The situation of affairs on the night of the 1st of July was rather
critical. The plan which the general had laid down had been delayed in
execution at El Caney, while the impetuousity of the troops had
precipitated an unexpected rapidity of movement at San Juan. Capron’s
Battery had opened at El Caney about half past seven o’clock, with
badly aimed and ill-directed fire, which did very little damage to the
enemy. The troops engaged in this part of the battle were pushed
forward until, by about eleven o’clock, they had become pretty
thoroughly deployed around the vicinity of Las Guamas Creek. They had
also extended slightly to the right and to the left toward the Du
Cuorot house. The Spanish forts obstinately held out, and the handful
of Spanish soldiers in El Caney and vicinity stubbornly resisted the
attack made by our troops.
About nine o’clock, Hamilton’s right piece, No. 3 of Capron’s Battery,
succeeded in planting a shell directly in the old stone fort, which
knocked a hole in the masonry; but, just at this juncture, the battery
was ordered to cease firing at the blockhouse, and to shell the enemy’s
trenches. The enemy forthwith utilized the hole made in the wall by the
shell as a loop-hole, and continued to fire through it until the fort
was taken by the infantry assault at about half-past four o’clock. No
worse commentary than this could possibly be made upon the tactical
handling of this battery of artillery, because, having obtained
perfectly the range of the enemy’s stronghold, it was simply asinine
not to knock that block-house to pieces immediately.
So Lawton’s Division had remained in front of El Caney, held by about
1000 Spaniards, while the shadows crept from the west to the north,
from the north to the northeast, and from the northeast toward the
east. It was coming toward night before the artillery was finally
turned loose. One corner and the roof of this block-house were knocked
off, but even then the artillery was so poorly handled that the enemy
had to be dislodged from this block-house by hand-to-hand fighting, A
single Hotchkiss gun, properly handled, should have converted it into
ruins in thirty minutes.
While these events were transpiring, Kent and Wheeler, constituting the
left wing of the army, had moved forward on the El Poso road, parallel
to the Aguadores River, as far as the San Juan had captured the San
Juan farm-house, and had gradually deployed to the right and to the
left along the San Juan River. About one o’clock their line had swept
forward and had captured the first ridge between the San Juan and the
city of Santiago, the “San Juan ridge,” driving the enemy on this
portion of the field into their last trenches. But the right flank of
this wing was entirely unsupported, and the road by the way of Fort
Canosa to San Juan, passing by the portion of the line subsequently
occupied by the dynamite gun, marked the extreme position of the right
of this wing of the army. The enemy was already well toward its right,
and had the excellent El Caney road to move upon. He was thoroughly
familiar with the country, while the troops composing this wing were
exhausted by the charge. This wing had no reserve that the firing-line
knew of, and, as a matter of fact, had none except two battalions of
the 71st New York, which had not got into battle, and which were
scattered along the road from the San Juan River to Siboney.
The position occupied by the left wing of the army was a strong natural
position, but had no protection for the right flank. In this, Lawton’s
Division did not execute the part of the battle assigned to it. Thus
the officers on the San Juan ridge, who knew anything about the plan of
the battle, were constantly directing their gaze, at every lull in the
fighting, toward El Caney, and to the right of Gen. Wood’s position,
but there were no indications of the approach of Gen. Lawton.
Returning now to the right wing: the San Juan block-house and the ridge
in its vicinity having been captured, a glance at the map will show
that the retreat of the Spanish forces at El Caney was in imminent
danger of being cut off. This capture occurred at 1:23-1/2 p. m. The
Spanish commander at El Caney had been killed about noon, his men had
suffered heavily, and the new commanding officer discovered that his
retreat by the El Caney road was threatened. The only other line of
retreat was by way of the San Miguel and Cuabitas roads. The Spanish
forces at El Caney were also running low in their ammunition, and it
was therefore decided to withdraw. Portions of the Spanish troops did
withdraw, some by way of the El Caney road toward Santiago; the
remainder, some 350 or 400, were crushed in the final charge upon El
Caney, between 4 and 4:30 o’clock.
Gen. Lawton’s Division then proceeded down the El Caney road to Santa
Cruz, passing by way of the masonry bridge. This was about dusk. The
division marched in columns of fours, with the artillery in front in
column of sections, and without even an advance guard thrown out. The
artillery had passed the masonry bridge and had nearly reached the
Santa Cruz farm-house, when the order was given to halt. The division
halted in the road and began to cook supper. Fires were kindled, and
coffee put on to boil. Suddenly, a few shots came scattering over the
ridge and dropped in among the troops. A messenger was sent back to
Gen. Shafter to inform him that further advance in this direction was
not practicable, as the enemy had been encountered in force. The
position this division was destined, in the beginning, to occupy was
within less than 300 yards of where it halted. There was no large body
of Spanish troops in that portion of the field. The whole valley
between that ridge and Santiago had been swept by machine gun fire
during the afternoon. It is possible that there might hare been a few
Spanish pickets on the ridge, but this is not believed to be probable.
There was some firing about this time from the Spanish trenches near
Fort Canosa, at the 13th Infantry upon the hill where the dynamite gun
was subsequently placed. A glance at the map will show that these
shots, having passed over the hill, would drop in the vicinity of the
masonry bridge and the Santa Cruz farm-house. This was the firing that
alarmed Lawton’s Division and caused the report mentioned to be sent
back to General Shafter.
Native Industry.
This statement of the conditions has been necessary in order to
understand why the counter-march was made by Lawton’s Division. The
position at El Caney had ceased to be of any importance as soon as the
San Juan block-house and ridge were taken; any Spanish troops remaining
at El Caney were necessarily victims. But it was vitally important to
hold the position gained by the left wing. The appearance of a heavy
force of the enemy in front of the masonry bridge could signify only
one thing, and that was that the left wing, with its right flank in the
air, was liable to be doubled up at any moment by a heavy force of the
enemy striking it upon that flank. Further, that Gen. Lawton, with this
column advancing on the El Caney road as before explained, was liable
to be struck at the head of his column and similarly doubled up. The
enemy would thus interpose between the two wings of the army, cutting
Lawton off, and probably defeating the army in detail, unless something
be done immediately.
Of course, it is known now that this operation of the enemy was never
probable for an instant; but that was the status of affairs at midnight
on July 1st, as then reported to the commanding general.
Lawton was, therefore, ordered to withdraw, by way of the El Caney
road, back to Gen. Shafter’s headquarters in rear of El Poso, from
which position his division was rushed forward on the El Poso road to
San Juan on the 2d of July. His men were marched almost all night,
almost all day the next day, and were well-nigh utterly exhausted when
they reached a position in rear of the right flank of the left wing. It
was supposed, up to this time, at headquarters, that the information on
which this marching was ordered was correct.
During the time that Lawton had been countermarching from Santa Cruz,
back by way of El Poso, there had been, as before stated, no reserve
for the left wing. The independent division of Gen. Bates had been
ordered to the front as rapidly as possible. Part of it had reached the
vicinity of El Poso, and from there one or two of the regiments had
participated in the fight, late on July 1st; but nobody on the firing
line knew anything about Bates’ independent division at this time, and
it was too much exhausted to be useful as a reserve. The morning of the
2d it was used to extend the lines. It is therefore evident, now that
the history of the battle is understood, that the Gatling guns were the
only effective reserve which the left wing of the army had during the
night of July 1st and all day on the 2d.
Acting on this belief, the Gatling Gun Battery was placed in reserve,
in the rear of Fort Roosevelt, on the morning of July 2d, and was held
there in reserve all day on July the 2d and 3d. The pieces were placed
within twenty yards of the firing-line, just below the crest of the
hill. The feed-guides were filled, and the gun crews lay down beside
their pieces. The battery was ready to either support the firing-line
against a charge, or protect its flank against a turning movement. But
it was not considered necessary or desirable to run the pieces up on
the firing-line in the open, and participate in the trench-firing,
which was the only fighting done on July 2d and 3d. It was considered
that the battery was too valuable as a reserve to sacrifice any of its
men uselessly. Some very well-meaning officers urged that the battery
be rushed up on the hill and put into action, but this was stubbornly
refused, under the third clause of the instructions given on the 1st of
July, “to make the best use of the guns possible.” Gen. Wood and Col.
Roosevelt were consulted, and they concurred with the above views, and
the battery remained in reserve.
Charge on San Juan Hill.
On the morning of the 2d of July a handsome young soldier, in the
uniform of a Rough Rider, approached the battery commander, saluted,
and said, “Col. Roosevelt directs me to report to you with my two
guns.” Inquiry elicited the fact that the young trooper was Serg.
William Tiffany, that he had command of two Colt’s automatic rapid-fire
guns, with a crew consisting of Corp. Stevens and six men, and that he
had 4,000 rounds of 7-millimeter ammunition. Four thousand was not a
very large supply for two guns which could fire at the rate of 500
shots each per minute. Fortunately, the Gatling Gun Detachment had
found time, on the 1st of July, to collect about 10,000 rounds of
Mauser ammunition in the captured trenches, and a comparison of the
Mauser with the 7-millimeter ammunition at once disclosed the fact that
it was precisely the same ammunition which Tiffany had brought along
for his guns. The problem of ammunition supply for Tiffany’s guns was
solved. He now had 14,000 rounds, and his guns became a very powerful
reinforcement at this point.
Serg. Tiffany and his men had carried these guns from Siboney to the
firing-line upon their backs. How they got the four boxes of ammunition
through they themselves could hardly tell. The firing was too heavy to
mount the tripods in the trenches during the daytime, so placing the
guns was deferred until night. For some reason it was not practicable
to place the tripods on the night of the 2d, and they were finally
placed on the night of the 3d; Serg. Tiffany, with two of his men,
aiding in digging the emplacements.
While digging, suddenly a burst of firing broke out, and it was
believed by many that a serious night attack had been made. During the
firing, Capt. Ayers, of the 10th Cavalry, and Col. Roosevelt again
displayed those characteristics of fearless bravery which so endeared
these two gallant officers to their men. Some of the troops in the
trenches had begun to fire wildly. In fact, all the firing was done
wild; there was no sense in any of it; there was no occasion for it.
Intent listening to the enemy’s fire made it absolutely certain that
their firing never approached nearer our lines. There may have been
some small body seeking to explore the road, but there was no
indication of any attack in force. At any rate, Roosevelt and Ayers
determined to stop the firing of our line, and suddenly, above the din
of battle, these two officers could be heard, tramping up and down the
trench in front of their men, haranguing, commanding, ridiculing their
men for shooting in the dark. Ayers told his men that they were no
better than the Cubans, upon which the burly black troopers burst into
a loud guffaw, and then stopped firing altogether. Roosevelt told his
men that he was ashamed of them. He was ashamed to see them firing
valuable ammunition into the darkness of the night, aiming at nothing;
that he thought cowboys were men who shot only when they could see the
“whites of the other fellow’s eyes.” They also stopped firing. The
enemy’s bullets continued to whiz by for a few minutes, and they too
ceased firing, and everybody began to laugh at everybody else. Tiffany
had joined the two officers in their walk up and down, exposing himself
with the utmost coolness. He and his men now succeeded in placing his
guns in the trench, and, from that time until the end of the fight,
they could hardly be induced to leave them long enough to eat; they
didn’t leave them to sleep—they slept in the trench by the guns.
About one o’clock on the 3d there was a lull in the firing, during
which a flag of truce was sent with a communication to General Toral,
notifying him that a bombardment would follow unless he surrendered.
The firing was resumed and continued until about half past twelve on
the 4th of July, at which time another flag of truce went up, and there
was no more firing until the 10th of July at about three o’clock.
Troops, however, were compelled to lie on their arms; the relief was
constantly in the trenches, and the nervous strain was even worse than
the actual dangers of battle.
Negotiations for capitulation having failed, firing was resumed about
three o’clock on the 10th, and continued until one o’clock on the 11th
of July. In this firing all four of the Gatling guns were used;
Tiffany’s guns and the dynamite gun under Serg. Borrowe participated.
Three of the Gatling guns had been placed in the trench on the night of
July 3d. The wheels were taken off and laid on the ground in the rear
of the pieces; sand-bag revetments were built up in front of the guns,
and each crew divided into two reliefs. One relief was required to be
constantly at the gun and always ready for instant action. The fourth
gun, the one that had been temporarily disabled, was repaired on the
4th, thoroughly cleaned, and placed in reserve behind the crest of the
hill. On the 4th of July, Serg. Borrowe had been directed to obey any
instructions given him by the Gatling gun commander, and the dynamite
gun had been placed in position to cooperate with the battery of
machine guns. There were now, therefore, seven pieces in the battery.
It was the most powerful and unique battery ever used in battle.
Gatlings at Baiquiri Just Before Starting For the Front.
The Sims-Dudley pneumatic dynamite gun throws a Whitehead torpedo,
carrying a charge of four and one-half pounds of explosive gelatine;
the effective force of this charge is equal to that of nine pounds of
dynamite, No. 1. The charge explodes, on striking, by means of a
percussion fuse, and steadiness of flight is secured by means of a
vane. The propelling force is a charge of seven ounces of smokeless
powder. The gun is pointed in the same manner as a mortar, and fired in
the same manner as a field-piece. During the 10th and 11th considerable
attention was devoted to the tactical cooperation of the guns composing
this unique battery.
The plan adopted was for the dynamite gun to throw a shell toward a
designated point. Upon the explosion of this shell the Spanish soldiers
invariably exposed themselves, and were immediately assailed by machine
gun fire. Occasionally a dynamite shell would fall with sufficient
accuracy to do efficient work on its own account. On the afternoon of
the 10th a dynamite shell fell in a long trench near Fort Canosa,
clearing out the trench. The Spanish survivors were cut down almost to
a man by the machine gun fire, and the Spanish troops were unable to
occupy this trench until the following morning, when the operation was
repeated, practically destroying the usefulness of this trench during
the whole fight. Capt. Duncan, of the 21st Infantry, states that this
relieved his battalion of an enfilading fire, and was a valuable
service to them. Another dynamite shell, on the afternoon of the 10th,
fell into a Spanish battery of artillery, near the brick hospital, and
completely destroyed the battery, which consisted of two 3-inch guns.
In all, about a dozen dynamite shells were thrown with some degree of
accuracy, and with good effect.
The fourth Gatling gun, which had been held in reserve, was used during
the afternoon of July 10th, and all day on the 11th, to pour a vertical
fire upon the city of Santiago, beyond that portion that was visible to
the American troops. Perhaps 6,000 or 7,000 shots were thus dropped
into the heart of the city, making the streets unsafe, communication
difficult, and striking terror to the hearts of the Spanish troops who
were held there in reserve. Gen. Toral, in his official statement to
his own government, specifically mentions this fire as one of his
principal reasons for surrender.
On the afternoon of the 10th and during the 11th of July a battery of
mortars, under command of Capt. Ennis, posted about half a mile to the
right of the machine gun battery, threw a few shells at the enemy’s
intrenchments. There were four of these mortars in action and they were
placed behind the ridge in a perfectly safe position. They threw,
perhaps, twenty-five shells all told. The first eight or ten failed to
explode for the reason that the fuses had not been punched. Finally,
Capt. Ennis discovered that his shells were not exploding, and, on
inquiry, found that there was no fuse-punch in the battery. He
succeeded in finding a brad-awl, which, luckily, some member of the
battery had in his pocket, and showed a sergeant how to punch the fuse
with a brad-awl. After this the mortar shells exploded all right. None
of this fire, however, was directed at the city; it was directed at the
trenches of the enemy, and not over eight or ten of the shells fell
with any precision. The mortar fire was effective in the sense that it
tended to demoralize the enemy, but its material effect was very small.
There was no firing of field-pieces during all this time of which any
account is necessary. The field-pieces were even less useful during
this time than they were on the 1st of July, if such a thing could be
possible.
On the night of the 4th of July the reserve Gatling gun was posted to
command the Fort Canosa road, in support of a picket on that road, and
from that time until the surrender this piece was posted there every
night. The members, therefore, of this detachment did practically
double duty. This was the gun in charge of Sergts. Weischaar and Ryder,
referred to in the official report. Luckily, it was not fired, but
there can be no doubt of the immense value it would have had if its use
had been necessary.
Summing up the use of machine guns from the 2d to the 11th of July,
inclusive, it may be said that they demonstrated the use of the arm as
a tactical reserve and an auxiliary to an outpost, and that, in
combination with a dynamite gun, they demonstrated that a new arm of
the service had been formed which can live at closer range to the
enemy, and do far more effective work, than artillery. Nor is this all
to be considered. It should be remembered that a field-piece throws a
shell which breaks into 273 fragments. The machine gun throws 1000
shots, and each of these shots is aimed with absolute precision.
Therefore, at any effective range, the machine gun is far superior to a
field-piece against anything except material obstacles. Of course the
machine guns will not do to batter down stone walls, nor to destroy
block-houses. It had already been demonstrated on the 1st of July that
“machine guns can go forward with the charging-line to the lodgment in
the enemy’s position,” and that “their presence on the field of battle,
with a supply of ammunition for ten minutes, is a decisive factor in
the engagement.”
These were the principal points claimed for the machine gun in the
discussion of the subject on the 1st of January. The use of the machine
gun for advance and rear guards was not demonstrated at Santiago, for
the reason that no opportunity was presented.