In such a campaign as that of Santiago, a certain amount of suffering
is inevitable. In such a climate as that of southern Cuba, a certain
amount of disease is unavoidable. In the very hot-bed of yellow fever
and malaria, no army could hope to escape without contracting these
diseases; and in a campaign conducted with the marvelous celerity of
the one at Santiago, some difficulty in forwarding supplies must
necessarily be encountered.
The root of all our difficulties lay in the fact that the commanding
general had under him supply departments whose officers reported to
heads of bureaus not under control of the corps commander. This caused
unnecessary delays in obtaining supplies, entailed confusion in their
distribution, and led to suffering beyond what was necessarily the
result of the climate and the campaign.
A brief description of the method of obtaining supplies will make this
point more clear. When a given article was wanted, whether it was soap,
quinine, tentage, or transportation, a requisition upon the chief of
the proper bureau at Washington had to be made, with full statement of
the reasons for the request; this requisition had to be approved by all
intermediate commanders and go through military channels to the chief
of the bureau, who might or might not be convinced of the necessity for
the article wanted. His action being endorsed thereon, the requisition
returned through the same devious route, and possibly might be followed
in course of time, either by invoices from some distant purchasing
agent of the required articles, or by directions of the bureau chief to
make further explanations. The usual length of time allowed for an
official communication through military channels, in time of peace at
home, from any regimental headquarters to Washington and return, is
from ten to thirty days. Here was the first cause of suffering.
If the heads of the supply departments in the field, beginning at
Tampa, could have acted promptly upon the orders of their respective
commanding officers, without the action of any other authority,
unnecessary delay would have been avoided.
To illustrate this point: The Gatling Gun Detachment was ordered to be
equipped with revolvers upon reporting to the detachment commander, and
this order was issued on the 11th of June, before sailing from Port
Tampa. They did not so report, and it devolved upon the detachment
commander to make requisition for the necessary equipment. This was
done, but no revolvers arrived. The invoices for revolvers reached the
detachment commander on the 15th of September, at Fort Leavenworth,
Kansas, where he was then, on leave of absence, sick, ten days after
the detachment was disbanded.
This is an extreme case, but the same difficulty was experienced in
obtaining supplies of all descriptions. It was, therefore, very
difficult for a quartermaster, a commissary, a medical officer, or any
other officer whose duty it was to obtain supplies, to have the same
when emergency demanded it. The necessity for supplies could not always
be foreseen, the quantity desired could not always be estimated for
with precision, and it followed that sometimes there was a deficiency
when the articles were needed.
Cieba Tree, under Which General Toral Surrendered.
Again, the transportation of the 5th Army Corps could not be made
available at first to carry supplies up from the landing-place. The
troops had drawn travel rations, which lasted them until they
disembarked. The first supply problem, upon landing, was that of
issuing rations; and, at the moment when every available boat was
engaged in carrying troops ashore, it became necessary to put rations
ashore also. The exigency demanded the speedy disembarkation of the
greatest possible number of men. The fight of La Guasimas emphasized
the necessity of getting men to the front. It was no time to delay the
movement of troops for the purpose of waiting on wagons, tentage, or
rations. The safety of the expedition, the fate of the whole campaign,
depended upon energetic and rapid movement to the front. Consequently
regiments were put forth with only such amounts of rations and tentage
as they could carry upon their backs. It will be readily seen that this
amount was very limited, and the only tentage possible was the shelter
tent.
There were 118 wagons in the hold of the Cherokee, but it was not
practicable to delay the disembarkation of the corps and hazard the
fate of the whole campaign by utilizing the only wharf and all the
boats two or three days to land these wagons. By the time they could be
taken off, the rains had made the roads almost impassable, and they
could not all be used. It was therefore a daily struggle to get enough
rations forward to feed the fighting-line from day to day. Greatly to
the credit of those who performed the duty, it can be said that, with
rare exceptions, all the soldiers of the 5th Army Corps had every day,
when they could possibly cook the same, hardtack and bacon, roast beef,
and coffee. This much was accomplished in the face of insurmountable
obstacles by the heroic exertions of the pack-train. When the 1st of
July arrived, and the battle began, it was ordered that all soldiers
carry three days’ rations. The heat was intense, the fight exceedingly
hot, and marching through the jungle extremely difficult. The
consequence was that the soldiers threw aside all impedimenta in order
to fight more effectively, and, of course, the rations went with the
blankets and the overcoats. The man who held on to a canteen and
haversack was fortunate; very many abandoned the haversack, and a
considerable number abandoned everything except rifle and ammunition.
That was what won the fight; but it made hungry men, and it caused men
to sleep on the wet ground under the open sky, without blankets or
tentage. The pack-train continued its magnificent work. During the
fighting it had to bring ammunition. The men were supposed to have
three days’ rations. As soon as the deficiency became known to the
higher officials, the pack-train began to bring food. Commissary depots
were established immediately in rear of the firing-line, and issues of
hardtack, bacon, and coffee, which were about the only components of
the ration that could be brought forward in sufficient quantities, were
made without formality or red tape. It was almost impossible to get a
sufficient quantity of even these components to the front. Sometimes
the ration was a little short. Bacon and hardtack for seventeen
consecutive days, after three weeks of travel ration, do not form the
most appetizing diet in the world. The exposure consequent upon the
fighting and lack of tentage had its inevitable result in sickness.
The same difficulties which had beset the quartermaster and commissary
departments were also encountered by the surgeons. Hospital
accommodations were scanty, the quantity of medicines available was
very limited, the number of wounded men disproportionately large, and,
when sickness was added to the wounds, the small number of surgeons
available at the front were not able to give the individual attention
and scientific treatment which forms a part of our admirable medical
system in time of peace. There were only three or four ambulances
available until after the 11th of July. A considerable number of the
surgeons were on duty at the general hospitals far in the rear; the
number at the front was not sufficient to attend to all the duties
which devolved upon them. This deplorable condition reacted, causing a
greater amount of illness. To add to this difficulty, the Volunteers
began to suffer excessively from the results of their own ignorance and
carelessness; and when the yellow fever scourge was added to all the
other difficulties which beset the 5th Corps, the outlook became
gloomy.
The attempt has been made in the foregoing exposition of the conditions
at Santiago to represent fairly the difficulties under which all parts
of the army labored. The fact remains, nevertheless, that there was an
appalling amount of suffering due to causes which might have been
foreseen and which were easily preventable.
Undergrowth in Cuba.
On the 18th day of July the transports entered the harbor of Santiago.
From that day forward there was unlimited wharfage at disposal, and
there were excellent macadamized roads leading to all parts of the
command. The fall of Santiago had been foreseen more than a week, and
if there was not a sufficient quantity of wagons present on board the
ships, there had been ample time to make telegraphic requisition for
them to Washington. Up to the surrender, the suffering from sickness
had been exceedingly light. There was something stimulating about the
nervous strain and excitement of the time which kept the men up to
their work; but the inadequacy of the medical supplies on hand had been
amply demonstrated by the 10th. and it had become fully apparent that
the medical corps was unable to handle the number of patients on hand.
The previous remark about the practicability of telegraphing to
headquarters for additional force applies to this department also.
The principal sufferings after the surrender were due to four causes:
first, improper clothes; second, improper food; third, lack of shelter;
fourth, lack of proper medical attention.
In regard to clothing and these other necessaries, it should be borne
in mind that the corps which went to Santiago was virtually the Regular
Army. Every regiment which went to Tampa went there ready for service.
Its equipment was just as complete on the 26th of April as it was on
the 6th of June. There should have been no problems to solve in regard
to them—and yet there were many.
_First—Clothing._
The troops wore the same clothing to Cuba they had brought from
Sheridan, Assinniboine, and Sherman. They wore winter clothing for
their service in the torrid zone, and those who received summer
clothing at all received it late in August, just in time to return to
the bracing breezes of Montauk Point, where, in their enfeebled
condition, winter clothing would have been more suitable. It did not
require a professor of hygiene to foresee that the winter clothing used
in northern Michigan would not be suitable for campaigning in southern
Cuba in July; or that summer clothing suitable for southern Cuba would
be too light for men returning to the northern part of Long Island. Is
it to be concluded that it was impossible to obtain summer clothing for
18,000 men between the 26th of April and the 6th of June?
_Second—Improper Food._
Most of the troops were embarked upon the transports by the 10th of
June. Their food on transport consisted of the travel ration: canned
roast beef, canned baked beans, canned tomatoes, and hardtack, with
coffee, were the components. They subsisted upon this food, imprisoned
in fetid holds of foul transports, unfit for the proper transportation
of convicts, until the 25th day of June, when they disembarked. On
drawing rations for the field it was found that the field ration would
be of the same components, with the addition of bacon and minus the
baked beans and tomatoes. During the emergency, up to include the 18th
day of July, this was the ration. Occasionally a few cans of tomatoes
found their way to camp, but rarely. The ration was always short, such
as it was, but this the soldiers could have endured and did endure
without a murmur.
But on the 18th of July, with unlimited wharfage at a distance of two
miles and a half, with excellent roads, and with abundance of
transportation (see Gen. Shafter’s Official Report), and with surrender
foreknown for a sufficient length of time to have brought any quantity
of vegetables from New York City, the ration continued to be bacon,
canned beef, hardtack, and coffee. Finally, about the 25th of July,
small amounts of soft bread began to be doled out, and an occasional
issue of frozen fresh beef was made. It was soon demonstrated that not
sufficient fresh beef could be made available. The vegetables which had
been brought had nearly all spoiled on the transports. Hundreds of
barrels of potatoes and onions were unloaded upon the docks and were so
badly decayed as to make them useless. These vegetables had been
drifting about the Caribbean Sea and upon the Atlantic Ocean since the
9th and 10th of June. Occasionally it was practicable to get a quarter
or a half ration of potatoes and half of the usual allowance of canned
tomatoes, but that was all.
It did not require a professor of hygienic dietetics to predict that
men fed in the tropics upon a diet suited to the icy shores of
Greenland would become ill, especially when they were clad in a manner
suited to the climate of Labrador. Are we to conclude that it was
impossible to get rice, beans, canned fruits, canned corn, and other
vegetables to take the place of potatoes and onions?
Cuban Residence.
_Third—Lack of Shelter._
The allowance of tentage was prescribed for each regiment. Granted that
it was impossible to get tentage up until after the surrender; yet it
should have been practicable to forward tentage over two and one-half
miles of macadamized roads. Yet whole regiments remained without
tentage until they embarked for the United States. The 13th Infantry
did not get tentage until the 5th of August. The 20th Infantry and the
3d Infantry obtained a portion of their tentage about the same time,
but a large part of these regiments remained under shelter tents until
they reembarked. The 1st Illinois and the 34th Michigan remained in
shelter tents until the 15th of August, at which time the author
embarked for the United States. These regiments are fair examples.
The Gatling Gun Detachment was provided with shelter-halves and
remained under them until the 10th of August. Repeated applications for
proper tentage were made, accompanied by medical certificates that the
issue of tentage was imperatively necessary for the health of the
command. Endorsements thereon by the chief quartermaster of the 5th
Corps as late as the 5th of August show that there was no available
tentage for issue. Application was made to the regimental commander,
13th Infantry, for a portion of regimental tentage for the detachment
of the 13th Infantry; but, in spite of the fact that the reduced
regiment had on hand all the canvas prescribed for the full regiment,
none could be obtained for the detachment. The detachment commander was
entirely without tentage from the 25th of June until the 5th of
August—forty-five days in the rainy season in Cuba, exposed to the
torrid sun by day, to chilling dews by night, and the drenching rains
of the afternoon, without shelter from any inclemencies of the weather,
and this in spite of repeated applications to proper authorities for
the suitable allowance of tentage. Is it any wonder that men grew sick,
and that death stalked broadcast through the camp of the 5th Corps,
under these conditions?
_Fourth—Lack of Proper Medical Attendance._
The surgeons who were at the front with the firing-line worked
heroically, but were burdened beyond their physical powers. Owing to
the foregoing causes, great numbers of men became ill as soon as the
strain and tension of the battle were relieved. It was not uncommon to
find twenty or twenty-five per cent of a command on the sick-report,
and in some cases the sick-list went as high as fifty per cent. There
were no well men in the 5th Army Corps. Those who refused to go on the
sick-report were, nevertheless, sick. The author has yet to find a
single member of the expedition who did not suffer from the climatic
fever. The surgeons themselves were not exempt, and the very limited
supply of doctors was speedily decreased by sickness. Were there no
doctors in the United States who were willing to come to Cuba?
Up to the 25th of July the supply of medicines was very deficient.
There was never a sufficient supply of ambulances. The accommodations
in the hospitals were even worse than those on the firing-line. A sick
soldier on the firing-line could always find some comrade who would cut
green boughs or gather grass for a bed, but the one who went to the
hospital had to lie on the ground. The supply of hospital cots was
ridiculously inadequate, and this condition did not improve.
The difficulty of obtaining adequate medical attendance may be
illustrated by the case of Priv. Fred C. Elkins, of the 17th Infantry,
member of the Gatling Gun Detachment. Priv. Elkins had been hurt in the
fight on the 1st of July and had been sent to the hospital. He found
the accommodations so wretched that he feigned improvement and returned
to his detachment. He remained with the detachment until the 14th of
July, improving so far as his injury was concerned, but contracted the
climatic fever. During this time he was prescribed for twice by the
assistant surgeon with the Rough Riders, Dr. Thorpe, previous to the
time this regiment was moved westward on the firing-line. His condition
became worse, and on the 12th of July Dr. Brewer, 1st lieutenant and
assistant surgeon with the 10th Cavalry, was called upon to examine
him. This surgeon had then under treatment over 100 cases pertaining to
his proper command, and was himself ill, but he readily came and
inspected the patient. He promised to send medicines for him, but in
the rush of overwork forgot to do so, and on the 13th of July he was
again summoned. This time he sent a hospital attendant to take the
patient’s temperature, which was 104°. No medicines were sent. On the
14th of July the patient became delirious. The detachment commander
went in person to request the same surgeon to attend to the case, he
being the only one available at that time. The hospital attendant was
again ordered to take the temperature. At the end of an hour even this
had been neglected. The hospital man was sick, and had been without
sleep for fifty hours. Priv. Elkins was put upon a board and carried to
Brewer’s tent, with his descriptive list in his pocket. The surgeon was
told the name of the patient and the facts that he was related to a
distinguished family and had been recommended for a commission for
gallantry upon the field of battle. Dr. Brewer was himself suffering at
the time, with a temperature of 103°, but he rose from his own sick-bed
and administered remedies which relieved the patient. The following
day, the third of his illness, Dr. Brewer was found to be suffering
from yellow fever, and was carried back to the yellow fever hospital at
Siboney along with Priv. Elkins. He had been sick all the time, but had
done his best. Priv. Elkins improved sufficiently to write a letter to
his commanding officer from the hospital at Siboney, on the 25th of
July, which reached that officer at Fort Leavenworth, Kansas, on the
12th day of September. In spite of the fact that the patient was
furnished with descriptive list, and was specially commended to the
care of the surgeon as a soldier marked for extreme gallantry, all
trace of him had been lost; and although two private detectives were
searching for him a month, no further clew had been found to his
whereabouts or fate as late as the 1st of October. Even if his
descriptive list had not been furnished with this man, the fact that he
was alive and rational enough on the 25th day of July to write a letter
concerning his approaching discharge should have made it easy for some
record of his case to have been kept.
But this one isolated case sinks into insignificance beside the
condition in which some of the sick were left by commands returning to
the United States. All cases of yellow fever suspects were left behind,
and in the mad scramble to embark for the return voyage many of these
were left without proper attention or supplies.
Gen. Kent’s Division had left by the 11th of August. The following
extract from a letter dated Santiago de Cuba, August 12, 1898, will
convey some idea of the condition in which the sick of this division
were left:
“Yesterday Gen. Kent’s Division left for Montauk, and they left behind
350 sick, many of them too ill to care for themselves. This humane
country, of course, left ample care for them? There was left one
surgeon, one steward, and one case of medicines. Many of these men are
too ill to rise. They are ‘suspected’ of having yellow fever. They are
suffering from Cuban malaria, and many of them from diarrhea. There was
not left a single bed-pan for this battalion of bed-ridden, suffering
humanity, nor any well men to nurse the sick. There was not even left
any to cook food for them. Those left by the 9th Infantry had to bribe
marauding, pilfering Cubans, with a part of their rations, to carry
food to the camp of the 13th, where there were a few less ill, to get
it cooked.
“They are too sick to dig sinks; some are delirious. When the poor
emaciated wrecks of manhood have to obey the calls of Nature, they must
either wallow in their own filth or stagger a few paces from their wet
beds on the slimy soil to deposit more germs of disease and death on
the surface already reeking with ghastly, joint-racking rheums.
“There were left less than fifty cots for these 350 sick men—men
compelled by sheer weakness to lie on the ground which will soon lie on
them, if enough strong men are left by that time to cover them
mercifully over with the loathsome, reeking vegetable detritus which
passes here for soil, and which is so fairly animate that you can see
every spadeful of it writhe and wriggle as you throw it over the
rotting hour-dead shell of what was a free American citizen and a
Chevalier Bayard.
“When the last man and wagon of the flying division disappeared over
the hill toward health and home, a despairing wail went up from the
doomed 350 left in this condition of indescribable horror. ‘We are
abandoned to die!’ they cried; ‘we are deserted by our own comrades in
the hour of danger and left to helplessly perish!’
“These men are those who fought the climate, hunger, and the enemy on
the battle-field which has shed so much undying glory on the American
arms. They are the men who have accomplished unheard-of feats of
endurance and performed incredible feats of valor on the same
ground—not for Cuba, but at the call of duty. They are citizens. They
are brave soldiers who have done their full duty because it was duty.”
Santiago Street Scene
The mail facilities were wretched. Cords of mail were stacked up at
Siboney for weeks; and although there was more transportation on hand
than could be used, the officer detailed to attend to the mail business
of the corps, Lieut. Saville, of the 10th Infantry, could not succeed
in securing a wagon to haul this mail to the front. Since the corps
returned to the United States a dozen letters have reached the author
which have chased him by way of Santiago and Montauk, since dates
between the 1st and 20th of July, inclusive. The person to whom these
letters were addressed was well known to every officer and employee in
the corps, and if the mail addressed to one so well known could go
astray in this manner, what could an unknown private expect? This may
seem like a little hardship, but to men in the weakened and enfeebled
condition of the survivors of the 5th Corps a letter from home was both
food and medicine. Scores of men who are to-day rotting in Cuban graves
died of nostalgia, and might have lived if they had received the
letters from home which were sent to them.