At this point in the history of the detachment, it would be well to
give some account of the reasoning which led to its formation and the
personnel of the detachment.
Since the days of ’65 the armies of the civilized world have adopted a
rifle whose effective range is more than twice as great as that used in
the Civil War. Very able discussions have been made upon the
theoretical changes of the battle-field thus brought about, but no
proper conclusion had been reached. It was acknowledged by all
text-book writers that the artillery arm of the service would find much
greater difficulty in operating at short ranges, and that assaults upon
fortified positions would be much more difficult in the future. But
only Gen. Williston, of the United States Artillery, had ever taken the
advanced ground that in a machine gun arm would be found a valuable
auxiliary as a result of these changed conditions. This theory of Gen.
Williston’s was published in the _Journal of the Military Service
Institute_ in the spring of ’86, but never went, so far as Gen.
Williston was concerned, beyond a mere theory; nor had the detachment
commander ever heard of Gen. Williston’s article until after the battle
of Santiago.
Gatling Battery under Artillery Fire at El Poso.
A study of the science of tactics—not merely drill regulations, but
tactics in the broader sense of maneuvering bodies of troops upon the
battle-field—had led Lieut. Parker to the conclusion that the artillery
arm of the service had been moved back upon the battle-field to ranges
not less than 1500 yards. This not because of lack of courage on the
part of the Artillery, but as an inherent defect in any arm of the
service which depends upon draft to reach an effective position. It was
not believed that animals could live at a shorter range in anything
like open country. The problem of supporting an infantry charge by some
sort of fire immediately became the great tactical problem of the
battle-field. Admitting that the assault of a fortified position has
become much more difficult than formerly, the necessity of artillery
support, or its equivalent in some kind of fire, became correspondingly
more important, while under the conditions it became doubly more
difficult to bring up this support in the form of artillery fire.
The solution of this problem, then, was the principal difficulty of the
modern battle-field; and yet, strange to say, the curtailed usefulness
of artillery does not seem to have suggested itself to anybody else in
the service previous to the first day of July. This problem had been
made the subject of special study by him for several years, and had led
to the conclusion that some form of machine gun must be adopted to take
the place of artillery from 1500 yards down. This in turn led to the
study of machine guns. The different forms in use in the different
armies of the world had been considered, and it was found that there
was none in any service properly mounted for the particular use
desired. All of them required the service of animals as pack-mules, or
for draft, while the very conditions of the problem required a gun to
be so mounted that the use of animals could be dispensed with.
The Maxim gun has been reduced in weight to about 60 pounds, and is
furnished with a tripod weighing about the same; but this is too heavy,
and the supply of ammunition at once becomes a critical question. The
Colt’s automatic rapid-fire gun has been reduced to 40 pounds, with a
tripod of equal weight, but here again the same difficulty presents
itself. The soldier is capable of carrying only a limited amount of
weight; and with his already too heavy pack, his three days’ rations,
together with the heat, fatigue and excitement of battle, it did not
appear possible for any tripod-mounted gun to be effectively used.
The problem therefore resolved itself into the question of carriages: A
carriage capable of carrying any form of machine gun using
small-caliber ammunition, capable of being moved anywhere by draft,
capable of being dismantled and carried on a pack-mule, and, above,
all, capable of being moved by hand; required also some device for
getting the requisite amount of ammunition up to the firing-line. A
carriage and ammunition cart was invented fulfilling all these
conditions and the invention was presented to the adjutant-general of
the army for consideration, accompanied by a discussion of the proper
tactical use of the gun so mounted. This discussion, in part, was as
follows:
“It is claimed for this carriage that a machine gun mounted on it can
be carried with a firing-line of infantry on the offensive, over almost
any kind of ground, into the decisive zone of rifle fire and to the
lodgment in the enemy’s line, if one is made.
“On broken ground the piece can be moved forward by draft under cover
of sheltering features of the terrain to a position so near the enemy
that, under cover of its fire, an infantry line can effect a lodgment,
after which the piece can be rushed forward by a sudden dash.
“The machine gun, mounted on this carriage, is especially adapted for
service with the reserve of a battalion on the offensive, acting either
alone or in regiment. Its use will enable the commander to reduce the
reserve, thereby increasing the strength of the fighting-line, and yet
his flanks will be better protected than formerly, while he will still
have a more powerful reserve. If the fighting-line be driven back, the
machine guns will establish a point of resistance on which the line can
rally, and from which it can not be driven, unless the machine guns be
annihilated by artillery fire.
“In case of counter-charge by the enemy, the superior weight and
intensity of its fire will shake the enemy and so demoralize him that,
in all probability, a return counter-charge will result in his complete
discomfiture.
Gatling Gun on Firing-Line July 1st. (Taken under fire by Sergeant
Weigle.)
“Retiring troops as rear guards have in this weapon _par excellence_
the weapon for a swift and sharp return with the power of rapidly
withdrawing. If the enemy can by any means be enticed within its range,
he will certainly suffer great losses. If he cannot be brought in
range, his distance will be rather respectful.”
This discussion as presented was entirely and absolutely original with
the author and the result of his own unaided researches on the subject.
It will be seen in the account of the battle how accurately the
conditions there laid down were fulfilled.
But the carriage in use by the Gatling Gun Detachment was not the one
proposed to the War Department. That carriage has not, as yet, been
built, nor has the War Department in any way recognized the invention
or even acknowledged the receipt of the communication and drawings.
The problem, therefore, confronting the Gatling Gun Detachment was to
demonstrate the above uses of the machine gun, taking the obsolete
artillery carriage drawn by mules, and endeavor to get the guns into
action by draft. The _personnel_ of the detachment alone accounts for
their success. They got the guns up on the firing-line, not because of
any superiority of the carriage over that in use by the artillery, for
there was none; not because of aid rendered by other arms of the
service, for they actually went into battle as far as 100 yards in
advance of the infantry skirmishers; but because the Gatling Gun
Detachment was there for the purpose of getting into the fight and was
determined to give the guns a trial.
In the first place, all the members of the Gatling Gun Detachment were
members of the Regular Army. All but three of them were natives of the
United States, and those three were American citizens. Every man in the
detachment had been selected by the detachment commander, or had
voluntarily undertaken to perform this duty, realizing and believing
that it was an extremely hazardous duty. Every member of the detachment
possessed a common-school education, and some of them were well
educated. All of them were men of exceptionally good character and
sober habits. The drivers were Privs. Shiffer, Correll, Merryman, and
Chase. The description formerly given of Shiffer applies, with slight
modifications, to all the four. The first sergeant, Weigle, a native of
Gettysburg, a soldier of eight years’ experience in the Regular Army, a
man of fine natural ability and good educational attainments, was
worthy to command any company in the United States Army. Thoroughly
well instructed in the mechanism of Gatling guns, of exceptionally
cheerful and buoyant disposition, he was an ideal first sergeant for
any organization. Steigerwald, acting chief of gun No. 1, was of German
birth, well educated. He had chosen the military profession for the
love of it; he was a man of wonderfully fine physique, a “dead sure”
shot, and one who hardly understood the meaning of the word “fatigue.”
He was ambitious, he was an ardent believer in the Gatling gun, and he
was determined to win a commission on the battle-field.
Corporal Doyle was a magnificent type of the old-time Regular—one of
the kind that composed the army before Proctorism tried to convert it
into a Sunday-school. In former days Doyle had been a drinking man; but
the common opinion as expressed by his company officers even in those
days was, “I would rather have Doyle, drunk, than any other
non-commissioned officer, sober; because Doyle never gets too drunk to
attend to duty.” Two years before this Doyle had quit drinking, and the
only drawback to this most excellent noncommissioned officer had been
removed. He was a thorough disciplinarian; one of the kind that takes
no back talk; one who is prone to using the butt end of a musket as a
persuader, if necessary; and Doyle was thoroughly devoted to the
detachment commander. Corp. Smith was another of the same stamp. Corp.
Smith loved poker. In fact, his _sobriquet_ was “Poker Smith.” He was
one of the kind of poker-players who would “see” a $5 bet on a pair of
deuces, raise it to $25, and generally rake in the “pot.” It was Corp.
Smith who thought in this Gatling gun deal he was holding a pair of
deuces, because he didn’t take much stock in Gatling guns, but he was a
firm believer in his commanding officer and was prepared to “bluff” the
Dons to the limit of the game.
Fort Roosevelt.
Sergeants Ryder and Weischaar were splendid types of the American
Regular non-commissioned officer, alert, respectful, attentive to duty,
resolute, unflinching, determined, magnificent soldiers. Serg. Green
was a young man, only twenty-three, the idolized son of his parents, in
the army because he loved it; enthusiastic over his gun, and fully
determined to “pot” every Spaniard in sight. Corp. Rose was like unto
him. They were eager for nothing so much as a chance to get into
action, and equally determined to stay there. The privates of the
detachment were like unto the noncommissioned officers. They had
volunteered for this duty from a love of adventure, a desire to win
recognition, or from their personal attachment to the commanding
officer; and there was not a man who was not willing to follow him into
the “mouth of hell” if necessary. The gunners were expert shots with
the rifle. Numbers 1 and 2, who turned the crank and fed the gun,
respectively, were selected for their dexterity and coolness; the
drivers, for their skill in handling mules; and each of the other
members of the detachment was placed on that duty which he seemed best
fitted to perform.
The roll of the detachment and its organization as it went into battle
on the first day of July are subjoined:
_Gatling Gun Detachment, Fifth Army Corps._
Commanding Officer, John H. Parker, first lieutenant, 13th Infantry.
Acting First Sergeant, Alois Weischaar, sergeant, Co. A, 13th Infantry.
Acting Quartermaster Sergeant, William Eyder, Co. G, 13th Infantry.
Gun No. 1: Acting Chief and Gunner, Charles C. Steigerwald, corporal,
Co. A, 13th Infantry. No. 1, Private Voelker, Co. A, 12th Infantry. No.
2, Private Elkins, Co. D, 17th Infantry. No. 3, Private Schmandt, Co.
G, 13th Infantry. No. 4, Private Needles, Co. E, 17th Infantry. No. 5,
Private Click, Co. E, 17th Infantry. No. 6, Private Jones, Co. D, 13th
Infantry. Driver, Private Shiffer, Co. E, 17th Infantry.
Gun No. 2: Chief, Sergeant William Ryder, Co. G, 13th Infantry. Gunner,
Corporal Geo. N. Rose, Co. C, 13th Infantry. No. 1, Private Seaman, Co.
B, 13th Infantry. No. 2, Private Kastner, Co. A, 13th Infantry. No. 3,
Private Pyne, Co. H, 13th Infantry. No. 4, Private Schulze, Co. A, 17th
Infantry. No. 5, Private Barts, Co. E, 13th Infantry. Driver, Private
Correll, Co. C, 12th Infantry.
Gun No. 3: Chief, Sergeant Newton A. Green, Co. H, 13th Infantry.
Gunner, Corporal Matthew Doyle, Co. C, 13th Infantry. No. 1, Private
Anderson, Co. C, 12th Infantry. No. 2, Private Sine, Co. E, 17th
Infantry. No. 3, Private Lauer, Co. C, 12th Infantry. No. 4, Private
Dellett, Co. D, 17th Infantry. No. 5, Private Cory, Co. A, 13th
Infantry. No. 6, Private Greenberg, Co. G, 13th Infantry. Driver,
Private Merryman, Co. A, 17th Infantry.
Gun No. 4: Chief, Sergeant John N. Weigle, Co. L, 9th Infantry. Gunner,
Corporal Robert S. Smith, Co. C, 13th Infantry. No. 1, Private McGoin,
Co. D, 17th Infantry. No. 2, Private Misiak, Co. E, 13th Infantry. No.
3, Private Power, Co. A, 13th Infantry. No. 4, Private McDonald, Co. B,
17th Infantry. No. 5, Private Prazak, Co. E, 12th Infantry. Driver,
Private Chase, Co. H, 13th Infantry. Cook, Private Hoft, Co. D, 13th
Infantry. Assistant cook, Private Bremer, Co. G, 13th Infantry. Absent,
sick, Private Murray, Co. F, 13th Infantry, at Tampa.
Sergeant Weigle was subsequently appointed first sergeant of Co. L.,
9th Infantry, and of the Gatling Gun Detachment, vice Weischaar,
relieved at his own request.
Another element which contributed much to the success of the detachment
was the presence with it of Captain Marcotte. This excellent officer
had served with great distinction in the Civil War, having been
promoted from a private in the ranks through all of the grades up to a
captaincy, for meritorious conduct in battle, and having failed of
higher grades only because he was too badly shot to pieces to continue
with the Army. He joined the detachment on the 25th of June, and his
valuable advice was always at the disposal not merely of the commander,
but of any member of the detachment who wished to consult him. He had
spent seventeen years in the Cuban climate and was thoroughly familiar
with all the conditions under which we were laboring. He contributed
not a little, by his presence, his example, and his precept, to the
final success of the organization. When the battery went under fire,
Marcotte was with it. It was the first time most of the members had
passed through this ordeal, but who could run, or even feel nervous,
with this gray-haired man skipping about from point to point and taking
notes of the engagement as coolly as though he were sitting in the
shade of a tree sipping lime-juice cocktails, a mile from danger.
Such was the _personnel_ of the detachment. It lay in Camp Wheeler,
which was only about a mile and a half from El Poso, where the first
engagement occurred on the first of July, until that morning. The mules
were daily harnessed up and drilled in maneuvering the pieces, and the
members of the detachment experimentally posted in different positions
in order to get the most effective service.
On the 27th, Serg. Green was sent back to Siboney with orders to bring
Corp. Rose or his body. He brought Corp. Rose, and the corporal was
very glad to be brought.
The mules were fed with oats and on the juicy sugar-cane. It is worthy
of mention that no other organization at the front had oats. A feed or
two of oats was given to Gen. Wheeler and Col. Dorst for their horses;
it was the first time their horses had tasted oats since leaving the
transports, and was probably the last time until after the surrender.
Furthermore, the Gatling Gun Detachment had “grub.” Of course, it was
“short” on potatoes, onions, and vegetables generally; these luxuries
were not to be well known again until it returned to the United States;
but it did have hardtack, bacon, canned roast beef, sugar, and coffee,
having drawn all the rations it could carry before leaving Baiquiri,
and was the only organization which had as much as twenty-four hours’
rations. Gen. Hawkins and his whole brigade were living from hand to
mouth, one meal at a time. The same was true of Gen. Wheeler and the
whole cavalry division, and they were depending for that one meal upon
the pack-mule train. On the 30th of June a complete set of muster- and
pay-rolls, was prepared for the detachment, and it was duly mustered in
the usual form and manner. It was the only organization at the front of
which a formal muster was made, and was the only one there which had
muster- and pay-rolls.
It rained on the 29th and 30th of June. Not such rains as the people of
the United States are familiar with, but Cuban rains. It was like
standing under a barrel full of water and having the bottom knocked
out. These rains caused the rifles and carbines of the army to rust,
and some quickwitted captain bethought himself to beg oil from the
Gatling Gun Detachment. He got it. Another, and another, and still
another begged for oil; then regiments began to beg for oil; and
finally application was made for oil for a whole brigade. This led to
the following correspondence:
“Camp Six Miles from Santiago, “29th June, 1898.
“_The Adjutant-General, Cavalry Division, Present:_
“Sir,—I have the honor to inform you that I have learned that some of
the rifles in this command are badly in need of oil, and that in some
companies there is no oil to use on them. These facts I learned through
requests to me for oil.
“I therefore report to you that my men found at Altares (the second
landing-place) and reported to me four (4) barrels of lard oil and
three (3) barrels of cylinder oil, in an old oil-house near the machine
shops.
“If this be procured and issued, it will save the rifles and carbines
from rust.
“Very respectfully, “_John H. Parker_, “Lt. Comdg. G. G. Detachment,
5th Corps.”
_First Endorsement._
“Headquarters Cavalry Division, “Camp 6 miles east of Santiago de Cuba,
“June 29, 1898.
“Respectfully referred to the adjutant-general, 6th Army Corps.
“_Jos. Wheeler_, “Major-General U. S. Vols., Comdg.”
_Second Endorsement._
“Headquarters 5th Corps, “June 29, 1898.
“Return. Lt. Parker will send a man back tomorrow to obtain the
necessary oil.
“By command of Gen. Shafter.
“_E. J. McClernand_, “A. A. G.”
_Third Endorsement._
“Headquarters Cavalry Division, “June 29, 1898.
“Return Lt. Parker. Attention invited to the foregoing endorsement.
“_J. H. Dorst_, “Lieutenant-Colonel.”
_Fourth Endorsement._
“June 30, 1898.
“_The Quartermaster, Altares, Cuba:_
“Please furnish to Sergeant Green of my detachment transportation for
two (2) barrels of oil. He will show you an order from Gen. Shafter,
and the matter is urgent. The soldiers must have this oil at once, as
their rifles are rusting badly.
“_John H. Parker_, “Lt. Comdg. Gatling Gun Detach.”
Sergeant Greene’s Gun at Fort Roosevelt.
The quartermaster furnished the transportation and two barrels of oil
were duly forwarded to the front and placed in charge of brigade
quartermasters at different points, with orders to distribute out one
quart to each company. This oil, perhaps, had some bearing upon the
condition of the rifles in the fight following.
On the 27th of June, Captain Marcotte and the detachment commander made
a reconnaissance of a high hill to the left of Camp Wheeler, and,
having gained the top, reconnoitered the city of Santiago and its
surrounding defenses with a powerful glass, and as a result reported to
Gen. Wheeler that the key of Santiago was the Morro mesa, a promontory
or tableland overlooking the city on the east side at a distance of
about a mile and a half and not at that time occupied by the enemy,
with the proposition that a detail of a half-dozen men from the
detachment should make a rush and capture this plateau, and hold it
until the guns could be brought up. The general could not authorize the
proposed undertaking, as it would have endangered the safety of his
army, perhaps by leading to a premature engagement. By the time a
sufficient reconnaissance had been made and convinced everybody of the
value of this plan, the mesa had been strongly occupied by the enemy.
It is still believed that the occupation of this height was practicable
on the 27th of June, and thought, if it had been authorized, the
Gatlings could have occupied and held this position against all the
Spaniards in the city of Santiago. A glance at the map will show the
extreme tactical importance of this position.