevilla, within sight of the Spanish
stronghold at Santiago de Cuba. The outlook from Sevilla was one that
might have appalled the stoutest heart. Behind you ran a narrow road
made well-nigh impassable by rains, while to the front you looked upon
high foot-hills covered with a dense tropical growth, which could only
be traversed by bridle-paths terminating within range of the enemy’s
guns. Nothing daunted, you responded eagerly to the order to close upon
the foe, and, attacking at El Caney and San Juan, drove him from work
to work until he took refuge within his last and strongest entrenchment
immediately surrounding the city. Despite the fierce glare of a
Southern sun and rains that fell in torrents, you valiantly withstood
his attempts to drive you from the position your valor had won, holding
in your vise-like grip the army opposed to you. After seventeen days of
battle and siege, you were rewarded by the surrender of nearly 24,000
prisoners, 12,000 being those in your immediate front, the others
scattered in the various towns of eastern Cuba, freeing completely the
eastern part of the island from Spanish troops.
This was not done without great sacrifices. The death of 230 gallant
soldiers and the wounding of 1,284 others shows but too plainly the
fierce contest in which you were engaged. The few reported missing are
undoubtedly among the dead, as no prisoners were taken. For those who
have fallen in battle, with you the commanding general sorrows, and
with you will ever cherish their memory. Their devotion to duty sets a
high example of courage and patriotism to our fellow-countrymen. All
who have participated in the campaign, battle, and siege of Santiago de
Cuba will recall with pride the grand deeds accomplished, and will hold
one another dear for having shared great suffering, hardships, and
triumphs together.
All may well feel proud to inscribe on their banners the name of
Santiago de Cuba.
By command of Major-General Shafter.
Official: _John B. Miley, E. J. McClernand,_ Aide. Asst. Adj.-Gen.
APPENDIX II.
_The Santiago Campaign._
Report of Major-General Wm. R. Shafter, Commanding.
September 13, 1898.
Sir,—I have the honor to submit the following report of the campaign
which terminated in the fall of Santiago de Cuba and the adjacent
territory, and the establishment of the military government therein.
The expedition was undertaken in compliance with telegraphic
instructions of May 30, 1898, from Headquarters of the Army, in which
it was stated:
“Admiral Schley reports that two cruisers and two torpedo boats have
been seen in the harbor of Santiago. Go with your force to capture
garrison at Santiago and assist in capturing harbor and fleet.”
On this date there were a large number of transports in Port Tampa Bay,
which had been collected for the purpose of an expedition which it had
been previously contemplated I should command, and for such other
emergencies as might arise. Orders were immediately given for loading
aboard those transports the necessary subsistence and quartermaster
supplies, and for the embarkation of the authorized number of troops
and their material. General Orders No. 5, from these headquarters,
indicate the organizations it was at first proposed to take.
The order is as follows:
“Headquarters 5th Army Corps, “Tampa, Fla., May 31, 1898.
“G. O. 5.
“The following troops will hold themselves in readiness to move
immediately on board transports upon notification from these
headquarters:
“1. The 5th Army Corps.
“2. The Battalion of Engineers.
“3. The detachment of the Signal Corps.
“4. Five squadrons of cavalry, to be selected by the commanding general
of the cavalry division, in accordance with instructions previously
given.
“5. Four batteries of light artillery, to be commanded by a major, to
be selected by the commanding officer of the light artillery brigade.
“6. Two batteries of heavy artillery, to be selected by the commanding
officer of the siege artillery battalion, with eight (8) guns and eight
(8) field mortars.
“7. The Battalion of Engineers, the infantry and cavalry will be
supplied with 500 rounds of ammunition per man.
“8. All troops will carry, in addition to the fourteen (14) days’ field
rations now on hand, ten (10) days’ travel rations.
“9. The minimum allowance of tentage and baggage as prescribed in G. O.
54, A. G. O., c. s., will be taken.
“10. In addition to the rations specified in paragraph 8 of this order,
the chief commissary will provide sixty (60) days’ field rations for
the entire command.
“11. All recruits and extra baggage, the latter to be stored, carefully
piled and covered, will be left in camp in charge of a commissioned
officer, to be selected by the regimental commander. Where there are no
recruits available, the necessary guard only will be left.
“12. Travel rations will be drawn at once by the several commands, as
indicated in paragraph 8.
“By command of Maj.-Gen. Shafter.
“_E. J. McClernand,_ “A. A. G.”
This order was afterwards changed to include twelve squadrons of
cavalry, all of which were dismounted because of lack of transportation
for the animals, and because it was believed, from the best sources of
information obtainable, that mounted cavalry could not operate
efficiently in the neighborhood of Santiago. This was found
subsequently to be correct.
The facilities at Tampa and Port Tampa for embarking the troops and the
large amount of supplies required were inadequate, and with the utmost
effort it was not possible to accomplish this work as quickly as I
hoped and desired.
On the evening of June 7th I received orders to sail without delay, but
not with less than 10,000 men.
The orders referred to caused one division, composed of Volunteer
troops, commanded by Brig.-Gen. Snyder, and which it had been intended
to include in my command, to be left behind. I was joined, however, by
Brig.-Gen. Bates, who had already arrived on transports from Mobile,
Ala., with the 3d and 20th Infantry and one squadron of the 2d Cavalry
with their horses, the latter being the only mounted troops in my
command.
After some of them had already reached the lower bay, telegraphic
instructions were received from the honorable Secretary of War,
directing that the sailing of the expedition be delayed, waiting
further orders. This delay was occasioned by the Navy reporting that a
Spanish war vessel had been sighted in the Nicholas Channel. The ships
in the lower bay were immediately recalled. On the next day, in
compliance with instructions from the adjutant-general of the Army, the
necessary steps were taken to increase the command to the full capacity
of the transports, and the expedition sailed on June 14th with 815
officers and 16,072 enlisted men.
The passage to Santiago was generally smooth and uneventful. The health
of the command remained remarkably good, notwithstanding the fact that
the conveniences on many of the transports, in the nature of sleeping
accommodations, space for exercise, closet accommodations, etc., were
not all that could have been desired. While commenting upon this
subject, it is appropriate to add that the opinion was general
throughout the Army that the travel ration should include tomatoes,
beginning with the first day, and that a small quantity of canned fruit
would prove to be a most welcome addition while traveling at sea in the
tropics. If the future policy of our Government requires much
transportation for the military forces by sea, definite arrangements
should be determined upon to provide the necessary hammock
accommodations for sleeping. Hammocks interfere immeasurably less than
bunks with the proper ventilation of the ships and during the day can
be easily removed, thus greatly increasing space for exercise;
moreover, they greatly diminish the danger of fire.
While passing along the north coast of Cuba one of the two barges we
had in tow broke away during the night, and was not recovered. This
loss proved to be very serious, for it delayed and embarrassed the
disembarkation of the army. On the morning of June 20th we arrived off
Guantanamo Bay, and about noon reached the vicinity of Santiago, where
Admiral Sampson came on board my headquarters transport. It was
arranged between us to visit in the afternoon the Cuban general
(Garcia) at Aserraderos, about eighteen miles to the west of the Morro.
During the interview Gen. Garcia offered the services of his troops,
comprising about 4,000 men in the vicinity of Aserraderos and about
500, under Gen. Castillo, at the little town of Cujababo, a few miles
east of Baiquiri. I accepted his offer, impressing it upon him that I
could exercise no military control over him except, such as he would
concede, and as long as he served under me I would furnish him rations
and ammunition.
DISEMBARKATION IN CUBA.
Ever since the receipt of my orders I had made a study of the terrain
surrounding Santiago, gathering information mainly from the former
residents of the city, several of whom were on the transports with me.
At this interview all the possible points of attack were for the last
time carefully weighed, and then, for the information and guidance of
Admiral Sampson and Gen. Garcia, I outlined the plan of campaign, which
was as follows:
With the assistance of the small boats of the Navy, the disembarkation
was to commence on the morning of the 22d at Baiquiri; on the 21st 500
insurgent troops were to be transferred from Aserraderos to Cujababo,
increasing the force already there to 1,000 men. This force, under Gen.
Castillo, was to attack the Spanish force at Baiquiri in the rear at
the time of disembarkation. This movement was successfully made. To
mislead the enemy as to the real point of our intended landing, I
requested Gen. Garcia to send a small force (about 500 men), under Gen.
Rabi, to attack the little town of Cabanas, situated on the coast a few
miles to the west of the entrance to Santiago harbor, and where it was
reported the enemy had several men intrenched, and from which a trail
leads around the west side of the bay to Santiago.
I also requested Admiral Sampson to send several of his warships, with
a number of my transports, opposite this town, for the purpose of
making a show of disembarking there.
In addition, I asked the admiral to cause a bombardment to be made at
Cabanas and also at the forts around the Morro and at the towns of
Aguadores, Siboney, and Baiquiri. The troops under Gen. Garcia
remaining at Aserraderos were to be transferred to Baiquiri or Siboney
on the 24th. This was successfully accomplished at Siboney.
These movements committed me to approaching Santiago from the east over
a narrow road, at first in some places not better than a trail, running
from Baiquiri through Siboney and Sevilla, and making attack from that
quarter. This, in my judgment, was the only feasible plan, and
subsequent information and results confirmed my judgment.
On the morning of the 22d the Army commenced to disembark at Baiquiri.
The following general order indicates the manner in which the troops
left the transports and the amount of supplies carried immediately with
them:
“Headquarters 5th Army Corps, “On board S. S. _Segurança_, “At Sea,
June 20, 1898.
“G. O. 18.
(Extract.)
“1. Under instructions to be communicated to the proper commanders,
troops will disembark in the following order:
“First—The 2d Division, 5th Corps (Lawton’s). The Gatling Gun
Detachment will accompany this division.
“Second—Gen. Bates’ Brigade. This brigade will form as a reserve to the
2d Division, 5th Corps.
“Third—The dismounted cavalry division (Wheeler’s).
“Fourth—The 1st Division, 5th Corps (Kent’s).
“Fifth—The squadron of the 2d Cavalry (Rafferty’s).
“Sixth—If the enemy in force vigorously resist the landing, the light
artillery, or a part of it, will be disembarked by the battalion
commander, and brought to the assistance of the troops engaged. If no
serious opposition be offered this artillery will be unloaded after the
mounted squadron.
“2. All troops will carry on the person the blanket-roll (with
shelter-tent and poncho), three days’ field rations (with coffee,
ground), canteens filled, and 100 rounds of ammunition per man.
Additional ammunition, already issued to the troops, tentage, baggage,
and company cooking utensils will be left under charge of the
regimental quartermaster, with one non-commissioned officer and two
privates from each company.
“3. All persons not immediately on duty with and constituting a part of
the organizations mentioned in the foregoing paragraphs will remain
aboard ship until the landing be accomplished, and until notified they
can land.
“4. The chief quartermaster of the expedition will control all small
boats and will distribute them to the best advantage to disembark the
troops in the order indicated in paragraph 1.
“5. The ordnance officer—2d Lieut. Brooke, 4th Infantry—will put on
shore at once 100 rounds of ammunition per man, and have it ready for
distribution on the firing-line.
“6. The commanding general wishes to impress officers and men with the
crushing effect a well-directed fire will have upon the Spanish troops.
All officers concerned will rigidly enforce fire discipline, and will
caution their men to fire only when they can be see the enemy.
* * * * *
“By command of Maj.-Gen. Shafter.
“_E. J. McClernand_, “A. A. G.”
The small boats belonging to the Navy and the transports, together with
a number of steam launches, furnished by the Navy, were brought
alongside and loaded with troops as prescribed in the order just
quoted. When Gen. Lawton’s Division was fairly loaded in the small
boats, the latter were towed in long lines by the steam launches toward
the shore. The sea was somewhat rough, but by the exercise of caution
and good judgment the beach was reached and the troops disembarked
satisfactorily. As a precaution against a possible attack upon the part
of any Spaniards who might have been hidden in the adjacent
block-houses and woods, the Navy opened a furious cannonade on these
places while the troops were moving toward the shore. It was learned
afterward that the Spanish garrison had retired in the direction of
Siboney soon after daylight.
By night about 6,000 troops were on shore. Gen. Lawton was ordered to
push down a strong force to seize and hold Siboney.
On the 23d the disembarkation was continued and about 6,000 more men
landed. Early on this date Gen. Lawton’s advance reached Siboney, the
Spanish garrison of about 600 men retiring as he came up, and offering
no opposition except a few scattering shots at long range. Some of the
Cuban troops pursued the retreating Spaniards and skirmished with them.
During the afternoon of this date the disembarkation of Kent’s Division
was commenced at Siboney, which enabled me to establish a base eight
miles nearer Santiago and to continue the unloading of troops and
supplies at both points.
The disembarkation was continued throughout the night of the 23d and
24th, and by the evening of the 24th the disembarkation of my command
was practically completed.
PREPARING FOR THE ADVANCE.
The orders for June 24th contemplated Gen. Lawton’s Division taking a
strong defensive position a short distance from Siboney, on the road to
Santiago; Kent’s Division was to be held near Santiago, where he
disembarked; Bates’ Brigade was to take position in support of Lawton,
while Wheeler’s Division was to be somewhat to the rear on the road
from Siboney to Baiquiri. It was intended to maintain this situation
until the troops and transportation were disembarked and a reasonable
quantity of necessary supplies landed. Gen. Young’s Brigade, however,
passed beyond Lawton on the night of the 23d-24th, thus taking the
advance, and on the morning of the latter date became engaged with a
Spanish force intrenched in a strong position at La Guasima, a point on
the Santiago road about three miles from Siboney. Gen. Young’s force
consisted of one squadron of the 1st Cavalry, one of the 10th Cavalry,
and two of the 1st United States Volunteer Cavalry; in all, 964
officers and men.
The enemy made an obstinate resistance, but were driven from the field
with considerable loss. Our own loss was 1 officer and 15 men killed, 6
officers and 46 men wounded. The reported losses of the Spaniards were
9 killed and 27 wounded. The engagement had an inspiring effect upon
our men and doubtless correspondingly depressed the enemy, as it was
now plainly demonstrated to them that they had a foe to meet who would
advance upon them under a heavy fire delivered from intrenchments. Gen.
Wheeler, division commander, was present during the engagement and
reports that our troops, officers and men, fought with the greatest
gallantry. His report is attached, marked “A.” This engagement gave us
a well-watered country farther to the front on which to encamp our
troops.
My efforts to unload transportation and subsistence stores, so that we
might have several days’ rations on shore, were continued during the
remainder of the month. In this work I was ably seconded by Lieut.-Col.
Charles F. Humphrey, deputy Q. M. G., U. S. A., chief quartermaster,
and Col. John F. Weston, A. O. G. S., chief commissary; hut,
notwithstanding the utmost efforts, it was difficult to land supplies
in excess of those required daily to feed the men and animals, and the
loss of the scow, mentioned as having broken away during the voyage, as
well as the loss at sea of lighters sent by Quartermaster’s Department
was greatly felt. Indeed, the lack of steam launches, lighters, scows,
and wharves can only be appreciated by those who were on the ground
directing the disembarkation and landing of supplies. It was not until
nearly two weeks after the army landed that it was possible to place on
shore three days’ supplies In excess of those required for the daily
consumption.
After the engagement at La Guasima, and before the end of the month,
the army, including Gen. Garcia’s command, which had been brought on
transports to Siboney from Aserraderos, was mostly concentrated at
Sevilla, with the exception of the necessary detachments at Baiquiri
and Siboney.
On June 30th I reconnoitered the country about Santiago and made my
plan of attack. From a high hill, from which the city was in plain
view, I could see the San Juan Hill and the country about El Caney. The
roads were very poor, and, indeed, little better than bridle-paths
until the San Juan River and El Caney were reached.
The position of El Caney, to the northeast of Santiago, was of great
importance to the enemy as holding the Guantanamo road, as well as
furnishing shelter for a strong outpost that might be used to assail
the right flank of any force operating against San Juan Hill.
In view of this, I decided to begin the attack next day at El Caney
with one division, while sending two divisions on the direct road to
Santiago, passing by the El Pozo house, and as a diversion to direct a
small force against Aguadores, from Siboney along the railroad by the
sea, with a view of attracting the attention of the Spaniards in the
latter direction and of preventing them from attacking our left flank.
During the afternoon I assembled the division commanders and explained
to them my general plan of battle. Lawton’s Division, assisted by
Capron’s Light Battery, was ordered to move out during the afternoon
toward El Caney, to begin the attack there early the next morning.
After carrying El Caney, Lawton was to move by the El Caney road toward
Santiago, and take position on the right of the line. Wheeler’s
Division of dismounted cavalry, and Kent’s Division of infantry, were
directed on the Santiago road, the head of the column resting near El
Pozo, toward which heights Grimes’ Battery moved on the afternoon of
the 30th, with orders to take position thereon early the next morning,
and at the proper time prepare the way for the advance of Wheeler and
Kent, on San Juan Hill. The attack at this point was to be delayed
until Lawton’s guns were heard at El Caney and his infantry fire showed
he had become well engaged.
The remainder of the afternoon and night was devoted to cutting out and
repairing the roads, and other necessary preparations for battle. These
preparations were far from what I desired them to be, but we were in a
sickly climate; our supplies had to be brought forward by a narrow
wagon road, which the rains might at any time render impassable; fear
was entertained that a storm might drive the vessels containing our
stores to sea, thus separating us from our base of supplies; and,
lastly, it was reported that Gen. Pando, with 8,000 reinforcements for
the enemy, was _en route_ from Manzanillo, and might be expected in a
few days. Under these conditions, I determined to give battle without
delay.
THE BATTLE OF EL CANEY.
Early on the morning of July 1st, Lawton was in position around El
Caney, Chaffee’s Brigade on the right, across the Guantanamo road,
Miles’ Brigade in the center, and Ludlow’s on the left. The duty of
cutting off the enemy’s retreat along the Santiago road was assigned to
the latter brigade. The artillery opened on the town at 6:15 a. m. The
battle here soon became general, and was hotly contested. The enemy’s
position was naturally strong, and was rendered more so by
block-houses, a stone fort, and intrenchments cut in solid rock, and
the loop-holing of a solidly built stone church. The opposition offered
by the enemy was greater than had been anticipated, and prevented
Lawton from joining the right of the main line during the day, as had
been intended. After the battle had continued for some time, Bates’
Brigade of two regiments reached my headquarters from Siboney. I
directed him to move near El Caney, to give assistance if necessary. He
did so, and was put in position between Miles and Chaffee. The battle
continued with varying intensity during most of the day and until the
place was carried by assault about 4:30 p. m. As the Spaniards
endeavored to retreat along the Santiago road, Ludlow’s position
enabled him to do very effective work, and to practically cut off all
retreat in that direction.
After the battle at El Caney was well opened, and the sound of the
small-arm fire caused us to believe that Lawton was driving the enemy
before him, I directed Grimes’ Battery to open fire from the heights of
El Pozo on the San Juan block-house, which could be seen situated in
the enemy’s intrenchments extending along the crest of San Juan Hill.
This fire was effective, and the enemy could be seen running away from
the vicinity of the block-house. The artillery fire from El Pozo was
soon returned by the enemy’s artillery. They evidently had the range of
this hill, and their first shells killed and wounded several men. As
the Spaniards used smokeless powder, it was very difficult to locate
the position of their pieces, while, on the contrary, the smoke caused
by our black powder plainly indicated the position of our battery.
At this time the cavalry division, under Gen. Sumner, which was lying
concealed in the general vicinity of the El Pozo house, was ordered
forward with directions to cross the San Juan River and deploy to the
right of the Santiago side, while Kent’s Division was to follow closely
in its rear and deploy to the left.
These troops moved forward in compliance with orders, but the road was
so narrow as to render it impracticable to retain the column of fours
formation at all points, while the undergrowth on either side was so
dense as to preclude the possibility of deploying skirmishers. It
naturally resulted that the progress made was slow, and the long-range
rifles of the enemy’s infantry killed and wounded a number of our men
while marching along this road, and before there was any opportunity to
return this fire. At this time Generals Kent and Sumner were ordered to
push forward with all possible haste and place their troops in position
to engage the enemy. Gen. Kent, with this end in view, forced the head
of his column alongside of the cavalry column as far as the narrow
trail permitted, and thus hurried his arrival at the San Juan and the
formation beyond that stream. A few hundred yards before reaching the
San Juan the road forks, a fact that was discovered by Lieut.-Col.
Derby of my staff, who had approached well to the front in a war
balloon. This information he furnished to the troops, resulting in
Sumner moving on the right-hand road, while Kent was enabled to utilize
the road to the left.
Gen. Wheeler, the permanent commander of the cavalry division, who had
been ill, came forward during the morning, and later returned to duty
and rendered most gallant and efficient service during the remainder of
the day.
After crossing the stream, the cavalry moved to the right with a view
of connecting with Lawton’s left, when he could come up, and with their
left resting near the Santiago road.
In the meantime Kent’s Division, with the exception of two regiments of
Hawkins’ Brigade, being thus uncovered, moved rapidly to the front from
the forks previously mentioned in the road, utilizing both trails, but
more especially the one to the left, and, crossing the creek, formed
for attack in front of San Juan Hill. During the formation the 2d
Brigade suffered severely. While personally superintending this
movement, its gallant commander, Col. Wikoff, was killed. The command
of the brigade then devolved upon Lieut.-Col. Worth, 13th Infantry, who
was soon severely wounded, and next upon Lieut.-Col. Liscum, 24th
Infantry, who, five minutes later, also fell under the terrible fire of
the enemy, and the command of the brigade then devolved upon
Lieut.-Col. Ewers, 9th Infantry.
While the formation just described was taking place, Gen. Kent took
measures to hurry forward his rear brigade. The 10th and 2d Infantry
were ordered to follow. Wikoff’s Brigade, while the 21st was sent on
the right-hand road to support the 1st Brigade, under Gen. Hawkins, who
had crossed the stream and formed on the right of the division. The 2d
and 10th Infantry, Col. E. P. Pearson commanding, moved forward in good
order on the left of the division, passed over a green knoll, and drove
the enemy back toward his trenches.
After completing their formation under a destructive fire, and
advancing a short distance, both divisions found in their front a wide
bottom, in which had been placed a barbed-wire entanglement, and beyond
which there was a high hill, along the crest of which the enemy was
strongly posted. Nothing daunted, these gallant men pushed on to drive
the enemy from his chosen position, both divisions losing heavily. In
this assault Col. Hamilton, Lieuts. Smith and Shipp were killed, and
Col. Carroll, Lieuts. Thayer and Myer, all in the cavalry, were
wounded.
Great credit is due to Brig.-Gen. H. S. Hawkins, who, placing himself
between his regiments, urged them on by voice and bugle calls to the
attack so brilliantly executed.
In this fierce encounter words fail to do justice to the gallant
regimental commanders and their heroic men, for, while the generals
indicated the formations and the points of attack, it was, after all,
the intrepid bravery of the subordinate officers and men that planted
our colors on the crest of San Juan Hill and drove the enemy from his
trenches and block-houses, thus gaining a position which sealed the
fate of Santiago.
_In this action on this part of the field most efficient service was
rendered by Lieut. John H. Parker, 13th Infantry, and the Gatling Gun
Detachment under his command. The fighting continued at intervals until
nightfall, but our men held resolutely to the positions gained at the
cost of so much blood and toil._
I am greatly indebted to Gen. Wheeler, who, as previously stated,
returned from the sick-list to duty during the afternoon. His
cheerfulness and aggressiveness made itself felt on this part of the
battle-field, and the information he furnished to me at various stages
of the battle proved to be most useful.
THE BATTLE OF SANTIAGO.
My own health was impaired by overexertion in the sun and intense heat
of the day before, which prevented me from participating as actively in
the battle as I desired; but from a high hill near my headquarters I
had a general view of the battle-field, extending from El Caney on the
right to the left of our lines on San Juan Hill. His staff officers
were stationed at various points on the field, rendering frequent
reports, and through them, by the means of orderlies and the telephone,
I was enabled to transmit my orders. During the afternoon I visited the
position of Grimes’ Battery on the heights of El Pozo, and saw Sumner
and Kent in firm possession of San Juan Hill, which I directed should
be intrenched during the night. My engineer officer, Lieut.-Col. Derby,
collected and sent forward the necessary tools, and during the night
trenches of very considerable strength were constructed.
During the afternoon, Maj. Dillenback, by my order, brought forward the
two remaining batteries of his battalion and put them in position at El
Pozo, to the left of Grimes. Later in the afternoon all three batteries
were moved forward to positions near the firing-line, but the nature of
the country and the intensity of the enemy’s small-arm fire was such
that no substantial results were gained by our artillery in the new
positions. The batteries were intrenched during the night. Gen.
Duffield, with the 33d Michigan, attacked Aguadores, as ordered, but
was unable to accomplish more than to detain the Spaniards in that
vicinity.
After the brilliant and important victory gained at El Caney, Lawton
started his tried troops, who had been fighting all day and marching
much of the night before, to connect with the right of the cavalry
division. Night came on before this movement could be accomplished. In
the darkness the enemy’s pickets were encountered, and the division
commander, being uncertain of the ground and as to what might be in his
front, halted his command and reported the situation to me. This
information was received about 12:30 a. m., and I directed Gen. Lawton
to return by my headquarters and the El Pozo house as the only certain
way of gaining his new position.
This was done, and the division took position on the right of the
cavalry early next morning; Chaffee’s Brigade arriving first, about
half-past seven, and the other brigades before noon.
On the night of July 1st, I ordered Gen. Duffield, at Siboney, to send
forward the 34th Michigan and the 9th Massachusetts. Both of which had
just arrived from the United States. These regiments reached the front
the next morning. The 34th was placed in rear of Kent, and the 9th was
assigned to Bates, who placed it on his left.
Soon after daylight on July 2d the enemy opened battle, but because of
the intrenchments made during the night, the approach of Lawton’s
Division, and the presence of Bates’ Brigade, which had taken position
during the night on Kent’s left, little apprehension was felt as to our
ability to repel the Spaniards.
It is proper here to state that Gen. Bates and his brigade had
performed most arduous and efficient service, having marched much of
the night of June 30th-July 1st, and a good part of the latter day,
during which he also participated in the battle of El Caney, after
which he proceeded, by way of El Pozo, to the left of the line at San
Juan, reaching his new position about midnight.
All day on the 2d the battle raged with more or less fury, but such of
our troops as were in position at daylight held their ground, and
Lawton gained a strong and commanding position on the right.
About 10 p. m. the enemy made a vigorous assault to break through my
lines, but he was repulsed at all points.
SUMMONING THE ENEMY TO SURRENDER.
On the morning of the 3d the battle was renewed, but the enemy seemed
to have expended his energy in the assault of the previous night, and
the firing along the lines was desultory until stopped by my sending
the following letter within the Spanish lines:
“Headquarters U. S. Forces, near San Juan River, “July 3, 1898—8:30 a.
m.
“Sir,—I shall be obliged, unless you surrender, to shell Santiago de
Cuba. Please inform the citizens of foreign countries, and all the
women and children, that they should leave the city before 10 o’clock
to-morrow morning.
“Very respectfully, your obedient servant,
“_William R. Shafter_, “Maj.-Gen. U. S. Vols. “The Commanding General
of the Spanish Forces, Santiago de Cuba.”
To this letter I received the following reply:
“Santiago de Cuba, July 3, 1898.
“His Excellency the General Commanding Forces of the United States,
near San Juan River:
“Sir,—I have the honor to reply to your communication of to-day,
written at 8:30 a. m. and received at 1 p. m., demanding the surrender
of this city, or, in the contrary case, announcing to me that you will
bombard this city, and that I advise the foreigners, women and
children, that they must leave the city before 10 o’clock to-morrow
morning.
“It is my duty to say to you that this city will not surrender, and
that I will inform the foreign consuls and inhabitants of the contents
of your message.
“Very respectfully, _José Toral_, “Commander-in-Chief 4th Corps.”
Several of the foreign consuls came into my lines and asked that the
time given for them—the women and children—to depart from the city be
extended until 10 o’clock on July 5th. This induced me to write a
second letter, as follows:
“Santiago de Cuba, July 3d, 1898.
“Sir,—In consideration of a request of the consular officers in your
city for further delay in carrying out my intentions to fire on the
city, and in the interests of the poor women and children who will
suffer very greatly by their hasty and enforced departure from the
city, I have the honor to announce that I will delay such action,
solely in their interests, until noon of the 5th, provided that during
the interim your forces make no demonstration whatever upon those of my
own.
“I am, with great respect, your obedient servant,
“_William R Shafter_, “Maj.-Gen. U. S. A. “The Commanding General,
Spanish Forces.”
My first message went under a flag of truce at 12:42 p.m. I was of the
opinion that the Spaniards would surrender if given a little time, and
I thought this result would be hastened if the men of their army could
be made to understand they would be well treated as prisoners of war.
Acting upon this presumption, I determined to offer to return all the
wounded Spanish officers at El Caney who were able to bear
transportation, and who were willing to give their paroles not to serve
against the forces of the United States until regularly exchanged. This
offer was made and accepted. These officers, as well as several of the
wounded Spanish privates, twenty-seven in all, were sent to their lines
under the escort of some of our mounted cavalry. Our troops were
received with honors, and I have every reason to believe the return of
the Spanish prisoners produced a good impression on their comrades.
OPERATIONS AFTER SANTIAGO—OUR LOSSES.
The cessation of firing about noon on the 3d practically terminated the
battle of Santiago; all that occurred after this time may properly be
treated under the head of the siege which followed. After deducting the
detachments required at Siboney and Baiquiri to render those depots
secure from attack, organizations held to protect our flanks, others
acting as escorts and guards to light batteries, the members of the
Hospital Corps, guards left in charge of blanket-rolls which the
intense heat caused the men to cast aside before entering battle,
orderlies, etc., it is doubtful if we had more than 12,000 men on the
firing-line on July 1, when the battle was fiercest and when the
important and strong positions of El Caney and San Juan were captured.
A few Cubans assisted in the attack at El Caney, and fought valiantly,
but their numbers were too small to materially change the strength, as
indicated above. The enemy confronted us with numbers about equal to
our own; they fought obstinately in strong and intrenched positions,
and the results obtained clearly indicate the intrepid gallantry of the
company officers and men, and the benefits derived from the careful
training and instruction given in the company in the recent years in
rifle practice and other battle exercises. Our losses in these battles
were 22 officers and 208 men killed, and 81 officers and 1,203 men
wounded; missing, 79. The missing, with few exceptions, reported later.
The arrival of Gen. Escario on the night of July 2d, and his entrance
into the city was not anticipated, for although it was known, as
previously stated, that Gen. Pando had left Manzanillo with
reinforcements for the garrison of Santiago, it was not believed his
troops could arrive so soon. Gen. Garcia, with between 4,000 and 5,000
Cubans, was intrusted with the duty of watching for and intercepting
the reinforcement expected. This, however, he failed to do, and Escario
passed into the city along on my extreme right and near the bay. Up to
this time I had been unable to complete investment of the town with my
own men; but to prevent any more reinforcements coming in or the enemy
escaping. I extended my lines as rapidly as possible to the extreme
right, and completed the investment of the place, leaving Gen. Garcia’s
forces in the rear of my right flank to scout the country for any
approaching Spanish reinforcements, a duty which his forces were very
competent to perform.
It had been reported that 8,000 Spanish troops had left Holquin for
Santiago. It was also known that there was a considerable force at San
Luis, twenty miles to the north.
In the battle of Santiago the Spanish navy endeavored to shell our
troops on the extreme right, but the latter were concealed by the
inequalities of the ground, and the shells did little, if any, harm.
Their naval forces also assisted in the trenches, having 1,000 on
shore, and I am informed they sustained considerable loss; among
others, Admiral Cervera’s chief-of-staff was killed. Being convinced
that the city would fall, Admiral Cervera determined to put to sea,
informing the French consul it was better to die fighting than to sink
his ships. The news of the great naval victory which followed was
enthusiastically received by the Army.
The information of our naval victory was transmitted under flag of
truce to the Spanish commander in Santiago on July 4th, and the
suggestion again made that he surrender to save needless effusion of
blood.
On the same date I informed Admiral Sampson that if he would force his
way into the harbor the city would surrender without any further
sacrifice of life. Commodore Watson replied that Admiral Sampson was
temporarily absent, but that in his (Watson’s) opinion the Navy should
not enter the harbor.
In the meanwhile letters passing between Gen. Toral and myself caused
the cessation of hostilities to continue. Each army, however, continued
to strengthen its intrenchments. I was still of the opinion the
Spaniards would surrender without much more fighting, and on July 6th
called Gen. Toral’s attention to the changed conditions, and at his
request gave him time to consult his home government. This he did,
asking that the British consul, with the employees of the cable
company, be permitted to return from El Caney to the city. This I
granted.
The strength of the enemy’s position was such I did not wish to assault
if it could be avoided.
An examination of the enemy’s works, made after the surrender, fully
justifies the wisdom of the course adopted. The intrenchments could
only have been carried with very great loss of life, probably with not
less than 6,000 killed and wounded.
NEGOTIATIONS WITH GENERAL TORAL.
On July 8th Gen. Toral offered to march out of the city with arms and
baggage, provided he would not be molested before reaching Holquin, and
to surrender to the American forces the territory then occupied by him.
I replied that while I would submit his proposition to my home
government. I did not think it would be accepted.
In the meanwhile arrangements were made with Admiral Sampson that when
the Army again engaged the enemy the Navy would assist by shelling the
city from ships stationed off Aguadores, dropping a shell every few
minutes.
On July 10th the 1st Illinois and the 1st District of Columbia arrived
and were placed on the line to the right of the Cavalry division. This
enabled me to push Lawton farther to the right and to practically
command the Cobre road.
On the afternoon of the date last mentioned the truce was broken off at
4 p.m., and I determined to open with four batteries of artillery and
went forward in person to the trenches to give the necessary orders,
but the enemy anticipated us by opening fire with his artillery a few
minutes after the hour stated. His batteries were apparently silenced
before night, while ours continued playing upon his trenches until
dark. During this firing the Navy fired from Aguadores, most of the
shells falling in the city. There was also some small arms firing. On
this afternoon and the next morning, we lost Capt. Charles W. Rowell,
2d Infantry, and one man killed, and Lieut. Lutz, 2d Infantry, and ten
men wounded.
On the morning of July 11th the bombardment by the Navy and my field
guns was renewed, and continued until nearly noon, and on the same day
I reported to the Adjutant General of the Army that the right of
Ludlow’s brigade of Lawton’s division rested on the bay. Thus our hold
upon the enemy was complete.
At 2 p. m. on this date, the 11th, the surrender of the city was again
demanded. The firing ceased, and was not again renewed. By this date
the sickness in the Army was increasing very rapidly, as a result of
exposure in the trenches to the intense heat of the sun and the heavy
rains. Moreover, the dews in Cuba are almost equal to rains. The
weakness of the troops was becoming so apparent I was anxious to bring
the siege to an end, but in common with most of the officers of the
Army, I did not think an assault would be justifiable, especially as
the enemy seemed to be acting in good faith in their preliminary
propositions to surrender.
On July 11th I wrote to General Toral as follows:
“With the largely increased forces which have come to me and the fact
that I have your line of retreat securely in my hands, the time seems
fitting that I should again demand of your excellency the surrender of
Santiago and of your excellency’s army. I am authorized to state that
should your excellency so desire, the Government of the United States
will transport the entire command of your excellency to Spain.”
General Toral replied that he had communicated my proposition to his
General-in-Chief, General Blanco.
July 12th I informed the Spanish commander that Major General Miles,
Commander-in-Chief of the American Army, had just arrived in my camp,
and requested him to grant us a personal interview on the following
day. He replied he would be pleased to meet us. The interview took
place on the 13th, and I informed him his surrender only could be
considered, and that as he was without hope of escape he had no right
to continue the fight.
On the 14th another interview took place, during which General Toral
agreed to surrender, upon the basis of his army, the 4th Army Corps,
being returned to Spain, the capitulation embracing all of Eastern
Cuba, east of a line passing from Aserraderos, on the south, to Sagua
de Tanamo, on the north, via Palma, Soriano. It was agreed
Commissioners should meet during the afternoon to definitely arrange
the terms of surrender, and I appointed Major Generals Wheeler and
Lawton and Lieutenant Miley to represent the United States.
The Spanish Commissioners raised many points, and were especially
desirous of retaining their arms. The discussion lasted until late at
night and was renewed at 9:30 o’clock next morning. The terms of
surrender finally agreed upon included about 12,000 Spanish troops in
the city and as many more in the surrendered district.
It was arranged that the formal surrender should take place between the
lines on the morning of July 17th, each army being represented by 100
armed men. At the time appointed, I appeared at the place agreed upon,
with my general officers, staff, and 100 troopers of the 2d Cavalry,
under Captain Brett. General Toral also arrived with a number of his
officers and 100 infantry. We met midway between the representatives of
our two Armies, and the Spanish commander formally consummated the
surrender of the city and the 24,000 troops in Santiago and the
surrendered district.
After this ceremony I entered the city with my staff and escort, and at
12 o’clock, noon, the American flag was raised over the Governor’s
palace with appropriate ceremonies.
The 9th Infantry immediately took possession of the city and perfect
order was maintained. The surrender included a small gunboat and about
200 seamen, together with five merchant ships in the harbor. One of
these vessels, the Mexico, had been used as a war vessel, and had four
guns mounted on it.
In taking charge of the civil government, all officials who were
willing to serve were retained in office, and the established order of
government was preserved as far as consistent with the necessities of
military rule.
I soon found the number of officials was excessive, and I greatly
reduced the list, and some departments were entirely abolished.
A collector of customs, Mr. Donaldson, arrived soon after the
surrender, and, due to his energy and efficiency, this department was
soon working satisfactorily. The total receipts had, up to my
departure, been $102,000.
On August 4th I received orders to begin the embarkation of my command
and ship them to Montauk Point Long Island, New York. The movement
continued without interruption until August 25th, when I sailed for
Montauk with the last troops in my command, turning over the command of
the district to Major General Lawton.
DIFFICULTIES ENCOUNTERED IN THE CAMPAIGN.
Before closing my report I wish to dwell upon the natural obstacles I
had to encounter and which no foresight could have overcome or
obviated. The rocky and precipitous coast afforded no sheltered landing
places, the roads were mere bridle-paths, the effect of the tropical
sun and rains upon the unacclimated troops was deadly, and a dread of
strange and unknown diseases had its effect on the Army.
At Baiquiri the landing of the troops and stores was made a small
wooden wharf, which the Spaniards tried to burn, but unsuccessfully,
and the animals were pushed into the water and guided to a sandy beach
about 200 yards in extent. At Siboney the landing was made on the beach
and at a small wharf erected by the engineers.
I had neither the time nor the men to spare to construct permanent
wharves.
In spite of the fact that I had nearly 1,000 men continuously at work
on the roads, they were at times impassable for wagons.
The San Juan and Aguadores rivers would often suddenly rise so as to
prevent the passage of wagons, and then the eight pack trains with the
command had to be depended upon for the victualing of my Army, as well
as the 20,000 refugees, who could not in the interests of humanity be
left to starve while we had rations.
Often for days nothing could be moved except on pack trains.
After the great physical strain and exposure of July 1st and 2d, the
malarial and other fevers began to rapidly advance throughout the
command, and on July 4th the yellow fever appeared at Siboney. Though
efforts were made to keep this fact from the Army, it soon became
known.
The supply of Quartermaster and Commissary stores during the campaign
was abundant, and notwithstanding the difficulties in landing and
transporting the ration, the troops on the firing line were at all
times supplied with its coarser components, namely, of bread, meat,
sugar, and coffee.
There was no lack of transportation, for at no time up to the surrender
could all the wagons I had be used.
In reference to the sick and wounded, I have to say that they received
every attention that was possible to give them. The medical officers,
without exception, worked night and day to alleviate the suffering,
which was no greater than invariably accompanies a campaign. It would
have been better if we had had more ambulances, but as many were taken
as was thought necessary, judging from previous campaigns.
The discipline of the command was superb, and I wish to invite
attention to the fact that not an officer was brought to trial by court
martial, and, as far as I know, no enlisted men. This speaks volumes
for an Army of this size and in a campaign of such duration.
In conclusion, I desire to express to the members of my staff my thanks
for their efficient performance of all the duties required of them, and
the good judgment and bravery displayed on all occasions when demanded.
I submit the following recommendations for promotion, which I earnestly
desire to see made. It is a very little reward to give them for their
devotion and fearless exposure of their lives in their country’s cause:
E. J. McClernand, Lieutenant Colonel and Adjutant General, U. S. A., to
be brevetted Colonel for gallantry in the face of the enemy on the 1st
and 2d of July, and to be brevetted Brigadier General for faithful and
meritorious service throughout the campaign.
Geo. McC. Derby, Lieutenant Colonel of Engineers, U. S. V., to be
brevetted Colonel for hazardous service on July 1st and 2d in
reconnoitering the enemy’s lines, and to be brevetted Brigadier General
for hazardous and meritorious service in ascending, under a hot fire,
in a war balloon on July 1st, thus gaining valuable information.
J. D. Miley, Lieutenant Colonel and Inspector General, U. S. A., to be
brevetted Colonel for conspicuous gallantry in the battle of San Juan
on July 1st, and to be brevetted Brigadier General for faithful and
meritorious service throughout the campaign.
R. H. Noble, Major and Adjutant General, U. S. V., to be brevetted
Lieutenant Colonel for faithful and meritorious service throughout the
campaign.
J. J. Astor, Lieutenant Colonel and Inspector General, U. S. V., to be
brevetted Colonel for faithful and meritorious service during the
campaign.
B. F. Pope, Lieutenant Colonel and Surgeon, U. S. V., to be brevetted
Colonel for faithful and meritorious service during the campaign.
Maj. S. W. Groesbeck, Judge Advocate, U. S. A., to be brevetted
Lieutenant Colonel for faithful and meritorious service throughout the
campaign.
Charles F. Humphrey, Lieutenant Colonel, Quartermaster’s Department, to
be brevetted Brigadier General for faithful and meritorious service
throughout the campaign.
John F. Weston, Colonel and Assistant Commissary General of
Subsistence, Chief Commissary, to be brevetted Brigadier General for
meritorious service throughout the campaign.
C. G. Starr, Major and Inspector General, U. S. V., to be brevetted
Lieutenant Colonel for faithful and meritorious service throughout the
campaign.
Leon Roudiez, Major and Quartermaster, U. S. V., to be brevetted
Lieutenant Colonel for faithful and meritorious conduct throughout the
campaign.
H. J. Gallagher, Major and Commissary of Subsistence, U. S. V., to be
brevetted Lieutenant Colonel for faithful and meritorious service
throughout the campaign.
Capt. Brice, Commissary of Subsistence, U. S. V., to be brevetted Major
for faithful and meritorious service throughout the campaign.
E. H. Plummer, Captain, U. S. A., A. D. C., to be brevetted Major for
faithful and meritorious service throughout the campaign.
J. C. Gilmore, Jr., Captain and Assistant Adjutant General, U. S. V.,
to be brevetted Major for faithful and meritorious service during the
campaign.
W. H. McKittrick, Captain and Assistant Adjutant General, U. S. V., to
be brevetted Major for faithful and meritorious service during the
campaign.
Capt. Johnson, Assistant Quartermaster, U. S. V., to be brevetted Major
for faithful and meritorious service during the campaign.
I wish to invite special attention to Dr. G. Goodfellow, of New York,
who accompanied me throughout the campaign and performed much
professional service as well as duties as Volunteer aid. I recommend
him for favorable consideration of the War Department.
Mr. G. F. Hawkins, of New York, also accompanied me as Volunteer aid,
and I recommend him for favorable consideration of the War Department
for faithful and important services rendered.
My thanks are due to Admiral Sampson and Captain Goodrich, U. S. N.,
for their efficient aid in disembarking my Army. Without their
assistance it would have been impossible to have landed in the time I
did.
I also express my warmest thanks to division, brigade, and regimental
commanders, without exception, for their earnest efforts in carrying
out my wishes and for the good judgment they invariably displayed in
handling their troops.
The reports of the division commanders are attached hereto, and those
of the brigade and regimental commanders forwarded herewith, and
attention respectfully invited to them. Very respectfully,
_Wm. R. Shafter_, Major-General, United States Volunteers, Commanding
United States Forces in Cuba.
Adjutant General of the Army, Washington, D. C.
APPENDIX III.
Bivouac, near Santiago, Cuba, July 23, 1898.
_The Adjutant-General U. S. Army, Washington, D. C._
Sir,—In compliance with orders I have the honor to submit the following
report of my command, the Gatling Gun Detachment, 5th Army Corps,
covering its operations down to the present date:
1. Organization.—Pursuant to instructions from Gen. Shafter I was given
a detail of two sergeants and ten men on the 26th of May, 1898, from
the 13th Infantry, then in camp near Tampa, Fla., and directed to
report to 1st Lieut. John T. Thompson, O. D., ordinance officer, Tampa,
“for duty with Gatling guns.” I was placed in charge of four guns,
model 1895, cal. 30, and at once began the instruction of the
detachment. On June 1st I received verbal instruction to assist Lieut.
Thompson in his work at the ordinance depot, and performed this duty in
addition to my duties with the guns until June 6, 1898, superintending
issues to the expedition (5th Corps) then fitting out for Cuba.
On June 6th I took my men and guns aboard the transport Cherokee, and
on June 11th, per special orders No. 16 of that date, my detail was
increased to thirty-seven men, all told, of whom one was left sick in
hospital at Tampa. About twelve of these did not join me, however,
until after debarkation at Baiquiri, Cuba. On June 25th I received
verbal instructions from Gen. Shafter to disembark at once, select the
necessary number of mules (two per gun), and get to the front as soon
as possible, reporting on my arrival there to Gen. Wheeler, then in
command of all the troops at the front. I was unable to obtain any
tentage for myself, and had only shelter-tents for my men.
I was joined on June 25th by Capt. Henry Marcotte, 17th Infantry,
retired, regularly authorized correspondent of the Army and Navy
Journal, who has been with me ever since, enduring all the vicissitudes
of the season with Spartan fortitude, although equally destitute of
cover as myself and 60 years of age. I desire to express here
officially and fully, my sincere gratitude for the kindness which
permitted him to accompany my command, and the great appreciation of
the valuable advice and assistance which he has given continually. His
large experience of war, his clear head and good judgment have always
been at hand to aid, and his cool example to myself and my men under
fire did much to steady us and keep us up to our work when we were
first called on to face that ordeal.
All of the detachments, who had not previously joined me, did so on
June 26th, on which day I reached the extreme front and reported to
Gen. Wheeler. The guns were posted in a position to sweep the
neighboring hills toward the enemy, and I went into camp, remaining
there until the morning of July 1st.
Summing up the organization, it should be stated here that the
detachment was organized at the first, and has ever since remained an
independent command, receiving its orders directly from the corps
commander. It has had its own records, returns, rolls, etc., and has
been rationed separately all the time, and is composed of men selected
by myself from various regiments.
2. The Battery in Action.—On the morning of July 1st, I broke camp at
4:30 a.m., and pursuant to instructions from Gen. Shafter, proceeded to
El Poso, placing my battery, as I shall henceforth call it, in support
behind the position taken by a battery of artillery. I took this
position about 6 a.m., and soon after the artillery arrived, went on to
battery and opened fire at Santiago, the range being 2,600 yards. After
some time the enemy replied with a well-directed fire, the second shell
bursting directly over my battery in rear of artillery. Neither my men
nor mules showed any signs of disturbance, and we remained in our
perilous position nearly twenty minutes, the enemy’s shells bursting
all around us, until ordered to the rear by the chief-of-staff. The
battery went to the rear under fire quietly until out of range, and
remained there until the artillery fire ceased, at about 9 a.m. Private
Hoft, Company D, 13th Infantry, a member of the detachment who had been
detailed to guard the camp equipage at El Poso, remained at his post
during the whole of the artillery fight, and deserves great credit
therefor, his battery having been ordered to the rear. At 9 a.m. I
returned to El Poso, and there received the following instructions from
Col. McClernand, A. A. G., 5th Corps: “Find the 71st N. Y. V. and go on
with them, if you can. If this is not practical, find the best position
you can, and use your guns to the best advantage.” Pursuant to these
instructions, I went forward about a half-mile and found the 71st N. Y.
V. halting to learn what their instructions were. I could get no clear
idea of what they were going to do, but waited about fifteen minutes in
their rear to find out. Meantime troops continually passed us toward
the front. Then, about 10:15, firing began in front. I rode forward
alone along the rode, which was a narrow defile through the jungle, and
found that about a half-mile in front was a creek, upon the crossing of
which the enemy’s fire seemed concentrated. In front of this crossing
seemed to be a level plain of about 400 to 800 yards, beyond which was
a semi-circular ridge crowned with Spanish trenches from which the
Spanish fire seemed to come. Men were being hit continually at this
place (the ford), but it seemed to me to be a good place to work my
battery effectively.
I rode back, finding the Seventy-first still lying beside the road
without any apparent intention of moving. I determined to leave them
and go into action. Taking a gallop I moved the battery forward nearly
to the ford (about 150 yards), where I met Col. Derby of Gen. Shafter’s
staff, who informed me that the troops were not yet sufficiently
deployed to take advantage of my fire, and advised me to wait. The
bullets were cutting through all around, and, as we learned afterward,
the enemy’s sharpshooters were actually in the woods near us, up in
tall trees, picking off officers and men. It should be stated here that
the sudden increase of the enemy’s fire at this time was caused by a
wild cheering set up by the 71st N. Y. V., as the battery passed them
on its way to the front. The cheering located our position for the
enemy and drew his fire. Many a brave soldier who had gone to the front
was put forever beyond the possibility of cheering by this outburst of
ignorant enthusiasm.
I acted on Col. Derby’s advice, and he promised to send me word when
the moment for proper action came. This was necessary, as I knew only
part of the plan of battle and might have jeopardized other parts of
prematurely exposing our strength at this point. The gun crews lay down
under their guns and steadily remained at this posts. The fire finally
grew so hot that I moved about 100 yards back. This was about 12, noon.
At 1 p. m., or about that time, I received a message sent by Col.
Derby, I think, as follows: “Gen. Shafter directs that you give one of
your guns to Lieut. Miley, take the others forward beyond the ford
where the dynamite gun is, and go into action at the best point you can
find.” I obeyed the order, giving Lieut. Miley Sergeant Weigle’s gun
and crew and moving the rest forward at a gallop to the point beyond
the ford, which I had already selected as a good place. The battery
opened with three guns simultaneously at ranges of 600 to 800 yards at
1:15 p. m. The enemy at first concentrated his fire upon us, but soon
weakened and in five minutes was clambering from his trenches and
running to the rear. We fired as rapidly as possible upon the groups
thus presented until I saw a white handkerchief waved by some one of my
own regiment, the 13th Infantry, and at the same moment Capt. Landis,
1st Cavalry, who had voluntarily assisted me throughout, said: “Better
stop; our own men are climbing up the ridge.” I ordered the fire to
cease at 1:23 1/2 p.m., and a moment later saw our own troops occupy
the crest of the hill. The firing had been, continued by the battery
until our own troops were within 150 yards of the enemy’s trench, a
fact made possible by the steep slope of the hill upon which the enemy
had been.
At the time when my battery went into action I had no support, and the
position I took was at least 100 yards in front of any of our troops
along this part of the line. About the time I ceased firing Lieut.-Col.
Baldwin, 10th Cavalry, put two troops in support of my battery.
I have advanced in a letter to the Adjutant General from Fort
Leavenworth, dated January 1st, 1898, the theory that such guns as
these can be used offensively. The conditions of this assault were
favorable, the morale of my men superb, and the use made of the guns
followed the theory therein set forth with the exactness of a
mathematical demonstration. The infantry and cavalry had been pounding
away for two hours on these positions; in eight and one-half minutes
after the Gatlings opened the works were ours. Inspired by the friendly
rattle of the machine guns, our own troops rose to the charge; while
the enemy amazed by our sudden and tremendous increase of fire, first
diverted his fire to my battery, and then, unable to withstand the hail
of bullets, augmented by the moral effect of our battery fire and the
charging line, broke madly from his safe trenches and was mercilessly
cut by fire from these guns during his flight.
I at once limbered up and took stock of my losses. One man was killed,
one badly wounded, one mule hit twice, but not much injured, and
several men were missing.
Suddenly the fire was resumed at the front. I moved my three pieces
forward again at a gallop, and went into action on the skirmish line on
top of the captured position, with two pieces to the right and one to
the left of the main road from El Poso to Santiago. I was compelled to
make the skirmishers give way to the right and left in order to get
room for my guns on the firing-line, and to impress stragglers to carry
ammunition. Capt. Ayres, 10th Cavalry, gave me a detail of one sergeant
and two privates, all of whom did fine service. It seemed to me that
the enemy was trying to retake the position. About 4 to 4:14 p. m. I
saw a body, apparently about 400, of the enemy to the right front of my
position, apparently in front of the position occupied by Lieut.-Col.
Roosevelt with the 1st Volunteer Cavalry. I turned a Gatling gun on
them, using 600-yard range, and they disappeared. Soon after the firing
sensibly slackened.
In the rapid fire on this last body of the enemy I had overheated one
piece, and it went temporarily out of action. I went over to Col.
Roosevelt’s position, about a quarter of a mile to the right of a
salient, and reconnoitered. While there Sergeant Weigle reported to me
with his piece, informing me that Lieut. Miley had not put it into
action, and asked for instructions. This was about the hour of 5 p. m.,
and the fire became warmer at that moment. I directed Sergeant Weigle
to run his piece up on the firing-line and to report to the officer in
charge thereof. He did so and went into action at once. Col. Roosevelt,
who was and remained present, informs me that the gun was very
effectively used. I rejoined my other two guns and put both of them on
the line at the left of the El Poso road. At sundown the enemy made a
sharp attack, and all three of my guns were effectively used. During
the fight a battery in the city opened on my two guns, firing 16 cm.
shells. I at once turned my guns on it and kept up so warm a fire that
the cannoneers left their battery and did not return. In all they had
fired three shells at us, all of which broke just over or beyond the
battery. I secured the fuse of one, still warm, and after the surrender
visited the battery which had fired at us and examined the gun. It is a
16 cm. (6.2992 inches) bronze rifle gun in barbette on a pintle. This
is probably the first time in land fighting that such a piece was ever
silenced by machine-gun fire. The range I used was 2,000 yards
(estimated).
The guns were used during the remainder of the fighting in the
trenches. I took off the wheels and put the guns on the carriages in
emplacements, erecting a sandbag parapet in front as cover during the
night of July 4th. The disabled gun was brought up and repaired,
subsequently participating in the fighting. The dynamite gun, under
Sergeant Borrowe, 1st Volunteer Cavalry, cooperated with the battery
thus formed, and the whole battery, including the two Colt automatic
rapid-fire guns under Lieut. Tiffany, 1st United States Volunteer
Cavalry, did good work in all the subsequent fighting. I supplied about
eight thousand rounds of captured Mauser cartridges to Tiffany, which
had been captured by my battery, and which he used effectively in his
Colt’s guns. I had a strong fire directed upon a battery of seven
pieces of the enemy’s artillery at a distance of 1,500 yards in front
every time any attempt was made to use this battery. The result was
that only three shots were fired from these guns after July 4th. I
visited this battery after the surrender and found every gun in working
order, the 16 cm. gun being actually loaded. As no organization, except
my battery, of which I had general direction, had such orders, so far
as I can learn, the conclusion is that this battery of machine guns
kept out of action seven pieces of the enemy’s artillery by making it
too warm for his gunners to stay in their batteries.
I have made certain recommendations in hasty reports for gallantry,
which I personally witnessed. They were as follows:
Capt. J. R. F. Landis, 1st Cavalry, medal of honor. Volunteered to
assist observation of fire July 1st, and rendered great service at
imminent peril of his life made necessary in order to render such
service.
Sergeant John N. Weigle, 9th Infantry, 2d Lieutenant U. S. Army
(regulars). For conspicuous daring, intelligence, and coolness in
action, July 1st.
Corporal Charles C. Steigenwald, 13th Infantry, 2d Lieutenant U. S.
Army (regulars). For coolness and judgment in keeping his gun in action
with only one man to help on July 1st.
Private Fred C. Elkins, 17th Infantry, 2d Lieutenant United States
Volunteers. For conspicuous daring and courage in action. Although
wounded, he remained at his post until he fell from exhaustion, July
1st.
Corporal Matthew Doyle, 13th Infantry, medal of honor. Conspicuous
gallantry and coolness in action. When, two men had been shot down by
his side he continued to work his gun effectively alone until
assistance arrived, July 1st.
Sergt. Green, Company H, 13th Infantry, medal of honor. Conspicuous
coolness and steadiness in handling his piece under hot fire, July 1st.
Sergt. John Graham, 10th Cavalry, medal of honor. Conspicuous coolness
and steadiness under fire, July 1st.
Sergt. Weischaar, Company A, 13th Infantry, certificate of merit.
Particularly meritorious steadiness, night of July 6th. Being put on
outpost duty with a Gatling gun in time of truce, and having been
alarmed by a sentinel, whose duty it was to warn him of the enemy’s
approach, he coolly reserved his fire for personal investigation and
prevented a violation of the truce.
Sergt. Ryder, Company G, 13th Infantry, certificate of merit.
Particularly meritorious steadiness, night of July 6th. Being on
outpost duty with a Gatling gun in time of truce, and having been
alarmed by a sentinel, whose duty it was to warn him of the enemy’s
approach, he coolly held his fire for personal investigation and
prevented a violation of the truce.
In making these recommendations, I have limited myself to those which I
personally observed. If I recommended for every deserving act, there is
not a man in my whole detachment who has not deserved a certificate of
merit. They were selected in the beginning from an army corps for what
I knew of them, and they have abundantly justified my confidence in
them. With a less efficient personnel it would have been absolutely
impossible to organize, equip and instruct the first battery of Gatling
guns ever used in the history of war, in the short space of time
allotted me, and put it in efficient fighting shape. They fought their
guns on the skirmish line and in advance of it, standing boldly up to
do it when the skirmishers themselves lay down close for cover. My
loss, as footed up on the night of July 1st, was 33 1-3 per cent,
killed, wounded, and missing. The efficiency of the work of my guns was
attested to me by numerous Spanish officers and prisoners. Their
favorite expression was: “It was terrible when your guns opened,
always. They went b-r-r-r-r, like a lawn mower cutting the grass over
our trenches. We could not stick a finger up when you fired without
getting it cut off—so!”
The work of this experimental battery proves that in this weapon we
have a new arm supplementary to infantry and cavalry, independent of
both as one arm is of another, and more nearly capable of independent
action than any other arm of the service. It is equally demonstrated
that this new arm is entirely different from artillery in its
functions, and can live where the latter is compelled to retire.
It should, therefore, be organized as a separate arm. I have, at the
request of General Wheeler, drawn up a scheme of such an organization
and submitted it to him.
Experience shows me that the carriage is too heavy. I can only renew
the representations contained in my letter of January 1, 1898, to the
Adjutant General, accompanying drawing, etc., of my proposed carriage
for machine guns. I would now, based on experience, modify my theory of
organization as then proposed, and would make several changes in the
model of carriage then proposed without departing from the general
principles.
If any expression of such views is desired, I shall be very glad to
submit them when called upon by the War Department to do so.
Very respectfully,
_John H. Parker_, 2d Lieut., 13th Infantry, Commanding Gatling Gun
Detachment, 5th Corps.
INDEX.
CHAPTER I.
L’ENVOI.
Record of the Detachment The New Arm of the Service
CHAPTER II.
INCEPTION OF THE SCHEME.
Conditions at Tampa Florida Climate and its Effects Description of the
Gatling Gun Difficulties Encountered Politics at Tampa First Efforts to
obtain Authority Original Plan of Organization Tactical Employment of
Machine Guns A Lucky Accident The First Detail
CHAPTER III.
THE ORDNANCE DEPOT.
Defects in the Guns Instruction of the Detachment Status of the
Detachment Interview with General Wheeler General Wheeler’s Views
Interview with General Lee Issues of Ordnance Fire in the Magazine
Embarkation
CHAPTER IV.
THE VOYAGE AND DISEMBARKATION.
A Night Alarm on Transport Decisive Interview with General Shafter The
Official Authority at Last Condition of Transports Disembarkation
Private J. Shiffer—Corral Boss The Missouri Mule The First March
CHAPTER V.
THE MARCH.
The 13th Infantry Detail The Cuban Guide The Cuban as He Is Roads in
Cuba Private Jones and the Scorpion The Medical Department The
Newspaper Fraternity Chaplain Springer Arrival at the Front
CHAPTER VI.
THE BATTERY IN CAMP WHEELER.
Theory and Practice of Artillery and Machine Gun The Problem Presented
to this Detachment Personnel of the Detachment Roster on July 1st
Captain Marcotte Oil for an Army Futile Plans
CHAPTER VII.
THE BATTLE.
The Plan of Battle by General Shafter Did General Shafter Capture
Santiago? HE DID The Night Before the Battle El Poso The Final
Instructions The 71st New York Waiting for the Decisive Moment In
Action at Last The Killed and Wounded On the Skirmish Line
Reconnaissance Weigle Gets His Opportunity The Gatlings Knock out a
Heavy Battery The Brunettes The Artillery
CHAPTER VIII.
TACTICAL ANALYSIS OF THE BATTLES AT SANTIAGO.
El Caney San Juan Movements of Lawton’s Division The Gatlings as a
Tactical Reserve Sergeant William Tiffany The Night Alarm The Dynamite
Gun The Mortar Battery Summary of Tactical Deductions on use of Machine
Guns as Demonstrated in Battle
CHAPTER IX.
THE VOLUNTEERS.
The Surrender General Observations upon the Volunteers The 34th
Michigan The Rough Riders The 1st Illinois
CHAPTER X.
THE SUFFERINGS OF THE FIFTH ARMY CORPS.
The Difficulties of the Campaign Unnecessary Sufferings; the Causes The
Case of Private Elkins The Sick Left by Kent’s Division Some Staff—and
Some Others The Lesson to be Derived The General Staff—Proper
CHAPTER XI.
HOME AGAIN.
The Home Voyage The End of the Detachment
APPENDIX I
APPENDIX II
APPENDIX III