HOW RICHMOND WAS TAKEN.

General Grant, fresh from his great success at Vicksburg and

Chattanooga, having shown that he had military genius of a high order,

was created Lieutenant-General, and appointed to the command of all the

armies of the Union in the field. It was the beginning of a new

_regime_. Up to that time there had been little concert of action

between commanders. The armies lacked a head. The President, General

Halleck, Secretary Stanton, had ideas of their own upon the best methods

and plans for conducting the war. Department commanders worked at cross

purposes. Each officer in the field naturally looked upon his sphere of

action as the most important of all, and each had his own plan of

operations to lay before the Secretary of War. A million men were

tugging manfully at the Car of Freedom, which was at a stand-still, or

moved only by inches, because they had no head. But when the President

appointed General Grant to the command, he gave up his own plans, while

General Halleck became a subordinate. The department commanders found

all their plans set aside. There was not merely concert of action, but

unity of action, under the controlling force of an imperial will.

In the article entitled "The May Campaign in Virginia," the movements of

the Army of the Potomac, from the Rapidan to Cold Harbor, are given. It

is not intended in the present article to dwell in detail upon all the

subsequent movements of that army and its allies, the Armies of the

James and the Shenandoah. Volumes are needed to narrate the operations

around Petersburg,--the battles fought on the 18th and 19th of June east

of that city,--the struggles for the Weldon Railroad,--the movements

between the James and the Appomattox, and north of the James,--the

failure in the springing of the mine,--the march of the Fifth Corps to

Stony Creek,--the battles between the Weldon Road and Hatcher's

Run,--the many contests, sharp, fierce, and bloody, between the opposing

lines, whenever an attempt was made by either army to erect new

works,--the fights on Hatcher's Run,--the attack upon Fort Harrison,

north of the James,--the successive attempts of each commander to break

the lines of the other, ending with the Fort Stedman affair, the last

offensive effort of General Lee. The new campaign which was inaugurated

the next day after the attack on Fort Stedman compelled the Rebel chief

to stand wholly on the defensive.

The appointment of General Grant to the command of all the armies was

not only the beginning of a new _regime_, but the adoption of a new

idea,--that Lee's army was the objective point, rather than the city of

Richmond.

"The power of the Rebellion lies in the Rebel army," said General Grant

to the writer one evening in June last. We had been conversing upon Fort

Donelson and Pittsburg Landing. One by one his staff officers dropped

off to their own tents, and we were alone. It was a quiet, starlit

night. The Lieutenant-General was enjoying his fragrant Havana cigar,

and was in a mood for conversation, not upon what he was going to do,

but upon what had been done. He is always wisely reticent upon the

present and future, but agreeably communicative upon what has passed

into history.

"I have lost a good many men since the army left the Rapidan, but there

was no help for it. The Rebel army must be destroyed before we can put

down the Rebellion," he continued.[I]

There was a disposition at that time on the part of the disloyal press

of the North to bring General Grant into bad odor. He was called "The

Butcher." Even some Republican Congressmen were ready to demand his

removal. General Grant alluded to it and said,--

"God knows I don't want to see men slaughtered; but we have appealed to

arms, and we have got to fight it out."

He had already given public utterance to the expression,--"I intend to

fight it out on this line, if it takes all summer."

Referring to the successive flank movements which had been made, from

the Rapidan to the Wilderness, to Spottsylvania, to the North Anna, to

the Chickahominy, to Petersburg, he said,--

"My object has been to get between Lee and his southern communications."

At that time the Weldon Road was in the hands of the enemy, and Early

was on a march down the Valley, towards Washington. This movement was

designed to frighten Grant and send him back by steamboat to defend the

capital; but the Sixth Corps only was sent, while the troops remaining

still kept pressing on in a series of flank movements, which resulted in

the seizure of the Weldon Road. That was the most damaging blow which

Lee had received. He made desperate efforts to recover what had been

lost, but in vain. It was the beginning of the end. Then the public

generally could see the meaning of General Grant's strategy,--that the

Wilderness, Spottsylvania, and all the terrible battles which had been

fought, were according to a plan, which, if carried out, must end in

victory. The Richmond newspapers, which had ridiculed the campaign, and

had found an echo in the disloyal press of the North, began to discuss

the question of supplies; and to keep their courage up, they indulged in

boastful declarations that the Southside Railroad never could be taken.

The march of Sherman from Atlanta to Savannah and through South

Carolina, destroying railroads and supplies,--the taking of

Wilmington,--Sheridan's movement from Winchester up the Valley of the

Shenandoah, striking the James River Canal and the Central Railroad, and

then the transfer of his whole force from the White House to the left

flank of the Army of the Potomac,--were parts of a well matured design

to weaken Lee's army.

Everything was ready for the final blow. The forces of General Grant

were disposed as follows. The Army of the James, composed of the

Twenty-Fourth and Twenty-Fifth Corps, and commanded by General Ord, was

north of the James River, its right flank resting near the old

battle-field of Glendale, and its left flank on the Appomattox. The

Ninth Army Corps--the right wing of the Army of the Potomac--was next in

line, then the Sixth, and then the Second, its left resting on Hatcher's

Run. The Fifth was in rear of the Second. The line thus held was nearly

forty miles in length, defended on the front and rear by strong

earthworks and abatis.

General Grant's entire force could not have been much less than a

hundred and thirty thousand, including Sheridan's cavalry, the force at

City Point, and the provisional brigade at Fort Powhatan. Lee's whole

force was not far from seventy thousand,--or seventy-five thousand,

including the militia of Richmond and Petersburg; but he was upon the

defensive, and held an interior and shorter line.

The work which General Grant had in hand was the seizure of the

Southside Railroad by an extension of his left flank. He had attempted

it once with the Fifth Corps, at Dabney's Mill, and had failed; but that

attempt had been of value: he had gained a knowledge of the country. His

engineers had mapped it, the roads, the streams, the houses. The fight

at Dabney's Mill was a random stroke,--a "feeling of the position," to

use a term common in camp,--which enabled him to detect the weak point

of Lee's lines. To comprehend the movement, it is necessary to

understand the geographical and topographical features of the country,

which are somewhat peculiar. Hatcher's Run is a branch of the Nottoway

River, which has its rise in a swamp about four miles from the

Appomattox and twenty southwest of Petersburg. The Southside Railroad

runs southwest from Petersburg, along the ridge of land between the

Appomattox and the head-waters of the Nottoway, protected by the swamp

of Hatcher's Run and by the swamp of Stony Creek, another tributary of

the Nottoway.

The point aimed at by General Grant is known as the "Five Forks," a

place where five roads meet, on the table-land between the head-waters

of Hatcher's Run and Stony Creek. It was the most accessible gateway

leading to the railroad. If he could break through at that point, he

would turn Lee's flank, deprive him of the protection of the swamps, use

them for his own cover, and seize the railroad. To take the Five Forks

was to take all; for the long and terrible conflict had become so shorn

of its outside proportions, so reduced to simple elements, that, if Lee

lost that position, all was lost,--Petersburg, Richmond, his army, and

the Confederacy.

Surprise is expressed that the Rebellion went down so suddenly, in a

night, at one blow, toppling over like a child's house of cards,

imposing to look upon, yet of very little substance; but the

calculations of General Grant were to give a finishing stroke.

If, by massing the main body of his troops upon the extreme left of his

line, he succeeded in carrying the position of the Five Forks, it would

compel Lee to evacuate Richmond. Lee's line of retreat must necessarily

be towards Danville; but Grant, at the Five Forks, would be nearer

Danville by several miles than Lee; and he would thus, instead of the

exterior line, have the interior, with the power to push Lee at every

step farther from his direct line of retreat. That Grant saw all this,

and executed his plan, is evidence of great military ability. The plan

involved not merely the carrying of the Five Forks, but great activity

afterwards. The capture of Lee was a forethought, not an afterthought.

"Commissaries will prepare twelve days' rations," was his order, which

meant a long march, and the annihilation of Lee's army. An ordinary

commander might have been satisfied with merely breaking down the door,

and seizing the railroad, knowing that it would be the beginning of

dissolution to the Rebel army; but Grant's plan went farther,--the

routing of the burglar from his house, and dispatching him on the spot.

Perhaps Lee saw what the end would be, and did the best he could with

his troops; but inasmuch as he did not issue the order for the transfer

of a division from Richmond to the south side till Saturday night, after

the Five Forks were lost, it may be presumed that he did not fully

comprehend the importance of holding that gateway. If he had seen that

Richmond must be eventually evacuated, he might have saved his army by a

sudden withdrawal from both Richmond and Petersburg on Friday night,

pushing down the Southside Road, and throwing his whole force on

Sheridan and the Fifth Corps, which would have enabled him to reach

Danville. Not doing that, he lost all.

It is not intended in this article to give the details of the attack at

the Five Forks and along the line, but merely to show how the forces

were wielded in that last magnificent, annihilating blow.

On the 25th of March, the Twenty-Fourth Corps was transferred from the

north side of the James to Hatcher's Run, taking the position of the

Second Corps.

The force designed for the attack upon the Five Forks was composed of

the Fifth Corps and Sheridan's Cavalry,--the whole under command of

Sheridan. The Second Corps was massed across Hatcher's Run, and kept in

position to frustrate any attempt which might be made to cut Sheridan

off from the support of the main army.

Sheridan found a large force in front of him, along Chamberlain's Creek,

three miles west of Dinwiddie Court-House. He had hard fighting, and was

repulsed. There was want of cooperation on the part of Warren,

commanding the Fifth Corps, who was relieved of his command the next

morning, General Griffin succeeding him. A heavy rain-storm came on.

Wagons went hub-deep in the mud. The swamps were overflowed. The army

came to a stand-still. The soldiers were without tents. Thousands had

thrown away their blankets. There was gloom and discouragement

throughout the camp. But all the axes and shovels were brought into

requisition, and the men went to work building corduroy roads. It was

much better for the _morale_ of the army than to sit by bivouac-fires

waiting for sunny skies. The week passed away. The Richmond papers were

confident and boastful of final success.

"We are very hopeful of the campaign which is opening, and trust that we

are to reap a large advantage from the operations evidently near at

hand.... We have only to resolve that we will never surrender, and it

will be impossible that we shall ever be taken," said the "Sentinel," in

its issue of Saturday morning, April 1st, the last paper ever issued

from that office. The editor was not aware of the fact, that on Friday

evening, while he was penning this paragraph, Sheridan was bursting open

the door at the Five Forks and had the Rebellion by the throat. Lee

attempted to retrieve the disaster on Saturday by depleting his left and

centre to reinforce his right. Then came the order from Grant, "Attack

vigorously all along the line." How splendidly it was executed! The

Ninth, the Sixth, the Second, the Twenty-Fourth Corps, all went tumbling

in upon the enemy's works, like breakers upon the beach, tearing away

_chevaux-de-frise_, rushing into the ditches, sweeping over the

embankments, and dashing through the embrasures of the forts. In an hour

the C. S. A.,--the Confederate Slave Argosy,--the Ship of State launched

but four years ago, which went proudly sailing, with the death's-head

and cross-bones at her truck, on a cruise against Civilization and

Christianity, hailed as a rightful belligerent, furnished with guns,

ammunition, provisions, and all needful supplies, by England and France,

was thrown a helpless wreck upon the shores of Time!

It would be interesting to follow the troops in their victorious advance

upon Petersburg, their closing in upon Lee, the magnificent tactics of

the pursuit, and the scenes of the surrender; but in this article we

have space only to glance at

The Atlantic Monthly, Volume 15, No. 92, June, 1865 A Magazine of Literature, Art, and Politics · 第 59 / 65 题