CHAPTER XXXVI

INDUSTRIAL PROGRESS AND THE PROLETARIAT

Russia till Lately a Peasant Empire--Early Efforts to Introduce Arts and

Crafts--Peter the Great and His Successors--Manufacturing Industry

Long Remains an Exotic--The Cotton Industry--The Reforms of Alexander

II.--Protectionists and Free Trade--Progress under High Tariffs--M.

Witte's Policy--How Capital Was Obtained--Increase of Exports--Foreign

Firms Cross the Customs Frontier--Rapid Development of Iron Industry--A

Commercial Crisis--M. Witte's Position Undermined by Agrarians and

Doctrinaires--M. Plehve a Formidable Opponent--His Apprehensions of

Revolution--Fall of M. Witte--The Industrial Proletariat.

Fifty years ago Russia was still essentially a peasant empire, living by

agriculture of a primitive type, and supplying her other wants chiefly

by home industries, as was the custom in Western Europe during the

Middle Ages.

For many generations her rulers had been trying to transplant into their

wide dominions the art and crafts of the West, but they had formidable

difficulties to contend with, and their success was not nearly as great

as they desired. We know that as far back as the fourteenth century

there were cloth-workers in Moscow, for we read in the chronicles that

the workshops of these artisans were sacked when the town was stormed

by the Tartars. Workers in metal had also appeared in some of the larger

towns by that time, but they do not seem to have risen much above the

level of ordinary blacksmiths. They were destined, however, to make more

rapid progress than other classes of artisans, because the old Tsars of

Muscovy, like other semi-barbarous potentates, admired and envied the

industries of more civilised countries mainly from the military point

of view. What they wanted most was a plentiful supply of good arms

wherewith to defend themselves and attack their neighbours, and it was

to this object that their most strenuous efforts were directed.

As early as 1475 Ivan III., the grandfather of Ivan the Terrible, sent a

delegate to Venice to seek out for him an architect who, in addition to

his own craft, knew how to make guns; and in due course appeared in

the Kremlin a certain Muroli, called Aristotle by his contemporaries on

account of his profound learning. He undertook "to build churches and

palaces, to cast big bells and cannons, to fire off the said cannons,

and to make every sort of castings very cunningly"; and for the exercise

of these various arts it was solemnly stipulated in a formal document

that he should receive the modest salary of ten roubles monthly. With

regard to the military products, at least, the Venetian faithfully

fulfilled his contract, and in a short time the Tsar had the

satisfaction of possessing a "cannon-house," subsequently dignified with

the name of "arsenal." Some of the natives learned the foreign art, and

exactly a century later (1856) a Russian, or at least a Slav, called

Tchekhof, produced a famous "Tsar-cannon," weighing as much as 96,000

lbs. The connection thus established with the mechanical arts of the

West was always afterwards maintained, and we find frequent notices of

the fact in contemporary writers. In the reign of the grandfather of

Peter the Great, for example, two paper-works were established by an

Italian; and velvet for the Tsar and his Boyars, gold brocades for

ecclesiastical vestments, and rude kinds of glass for ordinary purposes

were manufactured under the august patronage of the enlightened ruler.

His son Alexis went a good many steps further, and scandalised

his God-fearing orthodox subjects by his love of foreign heretical

inventions. It was in his German suburb of Moscow that young Peter,

who was to be crowned "the Great," made his first acquaintance with the

useful arts of the West.

When the great reformer came to the throne he found in his Tsardom,

besides many workshops, some ten foundries, all of which were under

orders "to cast cannons, bombs, and bullets, and to make arms for the

service of the State." This seemed to him only a beginning, especially

for the mining and iron industry, in which he was particularly

interested. By importing foreign artificers and placing at their

disposal big estates, with numerous serfs, in the districts where

minerals were plentiful, and by carefully stipulating that these

foreigners should teach his subjects well, and conceal from them none of

the secrets of the craft, he created in the Ural a great iron industry,

which still exists at the present day. Finding by experience that State

mines and State ironworks were a heavy drain on his insufficiently

replenished treasury, he transferred some of them to private persons,

and this policy was followed occasionally by his successors. Hence the

gigantic fortunes of the Demidofs and other families. The Shuvalovs, for

example, in 1760 possessed, for the purpose of working their mines and

ironworks, no less than 33,000 serfs and a corresponding amount of land.

Unfortunately the concessions were generally given not to enterprising

business-men, but to influential court-dignitaries, who confined their

attention to squandering the revenues, and not a few of the mines and

works reverted to the Government.

The army required not only arms and ammunition, but also uniforms and

blankets. Great attention, therefore, was paid to the woollen industry

from the reign of Peter downwards. In the time of Catherine there

were already 120 cloth factories, but they were on a very small scale,

according to modern conceptions. Ten factories in Moscow, for example,

had amongst them only 104 looms, 130 workers, and a yearly output for

200,000 roubles.

While thus largely influenced in its economic policy by military

considerations, the Government did not entirely neglect other branches

of manufacturing industry. Ever since Russia had pretensions to being

a civilised power its rulers have always been inclined to pay more

attention to the ornamental than the useful--to the varnish rather than

the framework of civilisation--and we need not therefore be surprised

to find that long before the native industry could supply the materials

required for the ordinary wants of humble life, attempts were made to

produce such things as Gobelin tapestries. I mention this merely as an

illustration of a characteristic trait of the national character,

the influence of which may be found in many other spheres of official

activity.

If Russia did not attain the industrial level of Western Europe, it was

not from want of ambition and effort on the part of the rulers. They

worked hard, if not always wisely, for this end. Manufacturers were

exempted from rates and taxes, and even from military service, and some

of them, as I have said, received large estates from the Crown on the

understanding that the serfs should be employed as workmen. At the

same time they were protected from foreign competition by prohibitive

tariffs. In a word, the manufacturing industry was nursed and fostered

in a way to satisfy the most thorough-going protectionist, especially

those branches which worked up native raw material such as ores, flax,

hemp, wool, and tallow. Occasionally the official interference and

anxiety to protect public interests went further than the manufacturers

desired. On more than one occasion the authorities fixed the price

of certain kinds of manufactured goods, and in 1754 the Senate, being

anxious to protect the population from fires, ordered all glass and iron

works within a radius of 200 versts around Moscow to be destroyed! In

spite of such obstacles, the manufacturing industry as a whole

made considerable progress. Between 1729 and 1762 the number of

establishments officially recognised as factories rose from 26 to 335.

These results did not satisfy Catherine II., who ascended the throne in

1762. Under the influence of her friends, the French Encyclopedistes,

she imagined for a time that the official control might be relaxed, and

that the system of employing serfs in the factories and foundries might

be replaced by free labour, as in Western Europe; monopolies might be

abolished, and all liege subjects, including the peasants, might be

allowed to embark in industrial undertakings as they pleased, "for

the benefit of the State and the nation." All this looked very well on

paper, but Catherine never allowed her sentimental liberalism to injure

seriously the interests of her Empire, and she accordingly refrained

from putting the laissez-faire principle largely into practice. Though

a good deal has been written about her economic policy, it is hardly

distinguishable from that of her predecessors. Like them, she maintained

high tariffs, accorded large subsidies, and even prevented the export of

raw material, in the hope that it might be worked up at home; and when

the prices in the woollen market rose very high, she compelled the

manufacturers to supply the army with cloth at a price fixed by the

authorities. In short, the old system remained practically unimpaired,

and notwithstanding the steady progress made during the reign of

Nicholas I. (1825-55), when the number of factory hands rose from

210,000 to 380,000, the manufacturing industry as a whole continued to

be, until the serfs were emancipated in 1861, a hothouse plant which

could flourish only in an officially heated atmosphere.

There was one branch of it, however, to which this remark does not

apply. The art of cotton-spinning and cotton-weaving struck deep root

in Russian soil. After remaining for generations in the condition of

a cottage industry--the yarn being distributed among the peasants

and worked up by them in their own homes--it began, about 1825, to be

modernised. Though it still required to be protected against foreign

competition, it rapidly outgrew the necessity for direct official

support. Big factories driven by steam-power were constructed, the

number of hands employed rose to 110,000, and the foundations of great

fortunes were laid. Strange to say, many of the future millionaires were

uneducated serfs. Sava Morozof, for example, who was to become one of

the industrial magnates of Moscow, was a serf belonging to a proprietor

called Ryumin; most of the others were serfs of Count Sheremetyef--the

owner of a large estate on which the industrial town of Ivanovo had

sprung up--who was proud of having millionaires among his serfs, and who

never abused his authority over them. The great movement, however, was

not effected without the assistance of foreigners. Foreign foremen were

largely employed, and in the work of organisation a leading part was

played by a German called Ludwig Knoop. Beginning life as a commercial

traveller for an English firm, he soon became a large cotton importer,

and when in 1840 a feverish activity was produced in the Russian

manufacturing world by the Government's permission to import English

machines, his firm supplied these machines to the factories on condition

of obtaining a share in the business. It has been calculated that it

obtained in this way a share in no less than 122 factories, and hence

arose among the peasantry a popular saying:

"Where there is a church, there you find a pope,

And where there is a factory, there you find a Knoop."*

The biggest creation of the firm was a factory built at Narva in 1856,

with nearly half a million spindles driven by water-power.

* Gdye tserkov--tam pop;

A gdye fabrika--tam Knop.

In the second half of last century a revolution was brought about in the

manufacturing industry generally by the emancipation of the serfs,

the rapid extension of railways, the facilities for creating limited

liability companies, and by certain innovations in the financial policy

of the Government. The emancipation put on the market an unlimited

supply of cheap labour; the construction of railways in all directions

increased a hundredfold the means of communication; and the new banks

and other credit institutions, aided by an overwhelming influx of

foreign capital, encouraged the foundation and extension of industrial

and commercial enterprise of every description. For a time there was

great excitement. It was commonly supposed that in all matters relating

to trade and industry Russia had suddenly jumped up to the level of

Western Europe, and many people in St. Petersburg, carried away by the

prevailing enthusiasm for liberalism in general and the doctrines of

Free Trade in particular, were in favour of abolishing protectionism

as an antiquated restriction on liberty and an obstacle to economic

progress.

At one moment the Government was disposed to yield to the current, but

it was restrained by an influential group of conservative Political

Economists, who appealed to patriotic sentiment, and by the Moscow

manufacturers, who declared that Free Trade would ruin the country.

After a little hesitation it proceeded to raise, instead of lowering,

the protectionist tariff. In 1869-76 the ad valorem duties were, on an

average, under thirteen per cent., but from that time onwards they rose

steadily, until the last five years of the century, when they averaged

thirty-three per cent., and were for some articles very much higher.

In this way the Moscow industrial magnates were protected against the

influx of cheap foreign goods, but they were not saved from foreign

competition, for many foreign manufacturers, in order to enjoy the

benefit of the high duties, founded factories in Russia. Even the firmly

established cotton industry suffered from these intruders. Industrial

suburbs containing not a few cotton factories sprang up around St.

Petersburg; and a small Polish village called Lodz, near the German

frontier, grew rapidly into a prosperous town of 300,000 inhabitants,

and became a serious rival to the ancient Muscovite capital. So

severely was the competition of this young upstart felt, that the Moscow

merchants petitioned the Emperor to protect them by drawing a customs

frontier round the Polish provinces, but their petition was not granted.

Under the shelter of the high tariffs the manufacturing industry as a

whole has made rapid progress, and the cotton trade has kept well to

the front. In that branch, between 1861 and 1897, the number of hands

employed rose from 120,000 to 325,000, and the estimated value of the

products from 72 to 478 millions of roubles. In 1899 the number of

spindles was considerably over six millions, and the number of automatic

weaving machines 145,000.

The iron industry has likewise progressed rapidly, though it has not yet

outgrown the necessity for Government support, and it is not yet able to

provide for all home wants. About forty years ago it received a powerful

impulse from the discovery that in the provinces to the north of the

Crimea and the Sea of Azof there were enormous quantities of iron ore

and beds of good coal in close proximity to each other. Thanks to this

discovery and to other facts of which I shall have occasion to speak

presently, this district, which had previously been agricultural and

pastoral, has outstripped the famous Ural region, and has become the

Black Country of Russia. The vast lonely steppe, where formerly one saw

merely the peasant-farmer, the shepherd, and the Tchumak,* driving along

somnolently with his big, long-horned, white bullocks, is now dotted

over with busy industrial settlements of mushroom growth, and great

ironworks--some of them unfinished; while at night the landscape is lit

up with the lurid flames of gigantic blast-furnaces. In this wonderful

transformation, as in the history of Russian industrial progress

generally, a great part was played by foreigners. The pioneer who did

most in this district was an Englishman, John Hughes, who began life

as the son and pupil of a Welsh blacksmith, and whose sons are now

directors of the biggest of the South Russian ironworks.

* The Tchumak, a familiar figure in the songs and legends of

Little Russia, was the carrier who before the construction

of railways transported the grain to the great markets, and

brought back merchandise to the interior. He is gradually

disappearing.

Much as the South has progressed industrially in recent years, it still

remains far behind those industrial portions of the country which were

thickly settled at an earlier date. From this point of view the most

important region is the group of provinces clustering round Moscow; next

comes the St. Petersburg region, including Livonia; and thirdly Poland.

As for the various kinds of industry, the most important category is

that of textile fabrics, the second that of articles of nutrition,

and the third that of ores and metals. The total production, if we may

believe certain statistical authorities, places Russia now among the

industrial nations of the world in the fifth place, immediately after

the United States, England, Germany, and France, and a little before

Austria.

The man who has in recent times carried out most energetically the

policy of protecting and fostering native industries is M. Witte, a name

now familiar to Western Europe. An avowed disciple of the great German

economist, Friedrich List, about whose works he published a brochure in

1888, he held firmly, from his youth upwards, the doctrine that

"each nation should above all things develop harmoniously its natural

resources to the highest possible degree of independence, protecting

its own industries and preferring the national aim to the pecuniary

advantage of individuals." As a corollary to this principle he declared

that purely agricultural countries are economically backward and

intellectually stagnant, being condemned to pay tribute to the nations

who have learned to work up their raw products into more valuable

commodities. The good old English doctrine that certain countries were

intended by Providence to be eternally agricultural, and that their

function in the economy of the universe is to supply raw material

for the industrial nations, was always in his eyes an abomination--an

ingenious, nefarious invention of the Manchester school, astutely

invented for the purpose of keeping the younger nations permanently in

a state of economic bondage for the benefit of English manufacturers. To

emancipate Russia from this thraldom by enabling her to create a great

native industry, sufficient to supply all her own wants, was the aim of

his policy and the constant object of his untiring efforts. Those who

have had the good fortune to know him personally must have often

heard him discourse eloquently on this theme, supporting his views by

quotations from the economists of his own school, and by illustrations

drawn from the history of his own and other countries.

A necessary condition of realising this aim was that there should be

high tariffs. These already existed, and they might be raised

still higher, but in themselves they were not enough. For the rapid

development of the native industry an enormous capital was required, and

the first problem to be solved was how this capital could be obtained.

At one moment the energetic minister conceived the project of creating a

fictitious capital by inflating the paper currency; but this idea

proved unpopular. When broached in the Council of State it encountered

determined opposition. Some of the members of that body, especially M.

Bunge, who had been himself Minister of Finance, and who remembered

the evil effects of the inordinate inflation of the currency on foreign

exchanges during the Turkish War, advocated strongly the directly

opposite course--a return to gold monometallism, for which M.

Vishnegradski, M. Witte's immediate predecessor, had made considerable

preparations. Being a practical man without inveterate prejudices, M.

Witte gave up the scheme which he could not carry through, and adopted

the views of his opponents. He would introduce the gold currency as

recommended; but how was the requisite capital to be obtained? It must

be procured from abroad, somehow, and the simplest way seemed to be to

stimulate the export of native products. For this purpose the railways

were extended,* the traffic rates manipulated, and the means of

transport improved generally.

* In 1892, when M. Witte undertook the financial

administration, there were 30,620 versts of railway, and at

the end of 1900 there were 51,288 versts.

A certain influx of gold was thus secured, but not nearly enough for the

object in view.* Some more potent means, therefore, had to be employed,

and the inventive minister evolved a new scheme. If he could only induce

foreign capitalists to undertake manufacturing industries in Russia,

they would, at one and the same time, bring into the country the capital

required, and they would cooperate powerfully in that development of the

national industry which he so ardently wished. No sooner had he roughly

sketched out his plan--for he was not a man to let the grass grow under

his feet--than he set himself to put it into execution by letting it

be known in the financial world that the Government was ready to open

a great field for lucrative investments, in the form of profitable

enterprises under the control of those who subscribed the capital.

* In 1891 the total value of the exports was roughly

70,000,000 pounds. It then fell, in consequence of bad

harvests, to 45 millions, and did not recover the previous

maximum until 1897, when it stood at 73 millions.

Thereafter there was a steady rise till 1901, when the total

was estimated at 76 millions.

Foreign capitalists responded warmly to the call. Crowds of

concession-hunters, projectors, company promoters, et hoc genus omne,

collected in St. Petersburg, offering their services on the most

tempting terms; and all of them who could make out a plausible case were

well received at the Ministry of Finance. It was there explained to them

that in many branches of industry, such as the manufacture of textile

fabrics, there was little or no room for newcomers, but that in

others the prospects were most brilliant. Take, for example, the iron

industries of Southern Russia. The boundless mineral wealth of that

region was still almost intact, and the few works which had been there

established were paying very large dividends. The works founded by John

Hughes, for example, had repeatedly divided considerably over twenty per

cent., and there was little fear for the future, because the Government

had embarked on a great scheme of railway extension, requiring an

unlimited amount of rails and rolling-stock. What better opening could

be desired? Certainly the opening seemed most attractive, and into it

rushed the crowd of company promoters, followed by stock-jobbers and

brokers, playing lively pieces of what the Germans call Zukunftsmusik.

An unwary and confiding public, especially in Belgium and France,

listened to the enchanting strains of the financial syrens, and invested

largely. Quickly the number of completed ironworks in that region rose

from nine to seventeen, and in the short space of three years the output

of pig-iron was nearly doubled. In 1900 there were 44 blast furnaces in

working order, and ten more were in course of construction. And all this

time the Imperial revenue increased by leaps and bounds, so that the

introduction of the gold currency was effected without difficulty. M.

Witte was declared to be the greatest minister of his time--a Russian

Colbert or Turgot, or perhaps the two rolled into one.

Then came a change. Competition and over-production led naturally to a

fall in prices, and at the same time the demand decreased, because the

railway-building activity of the Government slackened. Alarmed at this

state of things, the banks which had helped to start and foster the huge

and costly enterprises contracted their credits. By the end of 1899 the

disenchantment was general and widespread. Some of the companies were

so weighted by the preliminary financial obligations, and had conducted

their affairs in such careless, reckless fashion, that they had soon

to shut down their mines and close their works. Even solid undertakings

suffered. The shares of the Briansk works, for example, which had given

dividends as high as 30 per cent., fell from 500 to 230. The Mamontof

companies--supposed to be one of the strongest financial groups in the

country--had to suspend payment, and numerous other failures occurred.

Nearly all the commercial banks, having directly participated in the

industrial concerns, were rudely shaken. M. Witte, who had been for a

time the idol of a certain section of the financial world, became very

unpopular, and was accused of misleading the investing public. Among the

accusations brought against him some at least could easily be refuted.

He may have made mistakes in his policy, and may have been himself

over-sanguine, but surely, as he subsequently replied to his accusers,

it was no part of his duty to warn company promoters and directors that

they should refrain from over-production, and that their enterprises

might not be as remunerative as they expected. As to whether there

is any truth in the assertion that he held out prospects of larger

Government orders than he actually gave, I cannot say. That he cut

down prices, and showed himself a hard man to deal with, there seems no

doubt.

The reader may naturally be inclined to jump to the conclusion that the

commercial crisis just referred to was the cause of M. Witte's fall.

Such a conclusion would be entirely erroneous. The crisis happened in

the winter of 1899-1900, and M. Witte remained Finance Minister until

the autumn of 1903. His fall was the result of causes of a totally

different kind, and these I propose now to explain, because the

explanation will throw light on certain very curious and characteristic

conceptions at present current in the Russian educated classes.

Of course there were certain causes of a purely personal kind, but

I shall dismiss them in a very few words. I remember once asking

a well-informed friend of M. Witte's what he thought of him as an

administrator and a statesman. The friend replied: "Imagine a negro of

the Gold Coast let loose in modern European civilisation!" This reply,

like most epigrammatic remarks, is a piece of gross exaggeration, but

it has a modicum of truth in it. In the eyes of well-trained Russian

officials M. Witte was a titanic, reckless character, capable at any

moment of playing the part of the bull in the china-shop. As a masterful

person, brusque in manner and incapable of brooking contradiction,

he had made for himself many enemies; and his restless, irrepressible

energy had led him to encroach on the provinces of all his colleagues.

Possessing as he did the control of the purse, his interference could

not easily be resisted. The Ministers of Interior, War, Agriculture,

Public Works, Public Instruction, and Foreign Affairs had all occasion

to complain of his incursions into their departments. In contrast to his

colleagues, he was not only extremely energetic, but he was ever

ready to assume an astounding amount of responsibility; and as he was

something of an opportunist, he was perhaps not always quixotically

scrupulous in the choice of expedients for attaining his ends.

Altogether M. Witte was an inconvenient personage in an administration

in which strong personality is regarded as entirely out of place, and in

which personal initiative is supposed to reside exclusively in the Tsar.

In addition to all this he was a man who felt keenly, and when he was

irritated he did not always keep the unruly member under strict

control. If I am correctly informed, it was some imprudent and not very

respectful remarks, repeated by a subordinate and transmitted by a Grand

Duke to the Tsar, which were the immediate cause of his transfer from

the influential post of Minister of Finance to the ornamental position

of President of the Council of Ministers; but that was merely the

proverbial last straw that broke the camel's back. His position was

already undermined, and it is the undermining process which I wish to

describe.

The first to work for his overthrow were the Agrarian Conservatives.

They could not deny that, from the purely fiscal point of view, his

administration was a marvellous success; for he was rapidly doubling the

revenue, and he had succeeded in replacing the fluctuating depreciated

paper currency by a gold coinage; but they maintained that he was

killing the goose that laid the golden eggs. Evidently the tax-paying

power of the rural classes was being overstrained, for they were falling

more and more into arrears in the payment of their taxes, and their

impoverishment was yearly increasing. All their reserves had been

exhausted, as was shown by the famines of 1891-92, when the Government

had to spend hundreds of millions to feed them. Whilst the land was

losing its fertility, those who had to live by it were increasing in

numbers at an alarming rate. Already in some districts one-fifth of the

peasant households had no longer any land of their own, and of those

who still possessed land a large proportion had no longer the cattle and

horses necessary to till and manure their allotments. No doubt M.

Witte was beginning to perceive his mistake, and had done something to

palliate the evils by improving the system of collecting the taxes and

abolishing the duty on passports, but such merely palliative remedies

could have little effect. While a few capitalists were amassing gigantic

fortunes, the masses were slowly and surely advancing to the brink

of starvation. The welfare of the agriculturists, who constitute

nine-tenths of the whole population, was being ruthlessly sacrificed,

and for what? For the creation of a manufacturing industry which rested

on an artificial, precarious basis, and which had already begun to

decline.

So far the Agrarians, who champion the interests of the agricultural

classes. Their views were confirmed and their arguments strengthened by

an influential group of men whom I may call, for want of a better name,

the philosophers or doctrinaire interpreters of history, who have,

strange to say, more influence in Russia than in any other country.

The Russian educated classes desire that the nation should be wealthy

and self-supporting, and they recognise that for this purpose a large

manufacturing industry is required; but they are reluctant to make the

sacrifices necessary to attain the object in view, and they imagine

that, somehow or other, these sacrifices may be avoided. Sympathising

with this frame of mind, the doctrinaires explain that the rich and

prosperous countries of Europe and America obtained their wealth and

prosperity by so-called "Capitalism"--that is to say, by a peculiar

social organisation in which the two main factors are a small body of

rich capitalists and manufacturers and an enormous pauper proletariat

living from hand to mouth, at the mercy of the heartless employers of

labour. Russia has lately followed in the footsteps of those wealthy

countries, and if she continues to do so she will inevitably be saddled

with the same disastrous results--plutocracy, pauperism, unrestrained

competition in all spheres of activity, and a greatly intensified

struggle for life, in which the weaker will necessarily go to the wall.*

* Free competition in all spheres of activity, leading to

social inequality, plutocracy, and pauperism, is the

favourite bugbear of Russian theorists; and who is not a

theorist in Russia? The fact indicates the prevalence of

Socialist ideas in the educated classes.

Happily there is, according to these theorists, a more excellent way,

and Russia can adopt it if she only remains true to certain mysterious

principles of her past historic development. Without attempting to

expound those mysterious principles, to which I have repeatedly referred

in previous chapters, I may mention briefly that the traditional

patriarchal institutions on which the theorists found their hopes of a

happy social future for their country are the rural Commune, the native

home-industries, and the peculiar co-operative institutions called

Artels. How these remnants of a semi-patriarchal state of society are to

be practically developed in such a way as to withstand the competition

of manufacturing industry organised on modern "capitalist" lines, no

one has hitherto been able to explain satisfactorily, but many people

indulge in ingenious speculations on the subject, like children planning

the means of diverting with their little toy spades a formidable

inundation. In my humble opinion, the whole theory is a delusion; but

it is held firmly--I might almost say fanatically--by those who, in

opposition to the indiscriminate admirers of West-European and American

civilisation, consider themselves genuine Russians and exceptionally

good patriots. M. Witte has never belonged to that class. He believes

that there is only one road to national prosperity--the road by which

Western Europe has travelled--and along this road he tried to drive his

country as rapidly as possible. He threw himself, therefore, heart and

soul into what his opponents call "Capitalism," by raising State loans,

organising banks and other credit institutions, encouraging the creation

and extension of big factories, which must inevitably destroy the home

industry, and even--horribile dictu!--undermining the rural Commune,

and thereby adding to the ranks of the landless proletariat, in order to

increase the amount of cheap labour for the benefit of the capitalists.

With the arguments thus supplied by Agrarians and doctrinaires, quite

honest and well-meaning, according to their lights, it was easy to sap

M. Witte's position. Among his opponents, the most formidable was the

late M. Plehve, Minister of Interior--a man of a totally different

stamp. A few months before his tragic end I had a long and interesting

conversation with him, and I came away deeply impressed. Having

repeatedly had conversations of a similar kind with M. Witte, I could

compare, or rather contrast, the two men. Both of them evidently

possessed an exceptional amount of mental power and energy, but in the

one it was volcanic, and in the other it was concentrated and thoroughly

under control. In discussion, the one reminded me of the self-taught,

slashing swordsman; the other of the dexterous fencer, carefully trained

in the use of the foils, who never launches out beyond the point at

which he can quickly recover himself. As to whether M. Plehve was

anything more than a bold, energetic, clever official there may be

differences of opinion, but he certainly could assume the airs of a

profound and polished statesman, capable of looking at things from a

much higher point of view than the ordinary tchinovnik, and he had the

talent of tacitly suggesting that a great deal of genuine, enlightened

statesmanship lay hidden under the smooth surface of his cautious

reserve. Once or twice I could perceive that when criticising the

present state of things he had his volcanic colleague in his mind's eye;

but the covert allusions were so vague and so carefully worded that the

said colleague, if he had been present, would hardly have been justified

in entering a personal protest. A statesman of the higher type, I was

made to feel, should deal not with personalities, but with things, and

it would be altogether unbecoming to complain of a colleague in presence

of an outsider. Thus his attitude towards his opponent was most correct,

but it was not difficult to infer that he had little sympathy with the

policy of the Ministry of Finance.

From other sources I learned the cause of this want of sympathy. Being

Minister of Interior, and having served long in the Police Department,

M. Plehve considered that his first duty was the maintenance of public

order and the protection of the person and autocracy of his august

master. He was therefore the determined enemy of revolutionary

tendencies, in whatever garb or disguise they might appear; and as

a statesman he had to direct his attention to everything likely to

increase those tendencies in the future. Now it seemed that in the

financial policy which had been followed for some years there were

germs of future revolutionary fermentation. The peasantry were becoming

impoverished, and were therefore more likely to listen to the insidious

suggestions of Socialist agitators; and already agrarian disturbances

had occurred in the provinces of Kharkof and Poltava. The industrial

proletariat which was being rapidly created was being secretly organised

by the revolutionary Social Democrats, and already there had been

serious labour troubles in some of the large towns. For any future

revolutionary movement the proletariat would naturally supply recruits.

Then, at the other end of the social scale, a class of rich capitalists

was being created, and everybody who has read a little history knows

that a rich and powerful tiers etat cannot be permanently conciliated

with autocracy. Though himself neither an agrarian nor a Slavophil

doctrinaire, M. Plehve could not but have a certain sympathy with those

who were forging thunderbolts for the official annihilation of M. Witte.

He was too practical a man to imagine that the hands on the dial of

economic progress could be set back and a return made to moribund

patriarchal institutions; but he thought that at least the pace might

be moderated. The Minister of Finance need not be in such a desperate,

reckless hurry, and it was desirable to create conservative forces which

might counteract the revolutionary forces which his impulsive colleague

was inadvertently calling into existence.

Some of the forgers of thunderbolts went a great deal further,

and asserted or insinuated that M. Witte was himself consciously a

revolutionist, with secret, malevolent intentions. In support of their

insinuations they cited certain cases in which well-known Socialists had

been appointed professors in academies under the control of the Ministry

of Finance, and they pointed to the Peasant Bank, which enjoyed M.

Witte's special protection. At first it had been supposed that the bank

would have an anti-revolutionary influence by preventing the

formation of a landless proletariat and increasing the number of small

land-owners, who are always and everywhere conservative so far as the

rights of private property are concerned.

Unfortunately its success roused the fears of the more conservative

section of the landed proprietors. These gentlemen, as I have already

mentioned, pointed out that the estates of the nobles were rapidly

passing into the hands of the peasantry, and that if this process were

allowed to continue the hereditary Noblesse, which had always been the

civilising element in the rural population, and the surest support of

the throne, would drift into the towns and there sink into poverty or

amalgamate with the commercial plutocracy, and help to form a tiers etat

which would be hostile to the Autocratic Power.

In these circumstances it was evident that the headstrong Minister

of Finance could maintain his position only so long as he enjoyed the

energetic support of the Emperor, and this support, for reasons which I

have indicated above, failed him at the critical moment. When his

work was still unfinished he was suddenly compelled, by the Emperor's

command, to relinquish his post and accept a position in which, it was

supposed, he would cease to have any influence in the administration.

Thus fell the Russian Colbert-Turgot, or whatever else he may be

called. Whether financial difficulties in the future will lead to his

reinstatement as Minister of Finance remains to be seen; but in any case

his work cannot be undone. He has increased manufacturing industry to

an unprecedented extent, and, as M. Plehve perceived, the industrial

proletariat which manufacturing industry on capitalist lines always

creates has provided a new field of activity for the revolutionists.

I return, therefore, to the evolution of the revolutionary movement in

order to describe its present phase, the first-fruits of which have

been revealed in the labour disturbances in St. Petersburg and other

industrial centres.

Russia · 第 36 / 39 章