CHAPTER XXIX.

_Of Trains of Reasoning._

§ 800. The formal logician is only concerned to examine whether the

conclusion duly follows from the premisses: he need not concern

himself with the truth or falsity of his data. But the premisses of

one syllogism may themselves be conclusions deduced from other

syllogisms, the premisses of which may in their turn have been

established by yet earlier syllogisms. When syllogisms are thus linked

together we have what is called a Train of Reasoning.

§ 801. It is plain that all truths cannot be established by

reasoning. For the attempt to do so would involve us in an infinite

regress, wherein the number of syllogisms required would increase at

each step in a geometrical ratio. To establish the premisses of a

given syllogism we should require two preceding syllogisms; to

establish their premisses, four; at the next step backwards, eight; at

the next, sixteen; and so on ad infinitum. Thus the very possibility

of reasoning implies truths that are known to us prior to all

reasoning; and, however long a train of reasoning may be, we must

ultimately come to truths which are either self-evident or are taken

for granted.

§ 802. Any syllogism which establishes one of the premisses of another

is called in reference to that other a Pro-syllogism, while a

syllogism which has for one of its premisses the conclusion of another

syllogism is called in reference to that other an Epi-syllogism.

_The Epicheirema_.

§ 803. The name Epicheirema is given to a syllogism with one or both

of its premisses supported by a reason. Thus the following is a

double epicheirema--

All B is A, for it is E.

All C is B, for it is F.

.'. All C is A.

All virtue is praiseworthy, for it promotes the general welfare.

Generosity is a virtue, for it prompts men to postpone self to others.

.'. Generosity is praiseworthy.

§ 804. An epicheirema is said to be of the first or second order

according as the major or minor premiss is thus supported. The double

epicheirema is a combination of the two orders.

§ 805. An epicheirema, it will be seen, consists of one syllogism

fully expressed together with one, or, it may be, two enthymemes (§

557). In the above instance, if the reasoning which supports the

premisses were set forth at full length, we should have, in place of

the enthymemes, the two following pro-syllogisms--

(i) All E is A.

All B is E.

.'. All B is A.

Whatever promotes the general welfare is praiseworthy.

Every virtue promotes the general welfare.

.'. Every virtue is praiseworthy.

(2) All F is B.

All C is F.

.'. All C is B.

Whatever prompts men to postpone self to others is a virtue.

Generosity prompts men to postpone self to others.

.'. Generosity is a virtue.

§ 806. The enthymemes in the instance above given are both of the

first order, having the major premiss suppressed. But there is

nothing to prevent one or both of them from being of the second

order--

All B is A, because all F is.

All C is B, because all F is.

.'. All C is A.

All Mahometans are fanatics, because all Monotheists are.

These men are Mahometans, because all Persians are.

.'. These men are fanatics.

Here it is the minor premiss in each syllogism that is suppressed,

namely,

(1) All Mahometans are Monotheists.

(2) These men are Persians.

_The Sorites_.

§ 807. The Sorites is the neatest and most compendious form that can

be assumed by a train of reasoning.

§ 808. It is sometimes more appropriately called the chain-argument,

and map be defined as--

A train of reasoning, in which one premiss of each epi-syllogism is

supported by a pro-syllogism, the other being taken for granted.

This is its inner essence.

§ 809. In its outward form it may be described as--A series of

propositions, each of which has one term in common with that which

preceded it, while in the conclusion one of the terms in the last

proposition becomes either subject or predicate to one of the terms in

the first.

§ 810. A sorites may be either--

(1) Progressive,

or (2) Regressive.

_Progressive Sorites_.

All A is B.

All B is C.

All C is D.

All D is E.

.'. All A is E.

_Regressive Sorites_.

All D is E.

All C is D.

All B is C.

All A is B.

.'. All A is E.

§ 811. The usual form is the progressive; so that the sorites is

commonly described as a series of propositions in which the predicate

of each becomes the subject of the next, while in the conclusion the

last predicate is affirmed or denied of the first subject. The

regressive form, however, exactly reverses these attributes; and would

require to be described as a series of propositions, in which the

subject of each becomes the predicate of the next, while in the

conclusion the first predicate is affirmed or denied of the last

subject.

§ 812. The regressive sorites, it will be observed, consists of the

same propositions as the progressive one, only written in reverse

order. Why then, it may be asked, do we give a special name to it,

though we do not consider a syllogism different, if the minor premiss

happens to precede the major? It is because the sorites is not a mere

series of propositions, but a compressed train of reasoning; and the

two trains of reasoning may be resolved into their component

syllogisms in such a manner as to exhibit a real difference between

them.

§ 813. The Progressive Sorites is a train of reasoning in which the

minor premiss of each epi-syllogism is supported by a pro-syllogism,

while the major is taken for granted.

§ 814. The Regressive Sorites is a train of reasoning in which the

major premiss of each epi-syllogism is supported by a pro-syllogism,

while the minor is taken for granted.

_Progressive Sorites_.

(i) All B is C.

All A is B.

.'. All A is C.

(2) All C is D.

All A is C.

.'. All A is D.

(3) All D is E.

All A is D.

.'. All A is E.

_Regressive Sorites_.

(1) All D is E.

All C is D.

.'. All C is E.

(2) All C is E.

All B is C.

.'. All B is E.

(3) All B is E.

All A is B.

.'. All A is E.

§ 815. Here is a concrete example of the two kinds of sorites,

resolved each into its component syllogisms--

_Progressive Sorites_.

All Bideford men are Devonshire men.

All Devonshire men are Englishmen.

All Englishmen are Teutons.

All Teutons are Aryans.

.'. All Bideford men are Aryans.

(1) All Devonshire men are Englishmen.

All Bideford men are Devonshire men.

.'. All Bideford men are Englishmen.

(2) All Englishmen are Teutons.

All Bideford men are Englishmen.

.'. All Bideford men are Teutons.

(3) All Teutons are Aryans.

All Bideford men are Teutons.

.'. All Bideford men are Aryans.

_Regressive Sorites._

All Teutons are Aryans.

All Englishmen are Teutons.

All Devonshiremen are Englishmen.

All Bideford men are Devonshiremen.

.'. All Bideford men are Aryans.

(1) All Teutons are Aryans.

All Englishmen are Teutons.

.'. All Englishmen are Aryans.

(2) All Englishmen are Aryans.

All Devonshiremen are Englishmen.

.'. All Devonshiremen are Aryans.

(3) All Devonshiremen are Aryans.

All Bideford men are Devonshiremen.

.'. All Bideford men are Aryans.

§ 816. When expanded, the sorites is found to contain as many

syllogisms as there are propositions intermediate between the first

and the last. This is evident also on inspection by counting the

number of middle terms.

§ 817. In expanding the progressive form we have to commence with the

second proposition of the sorites as the major premiss of the first

syllogism. In the progressive form the subject of the conclusion is

the same in all the syllogisms; in the regressive form the predicate

is the same. In both the same series of means, or middle terms, is

employed, the difference lying in the extremes that are compared with

one another through them.

[Illustration]

§ 818. It is apparent from the figure that in the progressive form we

work from within outwards, in the regressive form from without

inwards. In the former we first employ the term 'Devonshiremen' as a

mean to connect 'Bideford men' with 'Englishmen'; next we employ

'Englishmen' as a mean to connect the same subject 'Bideford men' with

the wider term 'Teutons'; and, lastly, we employ 'Teutons' as a mean

to connect the original subject 'Bideford men' with the ultimate

predicate 'Ayrans.'

§ 819. Reversely, in the regressive form we first use 'Teutons' as a

mean whereby to bring 'Englishmen' under 'Aryans'; next we use

'Englishmen' as a mean whereby to bring 'Devonshiremen' under the dame

predicate 'Aryans'; and, lastly, we use 'Devonshiremen' as a mean

whereby to bring the ultimate subject 'Bideford men' under the

original predicate 'Aryans.'

§ 820. A sorites may be either Regular or Irregular.

§ 821. In the regular form the terms which connect each proposition in

the series with its predecessor, that is to say, the middle terms,

maintain a fixed relative position; so that, if the middle term be

subject in one, it will always be predicate in the other, and vice

versâ. In the irregular form this symmetrical arrangement is violated.

§ 822. The syllogisms which compose a regular sorites, whether

progressive or regressive, will always be in the first figure.

In the irregular sorites the syllogisms may fall into different

figures.

§ 823. For the regular sorites the following rules may

be laid down.

(1) Only one premiss can be particular, namely, the first, if the

sorites be progressive, the last, if it be regressive.

(2) Only one premiss can be negative, namely, the last, if the

sorites be progressive, the first, if it be regressive.

§ 824. _Proof of the Rules for the Regular Sorites_.

(1) In the progressive sorites the proposition which stands first is

the only one which appears as a minor premiss in the expanded

form. Each of the others is used in its turn as a major. If any

proposition, therefore, but the first were particular, there would

be a particular major, which involves undistributed middle, if the

minor be affirmative, as it must be in the first figure.

In the regressive sorites, if any proposition except the last were

particular, we should have a particular conclusion in the syllogism

in which it occurred as a premiss, and so a particular major in the

next syllogism, which again is inadmissible, as involving

undistributed middle.

(2) In the progressive sorites, if any premiss before the last were

negative, we should have a negative conclusion in the syllogism in

which it occurs. This would necessitate a negative minor in the next

syllogism, which is inadmissible in the first figure, as involving

illicit process of the major.

In the regressive sorites the proposition which stands first is the

only one which appears as a major premiss in the expanded form.

Each of the others is used in its turn as a minor. If any premiss,

therefore, but the first were negative, we should have a negative

minor in the first figure, which involves illicit process of the

major.

§ 825. The rules above given do not apply to the irregular sorites,

except so far as that only one premiss can be particular and only one

negative, which follows from the general rules of syllogism. But there

is nothing to prevent any one premiss from being particular or any one

premiss from being negative, as the subjoined examples will show. Both

the instances chosen belong to the progressive order of sorites.

(1) Barbara.

All B is A.

All C is B.

All C is A.

All B is A.

All C is B.

Some C is D.

All D is E

.'. Some A is E

[Illustration]

(2) Disamis.

Some C is D.

All C is A.

Some A is D.

(3) Darii.

All D is E

Some A is D.

Some A is E.

(1) Barbara.

All B is C.

All A is B.

All A is C.

All A is B.

All B is C.

No D is C.

All E is D.

.'. No A is E.

[Illustration]

(2) Cesare.

No D is C.

All A is C.

.'. No A is D.

(3) Camestres.

All E is D.

No A is D.

.'. No A is E.

§ 826. A chain argument may be composed consisting

of conjunctive instead of simple propositions. This is

subject to the same laws as the simple sorites, to which

it is immediately reducible.

_Progressive._ _Regressive._

If A is B, C is D. If E is F, G is H.

If C is D, E is F. If C is D, E is F.

If E is F, G is H. If A is B, C is D.

.'. If A is B, G is H. .'. If A is B, G is H.

Deductive Logic · 第 29 / 30 章