FRENCH INTERVENTION IN MEXICO
The attempt of Louis Napoleon to establish a European monarchy in Mexico
under the tutelage of France was the most serious menace that republican
institutions in the new world have had to face since the schemes of the
Holy Alliance were checked by Monroe and Canning. The thwarting of that
attempt may be accounted one of the greatest triumphs of American
diplomacy. The internal disorders common to South and Central American
republics have always been a fruitful source of embarrassment to the
United States, on account of the liability to European intervention to
which these governments continually subject themselves in such periods
by their open and flagrant disregard of international obligations. Of no
country is this statement truer than of Mexico, where the well-nigh
interminable strife of parties gave rise between the years 1821 and 1857
to thirty-six different governments. In 1857 a favorable change occurred
in the affairs of the republic. A constituent congress, elected by the
people of the different states, framed and adopted a republican
constitution which promised better things for the future. Under the
provisions of this constitution an election was held in July (1857) and
General Comonfort chosen president almost without opposition. His term
of office was to begin December 1, 1857, and to continue four years.
Within one brief month, however, President Comonfort was driven from
the capital, and ultimately from the country, by an uprising headed by
General Zuloaga. As soon as Comonfort abandoned the presidency, General
Benito Juarez, the president of the Supreme Court of Justice, became
according to the constitution, the president _de jure_ of the republic
for the remainder of the unexpired term, that is, until December 1,
1861. General Zuloaga had, however, assumed the name of president, with
indefinite powers, and the entire diplomatic corps, including the
minister of the United States, had recognized his government. But
Zuloaga was speedily expelled, and the supreme power seized by General
Miramon, the head of the church party, whom the diplomatic corps
likewise recognized. Meanwhile Juarez, the constitutional president, had
proceeded to Vera Cruz, where he put his administration into successful
operation.
For several months, Mr. John Forsyth, the American minister, continued
at the city of Mexico in the discharge of his duties. In June, 1858,
however, he suspended his diplomatic connection with the Miramon
government. Our relations, which had been bad under former governments,
were now rendered almost intolerable under that of Miramon by outrages
towards American citizens and personal indignities to Mr. Forsyth
himself. His action was approved by President Buchanan, and he was
directed to return to the United States. All diplomatic intercourse was
thus terminated with the government of Miramon, but as yet none was
established with the Juarez government. The ultimate success of the
latter became, however, so probable that the following year the
President sent a confidential agent to Mexico to inquire into and
report upon the actual condition of the belligerents, and in consequence
of his report, Mr. Robert M. McLane was dispatched to Mexico, March 8,
1859, "with discretionary authority to recognize the government of
President Juarez, if on his arrival in Mexico he should find it entitled
to such recognition according to the established practice of the United
States." On the 7th of April, Mr. McLane presented his credentials to
President Juarez, having no hesitation, he said, "in pronouncing the
government of Juarez to be the only existing government of the
republic." He was cordially received by the authorities at Vera Cruz,
and during all the vicissitudes of the next eight years the United
States government continued to extend its sympathy and moral support to
the government of Juarez as the only one entitled to the allegiance of
the people of Mexico.
Juarez thus came forward, in the role of reformer, as the champion of
constitutionalism and the supremacy of the state against the
overreaching power, influence, and wealth of the church party. He was a
full-blooded Indian, without the slightest admixture of Spanish blood.
In December, 1860, he finally succeeded in overthrowing the party of
Miramon and driving the latter into exile. Immediately, on reoccupying
the city of Mexico, the Constitutionalists proceeded to execute with
severity the decree issued at Vera Cruz nationalizing or sequestrating
the property of the church.
The most difficult question which the new government had to face was
that of international obligations recklessly contracted by the various
revolutionary leaders who had successively been recognized as
constituting the government of Mexico. In consequence of debts
contracted and outrages and enormities perpetrated, for the most part
during the regime of Miramon and the church party, the governments of
England, France, and Spain determined to intervene in Mexico.
The grievances of the British government were based on the following
facts: non-settlement of claims of British bondholders; the murder of
the British vice-consul at Tasco; the breaking into the British legation
and the carrying off L152,000 in bonds belonging to British subjects,
besides numerous other outrages committed on the persons and property of
individuals.[193]
The claims of the British bondholders referred to had been recognized by
the Pakenham convention of October 15, 1842, and formed into a
consolidated fund of $250,000, which was to be paid off, principal and
interest, by a percentage on import duties at the custom-houses of Vera
Cruz and Tampico. This convention was not carried out by the Mexican
government, and on December 4, 1851, Mr. Doyle signed on behalf of Great
Britain a new convention, in which not only the claims under the
Pakenham convention, but others, recognized by both governments, were
likewise formed into a consolidated fund, on which the Mexican
government bound itself to pay five per cent. as a sinking fund and
three per cent. as interest until the debt should be paid off. This five
and three per cent. were to be met by a percentage of customs receipts.
In 1857 the sinking fund was to be raised to six per cent. and the
interest to four per cent.
Two days after the signing of this Doyle convention the Spanish minister
in Mexico also signed a convention on behalf of some Philippine
missionaries, known as the "Padre Moran" convention, on almost the same
basis as the British. The consolidated fund in this case was $983,000,
the sinking fund five per cent., and the interest three per cent.
The interest was paid on both funds in almost the whole amount, but the
sinking fund was not kept up. Succeeding agreements were made in 1858,
in 1859, and in 1860, by which the custom-house assignments to satisfy
both conventions (British and Spanish) were raised from twelve per cent.
in 1851, to twenty-nine per cent. in 1860.[194]
It will thus be seen that the British and Spanish claims were perfectly
legitimate. The French claims, however, were of a somewhat different
character. During Miramon's administration arrangements were made
through the agency of Jecker, a Swiss banker, by which $750,000 were to
be raised through an issue of $15,000,000 of bonds. These bonds fell
into the hands of Jecker's French creditors and were pressed by the
French government, which thus demanded the repayment of twenty times the
original sum advanced. A claim was made also for $12,000,000 for torts
on French subjects.[195]
When the Liberal party came into power again in 1860, they were unable
to meet the situation and showed a disposition to question the
obligatory force of engagements entered into by their various
revolutionary predecessors. The British government had undertaken to
provide against this contingency upon the occasion of extending
recognition to the Juarez administration. Under date of March 30, 1861,
Lord John Russell wrote to Sir Charles Wyke, recently appointed minister
to Mexico, as follows:
The instructions addressed to Mr. Mathew, both before and
since the final triumph of the Liberal party, made the
recognition by Great Britain of the constitutional
government contingent upon the acknowledgment by that
government of the liability of Mexico for the claims of
British subjects who, either in their persons or in their
property, for a long series of years, can be proved to have
suffered wrong at the hands of successive governments in
Mexico.[196]
And further on in the same communication the attitude of the British
government is expressed yet more strongly:
Her majesty's government will not admit as an excuse for
hesitation in this respect the plea that the robbery was
committed by the late government. For, as regards this, as
indeed all other claims, her majesty's government cannot
admit that the party who committed the wrong is alone
responsible. Great Britain does not recognize any party as
constituting the republic in its dealing with foreign
nations, but holds the entire republic, by whatever party
the government of it may from time to time be administered,
to be responsible for wrongs done to British subjects by any
party or persons at any time administering the powers of
government.
Mexico, however, was slow to admit this principle of international law.
In a letter to Lord John Russell, June 25, 1861, and in other
communications, Sir Charles Wyke urged the necessity of a naval
demonstration against Mexico. His plan was to take possession of the
custom-houses of Vera Cruz, Tampico, and Matamoros on the Atlantic, and
of one or two on the Pacific, lower the duties so as to attract the
great bulk of trade from other ports, and pay themselves by the
percentage to which they were entitled by treaty stipulation.
On the 17th of July, 1861, President Juarez brought matters to a crisis
by the publication of a decree, the first article of which declared that
"all payments are suspended for two years, including the assignments for
the loan made in London and for the foreign conventions."[197]
On the 23rd, Sir Charles Wyke, the British minister, demanded the repeal
of this law within forty-eight hours. On the 24th, the French minister
demanded its repeal within twenty-four hours. These demands were not
complied with and diplomatic relations were immediately broken off by
the British and French representatives.
The Spanish government had acted somewhat in advance of the other
governments and was already preparing to back its claims by an armed
expedition against Mexico. The rupture with the British and French
governments very naturally pointed to joint action with Spain as the
best means of securing their interests. The United States government,
which had just entered upon one of the greatest struggles of modern
times and had its hands practically tied as far as Mexico was concerned,
regarded the contemplated intervention of European powers in Mexico
with grave apprehension, not to say suspicion. So great was the
uneasiness occasioned in the United States by the measures in
contemplation and so strong was the desire to ward off the threatened
danger to republican institutions on this continent, that Mr. Seward
authorized (September 2, 1861) the negotiation of a treaty with Mexico
for the assumption by the United States of the payment of the interest,
at three per cent., upon the funded debt of Mexico (the principal of
which was about $62,000,000) for the term of five years from the date of
the decree of the Mexican government suspending such payment, "provided
that the government of Mexico will pledge to the United States its faith
for the reimbursement of the money so to be paid, with six per cent.
interest thereon, to be secured by a specific lien upon all the public
lands and mineral rights in the several Mexican states of Lower
California, Chihuahua, Sonora, and Sinaloa, the property so pledged to
become absolute in the United States at the expiration of the term of
six years from the time when the treaty shall go into effect, if such
reimbursement shall not have been made before that time."[198] All this,
of course, was subject to the confirmation of the Senate.
This step was communicated informally to the British and French
governments, and the validity of the convention was to be conditioned
upon those governments engaging not to take any measures against Mexico
to enforce the payment of the interest of the loan until time should
have been given to submit the convention to the ratification of the
United States Senate at its approaching session. It was also to be a
condition that, if the convention should be ratified, Great Britain and
France should engage, on their part, not to make any demand upon Mexico
for the interest, except upon its failing to be punctually paid by the
United States.[199]
Grave objections to Mr. Seward's plan of paying the interest on the
Mexican debt were entertained both in Paris and in London. The French
minister of state, M. Thouvenel, said to the British minister at Paris:
It might not be possible to prevent the United States
offering money to Mexico, or to prevent Mexico receiving
money from the United States, but neither England nor France
ought in any way to recognize the transaction.[200]
Lord Lyons declared to Mr. Seward:
That her majesty's government were as apprehensive as Mr.
Seward himself could be, of an attempt to build upon a
foundation of debts due, and injuries inflicted, by Mexico,
a pretension to establish a new government in that country.
Her majesty's government thought, however, that the most
effectual mode of guarding against this danger would be for
Great Britain, the United States, and France to join Spain
in a course of action, the objects and limits of which
should be distinctly defined beforehand. This certainly
appeared more prudent than to allow Spain to act alone now,
and afterwards to oppose the results of her operations, if
she should go too far.[201]
The British government avoided beforehand the necessity of a point-blank
refusal of the plan of Mr. Seward, in case the treaty should go through,
by declaring that the interest on the funded debt was not the only cause
of complaint, but that there remained over and above that the outrages
perpetrated upon British subjects still unredressed.
Mr. Charles Francis Adams, the United States minister to England, did
not approve the plan of guaranteeing the Mexican interest, and in his
dispatch to Mr. Seward of November 1, 1861, he expressed his opinion
rather more frankly than is usual for a minister to do in discussing an
instruction from the state department.
You will permit me here, however, to make a single remark in
this connection upon the importance of appearing to divest
the United States of any personal and selfish interest in
the action it may think proper to adopt. The view
customarily taken in Europe is that their government is
disposed to resist all foreign intervention in Mexico, not
upon any principle, but simply because it is itself
expecting, in due course of time, to absorb the whole
country for its own benefit. Hence any proposal like that
which I had the honor to receive, based upon the mortgage of
portions of Mexican territory as security for engagements
entered into by the United States, naturally becomes the
ground of an outcry that this is but the preliminary to an
entry for inevitable foreclosure. And then follows the
argument that if this process be legitimate in one case, why
not equally in all. As against Great Britain and France, it
would be difficult to oppose to this the abstract principle
contained in what has been denominated the Monroe Doctrine,
however just in substance.[202]
While Mr. Corwin was still in negotiation with the Mexican government
in reference to some method of releasing Mexico from her complications
with the allied governments of Europe, the United States Senate, in
reply to two successive messages of the President, passed a resolution,
February 25, 1862, declaring the opinion "that it is not advisable to
negotiate a treaty that will require the United States to assume any
portion of the principle or interest of the debt of Mexico, or that will
require the concurrence of European powers." This effectually put an end
to Mr. Seward's plan.
Meanwhile Sir Charles Wyke had reopened negotiations with the Mexican
government and negotiated a treaty which might have satisfied British
claims, but the treaty was thrown out by the Mexican congress by a large
majority, and also disapproved by the British government in view of an
agreement entered into with France and Spain unknown to Sir Charles
Wyke.[203]
The agreement referred to was the convention signed at London, October
31, 1861, between Spain, France, and Great Britain, in reference to the
situation of affairs in Mexico and looking to armed intervention for the
purpose of securing their rights. The preamble of the convention recites
that the three contracting parties "being placed by the arbitrary and
vexatious conduct of the authorities of the republic of Mexico under the
necessity of exacting from those authorities a more efficient protection
for the persons and property of their subjects, as well as the
performance of the obligations contracted toward them by the republic of
Mexico, have arranged to conclude a convention between each other for
the purpose of combining their common action." The most important
article of the convention in view of its subsequent violation by the
Emperor Napoleon, was the second, which declared that:
The high contracting parties bind themselves not to seek for
themselves, in the employment of coercive measures foreseen
by the present convention, any acquisition of territory, or
any peculiar advantage, and not to exercise in the
subsequent affairs of Mexico any influence of a character to
impair the right of the Mexican nation to choose and freely
to constitute the form of its own government.
The fourth article, recognizing that the United States also had claims
against Mexico, provided:
that immediately after the signing of the present
convention, a copy of it shall be communicated to the
government of the United States, that that government shall
be invited to accede to it.... But, as the high contracting
parties would expose themselves, in making any delay in
carrying into effect articles one and two of the present
convention, to fail in the end which they wish to attain,
they have agreed not to defer, with a view of obtaining the
accession of the government of the United States, the
commencement of the above-mentioned operations beyond the
period at which their combined forces may be united in the
vicinity of Vera Cruz.[204]
The advisability of inviting the cooperation of the United States had
been the subject of considerable discussion and difference of opinion
among the three European governments. England and France had urged the
cooperation of the United States, while Spain had opposed it.
In compliance with the fourth article the convention was submitted to
the government of the United States by a note dated November 30, 1861,
signed jointly by the representatives of Spain, France, and Great
Britain at Washington.
Mr. Seward's reply conveying the declination of the United States to the
invitation to cooperate with the three allied European powers in the
demonstration against Mexico was dated December 4, 1861. After reviewing
the substance of the convention, he said:
First. As the undersigned has heretofore had the honor to
inform each of the plenipotentiaries now addressed, the
President does not feel himself at liberty to question, and
he does not question, that the sovereigns represented have
undoubted right to decide for themselves the fact whether
they have sustained grievances, and to resort to war against
Mexico for the redress thereof, and have a right also to
levy the war severally or jointly.
In the second place, Mr. Seward expressed the satisfaction of his
government that the allied powers had clearly repudiated in the
convention all idea of carrying on the war for their own ambitious ends
and all intention of exercising in the subsequent affairs of Mexico any
influence of a character to impair the right of the Mexican people to
choose and freely to constitute the form of their own government.
It is true, as the high contracting parties assume, that the
United States have, on their part, claims to urge against
Mexico. Upon due consideration, however, the President is of
opinion that it would be inexpedient to seek satisfaction of
their claims at this time through an act of accession to the
convention. Among the reasons for this decision which the
undersigned is authorized to assign, are, first, that the
United States, so far as it is practicable, prefer to adhere
to a traditional policy recommended to them by the father of
their country and confirmed by a happy experience, which
forbids them from making alliances with foreign nations;
second, Mexico being a neighbor of the United States on this
continent, and possessing a system of government similar to
our own in many of its important features, the United States
habitually cherish a decided good-will toward that republic,
and a lively interest in its security, prosperity, and
welfare. Animated by these sentiments, the United States do
not feel inclined to resort to forcible remedies for their
claims at the present moment, when the government of Mexico
is deeply disturbed by factions within, and exposed to war
with foreign nations. And of course, the same sentiments
render them still more disinclined to allied war against
Mexico, than to war to be waged against her by themselves
alone.
In conclusion, Mr. Seward referred to the fact that the United States
government had authorized their representative in Mexico to enter into a
treaty conceding to the Mexican government material aid, which might, he
hoped, enable that government to satisfy the just claims and demands of
the allied sovereigns and so to avert the war which they have agreed
among each other to levy against Mexico.[205]
As already related, the efforts of the executive in this direction were
not approved by the Senate and the negotiations in regard to
guaranteeing the interest on the Mexican loan were broken off. The
treaty negotiated by Mr. Corwin was in fact never submitted to the
Senate, for by the time it was ready the French forces occupied a part
of Mexican territory, and it was feared that a loan to Mexico under
such conditions would be considered a breach of neutrality.
In pursuance of the London convention, Vera Cruz was occupied in the
early part of 1862 by a Spanish force of 6,000 men under command of
Marshal Prim; a French force of 2,500, which was largely reinforced soon
afterward; and a force of 700 British marines.
The first intimation of the real purposes of the Emperor Louis Napoleon
was given in the letter of instructions of M. Thouvenel to the admiral
commanding the French expedition to Mexico, dated November 11, 1861. He
said that in case of the withdrawal of the Mexican forces from the coast
into the interior of the country, an advance upon the capital might
become necessary. He reminded the admiral of the self-abnegatory
character of the second article of the convention, but continued:
There are, however, certain hypotheses which present
themselves to our foresight and which it was our duty to
examine. It might happen that the pressure of the allied
forces upon the soil of Mexico might induce the sane portion
of the people, tired of anarchy, anxious for order and
repose, to attempt an effort to constitute in the country a
government presenting the guarantees of strength and
stability which have been wanting to all those which have
succeeded each other since the emancipation.
To such efforts the admiral was expressly told that he was not to refuse
his encouragement.[206]
In view of this order, the British government at once instructed its
agent, Sir Charles Wyke, that, while there was nothing to be said
against the reasoning of the French government in reference to the
probable necessity of marching against the city of Mexico, he was to
decline to take part in the advance into the interior, and that the
fact, that the whole available British force was only 700 marines, would
be sufficient reason for declining.[207]
The seriousness of the situation was fully appreciated by the United
States government. Shortly after the occupation of Vera Cruz by the
Spanish forces and the announcement of the outfit of a French force to
follow up the advantage, Mr. Charles Francis Adams wrote to his
government from London:
It is no longer concealed that the intention is to advance
to the capital, and to establish a firm government, _with
the consent of the people_, at that place. But who are meant
by that term does not appear. This issue is by no means
palatable to the government here, though it is difficult to
imagine that they could have been blind to it. Feeble
murmurs of discontent are heard, but they will scarcely be
likely to count for much in the face of the obligation under
which the action of the emperor in the Trent case has placed
them. The military occupation will go on, and will not cease
with the limits now assigned to it. It is not difficult to
understand the nature of the fulcrum thus obtained for
operations in a new and a different quarter, should the
occasion be made to use it. The expedition to the city of
Mexico may not stop until it shows itself in the heart of
the Louisiana purchase.[208]
About this time reports began to be circulated that the Archduke
Ferdinand Maximilian of Austria would be invited by a large body of
Mexicans to place himself on the throne of Mexico, and that the Mexican
people would gladly hail such a change. To whatever extent such reports
might be credited, the United States could not call into question the
good faith of the parties to the London convention. The British
government, as the issue showed, acted with perfect sincerity in the
matter; and the Spanish government, whatever may have been its original
intentions, followed the lead of Great Britain. When the reports in
regard to Maximilian were first circulated, the British government
declared to its agent, Sir Charles Wyke, that:
If the Mexican people, by a spontaneous movement, place the
Austrian Archduke on the throne of Mexico, there is nothing
in the convention to prevent it. On the other hand, we could
be no parties to a forcible intervention for this purpose.
The Mexicans must consult their own interests.[209]
At the time, however, the attitude of the British government was not at
all understood. Mr. Adams wrote:
Great Britain occupies the post of holding the door, whilst
her two associates, with her knowledge, go in, fully
prepared, if they can, to perpetrate the act which she, at
the outset, made them denounce, at the same time that she
disavowed every idea of being made to participate in
it.[210]
In the face of armed invasion, the Mexican government assumed a more
reasonable attitude, and on the 19th day of February, 1862, the
plenipotentiaries of Spain, Great Britain, and France signed, at
Soledad, with the secretary of state of the Mexican government a
preliminary agreement or convention, in which they recognized the
constitutional government as then organized. Declaring that they had "no
designs against the independence, sovereignty and integrity of the
Mexican republic," they agreed to open negotiations for the settlement
of all the demands which they had to make at Orizaba. During the
negotiations the forces of the allies were to be allowed to leave the
unhealthy locality of Vera Cruz and occupy the three towns of Cordova,
Orizaba, and Tehuacan, with their natural approaches. In the event of
negotiations being broken off, the allies agreed to abandon the towns
above named before reopening hostilities.[211]
The convention of Soledad proved, however, of short duration. On the 9th
of April, 1862, the representatives of the allies announced in a formal
note to the Mexican government, "that not having been able to agree
about the interpretation which ought to be given in the present
circumstances to the convention of the 31st of October, 1861 (the
convention of London), they have resolved to adopt for the future an
entirely separate and independent line of action. In consequence, the
commander of the Spanish forces will immediately take the necessary
measures to reimbark his troops. The French army will concentrate in
Paso Aucho as soon as the Spanish troops have passed from this position,
that is to say, probably about the 20th of April, thereupon beginning
their operations."[212] According to instructions already alluded to,
the British force, which was limited to 700 marines, had declined to
advance into the interior, and hence was not present when the breach
occurred.
In spite of all appearances to the contrary, the French government still
persisted in disavowing to the United States government, in the most
emphatic terms, all designs upon the independence of the Mexican
republic. Even after the rupture at Orizaba, M. Thouvenel assured Mr.
Dayton, the United States minister at Paris, that all that France wanted
was that there should be a stable government in Mexico, not an anarchy
with which other nations could have no relations.
That if the people of that country chose to establish a
republic it was all well; France would make no objection. If
they chose to establish a monarchy, as that was the form of
government here, it would be charming (charmant), but they
did not mean to do anything to induce such a course of
action. That all the rumors that France intended to
establish the Archduke Maximilian on the throne of Mexico
were utterly without foundation.[213]
M. Thouvenel's disclaimer to the British government was equally
emphatic.[214]
To return to the situation of affairs at Orizaba, the disagreement
between the allies requires some explanation. The immediate cause of the
rupture and of the withdrawal from the convention of London was the
protection extended by the French agents to General Almonte, Padre
Miranda, and other leading men of the reactionary or church party who
had been banished from the country and who now from the French camp
maintained an active correspondence with Marquez, Cobos, and other
notorious chiefs of the armed bands then in open rebellion against the
constituted government of the country. Almonte and his associates openly
favored the scheme of placing Maximilian on the throne.
The Mexican government demanded the removal of General Almonte and his
associates from the camp of the allies, and in this demand the British
and Spanish representatives concurred. A somewhat stormy conference was
held between the commissioners of the allied powers at Orizaba, April 2,
1862, at which the French agents virtually said that they did not regard
the convention of London or the preliminaries of Soledad as binding upon
them. Specifically then the two causes of the rupture were (1) the
persistency of the French commissioners in opposing the removal of the
Mexican exiles, and (2) their refusal to take part in the conferences
which had been arranged by the convention of Soledad to be held with the
Juarez government at Orizaba, April 15, 1862. The British government
heartily approved of the action of its agent, Sir Charles Wyke, in
breaking up the conference and putting an end to the joint action of the
three powers.[215] The policy of Spain was completely in accord with
that of England.
The French government was not satisfied with the convention of Soledad,
but did not dispute its validity, and declared that if the negotiations
should be broken off, its provisions in regard to the withdrawal of the
troops from their vantage ground must be observed. The French government
further assumed that, when negotiations with the Mexican government
should be broken off, the allied forces would proceed to act jointly
under the convention of London.[216] The British and Spanish
governments, however, having become convinced of the duplicity of the
French government in the matter, terminated the London convention
without further discussion and ordered the immediate withdrawal of their
forces and agents from Mexican territory.
The government of Louis Napoleon, thus left to its own devices by the
withdrawal of Great Britain and Spain, and by the helpless condition,
for the time being, to which the war of secession had reduced the
government of the United States, greatly reinforced its Mexican
expedition and placed General Forey in command. Soon after the
withdrawal of the British and Spanish contingents, General Almonte
instituted a government in the territory occupied by the French and
assumed the title of "Supreme Chief of the Nation," but it soon became
evident, as Mr. Dayton expressed it, that instead of the emperor having
availed himself of the services of General Almonte, Almonte had availed
himself of the services of the emperor. Accordingly, shortly after
General Forey assumed command, he issued an order dissolving the
ministry of Almonte, depriving him of his title and limiting him
thereafter "in the most exact manner to the instructions of the emperor,
which are to proceed as far as possible, with other Mexican generals
placed under the protection of our flag, to the organization of the
Mexican army."
The misfortunes which had overtaken Mexico and the dangers that
threatened the permanence of her republican institutions, had now
thoroughly alarmed her sister republics of Central and South America,
and a correspondence began between them relative to organizing an
international American conference to oppose European aggression.
During the remarkable series of events that took place in Mexico in the
spring of 1862, Mr. Seward consistently held to the opinion well
expressed in a dispatch to Mr. Dayton, June 21, 1862:
France has a right to make war against Mexico, and to
determine for herself the cause. We have a right and
interest to insist that France shall not improve the war she
makes to raise up in Mexico an anti-republican and
anti-American government, or to maintain such a government
there. France has disclaimed such designs, and we, besides
reposing faith in the assurances given in a frank, honorable
manner, would, in any case, be bound to wait for, and not
anticipate a violation of them.[217]
For some months the French troops gradually extended their military
operations and occupied a greater extent of territory without, however,
any material change in the situation. The Juarez government still held
the capital. In the spring of 1863, however, military operations were
pushed forward with greater activity, and in June, General Forey
organized a junta of government composed of thirty-five Mexican citizens
designated by decree of the French emperor's minister. The members of
this supreme junta were to associate with them two hundred and fifteen
citizens of Mexico to form an assembly of two hundred and fifty
notables. This assembly was to occupy itself with the form of the
permanent government of Mexico. The junta appointed an executive body of
three, of whom General Almonte was the head.
On the 10th of July, 1863, the capital of Mexico was occupied by the
French army, and on the following day the Assembly of Notables declared:
1. The Mexican nation adopts as its form of government a
limited hereditary monarchy, with a Catholic prince.
2. The sovereign shall take the title of Emperor of Mexico.
3. The imperial crown of Mexico is offered to his imperial
and royal highness the Prince Ferdinand Maximilian, Archduke
of Austria, for himself and his descendants.
4. If, under circumstances which cannot be foreseen, the
Archduke of Austria, Ferdinand Maximilian, should not take
possession of the throne which is offered to him, the
Mexican nation relies on the good will of his majesty,
Napoleon III, Emperor of the French, to indicate for it
another Catholic prince.[218]
The crown of Mexico was formally offered to Maximilian by a deputation
of Mexicans headed by Senor Estrada, October 3, 1863; but Maximilian
replied that he could not accept the proffered throne until the whole
nation should "confirm by a free manifestation of its will the wishes of
the capital." This was a wise decision, had it been given in good faith
and had it been wisely adhered to, but the sequel shows that the
archduke was either not sincere in his protestations or else was
woefully deceived by representations subsequently made to him. Six
months later he accepted the crown without the question having been
submitted to the wishes of any but a very small portion of the Mexican
people.
In spite of the declaration of the Mexican Assembly, which showed so
unmistakably the hand of Napoleon, the French government continued to
repudiate the designs imputed to it against the independence of Mexico,
and Mr. Seward continued to express, officially at least, the
satisfaction of the American government at the explanations vouchsafed
by France. September 11, 1863, he stated the case as follows:
When France made war against Mexico, we asked of France
explanations of her objects and purposes. She answered, that
it was a war for the redress of grievances; that she did not
intend to permanently occupy or dominate in Mexico, and that
she should leave to the people of Mexico a free choice of
institutions of government. Under these circumstances the
United States adopted, and they have since maintained entire
neutrality between the belligerents, in harmony with the
traditional policy in regard to foreign wars. The war has
continued longer than was anticipated. At different stages
of it France has, in her intercourse with us, renewed the
explanations before mentioned. The French army has now
captured Pueblo and the capital, while the Mexican
government, with its principal forces, is understood to have
retired to San Luis Potosi, and a provisional government has
been instituted under French auspices in the city of Mexico,
which being supported by arms, divides the actual dominion
of the country with the Mexican government, also maintained
by armed power. That provisional government has neither made
nor sought to make any communication to the government of
the United States, nor has it been in any way recognized by
this government. France has made no communication to the
United States concerning the provisional government which
has been established in Mexico, nor has she announced any
actual or intended departure from the policy in regard to
that country which her before-mentioned explanations have
authorized us to expect her to pursue.[219]
The probable acceptance of the crown by Maximilian was, however, the
subject of frequent communications between the governments of France and
the United States. In the course of a somewhat familiar conversation
with M. Drouyn de Lhuys, the French minister of state, in August, 1863,
Mr. Dayton expressed the fear that in quitting Mexico France might leave
a _puppet_ behind her. De Lhuys replied: "No; the strings would be too
long to work."
The chances of Maximilian's success in Mexico had been from the first
deliberately calculated on the basis of the probable success of the
Southern Confederacy; and, therefore, the cause of the Juarez government
and the cause of the Union were considered the same. The active sympathy
of the Unionists with the Mexican republic made it difficult for the
administration to maintain neutrality. This difficulty was further
enhanced by the doubt entertained in the United States as to the
intentions of France. In this connection Mr. Seward wrote to Mr. Dayton,
September 21, 1863, as follows:
The President thinks it desirable that you should seek an
opportunity to mention these facts to Mr. Drouyn de Lhuys,
and to suggest to him that the interests of the United
States, and, as it seems to us, the interests of France
herself, require that a solution of the present
complications in Mexico be made, as early as may be
convenient, upon the basis of the unity and independence of
Mexico.[220]
In reply, the French minister declared that the question of the
establishment of Maximilian on the Mexican throne was to be decided by a
majority vote of the entire nation; that the dangers of the government
of the archduke would come principally from the United States, and the
sooner the United States showed itself satisfied, and manifested a
willingness to enter into peaceful relations with that government, the
sooner would France be ready to leave Mexico and the new government to
take care of itself, which France would, in any event, do as soon as she
with propriety could; but that she would not lead or tempt the archduke
into difficulty, and then desert him before his government was settled.
He said that the early acknowledgment of that government by the United
States would tend to shorten, or perhaps to end, all the troublesome
complications of France in that country; that they would thereupon quit
Mexico.[221]
To this communication, Mr. Seward replied that the French government had
not been left uninformed of the opinion of the United States that the
permanent establishment of a foreign and monarchical government in
Mexico would be found neither easy nor desirable; that the United States
could not anticipate the action of the Mexican people; and that the
United States still regarded Mexico as the scene of a war which had not
yet ended in the subversion of the government long existing there, with
which the United States remained in the relation of peace and
friendship.[222]
Before formally accepting the crown, the archduke visited England with a
view to securing a promise of recognition for his new position. He was,
of course, to pass through Paris, and in view of his approaching visit,
Mr. Dayton asked for instructions as to his conduct on the occasion. Mr.
Seward replied, February 27, 1864:
I have taken the President's direction upon the question. If
the Archduke Maximilian appears in Paris only in his
character as an imperial prince of the house of Hapsburg,
you will be expected to be neither demonstrative nor
reserved in your deportment toward him. If he appears there
with any assumption of political authority or title in
Mexico, you will entirely refrain from intercourse with him.
Should your proceeding be a subject of inquiry or remark,
you will be at liberty, in the exercise of your own
discretion, to say that this government, in view of its
rights and duties in the present conjuncture of its affairs,
has prescribed fixed rules to be observed, not only by this
department, but by its representatives in foreign countries.
We acknowledge revolutions only by direction of the
President, upon full and mature consideration.[223]
The archduke visited London in company with his father-in-law, Leopold
of Belgium. The British government declined to act on the subject at
that juncture, "but gave them reason to hope that, so soon as the action
in Mexico would appear to justify it, they would acknowledge him."[224]
Spain and Belgium were ready to follow in the wake of France.
About the time of this visit of Maximilian to England, Mr. McDougall, of
California, introduced in the Senate a resolution declaring "that the
movements of the government of France, and the threatened movement of
an emperor, improvised by the Emperor of France, demand by this
republic, if insisted upon, war." This resolution was not carried, but
some days later, on the 4th of April, 1864, the House of Representatives
passed by a unanimous vote a resolution declaring its opposition to the
recognition of a monarchy in Mexico. Mr. Seward, fearing a rupture with
France on this account, took pains to inform the government of that
country, through Mr. Dayton, that this action of the House was in no way
binding on the executive, even if concurred in by the Senate.
The formal acceptance of the crown of Mexico by Maximilian took place
April 10, 1864, at Miramar, the palace he had built near Trieste, in the
presence of the Mexican deputation. The next day the Emperor and Empress
of Mexico, as they styled themselves, set out for their new dominions by
way of Rome, where they received the blessing of the Pope. Before
leaving Europe Maximilian signed with the Emperor of the French a
convention in the following terms:
The French troops in Mexico were to be reduced as soon as possible to
25,000 men.
The French troops were to evacuate Mexico in proportion as the Emperor
of Mexico could organize troops to replace them.
The "foreign legion," composed of 8,000 men, was to remain in Mexico six
years after all the other French troops should have been recalled.
The expenses of the French expedition to Mexico, to be paid by the
Mexican government, were fixed at the sum of two hundred and seventy
million francs for the whole duration of the expedition down to July 1,
1864. From July 1st all expenses of the Mexican army were to be met by
Mexico.[225]
The resolution of the House referred to above came very near producing
the rupture that Mr. Seward was striving to avert, or at least to
postpone, during the continuance of the war of secession. When Mr.
Dayton visited M. Drouyn de Lhuys just after the resolution reached
Europe, the remark which greeted Mr. Dayton when he entered the room
was: "Do you bring us peace, or bring us war?" Mr. Dayton replied that
he did not think France had a right to think that the United States was
about to make war against her on account of anything contained in that
resolution; that it embodied nothing more than the principles which the
United States had constantly held out to France from the beginning.
The Confederate agents were taking advantage of the resolution to stir
up trouble between the United States and France. In fact they had long
caused reports to be spread in Europe, and had succeeded in gaining
credence for them, to the effect that the United States government was
only awaiting the termination of domestic troubles to drive the French
from Mexico. The French naturally concluded that if they were to have
trouble with the United States, it was safest for them to choose their
own time.[226] Napoleon was all the while coquetting with the
Confederate government, and holding above Mr. Seward's head a veiled
threat of recognition of Confederate independence. The Confederate
government quickly caught at the suggestion of an alliance between
Maximilian and the South with the power of France to back them. A
Confederate agent was actually accredited to the government of
Maximilian, but did not reach his destination. Although Napoleon's
calculations were based on the overthrow of the Union, and although he
had assumed at the outset, with England and Spain, an attitude decidedly
unfriendly to the Federal government, nevertheless he was not willing to
go the full length of recognizing the Confederacy as an independent
power while the issue of the conflict was still in doubt.
In speaking of Slidell's movements in Europe and the encouragement given
him in France, Mr. Bigelow wrote to Mr. Seward, February 14, 1865:
I am strongly impressed with the conviction that, but for
the Mexican entanglement, the insurgents would receive very
little further countenance from the imperial government, and
that a reconciliation of the national policies of the two
countries on that question would speedily dispose of all
other sources of dissatisfaction.
As the war of secession seemed nearing its end, the French papers became
uneasy in view of possible intervention in Mexico by the United States
on the ground of the Monroe Doctrine. This principle of American
diplomacy, which was likened to the sword of Damocles suspended over the
head of Maximilian, was discussed in all its bearings on the present
case by the journals of Europe.[227]
Throughout all this period of turmoil, the United States recognized no
authority in Mexico but that of the Juarez government. In April, 1864,
the French minister at Washington complained that serious complications
with France were likely to arise out of grants of land made by
"ex-President Juarez" in Sonora to emigrants from California. The French
government regarded these grants as illegal and proposed to send forces
there to prevent the parties from taking "illicit possession."
In May, 1864, the French government sought explanations in regard to a
club formed in New Orleans, called the "D. M. D.," Defenders of the
Monroe Doctrine. Mr. Seward replied that the object of the club, so far
as the government had been able to ascertain, was to bring moral
influences to bear upon the government of the United States in favor of
a maintenance of the Monroe Doctrine, but not to act in violation of the
law, or of the well-understood governmental policy of neutrality in the
war which existed between France and Mexico. Members of the association
did, however, actually start on an expedition to Brownsville, but the
steamer was taken possession of by United States officials. During the
year 1864 constant complaint was made by the French government of
shipments of arms to the Juarez government from California and from
various points along the Rio Grande, particularly Brownsville, in
violation of American neutrality.
Shortly after the surrender of General Lee, several Confederate officers
of high position and influence went to Mexico and identified themselves
with the government of Maximilian. Dr. Wm. M. Gwin, a former United
States Senator from California, organized a plan for colonizing the
states of northern Mexico with ex-Confederates. This scheme was the
subject of several representations to the French government on the part
of Mr. Seward. He reminded them that the sympathies of the American
people were already considerably excited in favor of the republic of
Mexico; that they were disposed to regard with impatience the continued
intervention of France in that country; and that any favor shown to the
proceedings of Dr. Gwin by the titular Emperor of Mexico or by the
imperial government of France would tend greatly to increase the popular
impatience. He further requested an assurance that the pretenses of Dr.
Gwin and his associates were destitute of any sanction from the Emperor
of France.
Among the most prominent Confederates connected with this scheme were
Matthew F. Maury, the distinguished geographer and naval officer, who
became a naturalized Mexican citizen and was appointed Imperial
Commissioner of Immigration and an honorary councillor of state; and
General John B. Magruder, who was charged with the supervision of the
survey of lands for colonization. It was hoped that the prominence of
these men and the high rank they had held under the Confederate
government would, in the general uncertainty that prevailed as to the
treatment of the South by the victorious Union party, induce many
persons to emigrate to Mexico. Maximilian issued a special decree,
September 5, 1865, regarding colonization with a view to inducing
Southern planters to emigrate to Mexico with their slaves--the latter to
be reduced to a state of _peonage_, regular slavery being prohibited by
the laws of the empire. This scheme was altogether impracticable.
In July, 1865, Maximilian finally made an effort to secure recognition
of his government by the United States. On the 17th of July, the Marquis
de Montholon, the French minister at Washington, called at the
department of state and informed Mr. Seward that a special agent had
arrived at Washington, bearing a letter signed by Maximilian and
addressed to the President of the United States, a copy of which the
marquis presented to the secretary of state. On the 18th, Mr. Seward
delivered back the copy of the letter to the Marquis de Montholon, and
said that, as the United States were on friendly relations with the
republican government of Mexico, the President declined to receive the
letter or to hold any intercourse with the agent who brought it. The
French government expressed to its representative at Washington its
annoyance and embarrassment at this step, and said that Maximilian
should have taken measures to learn the disposition of the United States
before sending the agent.[228]
Mr. Tucker, in his book on the Monroe Doctrine, makes the statement that
Mr. Bigelow, who succeeded Mr. Dayton as minister to France, announced
to the French government that the United States would recognize the
empire of Maximilian upon the immediate withdrawal of the French troops
from the territory of Mexico, but that this statement, made upon the
envoy's own authority, was disavowed by the President. This is hardly a
correct version of the case. It seems that Mr. Bigelow, in the course of
a conversation with M. Drouyn de Lhuys, asked him, "in his own name, and
without prejudicing the opinion of his government, if he did not think
that the recognition of Maximilian by the United States would
facilitate and hasten the recall of the French troops."[229]
On the 3rd of October, 1865, Maximilian issued a decree at the city of
Mexico, the first article of which declared:
All persons belonging to armed bands or corps, not legally
authorized, whether they proclaim or not any political
principles, and whatever be the number of those who compose
the said bands, their organization, character and
denomination shall be tried militarily by the
courts-martial; and if found guilty even of the only fact of
belonging to the band, they shall be condemned to capital
punishment, within the twenty-four hours following the
sentence.[230]
The United States, through Mr. Bigelow, protested to France against this
decree, as repugnant to the sentiments of modern civilization and the
instincts of humanity. M. Drouyn de Lhuys replied with a touch of
sarcasm:
Why do you not go to President Juarez? We are not the
government of Mexico and you do us too much honor to treat
us as such. We had to go to Mexico with an army to secure
certain important interests, but we are not responsible for
Maximilian or his government. He is accountable to you, as
to any other government, if he violated its rights, and you
have the same remedies there that we had.[231]
The American government was now relieved from the burden of civil war,
and for several months the correspondence of Mr. Seward had been
assuming a more decided tone. On September 6, 1865, he reminded the
French government that the attention of the country was now no longer
occupied by the civil war, and that henceforth both the Congress and the
people of the United States might be expected to give a very large share
of their attention to questions of foreign policy, chief among which was
likely to be that of their relations with France in regard to Mexico.
About this time Major General Schofield was sent to Paris on a mission,
the precise object of which was long a matter of mystery. It appears
from John Bigelow's memoirs that Grant, Schofield, and a number of other
army officers were bringing great pressure to bear upon the government
to intervene by force and drive Maximilian from Mexico. Seward, with his
usual political sagacity, concluded that the best method of holding
Grant and his followers in check was to send Schofield to Paris on an
informal mission. According to the latter, Seward said to him: "I want
you to get your legs under Napoleon's mahogany and tell him he must get
out of Mexico." Seward knew perfectly well that Schofield would not be
as belligerent in the presence of the Emperor as he was in Washington,
and above all he had confidence in Bigelow's tact and ability to handle
Schofield when he arrived in Paris. The plan worked beautifully. Neither
Bigelow nor Schofield reported just what took place at the interview
with the Emperor, but we may be sure that Schofield did not say in Paris
what he had intended to say when he left Washington. After Bigelow
returned from Paris in 1867, he had a conversation with Seward in which
the latter said:
I sent General Schofield to Paris to parry a letter brought
to us from Grant insisting that the French be driven head
over heels and at once out of Mexico. It answered my
purpose. It gave Schofield something to do, and converted
him to the policy of the Department by convincing him that
the French were going as fast as they could. That pacified
Grant and made everything easy.[232]
On November 6 Seward wrote:
The presence and operations of a French army in Mexico, and
its maintenance of an authority there, resting upon force
and not the free will of the people of Mexico, is a cause of
serious concern to the people of the United States.... They
still regard the effort to establish permanently a foreign
and imperial government in Mexico as disallowable and
impracticable. For these reasons they could not now agree to
compromise the position they have hitherto assumed. They are
not prepared to recognize any political institutions in
Mexico which are in opposition to the republican government
with which we have so long and so constantly maintained
relations of amity and friendship.
Finally, on December 16, 1865, Seward addressed what was practically an
ultimatum to France. He pointed out the likelihood that Congress, then
in session, would direct by law the action of the executive on this
important subject, and stated that:
It has been the President's purpose that France should be
respectfully informed upon two points, namely: First, that
the United States earnestly desire to continue and to
cultivate sincere friendship with France. Second, that this
policy would be brought into imminent jeopardy, unless
France could deem it consistent with her interest and honor
to desist from the prosecution of armed intervention in
Mexico, to overthrow the domestic republican government
existing there, and to establish upon its ruins the foreign
monarchy which has been attempted to be inaugurated in the
capital of that country.
In conclusion he added:
It remains now only to make known to M. Drouyn de Lhuys my
profound regret that he has thought it his duty to leave the
subject, in his conversation with you, in a condition that
does not authorize an expectation on our part that a
satisfactory adjustment of the case can be effected on any
basis that thus far has been discussed.
As late as November 29, 1865, the French government, through the Marquis
de Montholon, still insisted on recognition of Maximilian by the United
States as the only basis for an arrangement for the recall of the French
troops.[233]
The formal reply to Mr. Seward's note of December 16 was received
through the Marquis de Montholon, January 29, 1866. M. Drouyn de Lhuys
still insisted that the French expedition had in it nothing hostile to
the institutions of the new world, and assuredly still less to those of
the United States. He called attention to the fact that the United
States had acknowledged the right of France to make war on Mexico, and
continued: "On the other part, we admit, as they do, the principle of
non-intervention; this double postulate includes, as it seems to me, the
elements of an agreement." He also contended that the right to make war
implied the right to secure the results of war; that they had to demand
guarantees, and these guarantees they could not look for from a
government whose bad faith they had proven on so many occasions; that
they found themselves engaged in the establishment of a regular
government, which showed itself disposed to keep its engagements; that
the Mexican people had spoken, and that the Emperor Maximilian had been
called to the throne by the will of the people of the country.[234]
Mr. Seward's counter-reply was dated February 12, 1866. He declared that
the proceedings in Mexico were regarded in the United States as having
been taken without the authority, and prosecuted against the will and
opinions of the Mexican people; that the United States had not seen any
satisfactory evidence that the people of Mexico had spoken and called
into being or accepted the so-called empire, and that the withdrawal of
the French troops was deemed necessary to allow such a proceeding to be
taken. He added, however, that:
France need not for a moment delay her proposed withdrawal
of military forces from Mexico, and her putting the
principle of non-intervention into full and complete
practice in regard to Mexico through any apprehension that
the United States will prove unfaithful to the principles
and policy in that respect which, on their behalf, it has
been my duty to maintain in this now very lengthened
correspondence.[235]
He concluded with a virtual ultimatum:
We shall be gratified when the Emperor shall give to us ...
definite information of the time when French military
operations may be expected to cease in Mexico.
Napoleon finally decided that, in view of the European situation, he
could not risk a war with the United States, and in the issue of April
5, 1866, the _Moniteur_ announced that the Emperor had decided that the
French troops should evacuate Mexico in three detachments: the first to
leave in November, 1866; the second in March, 1867; and the third in
November, 1867. In the course of a conversation with Mr. Bigelow the day
following M. Drouyn de Lhuys acknowledged that this statement was
official.[236] The decision of the emperor was officially made known to
the United States in a note of April 21, 1866. Seward had very
fortunately left a loophole in his dispatch of February 12, in the
statement that the United States would continue to pursue its policy of
neutrality after the French evacuation. De Lhuys said:
We receive this assurance with entire confidence and we find
therein a sufficient guarantee not any longer to delay the
adoption of measures intended to prepare for the return of
our army.[237]
American historians have usually attributed Napoleon's backdown to
Seward's diplomacy supported by the military power of the United States,
which was, of course, greater then than at any other time in our
history. All this undoubtedly had its effect on Napoleon's mind, but it
appears that conditions in Europe just at that particular moment had an
even greater influence in causing him to abandon his Mexican scheme.
Within a few days of the receipt of Seward's ultimatum Napoleon was
informed of Bismarck's determination to force a war with Austria over
the Schleswig-Holstein controversy. Napoleon realized that the
territorial aggrandizement of Prussia, without any corresponding gains
by France, would be a serious blow to his prestige and in fact endanger
his throne. He at once entered upon a long and hazardous diplomatic game
in which Bismarck outplayed him and eventually forced him into war. In
order to have a free hand to meet the European situation he decided to
yield to the American demands.
About the time that the French government announced its intention of
withdrawing its forces from Mexico, it was found that troops were being
enlisted in Austria for the Mexican "foreign legion." The United States
government at once took measures to prevent the French troops from being
replaced by Austrians by declaring to the Austrian government through
Mr. Motley, "that in the event of hostilities being carried on hereafter
in Mexico by Austrian subjects, under the command or with the sanction
of the government of Vienna, the United States will feel themselves at
liberty to regard those hostilities as constituting a state of war by
Austria against the republic of Mexico; and in regard to such war, waged
at this time and under existing circumstances, the United States could
not engage to remain as silent and neutral spectators."[238]
Mr. Motley seems to have been somewhat surprised and puzzled at the
sudden and emphatic change of tone in the instructions of his
government, and failed to carry them out in the spirit intended by Mr.
Seward. This brought forth a sharp reprimand. Mr. Seward expressed his
strong disapproval of the position taken by Mr. Motley in his
communication of the instructions of the department to the Austrian
government, and directed him to carry out his instructions according to
the strict letter, adding:
I refrain from discussing the question you have raised,
"Whether the recent instructions of this department
harmonize entirely with the policy which it pursued at an
earlier period of the European intervention in Mexico."
Mr. Motley was instructed to withdraw from Vienna in case troops were
sent from Austria to Mexico. The embarkation of troops for this purpose
was stopped. Austria was in a great state of excitement over the
approaching war with Prussia, and, besides needing all her available
troops at home, did not care to antagonize the United States.
It was now a question of great interest in this country and in Europe,
whether Maximilian would withdraw from Mexico with the French troops or
attempt to maintain himself there without foreign support. Napoleon sent
one of his aides to Mexico to make known his intentions to Maximilian.
This fact was communicated to the United States government, October 16,
1866:
Mr. de Castelnau has for his mission to make it well
understood that the limit of our sacrifices is reached and
that if the Emperor Maximilian, thinking to find in the
country itself a point of sufficient support, may wish to
endeavor to maintain himself there, he cannot for the future
count on any succor on the part of France. But it may happen
that, deeming it impossible to triumph through his own
resources over the difficulties which surround him, this
sovereign may determine to abdicate. We will do nothing to
dissuade him from this, and we think that on this hypothesis
there would be ground to proceed, by way of election, in the
establishment of a new government.[239]
When the time came for the withdrawal of the first contingent of French
troops, no action to that end was taken by the French government, and
the United States had once more to seek an explanation. The Emperor
assured the American government, however, that he had decided from
military considerations to withdraw all his troops in the spring in a
body, as the recent successes of the insurgents would render any large
reduction of his forces perilous to those who remained. He further
stated that he had counselled Maximilian to abdicate.[240] To the
surprise of everyone, however, Maximilian seemed to think that honor
demanded that he should remain in Mexico and share the fate of his
supporters.
After the withdrawal of Mr. Corwin, owing to the unsettled state of
affairs in Mexico, the United States had no one accredited to that
government until May, 1866, when Mr. Lewis D. Campbell, of Ohio, was
appointed. He left New York for his post in November, 1866, accompanied
by Lieutenant General William T. Sherman of the army. They proceeded in
the U. S. S. _Susquehanna_ by way of Havana, but as they found the
principal Mexican ports on the Atlantic still occupied by the French,
they proceeded to New Orleans, from which point Mr. Campbell tried to
establish regular communication with President Juarez. The President had
first decided to dispatch General Grant with Mr. Campbell, in the hope
"that some disposition might be made of the land and naval forces of the
United States without interfering within the jurisdiction of Mexico, or
violating the laws of neutrality, which would be useful in favoring the
restoration of law, order and republican government in that country."
This demonstration was intended to insure the withdrawal of the French
army according to the promises of the Emperor. A hitch occurred through
some question raised by General Grant and General Sherman was
substituted.[241]
The French army was withdrawn in the spring of 1867, and it very soon
became evident that Maximilian's cause would speedily collapse. In view
of the almost inevitable capture of Maximilian, Mr. Seward telegraphed
to Mr. Campbell at New Orleans, April 6, 1867:
You will communicate to President Juarez, promptly and by
effectual means, the desire of this government, that in case
of capture, the prince and his supporters may receive the
humane treatment accorded by civilized nations to prisoners
of war.
Some of the prisoners already taken had been summarily executed.
Mr. Campbell at once dispatched a special messenger, who succeeded in
getting through to the headquarters of Juarez, and who returned with an
answer from the Mexican government, dated April 22, 1867. This answer
not only undertook to defend the execution of prisoners above referred
to, but also intimated that similar severity would be practiced on
Maximilian and his leading associates, if captured, on the ground that,
by his harsh decrees, he had placed himself beyond the pale of the law
of nations.[242]
Maximilian and his chief supporters were taken prisoners, May 15, 1867.
This information was received in the United States toward the last of
the month, and along with it a report, not well authenticated and which
afterward proved to be false, that they had been executed on the 16th.
As soon as these rumors reached Washington, Mr. Seward telegraphed to
Mr. Campbell, then at New Orleans, June 1, 1867, directing him to
proceed at once to the residence of the President of Mexico and enter on
his mission, and if necessary to urge clemency to Maximilian and the
other prisoners of war. Mr. Campbell failed to act under these
instructions. He requested first that a public vessel of the United
States should be detailed to carry him to Mexico. When it was found that
no ship was available for this purpose, he was ordered to proceed to
Havana and thence by the British or French line of steamers to Vera
Cruz. He replied that under the circumstances he did not think it
becoming the dignity of the representative of the United States to
return to Mexico under the flag of a nation which had shown such
hostility to that country. He thus remained at New Orleans from the
first to the fifteenth of June. He was then ordered peremptorily to
proceed at once according to instructions. He replied that he was ill
and was afraid to go by way of Havana, where yellow fever was raging;
that he would resign, if desired. The same day Mr. Seward telegraphed
him that his resignation would be accepted.
Mr. Seward then informed Mr. Romero, the Mexican minister at Washington,
that Austria, France, and Great Britain had appealed to the United
States to use its good offices to avert the execution of Prince
Maximilian. He strongly recommended clemency to President Juarez, as
good policy, and requested Mr. Romero to make the same known to his
government at once. This was June 15, the same day that Mr. Campbell's
resignation was accepted. On the 21st, Mr. Seward requested Mr. Romero
to inform President Juarez that the Emperor of Austria would restore
Maximilian to all his rights of succession upon his release and
renouncing forever all projects in Mexico.[243]
Meanwhile Maximilian of Hapsburg, Miguel Miramon, and Tomas Mejia had
been tried by court-martial and sentenced to death, June 14. The
sentence was confirmed by the government on the 15th, and the execution
fixed for the 16th, but at the request of Maximilian's counsel, it was
suspended by order of President Juarez until the 19th, in order to allow
the prince to arrange certain business affairs of a private character.
At seven o'clock on the morning of June 19 the prisoners were shot.
FOOTNOTES:
[193] Brit. and For. St. Pap., 1861-62, Vol. LII. Also House Exec. Doc.
No. 100, Thirty-seventh Cong., Second Sess.
[194] Brit. and For. St. Pap., Vol. LII, p. 359.
[195] Wharton's Digest, Sec. 58, Vol. I, p. 312.
[196] Brit. and For. St. Pap., Vol. LII, p. 237.
[197] Brit. and For. St. Pap., Vol. LII, p. 294.
[198] Mr. Seward to Mr. Corwin, Sept. 2, 1861. House Exec. Doc. No. 100,
p. 22, Thirty-seventh Cong., Second Sess.
[199] Brit. and For. St. Pap., Vol. LII, p. 325.
[200] Earl Cowley to Earl Russell, Sept. 24, 1861. Brit. and For. St.
Pap., Vol. LII, p. 329.
[201] Earl Lyons to Earl Russell, Oct. 14, 1861. Brit. and For. St.
Pap., Vol LII, p. 375.
[202] Thirty-Seventh Cong., Second Sess., House Exec. Doc. No. 100, p.
201.
[203] Sir C. Wyke to Earl Russell, Nov. 25, 1861. Brit. and For. St.
Pap., Vol. LII, p. 398.
[204] Thirty-Seventh Cong., Second Sess., House Exec. Doc. No. 100, pp.
186-7.
[205] House Exec. Doc. No. 100, pp. 187-190, Thirty-seventh Cong.,
Second Sess. Brit. and For. St. Pap., Vol. LII. p. 394.
[206] House Exec. Doc. No. 100, p. 174, Thirty-seventh Cong., Second
Sess.
[207] Brit. and For. St. Pap., Vol. LII, p. 381.
[208] Adams to Seward, January 24, 1862. House Ex. Doc. No. 100 p. 206,
Thirty-seventh Cong., Second Sess.
[209] Brit. and For. St. Pap., Vol. LII, p. 418.
[210] H. Ex. Doc. No. 100, p. 209, Thirty-seventh Cong., Second Sess.
[211] H. Ex. Doc No. 54, p. 46, Thirty-seventh Cong., Third Sess.
[212] _Ibid._, p. 48.
[213] Dayton to Seward, April 22, 1862.
[214] Earl Cowley to Earl Russell, May 15, 1862, H. Ex. Doc. No. 54, p.
746, Thirty-seventh Cong., Third Sess.
[215] Earl Russell to Sir C. Wyke, May 22, 1862.
[216] Earl Cowley to Earl Russell, April 25, 1862, H. Ex. Doc. No. 54,
p. 694, Thirty-seventh Cong., Third Sess.
[217] H. Ex. Doc. No. 54, p. 530, Thirty-seventh Cong., Third Sess.
[218] Sen. Ex. Doc. No. 11, pp. 254-268, Thirty-eighth Cong., First
Sess.
[219] Seward to Motley, Sept. 11, 1863, Dipl. Corr., 1863; Sen. Ex. Doc.
No. 11, p. 479, Thirty-eighth Cong., First Sess.
[220] Sen. Ex. Doc. No. 11, p. 464, Thirty-eighth Cong., First Sess.
[221] Dayton to Seward, Oct. 9, 1863, Sen. Ex. Doc. No. 11, p. 471,
Thirty-eighth Cong., First Sess.
[222] Seward to Dayton, Oct. 23, 1863. _Ibid._
[223] Dip. Corr., 1864.
[224] Adams to Seward, March 24, 1864.
[225] Dipl. Corr., 1865, Part III, pp. 356-849.
[226] Dipl. Corr., 1864; also Sen. Ex. Doc. No. 11, Thirty-eighth Cong.,
First Sess.
[227] Dipl. Corr., 1865, Part III, pp. 380-385.
[228] Dipl. Corr. 1865, Part III.
[229] Tucker, p. 104; Dipl. Corr., 1865, Part III.
[230] Sen. Ex. Doc. No. 5, p. 3. Thirty-ninth Cong., First Sess.
[231] Mr. Bigelow to Mr. Seward, Nov. 30, 1865, Sen. Ex. Doc. No. 5,
Thirty-ninth Cong., First Sess.
[232] Bigelow, "Retrospections of an Active Life," Vol. IV, p. 42;
Bancroft, "Life of Seward," Vol. II, p. 435.
[233] Sen. Ex. Doc. No. 6, p. 98, Thirty-ninth Cong., First Sess.
[234] House Ex. Doc. No. 93, Thirty-ninth Cong., First Sess.
[235] Dipl. Corr., 1865, Part III; also H. Ex. Doc. No. 93, Thirty-ninth
Cong., First Sess.
[236] H. Ex. Doc. No. 93, p. 42, Thirty-ninth Cong., First Sess.
[237] _Ibid._
[238] Wharton's Digest, Sec. 58, Vol. I, p. 328.
[239] Dipl. Corr., 1866, Part I, p. 387.
[240] H. Ex. Doc. No. 30, Fortieth Cong., First Sess.
[241] Dipl. Corr., 1866, Part III.
[242] Dipl. Corr., 1866, Part III.
[243] Sen. Ex. Doc. No. 20, Fortieth Cong., First Sess.