who--as you must know--accompanies the army on behalf of the British
Government. Personally, I am known to several officers of the 21st Corps--
General Gougeard and his Chief of Staff, for instance--and also to some of
the aides-de-camp at headquarters."
"Well, get yourselves identified, and obtain a proper safe-conduct," said
the Provost. "Brigadier, you are to take these men to headquarters. If
they are identified there, you will let them go. If not, take them to the
château (the prison), and report to me."
Again we all set out, this time climbing the hilly ill-paved streets of
old Laval, above which the town's great feudal castle reared its dark,
round keep; and presently we came to the local college, formerly an
Ursuline convent, where Chanzy had fixed his headquarters.
In one of the large class-rooms were several officers, one of whom
immediately recognized me. He laughed when he heard our story. "I was
arrested myself, the other day," he said, "because I was heard speaking in
English to your General Feilding. And yet I was in uniform, as I am now."
The Gendarmes were promptly dismissed, though not before my father had
slipped something into the hand of the old brigadier for himself and his
comrades. Their firmness had saved us, for when a mob's passions are
inflamed by patriotic zeal, the worst may happen to the objects of its
wrath.
A proper safe-conduct (which I still possess) was prepared by an
aide-de-camp on duty, and whilst he was drafting it, an elderly but
bright-eyed officer entered, and went up to a large circular stove to warm
himself. Three small stars still glittered faintly on his faded cap,
and six rows of narrow tarnished gold braid ornamented the sleeves of his
somewhat shabby dolman. It was Chanzy himself.
He noticed our presence, and our case was explained to him. Looking at me
keenly, he said, "I think I have seen you before. You are the young
English correspondent who was allowed to make some sketches at
Yvré-l'Evêque, are you not?"
"Yes, _mon genéral_," I answered, saluting. "You gave me permission
through, I think, Monsieur le Commandant de Boisdeffre."
He nodded pleasantly as we withdrew, then lapsed into a thoughtful
attitude.
Out we went, down through old Laval and towards the new town, my father
carrying the safe-conduct in his hand. The Gendarmes must have already
told people that we were "all right," for we now encountered only pleasant
faces. Nevertheless, we handed the safe-conduct to one party of National
Guards for their inspection, in order that their minds might be quite at
rest. That occurred outside the hospital, where at that moment I little
imagined that a young Englishman--a volunteer in the Sixth Battalion of
the Côtes-du-Nord Mobile Guards (21st Army Corps)--was lying invalided by
a chill, which he had caught during an ascent in our army balloon with
Gaston Tissandier. Since then that young Englishman has become famous as
Field-Marshal Viscount Kitchener of Khartoum.
But the National Guards insisted on carrying my father and myself to the
chief café of Laval. They would take no refusal. In genuine French
fashion, they were all anxiety to offer some amends for their misplaced
patriotic impulsiveness that afternoon, when they had threatened, first,
to shoot, and, next, to drown us. In lieu thereof they now deluged us with
punch _à la française_, and as the café soon became crowded with other
folk who all joined our party, there ensued a scene which almost suggested
that some glorious victory had been gained at last by invaded and
unfortunate France.
XIII
THE BITTER END
Battues for Deserters--End of the Operations against Chanzy--Faidherbe's
Battles--Bourbaki's alleged Victories and Retreat--The Position in Paris--
The terrible Death Rate--State of the Paris Army--The Sanguinary Buzenval
Sortie--Towards Capitulation--The German Conditions--The Armistice
Provisions--Bourbaki's Disaster--Could the War have been prolonged?--The
Resources of France--The general Weariness--I return to Paris--The
Elections for a National Assembly--The Negotiations--The State of Paris--
The Preliminaries of Peace--The Triumphal Entry of the Germans--The War's
Aftermath.
We remained for a few days longer at Laval, and were not again interfered
with there. A painful interest attached to one sight which we witnessed
more than once. It was that of the many processions of deserters whom the
horse Gendarmerie of the headquarters staff frequently brought into the
town. The whole region was scoured for runaways, many of whom were found
in the villages and at lonely farms. They had generally cast off their
uniform and put on blouses, but the peasantry frequently betrayed them,
particularly as they seldom, if ever, had any money to spend in bribes.
Apart from those _battues_ and the measures of all kinds which Chanzy took
to reorganise his army, little of immediate import occurred at Laval.
Gambetta had been there, and had then departed for Lille in order to
ascertain the condition of Faidherbe's Army of the North. The German
pursuit of Chanzy's forces ceased virtually at Saint Jean-sur-Erve. There
was just another little skirmish at Sainte Mélaine, but that was all.
[I should add that on January 17 the Germans under Mecklenburg secured
possession of Alengon (Chanty's original objective) alter an ineffectual
resistance offered by the troops under Commandant Lipowski, who was
seconded in his endeavours by young M. Antonin Dubost, then Prefect of the
Orne, and recently President of the French Senate.] Accordingly my father
and I returned to Saint Servan, and, having conjointly prepared some
articles on Chanzy's retreat and present circumstances, forwarded them to
London for the _Pall Mall Gazette_.
The war was now fast drawing to an end. I have hitherto left several
important occurrences unmentioned, being unwilling to interrupt my
narrative of the fighting at Le Mans and the subsequent retreat. I feel,
however, that I now ought to glance at the state of affairs in other parts
of France. I have just mentioned that after visiting Chanzy at Laval
(January 19), Gambetta repaired to Lille to confer with Faidherbe. Let us
see, then, what the latter general had been doing. He was no longer
opposed by Manteuffel, who had been sent to the east of France in the hope
that he would deal more effectually than Werder with Bourbaki's army,
which was still in the field there. Manteuffel's successor in the north
was General von Goeben, with whom, on January 18, Faidherbe fought an
engagement at Vermand, followed on the morrow by the battle of Saint
Quentin, which was waged for seven hours amidst thaw and fog. Though it
was claimed as a French victory, it was not one. The Germans, it is true,
lost 2500 men, but the French killed and wounded amounted to 3500, and
there were thousands of men missing, the Germans taking some 5000
prisoners, whilst other troops disbanded much as Chanzy's men disbanded
during his retreat. From a strategical point of view the action at Saint
Quentin was indecisive.
Turning to eastern France, Bourbaki fought two indecisive engagements near
Villersexel, south-east of Vesoul, on January 9 and 10, and claimed the
victory on these occasions. On January 13 came another engagement at
Arcey, which he also claimed as a success, being congratulated upon it by
Gambetta. The weather was most severe in the region of his operations, and
the sufferings of his men were quite as great as--if not greater than--
those of Chanzy's troops. There were nights when men lay down to sleep,
and never awoke again. On January 15,16, and 17 there was a succession of
engagements on the Lisaine, known collectively as the battle of Héricourt.
These actions resulted in Bourbaki's retreat southward towards Besançon,
where for the moment we will leave him, in order to consider the position
of Paris at this juncture.
Since the beginning of the year, the day of the capital's surrender had
been fast approaching. Paris actually fell because its supply of food was
virtually exhausted. On January 18 it became necessary to ration the
bread, now a dark, sticky compound, which included such ingredients as
bran, starch, rice, barley, vermicelli, and pea-flour. About ten ounces
was allotted per diem to each adult, children under five years of age
receiving half that quantity. But the health-bill of the city was also a
contributory cause of the capitulation. In November there were 7444 deaths
among the non-combatant population, against 3863 in November, 1869. The
death-roll of December rose to 10,665, against 4214 in December the
previous year. In January, between sixty and seventy persons died from
small-pox every day. Bronchitis and pneumonia made an ever-increasing
number of victims. From January 14 to January 21 the mortality rose to no
less than 4465; from the latter date until January 28, the day of the
capitulation, the figures were 4671, whereas in normal times they had
never been more than 1000 in any week.
Among the troops the position was going from bad to worse. Thousands of
men were in the hospitals, and thousands contrived to desert and hide
themselves in the city. Out of 100,705 linesmen, there were, on January 1,
no fewer than 23,938 absentees; while 23,565 units were absent from the
Mobile Guard, which, on paper, numbered 111,999. Briefly, one man out of
every five was either a patient or a deserter. As for the German
bombardment, this had some moral but very little material effect. Apart
from the damage done to buildings, it killed (as I previously said) about
one hundred and wounded about two hundred persons.
The Government now had little if any confidence in the utility of any
further sorties. Nevertheless, as the extremist newspapers still clamoured
for one, it was eventually decided to attack the German positions across
the Seine, on the west of the city. This sortie, commonly called that of
Buzenval, took place on January 10, the day after King William of Prussia
had been proclaimed German Emperor in Louis XIV's "Hall of Mirrors" at
Versailles. [The decision to raise the King to the imperial dignity had
been arrived at on January 1.] Without doubt, the Buzenval sortie was
devised chiefly in order to give the National Guard the constantly
demanded opportunity and satisfaction of being led against the Germans.
Trochu, who assumed chief command, establishing himself at the fort of
Mont Valérien, divided his forces into three columns, led by Generals
Vinoy, Bellemare, and Ducrot. The first (the left wing) comprised
22,000 men, including 8000 National Guards; the second (the central
column) 34,500 men, including 16,000 Guards; and the third (the right
wing) 33,500 men, among whom were no fewer than 18,000 Guards. Thus the
total force was about 90,000, the National Guards representing about a
third of that number. Each column had with it ten batteries, representing
for the entire force 180 guns. The French front, however, extended over a
distance of nearly four miles, and the army's real strength was thereby
diminished. There was some fairly desperate fighting at Saint Cloud,
Montretout, and Longboyau, but the French were driven back after losing
4000 men, mostly National Guards, whereas the German losses were only
about six hundred.
The affair caused consternation in Paris, particularly as several
prominent men had fallen in the ranks of the National Guard. On the night
of January 21, some extremists forced their way into the prison of Mazas
and delivered some of their friends who had been shut up there since the
rising of October 31. On the morrow, January 22, there was a demonstration
and an affray on the Place de l'Hôtel de Ville, shots being exchanged with
the result that people were killed and wounded. The Government gained the
day, however, and retaliated by closing the revolutionary clubs and
suppressing some extremist newspapers. But four hours later Trochu
resigned his position as Military Governor of Paris (in which he was
replaced by General Vinoy), only retaining the Presidency of the
Government. Another important incident had occurred on the very evening
after the insurrection: Jules Favre, the Foreign Minister, had then
forwarded a letter to Prince Bismarck.
The Government's first idea had been merely to surrender--that is to open
the city-gates and let the Germans enter at their peril. It did not wish
to negotiate or sign any capitulation. Jules Favre indicated as much when,
writing to Bismarck, and certainly the proposed course might have placed
the Germans--with the eyes of the world fixed upon them--in a difficult
position. But Favre was no match for the great Prussian statesman. Formal
negotiations were soon opened, and Bismarck so contrived affairs that, as
Gambetta subsequently and rightly complained, the convention which Favre
signed applied far more to France as a whole than to Paris itself. In
regard to the city, the chief conditions were that a war indemnity of
£8,000,000 should be paid; that the forts round the city should be
occupied by the Germans; that the garrison--Line, Mobile Guard, and Naval
Contingent (altogether about 180,000 men)--should become prisoners of war;
and that the armament (1500 fortress guns and 400 field pieces) should be
surrendered, as well as the large stores of ammunition. On the other hand,
a force of 12,000 men was left to the French Government for "police duty"
in the city, and the National Guards were, at Favre's urgent but foolish
request, allowed to retain their arms. Further, the city was to be
provisioned. In regard to France generally, arrangements were made for an
armistice of twenty-one days' duration, in order to allow of the election
of a National Assembly to treat for peace. In these arrangements Favre and
Vinoy (the new Governor of Paris) were out-jockeyed by Bismarck and
Moltke. They were largely ignorant of the real position in the provinces,
and consented to very disadvantageous terms in regard to the lines which
the Germans and the French should respectively occupy during the armistice
period. Moreover, although it was agreed that hostilities should cease on
most points, no such stipulation was made respecting the east of France,
where both Bourbaki and Garibaldi were in the field.
The latter had achieved some slight successes near Dijon on January 21 and
23, but on February 1--that is, two days after the signing of the
armistice--the Garibaldians were once more driven out of the Burgundian
capital. That, however, was as nothing in comparison with what befell
Bourbaki's unfortunate army. Manteuffel having compelled it to retreat
from Besançon to Pontarlier, it was next forced to withdraw into
Switzerland [Before this happened, Bourbaki attempted his life.]
(neutral territory, where it was necessarily disarmed by the Swiss
authorities) in order to escape either capture or annihilation by the
Germans. The latter took some 6000 prisoners, before the other men (about
80,000 in number) succeeded in crossing the Swiss frontier. A portion of
the army was saved, however, by General Billot. With regard to the
position elsewhere, Longwy, I should mention, surrendered three days
before the capitulation of Paris; but Belfort prolonged its resistance
until February 13, when all other hostilities had ceased. Its garrison,
so gallantly commanded by Colonel Denfert-Bochereau, was accorded the
honours of war.
As I wrote in my book, "Republican France," the country generally was
weary of the long struggle; and only Gambetta, Freycinet, and a few
military men, such as Chanzy and Faidherbe, were in favour of prolonging
it. From the declaration of war on July 15 to the capitulation of Paris
and the armistice on January 28, the contest had lasted twenty-eight
weeks. Seven of those weeks had sufficed to overthrow the Second Empire;
but only after another one-and-twenty weeks had the Third Republic laid
down her arms. Whatever may have been the blunders of the National
Defence, it at least saved the honour of France,
It may well be doubted whether the position could have been retrieved had
the war been prolonged, though undoubtedly the country was still possessed
of many resources. In "Republican France," I gave a number of figures
which showed that over 600,000 men could have been brought into action
almost immediately, and that another 260,000 could afterwards have been
provided. On February 8, when Chanzy had largely reorganized his army, he,
alone, had under his orders 4952 officers and 227,361 men, with 430 guns.
That careful and distinguished French military historian, M. Pierre
Lehautcourt, places, however, the other resources of France at even a
higher figure than I did. He also points out, rightly enough, that
although so large a part of France was invaded, the uninvaded territory
was of greater extent, and inhabited by twenty-five millions of people. He
estimates the total available artillery on the French side at 1232 guns,
each with an average allowance of 242 projectiles. In addition, there were
443 guns awaiting projectiles. He tells us that the French ordnance
factories were at this period turning out on an average 25,000 chassepots
every month, and delivering two million cartridges every day; whilst other
large supplies of weapons and ammunition were constantly arriving from
abroad. On the other hand, there was certainly a scarcity of horses, the
mortality of which in this war, as in all others, was very great. Chanzy
only disposed of 20,000, and the remount service could only supply another
12,000. However, additional animals might doubtless have been found in
various parts of France, or procured from abroad.
But material resources, however great they may be, are of little avail
when a nation has practically lost heart. In spite, moreover, of all the
efforts of commanding officers, insubordination was rampant among the
troops in the field. There had been so many defeats, so many retreats,
that they had lost all confidence in their generals. During the period of
the armistice, desertions were still numerous. I may add, that if at the
expiration of the armistice the struggle had been renewed, Chanzy's plan--
which received approval at a secret military and Government council held
in Paris, whither he repaired early in February--was to place General
de Colomb at the head of a strong force for the defence of Brittany,
whilst he, Chanzy, would, with his own army, cross the Loire and defend
southern France.
Directly news arrived that an armistice had been signed, and that Paris
was once more open, my father arranged to return there, accompanied by
myself and my younger brother, Arthur Vizetelly. We took with us, I
remember, a plentiful supply of poultry and other edibles for distribution
among the friends who had been suffering from the scarcity of provisions
during the latter days of the siege. The elections for the new National
Assembly were just over, nearly all of the forty-three deputies returned
for Paris being Republicans, though throughout the rest of France
Legitimist and Orleanist candidates were generally successful. I remember
that just before I left Saint Servan one of our tradesmen, an enthusiastic
Royalist, said to me, "We shall have a King on the throne by the time you
come back to see us in the summer." At that moment it certainly seemed as
if such would be the case. As for the Empire, one could only regard it as
dead. There were, I think, merely five recognized Bonapartist members in
the whole of the new National Assembly, and most of them came from
Corsica. Thus, it was by an almost unanimous vote that the Assembly
declared Napoleon III and his dynasty to be responsible for the "invasion,
ruin, and dismemberment of France."
The Assembly having called Thiers to the position of "Chief of the
Executive Power," peace negotiations ensued between him and Bismarck. They
began on February 22, Thiers being assisted by Jules Favre, who retained
the position of Minister of Foreign Affairs, mainly because nobody else
would take it and append his signature to a treaty which was bound to be
disastrous for the country. The chief conditions of that treaty will be
remembered. Germany was to annex Alsace-Lorraine, to receive a war
indemnity of two hundred million pounds sterling (with interest in
addition), and secure commercially "most favoured nation" treatment from
France. The preliminaries were signed on February 26, and accepted by the
National Assembly on March 1, but the actual treaty of Frankfort was not
signed and ratified until the ensuing month of May.
Paris presented a sorry spectacle during the weeks which followed the
armistice. There was no work for the thousands of artisans who had become
National Guards during the siege. Their allowance as such was prolonged in
order that they might at least have some means of subsistence. But the
unrest was general. By the side of the universal hatred of the Germans,
which was displayed on all sides, even finding vent in the notices set up
in the shop-windows to the effect that no Germans need apply there, one
observed a very bitter feeling towards the new Government. Thiers had been
an Orleanist all his life, and among the Paris working-classes there was a
general feeling that the National Assembly would give France a king. This
feeling tended to bring about the subsequent bloody Insurrection of the
Commune; but, as I wrote in "Republican France," it was precisely the
Commune which gave the French Royalists a chance. It placed a weapon in
their hands and enabled them to say, "You see, by that insurrection, by
all those terrible excesses, what a Republic implies. Order, quietude,
fruitful work, are only possible under a monarchy." As we know, however,
the efforts of the Royalists were defeated, in part by the obstinacy of
their candidate, the Comte de Chambord, and in part by the good behaviour
of the Republicans generally, as counselled both by Thiers and by
Gambetta.
On March 1, the very day when the National Assembly ratified the
preliminaries of peace at Bordeaux, the Germans made their triumphal entry
into Paris. Four or five days previously my father had sent me on a
special mission to Bordeaux, and it was then that after long years I again
set eyes on Garibaldi, who had been elected as a French deputy, but who
resigned his seat in consequence of the onerous terms of peace. Others,
notably Gambetta, did precisely the same, by way of protesting against the
so-called "Devil's Treaty." However, I was back in Paris in time to
witness the German entry into the city. My father, my brother Arthur, and
myself were together in the Champs Elysées on that historical occasion. I
have related elsewhere [In "Republican France."] how a number of women of
the Paris Boulevards were whipped in the Champs Elysées shrubberies by
young roughs, who, not unnaturally, resented the shameless overtures made
by these women to the German soldiery. There were, however, some
unfortunate mistakes that day, as, for instance, when an attempt was
made to ill-treat an elderly lady who merely spoke to the Germans in the
hope of obtaining some information respecting her son, then still a
prisoner of war. I remember also that Archibald Forbes was knocked down
and kicked for returning the salute of the Crown Prince of Saxony. Some of
the English correspondents who hurried to the scene removed Forbes to a
little hotel in the Faubourg St. Honoré, for he had really been hurt by
that savage assault, though it did not prevent him from penning a graphic
account of what he witnessed on that momentous day.