THE CONTIO
Contio, derived from conventio,[766] originally signified “a coming
together,” “a meeting” of any kind. In an early stage of its history it
must have been a general term for public assembly, especially comitia.
This meaning appears most clearly in a passage of Macrobius,[767] in
which, quoting the treatise of Lucius Julius Caesar on the Auspices, he
declares (1) that on market days a contio cannot be called, (2) in other
words, that on such days business cannot be transacted with the people,
(3) that for this reason the Romans cannot hold comitia on market days.
Cicero,[768] too, states with reference to a certain market day that
“for two days no contio can be held”—for the day of the market and the
one following. From the context it is evident that he, like Macrobius,
is thinking of comitia, which, as is well known, could not legally meet
on market days.[769] Doubtless in the conservative nomenclature of
the pontiffs and augurs, quoted by Macrobius and Cicero, contio still
included comitia; it must in fact have applied more particularly to
the formal, voting assembly; for informal meetings were not forbidden
on such days.[770] But in the time of Cicero this use of the word was
obsolete excepting in the archaic formulae of the sacerdotal colleges.
In the political language of his age contio had come to be restricted
to the non-voting assembly—either organized[771] or more commonly
unorganized—summoned by a magistrate or a sacerdos,[772] and in this
sense it will be used in the present volume. Still farther removed from
its origin is the meaning “oration” delivered to the people in such a
gathering.[773]
Because of the passive character of this form of assembly the magistrate
admitted all who wished to attend, without inquiring whether they were
citizens and in full possession of their political rights.[774] It might
be composed either of soldiers[775] or of civilians, presided over in
the field by the commander, in the city by any magistrate who had a
right to hold comitia in their own or in another’s name, including the
king,[776] interrex, dictator, master of horse, and tribunes of the
plebs;[777] also the quaestors[778] and aediles,[779] the pontifex
maximus and the rex sacrorum.[780] Necessarily the right belonged as well
to all extraordinary magistrates, as the decemviri legibus scribundis,
who possessed consular power within the city.[781] But promagistrates
and any others who held an exclusively military imperium could summon
neither the comitia nor the civil contio.[782] The censors held contiones
for the taking of the census,[783] for imposing fines,[784] and for the
lustration. In the last-named function the assembly was also called
comitia centuriata or exercitus urbanus.[785] The quaestors, the curule
aediles, and the plebeian aediles exercised their jurisdiction in
contiones and comitia, which for this purpose they called not in their
own name but by permission of a higher magistrate.[786]
As the contio did not, like the comitia, theoretically include all the
people, any number of magistrates could simultaneously hold meetings of
the kind.[787] A minor officer had no right to take charge of, or to
summon the people from, a contio called by another. A higher officer
exercised this right against a lower; the consul, for instance,
could take the meeting from the hands of any ordinary patrician
magistrate,[788] though not of a tribune of the plebs. No one dared
disturb a meeting of any kind under the presidency of the latter,[789]
and at least in the late republic a tribune sometimes forbade a patrician
magistrate to address an assembly;[790] but otherwise consuls and
plebeian tribunes might hold simultaneous contiones.[791]
Sometimes the contio was summoned merely to witness a public act. The
consuls called the people together outside the walls by the sound of
the war-trumpet to see an execution for treason. On this occasion the
citizens were arrayed in centuries on the Campus Martius, in an assembly
called at once comitia centuriata and contio.[792] We hear of a similar
execution of an astrologer or magician outside the Esquiline gate,
according to a primitive custom;[793] and it was most probably in a
contio that the supreme pontiff scourged to death a man who had wronged a
Vestal.[794] The people gathered in the same kind of meeting to witness
an oath,[795] a judicial process,[796] or the levy of a fine.[797] But
it was preëminently the listening assembly, hence the definition offered
by Gellius,[798] “To hold a contio is to address the people, without
calling on them for a vote.” It applied not only to the isolated meeting
summoned to hear edicts, reports, communications of every kind, including
arguments and appeals for or against a given policy,[799] but also to
the preparatory stage of the voting assembly whether addresses were
delivered or not. Occasionally in early times there was speaking on the
merits of candidates at the opening of an electoral assembly, and the
voting was sometimes interrupted for the purpose.[800] Before the age of
Cicero this rare proceeding had disappeared. In his day the canvass for
candidates had been made before the holding of the preliminary contio,
which accordingly was brief and formal. Because much time was required
for the voting of the centuries,[801] speaking on the day of their
assembly had to be minimized. For this reason the contio for advising
the adoption of a resolution by the comitia centuriata was held on an
earlier day. Such was the meeting summoned in the Campus Martius by the
consul P. Lentulus for the purpose of urging the people to vote in the
ensuing centuriate assembly for the recall of Cicero.[802] In judicial
proceedings before any of the assemblies the testimonies of witnesses and
the pleadings occupied the greater part of the time, and for this reason
judicial assemblies were frequently termed simply contiones. They will be
described in a later chapter.[803]
Informal contiones could be called at any time while the sun was up,[804]
with or without[805] an interval between the summons and the meeting, and
in any place[806] at the pleasure of the person who convoked them. In
public assemblies of every kind the people remained standing throughout
the session.[807] The magistrate who was about to summon an auspicated
contio repaired to the templum which he intended to occupy during the
meeting.[808] After taking the auspices there, and finding the omens
favorable, he ordered the crier to call the citizens.[809] His directions
to this assistant were prefaced by a solemn wish that the gathering of
the citizens might be well, fortunate, auspicious, and advantageous to
the Roman people, the commonwealth, himself, his colleague or colleagues,
and his magistracy.[810] After first issuing the summons from the templum
the crier repeated it while making the circuit of the walls.[811]
Meantime the presiding officer invited the senators, his colleague or
colleagues, and the various other magistrates to assist him with their
presence and advice.[812] The invitation was extended even to opposing
tribunes;[813] and on the other hand a presiding tribune was especially
anxious to secure the presence and favorable influence of patrician
magistrates and of the leading men of the state.[814] When the president
saw his friends about him and the people gathered, he called the contio
to order,[815] and proceeded to open the meeting with a prayer.[816] In
the case of a resolution to be brought before the assembly the magistrate
was accustomed first to submit it to the senate, which considered the
bill and perhaps suggested alterations;[817] but sometimes measures were
brought into the comitia without this senatorial deliberation.[818]
In the contio the presiding officer had power to exclude or to limit
discussion of his proposals. Ordinarily he found it advantageous to
instruct the people regarding the subject on which they were to vote; and
it was for this purpose that one or more contiones were held previous to
the comitia. The right to address the people belonged primarily to the
presiding magistrate. Although the king enjoyed the superior right, the
notion that in the regal period no private persons spoke in the assembly
seems to be unwarranted.[819] The custom of the republic prescribed that
the president should grant the privilege not only to his colleagues[820]
but also to all the higher magistrates.[821] In some cases the
invitation was extended to senators[822] and to other distinguished
private persons.[823] The tribunes sometimes gave the privilege to
freedmen,[824] to foreign kings,[825] and to ambassadors.[826] The early
republic did not allow women to be present in political meetings;[827]
but in time this severity began to relax. Livy[828] represents the
elder Cato as saying that his generation permitted women to take part
in affairs of state and to interfere in contiones and comitia—evidently
an exaggeration, as the context proves that the women referred to did
not actually come into the assembly, and the speaker intimates that
custom disapproved of their doing so. From the time of the Gracchi they
occasionally spoke in public. Dio Cassius[829] states that Tiberius
Gracchus brought his mother and children into a contio to join their
entreaties with his; and according to Valerius Maximus[830] a tribune of
the plebs required Sempronia, sister of the Gracchi, to come forward in a
similar meeting and give her opinion on the subject under consideration.
In the year 43 some ladies attended a contio to protest against being
taxed by the triumvirs. Hortensia spoke for the complainants.[831]
It was an accepted custom that no tribune should intercede against a
measure till an opportunity had been afforded private persons to speak
for or against it.[832] When after the victory of Pydna a tribune of the
plebs had introduced a motion to grant a triumph to Aemilius Paulus,
and the debate had been thrown open to the assembly, all for a time
remained silent, for no doubt was entertained as to its passing; but
finally Servius Galba, who as a military tribune had served under Paulus
and was his enemy, came forward and obstructed the measure by a long
harangue.[833] Although the president could, and perhaps often did, throw
the debate open to the citizens in this way, he was not compelled to
do so. The tribunician assembly was more deliberative than any other—a
circumstance which accounts for its designation as a concilium.[834]
Those invited to speak, if citizens, had to be of good standing and not
under disqualification through a special law or usage. The rex sacrorum
was prohibited not only from holding any other office but also from
addressing an assembly.[835] The spendthrift[836] and the man condemned
for extortion[837] were likewise forbidden. When the right was granted
as a special distinction, the receiver was probably placed thereby on a
footing of equal dignity with the magistrates.[838]
The president could also compel a citizen to speak. The holder of the
imperium had a right to summon any man into a public meeting, and order
him to answer any question put to him.[839] Tribunes of the plebs,
however, who lacked the power of summoning, exercised this coercive
function against citizens and even consuls, not through a direct right
but by a usurpation, probably based on their power to arrest and
imprison.[840]
The president extended permission by asking a man to give his opinion
on the subject under discussion, and it was not in good order even
for a magistrate to address the assembly unless invited, though he
had ground for resentment if he was passed over in favor of private
persons.[841] When Caesar as consul, 59, brought his agrarian bill
before the comitia without the consent of the senate and in spite of its
silent disapproval,[842] he first asked his colleague whether he had
any objection to the proposal. Bibulus offered none but declared that
he would allow no innovation during his consulship. Thereupon Caesar
begged him for support, and requested the people to join in the entreaty,
saying, “You will have the law on the sole condition that he is willing.”
Then Bibulus, answering in a loud voice, “You will not have this law the
present year, even if all of you want it,” left the assembly. Slighting
the other magistrates, Caesar invited Pompey and Crassus to address the
meeting, though they were but senators and therefore, as contrasted with
magistrates, merely private citizens. After Pompey had spoken at length,
commending the details of the law, Caesar asked if he would support it
against opponents, at the same time requesting the people to beg of him
this favor. They did so, doubtless by acclamation; and Pompey, greatly
flattered because the consul and the people besought help of him, a
private citizen, promised to stand by the law.[843]
A magistrate spoke from the platform, a private person from a lower
position, presumably from one of the steps; for the chairman to
bring a private speaker upon the stage was a cause of offence to his
colleagues.[844] When the president granted an opportunity to speak,
he had a right to fix the amount of time to be used. In the debate on
the law for assigning provinces to Caesar and Pompey, 55, the presiding
tribune granted one hour to Favorinus and two hours to Cato, both
opponents of the measure.[845] The speaker could use the time in whatever
way he pleased; a few persons by concert might waste the whole day in
trivialities, as is sometimes done in the senate of the United States of
America, so as to prevent voting on the subject for that date. In the
case above mentioned Favorinus, doubtless for lack of real argument,
exhausted his hour in lamentation over the shortness of the time allowed
him,[846] and Cato spent his two hours on irrelevant or minor matters,
merely that he might be silenced by the president while still appearing
to have something to say. He persisted in speaking accordingly till an
officer dragged him from the rostra and ejected him from the Forum. Even
then he returned several times to interrupt the proceedings with his
shouting.[847] If the speaker approved the measure, he might close with
the words, “This law of yours and your purpose and sentiments I praise
and most heartily approve”;[848] or more formally, “In my opinion this
bill as presented ought to be passed, and may it prove well, auspicious,
and fortunate both to yourselves and to the republic”;[849] or if opposed
to the proposition, he might conclude with this form of disapproval, “It
is my judgment that this law should by no means be repealed.”[850]
Sometimes the magistrates were invited in the order of their rank and
afterward private citizens; in other cases, especially in tribunician
contiones, private persons were called first that they might speak with
perfect freedom, uninfluenced by the opinion of their magistrates.[851]
As the president had absolute control, he could alter the usage to suit
his own interest, and could certainly reserve to himself the advantage
of speaking last.[852] It often happened that there was not enough time
in one day for the discussion of a question. In that case the magistrate
adjourned the meeting to a specified date.[853]
After the deliberation, or after the formality of opening the contio
which was merely preliminary to the comitia, the president ordered the
assembly to form into voting groups—curiae, centuries, or tribes. He
could say, for instance, “I order you to take your proper places in the
comitia centuriata,”[854] or more generally, “If you think fit, quirites,
move apart (into your voting groups).”[855] At the same time he ordered
the departure of all who lacked the qualification for voting.[856] The
lictors of the magistrates with imperium and the beadle (viator) of the
tribune attended to clearing away the unqualified.[857]
Schulze, C. F., _Volksversammlungen der Römer_, 141 ff., 243
ff.; Rubino, J., _Röm. Verfassung und Geschichte_, 240-53;
Lange, L., _Röm. Altertümer_, ii. 715-23, and see indices s.
v.; Mommsen, Th., _Röm. Staatsrecht_, i. 191-209; iii. 370-8,
and see index s. v.; Willems, P., _Droit public Rom._ 158 f.;
Herzog, E., _Röm. Staatsverfassung_, i. 632-6, 1057 f., and
see index s. v.; Karlowa, O., _Röm. Rechtsgeschichte_, i. 48
f., 379-81; Madvig, J. N., _Verf. u. Verw. d. röm. Staates_,
i. 219; Soltau, W., _Altröm. Volksversammlungen_, 37 ff.;
Humbert, G., _Contio_, in Daremberg et Saglio, _Dict._ i. 1484
f.; Liebenam, W., _Contio_, in Pauly-Wissowa, _Real-Encycl._
iv. 1149-53; Ruggiero, _Diz. ep._ ii. 1185, s. Contio; Lodge,
G., _Lex. Plaut._ i. 307, s. Contio; Forcellini, _Tot. Lat.
Lex._ ii. 349 f., s. Concio; Dupond, A., _Constitution et
magistratures Rom._ 60-3; Ihne, _History of Rome_, iv. 40-2.