THE FIRST USE OF THE AËROPLANE IN WAR--TRIPOLI--THE BALKANS
Manœuvres in peace were the first practical test of the value of
aëroplanes in war. The French proved their efficiency in their
manœuvres in Picardy as long ago as 1910. The result of their use was
a surprise for the military authorities themselves. Before the test it
had been considered that an observer in an airship which could hover
over the lines of the enemy or over a fortification would have a good
chance of being able to bring back to headquarters useful details of
what they had seen; but it had been thought by many military experts
that the aëroplanist from his forced, rapid movement would not be able
to form a mental picture of what actually passed his eyes, that if
the retina had recorded the fleeting image on the brain, there would
be confusion. The success of the aviator was an example of the truism
that experience often does not coincide with preconceived opinion,
for the reason that some unknown factor exists, and is only brought
to light by the special circumstances of the case. Of all people, the
aviator is one who constantly practises sharpness and concentration
of sense; his eye and brain have a perpetual habit of harmonious and
close-bound working; time to him has an enhanced value; none, like
he, has ever learnt the exigencies of the minutes. His whole system
becomes acclimatised to the constant maintenance of the equilibrium
of his powers, for he has realised that for any negligence he will
pay the death penalty. Is it wonder then that the glance of the
practised aviator over the far-stretching regions beneath him becomes
super-sight? So is it that the best aërial observer is often one who
combines in himself the varied occupation of engineer, pilot, and
scout, and who in his swift machine, arrow-like, darts above the enemy.
In the case of the military machines at the French manœuvres above
mentioned, the work of pilot and observer was often divided; and it was
found that the observer generally required some familiarity with flight
before acquiring the requisite sharpness of vision.
Generally speaking, in the manœuvres, the information brought back was
clear, defined, decisive. The intelligence brought back by cavalry
scouts has sometimes been a puzzle to the generals in command--hints
suggesting to them probabilities, perhaps, rather than accumulated
certainties. But the air scouts brought such definite statements as
these: “Have seen infantry hidden in a wood,” “A squadron with machine
guns are marching towards ----,” “Seen a company digging trenches at
----,” “The enemy are in full retreat,” etc.
The value of the new arm was manifest in this country in the very
first manœuvres in which aëroplanes were used; by its use the plans
made were all rapidly discovered and rendered useless! Plans made on
the old principle of fighting in the dark, each side ignorant of the
operations of the other, fell through once and for all; and it became
recognised that the coming of the aëroplane meant the revolution of the
methods of conducting war.
But if from the experience of manœuvres the value of aëroplane
reconnaissance was patent to expert military authority, the public
generally did not realise the value of the new arm until it had been
tried in something beyond mimic warfare. This occurred in the Italian
war operations in Tripoli. In this war the need of reconnaissance was
great; operations had to be carried on in a difficult country, and with
an enemy that adopted “tricky” forms of warfare. To Italy belongs the
credit of being the first nation to put aëroplanes to the test in war,
both for reconnaissance and offensive purposes. The types of aëroplanes
used in this war were chiefly Blériot and Nieuport monoplanes; one
Etrich monoplane was also included.
Very valuable information was acquired on several occasions by the
air scouts, who flew over wide tracts of desert, marking the position
of Turks and Arabs, and ascertaining their movements preparatory to
making attacks on Italian positions. The aëroplanes were fired upon
by the enemy, and sometimes the wings of an aëroplane were riddled
by shot without resulting accident, proving that the riddling of the
wings, so long as sufficient supporting surface remains, is not the
greatest evil to be feared. On one occasion Lieutenant Rossi, while
making a reconnaissance, nearly fell into the hands of the Arabs. The
motor suddenly stopped, and his machine was rapidly falling; the motor,
however, recovered just in time for the aviator to remain in the air,
and he was able to return to Tripoli.
Regarding the offensive use of aëroplanes in this war, it was related
that Lieutenant Gavotti threw from his machine upon an Arab camp a bomb
made of picrate of potash; he was at the time 700 feet above the oasis
of Aïn-zara, when he discovered beneath two masses of Arabs, numbering
each about 1,500 men. He took out the bomb from a bag at his side
with one hand, while with the other he manœuvred the machine, and as
he passed over a group of Arabs he dropped the bomb. He could follow
its course for a moment or two while he was passing over the bright
green verdure of the oasis, but it was speedily lost to sight, while
the noise of the motor prevented his hearing the explosion below. He
saw, however, a cloud of smoke and the Arabs flying in all directions.
This was the first instance on record of bomb throwing from aircraft.
Gavotti was himself of opinion that in bomb throwing the operation
should be carried out with the aid of two aëroplanes; the one in
advance should throw the bomb, the one following observe the result.
The one in advance would have to fly at a lower level so as to drop
the bomb; the observer following would fly much higher. The dropping
of the bomb in this case produced excellent moral effects. When, on
a later occasion, the aviators revisited the same spot, there was no
trace of Arab encampments. On another occasion Captain Moizo threw two
bombs into the Turkish camp near Aïn-zara, which also had the effect of
putting the Turks to flight.
A troublesome feature of flight over sandy deserts is found to be the
intrusion of sand into the valves and bearings of the engines; but
if aëroplanes can be armoured against shot, doubtless a sufficiently
light and effective means of protecting the engines against sand can be
devised.
Use of aëroplanes was also made in the Balkan war; and it may be noted
that before that war broke out Germans went to instruct the Turks in
bomb throwing from aircraft. Bulgaria had a hastily formed aviation
corps, and it showed itself useful.
It is, however, in the present European war that the large-scale use of
aëroplanes is being daily more and more manifested.