THE MONROE DOCTRINE
In the foregoing chapters we have discussed the origin and the more
important applications of the Monroe Doctrine. There remain, however,
certain general aspects of the subject which require special
consideration. In any discussion of the Monroe Doctrine it is important
to bear in mind that it was in its origin and has always remained purely
an executive policy. Neither house of Congress has ever expressly
sanctioned the language of President Monroe or attempted to formulate a
new definition of the policy. On January 20, 1824, a few weeks after
Monroe's famous message, Henry Clay made an effort to get Congress to
endorse the policy announced by the executive, but his resolution was
tabled.[289] In 1856 Senator Clayton, who as secretary of state had
negotiated the Clayton-Bulwer treaty, declared that he would be willing
to vote to assert the Monroe Doctrine and maintain it, but that he would
"not expect to be sustained in such a vote by both branches of Congress.
Whenever the attempt has been made to assert the Monroe Doctrine in
either branch of Congress, it has failed." And he added, "You cannot
prevail on a majority, and I will venture to say that you cannot prevail
on one-third, of either house of Congress to sustain it."[290] In fact,
the Monroe Doctrine never received anything approaching legislative
sanction until 1895, when, in response to President Cleveland's message
on the Venezuelan boundary dispute, Congress appropriated $100,000 to
pay the expenses of the commission which he proposed to appoint.
For nearly a hundred years we have successfully upheld the Monroe
Doctrine without resort to force. The policy has never been favorably
regarded by the powers of continental Europe. Bismarck described it as
"an international impertinence." In recent years it has stirred up
rather intense opposition in certain parts of Latin America. Until
recently no American writers appear to have considered the real nature
of the sanction on which the doctrine rested. How is it that without an
army and until recent years without a navy of any size we have been able
to uphold a policy which has been described as an impertinence to Latin
America and a standing defiance to Europe? Americans generally seem to
think that the Monroe Doctrine has in it an inherent sanctity which
prevents other nations from violating it. In view of the general
disregard of sanctities, inherent or acquired, during the past few
years, this explanation will not hold good and some other must be
sought. Americans have been so little concerned with international
affairs that they have failed to see any connection between the Monroe
Doctrine and the balance of power in Europe. The existence of a European
balance of power is the only explanation of our having been able to
uphold the Monroe Doctrine for so long a time without a resort to force.
Some one or more of the European powers would long ago have stepped in
and called our bluff, that is, forced us to repudiate the Monroe
Doctrine or fight for it, had it not been for the well-grounded fear
that as soon as they became engaged with us some other European power
would attack them in the rear. What other satisfactory explanation is
there for Louis Napoleon's withdrawal from Mexico, for Great Britain's
backdown in the Venezuelan boundary dispute, and for the withdrawal of
the German fleet from Venezuela in 1902?
While England has from time to time objected to some of the corollaries
deduced from the Monroe Doctrine, she has on the whole been not
unfavorably disposed toward the essential features of that policy. The
reason for this is that the Monroe Doctrine has been an open-door
policy, and has thus been in general accord with the British policy of
free trade. The United States has not used the Monroe Doctrine for the
establishment of exclusive trade relations with our Southern neighbors.
In fact, we have largely neglected the South American countries as a
field for the development of American commerce. The failure to cultivate
this field has not been due wholly to neglect, however, but to the fact
that we have had employment for all our capital at home and consequently
have not been in a position to aid in the industrial development of the
Latin-American states, and to the further fact that our exports have
been so largely the same and hence the trade of North and South America
has been mainly with Europe. There has, therefore, been little rivalry
between the United States and the powers of Europe in the field of South
American commerce. Our interest has been political rather than
commercial. We have prevented the establishment of spheres of influence
and preserved the open door. This situation has been in full accord with
British policy. Had Great Britain adopted a high tariff policy and been
compelled to demand commercial concessions from Latin America by force,
the Monroe Doctrine would long since have gone by the board and been
forgotten. Americans should not forget the fact, moreover, that at any
time during the past twenty years Great Britain could have settled all
her outstanding difficulties with Germany by agreeing to sacrifice the
Monroe Doctrine and give her rival a free hand in South America. In the
face of such a combination our navy would have been of little avail.
Contrary to a widely prevailing opinion the Monroe Doctrine has
undergone very little change since the original declaration, and the
official statements of the doctrine have on the whole been very
consistent. The only important extension was made less than two years
after the original declaration, when, in October, 1825, Secretary Clay,
acting under the direction of President John Quincy Adams, who assisted
in formulating the doctrine, notified the French government that we
could not consent to the occupation of Cuba and Porto Rico "by any other
European power than Spain under any contingency whatever." Similar
declarations were made to the other European powers, the occasion being
the fear that Spain would transfer her sovereignty over these islands to
some other government. President Monroe had declared that the American
continents were closed to colonization from Europe, meaning by
colonization very probably, as Professor John Bassett Moore says, "the
acquisition of title to territory by original occupation and
settlement."[291] He had made no declaration against the transfer of
sovereignty in America from one European power to another. In fact he
positively renounced any such idea, when he said: "With the existing
colonies or dependencies of any European power we have not interfered,
and shall not interfere." Here, then, within two years we have a
distinct advance upon the position taken by President Monroe. Yet this
advanced ground was held by succeeding administrations, until President
Grant could say in the case of the same islands in his first annual
message:
These dependencies are no longer regarded as subject to
transfer from one European power to another. When the
present relation of colonies ceases, they are to become
independent powers, exercising the right of choice and of
self-control in the determination of their future condition
and relations with other powers.[292]
And Secretary Hamilton Fish said a few months later that the President
had but followed "the teachings of all our history" when he made this
statement.[293]
The failure of Blaine and Frelinghuysen to oust Great Britain from her
interests in the canal under the Clayton-Bulwer treaty by an appeal to
the Monroe Doctrine and the successful enforcement of the doctrine by
President Cleveland and Secretary Olney in 1895 have been discussed at
sufficient length in previous chapters. While the policy of Cleveland
and Olney was vehemently denounced at the time, it is now generally
approved by American writers of authority on international law and
diplomacy.
When President McKinley decided to demand from Spain the cession of the
Philippine Islands, the opposition that the step encountered was based
to some extent on the fear that it would amount to a repudiation of the
Monroe Doctrine, that if we invaded the Eastern Hemisphere we could not
expect to keep Europe out of the Western. The use of the term
hemispheres in connection with the Monroe Doctrine has, of course, been
merely a figure of speech. The Monroe Doctrine dealt with the relations
between Europe and America, and Eastern Asia never came within its
purview. As a matter of fact, the Monroe Doctrine has been more fully
and more frequently asserted since the acquisition of the Philippines
than ever before. The participation of the United States in the First
Peace Conference at The Hague was taken by many Americans to mark the
end of the old order and the introduction of a new era in American
diplomacy, but, contrary to their expectations, this meeting was made
the occasion for an emphatic and effective declaration before the
assembled body of European nations of our adherence to the Monroe
Doctrine. Before the Convention for the Pacific Settlements of
International Disputes was adopted, the following declaration was read
before the conference and the treaty was signed by the American
delegates under this reservation:
Nothing contained in this convention shall be so construed
as to require the United States of America to depart from
its traditional policy of not intruding upon, interfering
with, or entangling itself in the political questions or
policy or internal administration of any foreign state; nor
shall anything contained in the said convention be construed
to imply a relinquishment by the United States of America of
its traditional attitude toward purely American
questions.[294]
Prior to the Roosevelt administration the Monroe Doctrine was regarded
by the Latin-American states as solely a protective policy. The United
States did not undertake to control the financial administration or the
foreign policy of any of these republics. It was only after their
misconduct had gotten them into difficulty and some foreign power, or
group of foreign powers, was on the point of demanding reparation by
force that the United States stepped in and undertook to see to it that
foreign intervention did not take the form of occupation of territory or
interference in internal politics. The Monroe Doctrine has always been
in principle a policy of American intervention for the purpose of
preventing European intervention, but American intervention always
awaited the threat of immediate action on the part of some European
power. President Roosevelt concluded that it would be wiser to restrain
the reckless conduct of the smaller American republics before disorders
or public debts should reach a point which gave European powers an
excuse for intervening. He held that since we could not permit European
powers to restrain or punish American states in cases of wrongdoing, we
must ourselves undertake that task. As long as the Monroe Doctrine was
merely a policy of benevolent protection, which Latin-American states
could invoke after their unwise or evil conduct had brought European
powers to the point of demanding just retribution, it was regarded with
favor and no objection was raised to it; but the Roosevelt declaration,
that if we were to continue to protect Latin-American states against
European intervention, we had a right to demand that they should refrain
from conduct which was likely to provoke such intervention, was quite a
different thing, and raised a storm of criticism and opposition.
The Roosevelt interpretation of the Monroe Doctrine was undoubtedly a
perfectly logical step. It was endorsed by the Taft administration and
has been extended by the Wilson administration and made one of our most
important policies in the zone of the Caribbean. President Roosevelt was
right in drawing the conclusion that we had arrived at a point where we
had either to abandon the Monroe Doctrine or to extend its application
so as to cover the constantly increasing number of disputes arising from
the reckless creation of public debts and loose financial
administration. It was absurd for us to stand quietly by and witness the
utterly irresponsible creation of financial obligations that would
inevitably lead to European intervention and then undertake to fix the
bounds and limits of that intervention. It is interesting to note that
President Wilson has not hesitated to carry the new policy to its
logical conclusion, and he has gone so far as to warn Latin-American
countries against granting to foreign corporations concessions which, on
account of their extended character, would be certain to give rise to
foreign claims which would, in turn, give an excuse for European
intervention. In discussing our Latin-American policy shortly after the
beginning of his administration, President Wilson said:
You hear of concessions to foreign capitalists in Latin
America. You do not hear of concessions to foreign
capitalists in the United States. They are not granted
concessions. They are invited to make investments. The work
is ours, though they are welcome to invest in it. We do not
ask them to supply the capital and do the work. It is an
invitation, not a privilege, and the states that are obliged
because their territory does not lie within the main field
of modern enterprise and action, to grant concessions are in
this condition, that foreign interests are apt to dominate
their domestic affairs--a condition of affairs always
dangerous and apt to become intolerable.... What these
states are going to seek, therefore, is an emancipation from
the subordination which has been inevitable to foreign
enterprise and an assertion of the splendid character which,
in spite of these difficulties, they have again and again
been able to demonstrate.
These remarks probably had reference to the oil concession which Pearson
& Son of London had arranged with the president of Colombia. This
concession is said to have covered extensive oil interests in Colombia,
and carried with it the right to improve harbors and dig canals in the
country. However, before the meeting of the Colombian Congress in
November, 1913, which was expected to confirm the concession, Lord
Cowdray, the president of Pearson & Son, withdrew the contract, alleging
as his reason the opposition of the United States.
Prior to the Great War, which has upset all calculations, it seemed
highly probable that the Platt Amendment would in time be extended to
all the weaker states within the zone of the Caribbean. If the United
States is to exercise a protectorate over such states, the right to
intervene and the conditions of intervention should be clearly defined
and publicly proclaimed. Hitherto whatever action we have taken in Latin
America has been taken under the Monroe Doctrine,--a policy of doubtful
legal sanction,--which an international court might not recognize.
Action under a treaty would have the advantage of legality. In other
words, the recent treaties with Caribbean states have converted American
policy into law.
The imperialistic tendencies of our Caribbean policy, whether they be
regarded as logical deductions from the Monroe Doctrine or not, have
undoubtedly aroused the jealousies and fears of our Southern neighbors.
One of the results has been the formation of the so-called A B C
Alliance, based on treaties between Argentina, Brazil, and Chile, the
exact provisions of which have not been made public. This alliance
doubtless serves a useful purpose in promoting friendly relations
between the three great states of South America, and since the
acceptance of the mediation of these powers in Mexico by President
Wilson there is no reason to regard it as in any sense hostile to the
United States. While the United States may very properly accept the
mediation of other American states in disputes like that arising out of
the Mexican situation, the United States would not feel under any
obligation to consult other American states or accept their advice on
any question involving the enforcement of the Monroe Doctrine. The
United States has always maintained the Monroe Doctrine as a principle
of self-defense, and, consequently, on its own authority. In 1825 the
Brazilian government proposed that the United States should enter into
an alliance with it in order to maintain the independence of Brazil in
case Portugal should be assisted by any foreign power in her efforts to
reconquer Brazil. Secretary Clay replied that while President Adams
adhered to the principles set forth by his predecessor, the prospect of
peace between Portugal and Brazil rendered such an alliance
unnecessary.[295]
In recent years the proposal has been more than once made that the
Monroe Doctrine be Pan Americanized. This proposal was discussed by Mr.
Root in his address before the American Society of International Law in
1914 in the course of which he said:
Since the Monroe Doctrine is a declaration based upon this
nation's right of self-protection, it cannot be transmuted
into a joint or common declaration by American states or any
number of them. If Chile or Argentina or Brazil were to
contribute the weight of its influence toward a similar end,
the right upon which that nation would rest its declaration
would be its own safety, not the safety of the United
States. Chile would declare what was necessary for the
safety of Chile. Argentina would declare what was necessary
for the safety of Argentina. Brazil, what was necessary for
the safety of Brazil. Each nation would act for itself and
in its own right and it would be impossible to go beyond
that except by more or less offensive and defensive
alliances. Of course such alliances are not to be
considered.[296]
President Wilson in his address before the Second Pan American
Scientific Congress in 1916 agreed in part with this when he said: "The
Monroe Doctrine was proclaimed by the United States on her own
authority. It has always been maintained, and always will be maintained,
upon her own responsibility."
The relation of the Monroe Doctrine to the Declaration of Rights and
Duties of Nations, drafted by the American Institute of International
Law, was discussed by Mr. Root in his address before the American
Society of International Law in 1916. He said in part:
Whether the United States will soon have occasion or will
long have the ability or the will to maintain the Monroe
Doctrine lies in the uncertain future. Whether it will be
necessary for her to act in defense of the doctrine or
abandon it, may well be determined by the issue of the
present war. Whether when the occasion comes she will prove
to have the ability and the will to maintain the doctrine,
depends upon the spirit of her people, their capacity for
patriotic sacrifice, the foresight and character of those to
whose initiative in foreign affairs the interests of the
people are entrusted. Whether the broader doctrine affirmed
by the American Institute of International Law is to be made
effective for the protection of justice and liberty
throughout the world depends upon whether the vision of the
nations shall have been so clarified by the terrible lessons
of these years that they can rise above small struggles for
advantage in international affairs, and realize that
correlative to each nation's individual right is that
nation's duty to insist upon the observance of the
principles of public right throughout the community of
nations.[297]
It is not probable that our participation in the Great War will result
in any weakening of the Monroe Doctrine. That principle has been fully
justified by a century of experience. It has saved South America from
the kind of exploitation to which the continents of Africa and Asia
have, during the past generation, fallen a prey. It would be strange
indeed if the United States, having insisted on the non-interference of
European powers in America when it was itself a weak power from the
military point of view, should now in the plenitude of its power relax
what has been for so many years the cardinal principle of its foreign
policy. The abandonment of our policy of neutrality and isolation does
not by any means mean the abandonment of the Monroe Doctrine. President
Wilson made this quite clear in his address to the Senate on January 22,
1917, when he said:
I am proposing, as it were, that the nations should with one
accord adopt the doctrine of President Monroe as the
doctrine of the world; that no nation should seek to extend
its polity over any other nation or people, but that every
people should be left free to determine its own polity, its
own way of development, unhindered, unthreatened, unafraid,
the little along with the great and powerful. I am proposing
that all nations henceforth avoid entangling alliances which
would draw them into competitions of power, catch them in a
net of intrigue and selfish rivalry, and disturb their own
affairs with influences intruded from without. There is no
entangling alliance in a concert of power.
The policy of isolation or the avoidance of entangling alliances, which
so many Americans confuse with the Monroe Doctrine, is in principle
quite distinct from it and is in fact utterly inconsistent with the
position and importance of the United States as a world power. The
difference in principle between the two policies can perhaps be best
illustrated by the following supposition. If the United States were to
sign a permanent treaty with England placing our navy at her disposal in
the event of attack from some European power, on condition that England
would unite with us in opposing the intervention of any European power
in Latin America, such a treaty would not be a violation of the Monroe
Doctrine, but a distinct recognition of that principle. Such a treaty
would, however, be a departure from our traditional policy of isolation,
originally announced by Washington and Jefferson.
The participation of the United States in the League of Nations would,
if that League be considered an entangling alliance, be a departure from
the policy of isolation but not a violation of the Monroe Doctrine. In
order to allay the fears of Americans on this point, President Wilson
caused to be inserted in the constitution of the League of Nations the
following clause:
Nothing in this Covenant shall be deemed to affect the
validity of international engagements, such as treaties of
arbitration or regional understandings like the Monroe
Doctrine, for securing the maintenance of peace.
This clause did not serve the purpose for which it was intended, and a
heated controversy at once arose as to the meaning of the language
employed. When the treaty came before the Senate this clause was the
object of attack, and Senator Lodge included among the fourteen
reservations which he proposed the following one on the Monroe Doctrine:
The United States will not submit to arbitration or to
inquiry by the assembly or by the council of the League of
Nations, provided for in said treaty of peace, any questions
which in the judgment of the United States depend upon or
relate to its long-established policy, commonly known as the
Monroe Doctrine; said doctrine is to be interpreted by the
United States alone and is hereby declared to be wholly
outside the jurisdiction of said League of Nations and
entirely unaffected by any provision contained in the said
treaty of peace with Germany.
The recognition of the Monroe Doctrine by the League of Nations, taken
in connection with the Senate's assertion of the exclusive right to
interpret its meaning, has caused some of the Latin-American countries
to delay joining the League until the Monroe Doctrine is clearly
defined. In February, 1920, Salvador brought this subject to the
attention of the United States in a formal note in which she argued
that, as the Monroe Doctrine was so variously interpreted by prominent
thinkers and public men even in the United States, it should be
officially defined.[298] In reply Salvador was referred to what
President Wilson had said on the subject of the Monroe Doctrine in his
address of January 6, 1916, before the Pan American Scientific Congress
at Washington.[299] These remarks have already been quoted in Chapter
VIII.[300] Salvador was informed that no further definition was deemed
necessary. The speech referred to may, therefore, be considered the
latest official interpretation of the Monroe Doctrine.
FOOTNOTES:
[289] Moore, "Digest of International Law," Vol. VI, p. 404.
[290] _Ibid._, p. 427.
[291] _Political Science Quarterly_, Vol. XI. p. 3.
[292] "Messages and Papers of the Presidents," Vol. VII, p. 32.
[293] Foreign Relations, 1870, pp. 254-260; Moore, "Digest of
International Law," Vol. VI, p. 431.
[294] "Treaties and Conventions of the United States" (Compiled by W. M.
Malloy), vol. II, p. 2032.
[295] Moore, "Digest of International Law," Vol. VI, p. 427.
[296] "Addresses on International Subjects," Elihu Root, p. 120.
[297] "Addresses on International Subjects," by Elihu Root, p. 425.
[298] The New York _Times_, February 8, 1920.
[299] The New York _Times_, March 2, 1920.
[300] Ante, pp. 306-307.
THE END
INDEX
A B C Alliance,
offers to mediate in Mexican crisis, 309;
divided in Great War, 313;
attitude towards United States, 329.
Aberdeen, Lord, tries to prevent annexation of Texas by United States,
262, 263.
Abolitionists, oppose admission of Texas, 262.
Adams, C. F.,
minister to England, views on the Mexican situation, 202;
warns his government against designs of Louis Napoleon on Mexico, 208;
on Mexican policy of Great Britain, 209.
Adams, John Quincy,
opposes joint action with England, 70, 71;
influence on Monroe's message of December 2, 1823, 72;
informs Russia that American continents are no longer open to European
colonization, 75;
views on Cuba, 86;
appoints delegates to Panama Congress, 292, 293.
Aix-la-Chapelle, conference of 1818, 58, 59.
Alexander I, Czar of Russia, and Holy Alliance, 61.
American Institute of International Law, 304;
adopts Declaration of Rights and Duties of Nations, 305-306.
Anglo-Japanese Alliance, 266.
Arbitration, international,
of Venezuelan boundary dispute, 248, 249;
of pecuniary claims against Venezuela, 255, 256.
Argentina,
British invasion of, 23-25;
beginnings of revolution in, 30;
remains neutral in Great War, 314, 315.
_Assiento_, contract for supplying slaves to Spanish colonies, 12-14.
_Audiencia_, in Spanish colonies, 4, 5.
Austria,
suppresses revolution in Naples and in Piedmont, 59, 60;
warned not to send troops to assistance of Maximilian in Mexico,
232, 233.
Balfour, A. J., on forcible collection of pecuniary claims, 257.
_Baltimore_, U. S. Cruiser, members of crew attacked by Chileans, 302.
Barbosa, Ruy, Brazilian statesman, 313.
Bay Islands, British claims to, 157, 160, 161.
Beaupre, A. M., minister to Colombia, 186.
Belize, British claims to, 157, 160, 161.
Bell, J. Franklin, in Cuba, 142.
Belligerent rights,
accorded to Spanish colonies, 48;
withheld from Cubans, 110-113;
House resolution, 113;
joint resolution of Congress, 127.
Bigelow, John, minister to France, 222, 225, 227.
Bismarck, Prince, on Monroe Doctrine, 321.
"Black Friday," 110.
_Black Warrior_, case of, 101-103.
Blaine, J. G.,
outlines new canal policy, 169-171;
proposes modifications of Clayton-Bulwer treaty, 172-173;
calls International American Conference at Washington, 300;
presides at opening session, 301.
Blanco, Ramon, governor of Cuba, 129.
Bliss, Tasker H., in charge of Cuban customs, 140.
Bolivar, Simon, character, 37;
joins patriot cause, 38;
career in Venezuela and Colombia, 39-42;
in Ecuador and Peru, 43, 44;
interest in Isthmian canal, 147;
summons Panama Congress, 292.
Bonaparte, Louis Napoleon,
interest in Isthmian canal, 148;
designs on Mexico, 207;
places Maximilian on the throne, 214-220;
forced to withdraw troops, 226-232.
Bonaparte, Napoleon,
invasion of Spain, 26-28;
cedes Louisiana to United States, 261.
Bowen, Herbert W., minister to Venezuela, 252.
Brazil,
becomes a republic, 301;
stands by United States in war with Germany, 312-314.
British Guiana, dispute over boundary of, 238-249.
British Honduras. See Belize.
Brougham, Lord, on Monroe's message of December 2, 1823, 77.
Bryan, William J.,
favors ratification of Spanish treaty, 136;
tries to adjust differences with Colombia resulting from Panama
Revolution, 274-276;
negotiates treaties with Nicaragua, 285, 286;
refuses to recognize Huerta, 308.
Buchanan, James,
proposes purchase of Cuba, 92;
connection with Ostend Manifesto, 104, 105;
recommends congressional action on Cuban question, 106;
criticises Clayton-Bulwer treaty, 157;
suggests abrogation of, 163; by prior usage
announces satisfactory adjustment of disputes growing out of, 165.
Buenos Aires, captured by the British, 24.
Bulwer, Sir Henry Lytton, signs canal treaty, 154.
Bunau-Varilla, Philippe,
and Panama revolution, 187;
first minister from Republic of Panama, 189.
Bureau of American Republics, 301, 303.
California, acquisition of, 264.
Campbell, L. D., minister to Mexico, 234-236.
Canal. See Panama Canal, Nicaragua Canal.
Canning, George,
on commercial relations with Spanish colonies, 54-55;
on recognition of, 55-56;
on European congresses, 58, 59;
on French intervention in Spain, 63, 64;
conferences with Rush on schemes of the Holy Alliance, 65-67, 72;
interviews with Prince Polignac on Spanish-American situation, 73, 74;
comments on Monroe's message of December 2, 1823, 78, 79;
decides to recognize Mexico and Colombia, 80, 81;
opposes French occupation of Cuba, 88.
Caribbean Sea,
naval supremacy in, 261, 264-266;
new American policies in, 267.
Carranza, Venustiano,
succeeds Huerta, 309;
recognized by United States, 310;
permits German intrigue, 316.
_Casa de Contratacion_, 8.
Castelar, Emilio, President of the Spanish Republic, 115.
Central American Court of Justice, 281-287.
Chile,
liberation of, 32, 33;
war with Spain, 298;
with Peru, 299-300;
quarrel with United States, 301, 302;
remains neutral in Great War, 315, 316.
Claims. See Pecuniary claims.
Clay, Henry,
advocates recognition of South American independence, 49-51, 82;
Cuban policy of, 88;
views on Isthmian Canal, 148;
and Panama Congress, 292-295;
applies Monroe Doctrine to Cuba and Porto Rico, 323.
Clayton, J. M.,
secretary of state, signs canal treaty, 154;
criticised by Buchanan, 157;
on refusal of Congress to endorse Monroe Doctrine, 320.
Clayton-Bulwer treaty, 154-156;
disputes arising out of, 159-165;
attempts of Blaine and Frelinghuysen to secure modifications of,
172-177;
alleged British violation of, 178-180;
abrogated, 181.
Cleveland, Grover,
transmits to Congress correspondence of Secretary Fish on Cuba, 125;
recognizes state of insurgency in Cuba, 126;
ignores resolution of Congress recognizing belligerency, 127;
message on Cuba, 128;
canal policy of, 177;
asserts Monroe Doctrine in Venezuelan boundary dispute, 238-239.
Cochrane, Lord (Earl Dundonald), commander of Chilean navy, 34, 35.
Colombia (New Granada),
war of liberation, 39-42;
signs canal treaty of 1846, 149, 150;
rejects Hay-Herran convention, 186;
demands arbitration of Panama question, 192;
strained relations with United States arising out of Panama
Revolution, 268-276;
remains neutral in the Great War, 312, 316.
Commerce, British, with Spanish colonies, 53-55.
Conference. See International American.
Convention of London of 1861, providing for joint intervention in
Mexico, 203.
Costa Rica, protests against protectorate over Nicaragua, 285-287.
Cromwell, W. N., attorney for French Panama Canal Company, 187.
Cuba,
British or French acquisition opposed by United States, 84-90;
annexation schemes, 91-106;
"Ten Years' War" in, 107-125;
insurrection of 1895, 125-129;
intervention of the United States in, 130-133;
American occupation of, 136-140;
reciprocity with, 140-142;
second period of American occupation, 142, 143;
enters war against Germany, 312, 313.
Cushing, Caleb, mission to Spain, 119-124.
Dallas-Clarendon treaty, amended by Senate and rejected by Great
Britain, 161, 162.
Danish West Indies,
annexation proposed by Seward, 264;
purchased by United States, 289, 290.
Davis, Cushman K., commissioner to negotiate peace with Spain, 135.
Dawson, T. C., minister to Dominican Republic, negotiates treaty
establishing financial supervision, 277-279.
Day, W. R., commissioner to negotiate peace with Spain, 135.
Dayton, W. L., minister to France, 214, 217, 219, 221.
De Lesseps, Ferdinand,
begins construction of Panama canal, 146;
effect on canal policy of United States, 167-169.
De Lhuys, Drouyn, French minister of state, 217, 221, 225, 231.
Dewey, George,
at Manila Bay, 134;
prepared to arrest German action against Venezuela, 253, 254.
Diaz, Porfirio, president of Mexico, joint mediator with President
Roosevelt in Central American affairs, 280-282.
Dominican Republic, under financial supervision of United States,
276-280.
Drago, L. M., Argentine minister, on war between Germany and United
States, 314, 315.
Drago Doctrine, 257-260.
DuBois, J. T., minister to Colombia, efforts to settle differences
arising out of Panama Revolution, 270-274.
Evarts, W. M., report on obligations of United States with respect to
Isthmus of Panama, 169.
Ferdinand VII, of Spain,
dethroned by Napoleon, 27;
restoration of, 29;
attempts to recover American colonies, 40.
Filibusters, Cuban, 92-96.
Financial supervision,
over Dominican Republic, 276-280;
over Nicaragua, 283;
over Haiti, 289.
Fish, Hamilton, secretary of state,
Cuban policy of, 108-124;
on British infringement of Clayton-Bulwer treaty, 167;
acts as mediator in war between Spain and republics on West coast of
South America, 298, 299.
Florida treaty, 52, 85, 261.
Fonseca Bay, naval base on,
offered to United States by Honduras, 153;
leased from Nicaragua, 286.
Forsyth, John,
secretary of state, 90;
minister to Mexico, 194.
France,
interest in Cuba, 87, 88, 97;
claims against Mexico, 197;
severs diplomatic relations with Juarez government, 199;
decides on joint intervention in Mexico, 203;
supports Maximilian on Mexican throne, 220-234.
Frelinghuysen, F. T.,
correspondence with Lord Granville on Clayton-Bulwer treaty, 175, 176;
signs canal treaty with Nicaragua, 177.
Frye, W. P., commissioner to negotiate peace with Spain, 135.
Garfield, J. A., canal policy of, 169.
Germany,
intervention in Venezuela, 249-252;
forced to withdraw, 252-255.
Goethals, G. W., in charge of construction of Panama Canal, 191.
Gomez, Maximo, leader of Cuban insurrection, 125.
Grace-Eyre-Cragin Syndicate, secures concession for canal through
Nicaragua, 183.
Grant, Ulysses S.,
Cuban policy of, 108-124;
favors driving French from Mexico, 227;
proposes annexation of Santo Domingo, 265;
on Monroe Doctrine, 324.
Gray, George, commissioner to negotiate peace with Spain, 135.
Great Britain,
secures monopoly of slave trade, 12-14;
entertains idea of revolutionizing Spanish America, 14-22, 26;
sends expedition to the Plate, 23-25;
commercial relations with Spanish America, 53-55;
attitude towards Holy Alliance, 60, 63;
recognizes independence of Mexico and Colombia, 80;
attitude towards Cuba, 85, 86, 90, 97;
signs Clayton-Bulwer treaty, 154;
disagrees with United States as to interpretation of the treaty,
160-164;
refuses to relinquish rights under treaty, 174;
interferes in affairs of Mosquito Indians, 178-180;
claims against Mexico, 196;
severs diplomatic relations with Juarez government, 199;
decides on joint intervention in Mexico, 203;
grows suspicious of France, 207-209;
withdraws troops from Mexico, 212, 213;
controversy with Venezuela over boundary of British Guiana, 238-249;
intervenes in Venezuela for collection of claims, 249-252;
opposes annexation of Texas by United States, 262-263;
attitude towards Monroe Doctrine, 322, 323.
Greytown, British occupation of, 157-160.
Guiana. See British Guiana.
Gwin, W. M., plan for colonizing ex-Confederates in Mexico, 223.
Hague Conference of 1907, resolutions on forcible collection of contract
debts, 259-260.
Hague Court, decision in Venezuelan case, 256.
Haiti,
occupied by U. S. Marines, 288;
agrees to American financial supervision, 289;
declares war on Germany, 316.
Hamilton, Alexander, interested in Miranda's projects, 17-19.
Harrison, Benjamin, dispute with Chile, 302.
Hay, John, secretary of state,
negotiates new canal treaty with England, 180, 181;
negotiates canal treaty with Colombia, 185;
calls Germany's attention to Monroe Doctrine, 251;
advises submission of Venezuelan case to Hague Court, 255.
Hay-Herran convention,
signed, 185;
rejected by Colombia, 186, 187.
Hay-Pauncefote treaty,
provisions, 180, 181;
practical recognition of American supremacy in Caribbean, 265-267.
Hayes, R. B., announces new canal policy, 168.
Hepburn Bill, 184.
Hoar, G. F., on acquisition of the Philippines, 136.
Holleben incident, 252-254.
Holy Alliance, treaty of the, 61.
Honduras,
Knox treaty establishing financial supervision over, 283;
protests against protectorate over Nicaragua, 285.
Huerta, Victoriano, Mexican dictator, 307-309.
India House, 8.
Indies,
Council of the, 4, 5;
laws of the, 4.
International American Conference,
at Washington, 300, 301;
at Mexico, 302;
at Rio de Janeiro, 303;
at Buenos Aires, 303.
International High Commission, 304.
Intervention, European doctrine of, 57.
Isthmian canal,
difficulties of, 144;
comparative merits of Panama and Nicaragua routes, 145, 146;
international questions involved in, 146, 147.
Italy, intervention in Venezuela, 249-252.
_Itata_, case of the, 302.
Iturbide, Augustin de,
leads revolution against Spain in Mexico, 45, 46;
proclaims himself emperor, 47.
Jefferson, Thomas,
interview with Miranda, 20;
letter to President Monroe on Canning's proposals, 68-70;
views on Cuba, 84, 87;
on recognition of _de facto_ governments, 308.
Juarez, Benito,
president of Mexico, 194;
recognized by United States, 195;
suspends payment on foreign debt, 199;
driven from capital by the French, 214, 215;
urged by United States to spare Maximilian's life, 235;
orders his execution, 237.
King, Rufus, correspondence with Miranda, 17-20.
Knox, P. C.,
investigates title of Panama Canal Company, 185;
tries to settle differences with Colombia resulting from Panama
Revolution, 270-274;
Central American policy, 282-285.
Lansing, Robert, secretary of state,
negotiates treaty for purchase of Danish West Indies, 290;
suggests adoption of Declaration of Rights and Duties of Nations, 305.
Latin America, and the Great War, 312-318.
Laybach, conference of powers at, 59.
League of Nations, and Monroe Doctrine, 333, 334.
Lee, Fitzhugh, consul-general at Havana, 129.
Lincoln, Abraham, views on Panama canal, 151.
Liverpool, Lord,
on conference at Aix-la-Chapelle, 58;
on French intervention in Spain, 63.
Lodge, H. C.,
on alleged secret alliance with England, 266;
reservation of Monroe Doctrine, 333.
Lome, Enrique Dupuy de, incident and recall, 129, 130.
Loomis, F. B., acting secretary of state, 188.
Lopez, Narciso, Cuban patriot, 92-96.
Louis Napoleon. See Bonaparte.
Louis Philippe,
suggested as possible ruler for Spanish America, 26;
and annexation of Texas, 262, 263.
Louisiana, ceded to United States, 261.
McKinley, William,
Cuban policy of, 128-132;
demands cession of Philippine Islands, 135.
McLane, R. M., minister to Mexico, 195.
Mackintosh, Sir James, on Monroe's message of December 2, 1823, 78.
Madero, Francisco, murder of, 307.
Madison, James,
receives Miranda informally, 20;
favors joint action with England against intervention of powers in
Spanish America, 70;
views on Cuba, 84.
Magoon, C. E., provisional governor of Cuba, 142.
Magruder, J. B., accepts office under Maximilian in Mexico, 224.
_Maine_, U. S. battleship,
sent to Havana, 129;
blown up, 130.
Marcy, William L., secretary of state, Cuban policy of, 99-105.
Maritime Canal Company, secures concessions from Nicaragua, 183.
Mason, John Y., connection with Ostend Manifesto, 104.
Maury, M. F., accepts office under Maximilian in Mexico, 224.
Maximilian, Archduke Ferdinand,
suggested for Mexican throne, 208-211;
offered the position of Emperor of Mexico, 215;
not recognized by the United States, 218, 219;
career in Mexico, 220-234;
death, 237.
Mexico,
becomes independent of Spain, 45-47;
frequent changes of government in, 193;
claims of foreigners against, 196;
joint intervention of England, France, and Spain, 203-212;
war with United States, 263, 264;
relations with United States under Huerta, 307-309;
under Carranza, 309-311;
hot-bed of German intrigue, 316.
Miles, Nelson A., occupies Porto Rico, 134.
Miranda, Francisco de,
plans for revolutionizing Spanish America, 15-19;
organizes expedition in New York, 20;
attempts to land in Venezuela, 21, 22;
takes part in Venezuelan revolution, 38;
imprisonment and death, 39.
Monroe, James,
attitude toward South American struggle for independence, 52, 53;
letter to Jefferson on Canning's proposals, 67, 68;
message of December 2, 1823, 76, 77.
Monroe Doctrine,
text of message of December 2, 1823, 76-77;
and Clayton-Bulwer treaty, 157, 159, 175, 176;
and French intervention in Mexico, 222, 223;
asserted by President Cleveland in Venezuelan boundary dispute,
238-249;
tested by Germany, 249-255;
imperialistic tendencies of, 290, 291, 329;
President Wilson's statement of, before Pan American Scientific
Conference, 306-307;
an executive policy, 320;
relation to European balance of power, 321, 322;
attitude of England toward, 322;
consistently interpreted, 323;
does not permit transfer of American colonies from one European
power to another, 323, 324;
reservation of, at Hague Conference, 325, 326;
as applied by President Roosevelt, 326, 327;
proposals to Pan Americanize, 330;
probable effects of Great War on, 331, 332;
distinct from policy of isolation, 332, 333;
recognized in covenant of League of Nations, 333;
Lodge reservation, 333;
definition of, demanded by Salvador, 334.
Moore, John Bassett,
secretary of commission to negotiate peace with Spain, 135;
on Monroe Doctrine, 323.
Morgan, J. T., advocates Nicaragua canal route, 184.
Mosquito Coast,
Great Britain's claims to, 157-159;
British interference in, 178-180.
Motley, J. L., minister to Austria, 232, 233.
Naon, R. S., Argentine ambassador to the United States, on "European
War and Pan Americanism," 316-318.
Napoleon. See Bonaparte.
New Granada. See Colombia.
Nicaragua,
signs canal treaty of 1867 with United States, 166;
canal treaty of 1884 withdrawn from Senate by Cleveland, 177;
sovereignty over Mosquito Coast, 178-180;
relations with United States under Roosevelt, 280, 281;
under Taft, 282-285;
under Wilson, 285-288;
treaty of 1916, 286.
Nicaragua Canal,
comparative merits of Nicaragua and Panama routes, 145, 146;
draft of treaty for construction of canal, 152, 153;
route investigated by Walker commission, 182.
O'Higgins, Bernardo, Chilean patriot, 32, 33.
Olney, Richard, secretary of state,
on Cuba, 127;
on Clayton-Bulwer treaty, 180;
interpretation of Monroe Doctrine in Venezuelan boundary dispute, 240.
Ostend Manifesto, 104, 105.
Ouseley, Sir William, mission to Central America, 162-164.
Palma, T. E., first president of Cuba, 140, 142.
Panama, Republic of,
recognized by President Roosevelt, 189;
leases Canal Zone to United States, 191.
Panama Canal,
comparative merits of Panama and Nicaragua routes, 145, 146;
treaty of 1846 with Colombia, 149;
opened to commerce, 191.
Panama Canal Company,
organized by De Lesseps, 167;
reorganization and extension of concession, 182;
offers to sell to United States, 184, 185.
Panama Congress, 292-295.
Panama Railroad, 146, 150.
Panama Revolution, 187-189.
Pan American Financial Conferences, 304.
Pan American Scientific Conferences, 304.
Pan American Union, 303.
Pan Americanism,
definition of, 292;
promoted by President Wilson's Mexican policy, 309, 311;
put to test in the Great War, 312-317.
Pecuniary Claims,
against Mexico, 196, 197;
British policy in regard to, 198;
attempt to collect by force from Venezuela, 249-257;
Resolutions of Second Hague Conference, 259, 260;
considered by International American Conferences, 302, 303.
Peru,
liberation of, 33-37;
war with Spain, 298;
war with Chile, 299, 300;
severs relations with Germany, 316.
Philippine Islands, ceded to United States, 135, 136.
Pierce, Franklin, Cuban policy of, 99-105.
Platt Amendment,
text of, 138-139;
treaty with Nicaragua embodying, defeated by Senate, 285, 286;
applied in part to Haiti, 289.
Poinsett, Joel R., 49, 53.
Polk, J. K., and Mexican War, 263, 264.
Porter, Horace, presents resolution to Hague Conference of 1907 on
forcible collection of pecuniary claims, 259.
Porto Rico, cession of, demanded by United States, 135.
Quitman, John A., relations with Lopez, 93-94.
Recognition, withheld from Huerta, 308. See Belligerent Rights.
Reed, Walter, yellow-fever investigations, 137.
Reid, Whitelaw, commissioner to negotiate peace with Spain, 135.
Roosevelt, Theodore,
and Cuban reciprocity, 140-142;
signs canal bill, 185;
denounces Colombia's rejection of Hay-Herran convention, 186;
recognizes Republic of Panama, 189;
on acquisition of Canal Zone, 190;
creates strained relations with Colombia, 192;
on Monroe Doctrine, 251;
interview with Holleben on German intervention in Venezuela, 252-254;
refuses to arbitrate Panama question, 268;
denounces Bryan treaty with Colombia as blackmail, 275;
establishes financial supervision over Dominican Republic, 276-280;
Central American policy, 280, 281;
attempts to purchase Danish West Indies, 290;
interpretation of Monroe Doctrine, 326, 327.
Root, Elihu,
author of Platt Amendment, 139;
attempts to settle differences with Colombia, 268-270;
visits South America, 303;
on Monroe Doctrine, 330, 331.
Rush, Richard, minister to England, conferences with Canning on schemes
of Holy Alliance, 65-67, 72, 73.
Russia, claims to northwestern coast of America, 75.
Sagasta, P. M., Spanish minister, Cuban policy of, 128.
Salisbury, Lord,
reply to Olney's dispatch on Venezuelan boundary dispute, 242;
agrees to arbitration of the boundary dispute, 248.
Salvador,
protests against protectorate over Nicaragua, 285-287;
requests official definition of Monroe Doctrine, 334.
Sampson, W. T., blockades Cuba, 134.
San Ildefonso, secret treaty of, 261.
San Martin, Jose de,
takes part in Argentine revolution, 30-32;
liberates Chile, 32, 33;
liberates Peru, 33-37;
relations with Bolivar, 43, 44;
death, 45.
Santo Domingo,
annexation proposed by Seward, 264;
annexation proposed by Grant, 265. See Dominican Republic.
Schenck, Robert C., minister to England, 120.
Schofield, J. M., informal mission to France, 227.
Seward, W. H.,
views on Panama canal, 151;
favors expansion, 165;
raises question as to binding force of Clayton-Bulwer treaty, 166;
proposes to assume payment of interest on foreign debt of Mexico, 200;
declines to unite with European powers in measures against Mexico,
205, 206;
attitude towards French in Mexico, 214-231;
efforts to annex Santo Domingo and Danish West Indies, 264, 265.
Shaw, Albert, and Panama Revolution, 189.
Sherman, John, secretary of state, 128.
Sherman, W. T., selected for special mission to Mexico, 234, 235.
Sickles, Daniel E., mission to Spain, 109-118.
Slave trade, 12-14.
Slavery, in Cuba, 89, 90, 106, 107, 111.
Slidell, John, introduces bill for purchase of Cuba, 106.
Smuggling, in Spanish colonies, 11.
Soule, Pierre, mission to Spain, 99-105.
Spain,
colonial policy of, 4-12;
revolution of 1820, 56,
suppressed by French army, 63;
revolution of 1868, 107;
republic proclaimed in, 113;
treaty of 1898 with United States, 136;
claims against Mexico, 197;
decides on joint intervention in Mexico, 203;
withdraws troops from Mexico, 212, 213;
extent of colonial empire at beginning of nineteenth century, 261;
war with Chile, Peru, Bolivia, and Ecuador, 298, 299.
Spanish-American republics,
accorded belligerent rights, 48;
recognized as independent by United States, 53,
by England, 80.
Spanish Colonies, revolt of, 28.
Spooner, J. C., offers amendment to canal bill, 184.
Sucre, Antonio Jose de, Venezuelan general, 42-44.
Suez Canal Convention, and Hay-Pauncefote treaty, 181.
Sumner, Charles, opposes annexation of Danish West Indies and Santo
Domingo, 264, 265.
Taft, W. H.,
proclaims provisional government in Cuba, 142;
tries to settle differences with Colombia resulting from Panama
Revolution, 270-274;
relations with Nicaragua and Honduras, 280-285;
and Huerta revolution, 308.
Taylor, Hannis, minister to Spain, 128.
Taylor, Zachary,
issues proclamation warning Americans against aiding Lopez expedition
against Cuba, 93;
and Mexican War, 263.
Texas,
claim to, abandoned by the United States, 261;
establishment of independence of, 262;
admitted to Union, 263.
Thayer, W. R., version of Holleben incident, 252-254.
Trade, with Spanish colonies, monopoly of, 12-14.
Troppau, conference of 1820, 59.
Tupac Amaru, last of the Incas, 6.
Tyler, John, and annexation of Texas, 262, 263.
Utrecht, treaty of, 12.
Venezuela,
declares independence, 38;
war of liberation, 39-42;
dispute with Great Britain over boundary of British Guiana, 238-249;
intervention of Germany, England, and Italy in, 249-252;
neutral in Great War, 312, 316.
Vera Cruz, landing of American Marines at, 309.
Verona, Congress of, 60-63.
Viceroy, office of, in Spanish colonies, 4, 5, 12.
Vienna, Congress of, 58.
Villa, Francisco, Mexican insurrectionary chief, 309, 310.
Virgin Islands. See Danish West Indies.
_Virginius_, case of the, 114-118.
Walker, J. G.,
head of commission to investigate canal routes, 182;
report of, 183, 184.
Walker, William, invasion of Central America, 163.
Webster, Daniel, Cuban policy of, 90, 97.
Wellington, Duke of, withdraws from Congress of Verona, 60.
Weyler, Valeriano, captain-general of Cuba, 125, 126, 129.
William II, Emperor of Germany,
intervention in Venezuela, 249-252;
forced to withdraw, 252-255.
Wilson, Henry Lane, ambassador to Mexico, 307.
Wilson, Woodrow,
submits treaty with Colombia adjusting differences resulting from
Panama Revolution, 274, 275;
Central American policy, 285-287;
Haitian policy, 288, 289;
relations with Latin America, 291;
interpretation of Monroe Doctrine, 306, 307;
Mexican policy of, 307-311;
Latin-American policy, 309, 311;
opposes concessions to foreign capitalists in Latin America, 328;
proposes to extend Monroe Doctrine to the world, 332.
Wood, Leonard, military governor of Cuba, 137-140.
Woodford, S. L., minister to Spain, 128, 130, 134.
Wyke, Sir Charles, British minister to Mexico, 198, 199, 203, 207.
Wyse, L. N. B., secures concession for Panama Canal, 167.
Zelaya, president of Nicaragua, 280-283.
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| Inconsistent hyphenation and spelling in the |
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| Typographical errors corrected in the text: |
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| Page 98 indefeasibility changed to indefensibility |
| Page 100 transmited changed to transmitted |
| Page 107 on changed to or |
| Page 165 Clayon changed to Clayton |
| Page 270 adminstration changed to administration |
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