THE PERSISTENT EFFORTS OF ENGLAND IN FAVOUR OF PEACE.
In 1891, Lord Salisbury, then Prime Minister of England, witnessing the
constant progress of Prussian militarism on land and sea, and fully
conscious of the misfortunes it was preparing for Humanity, ordered an
official statement to be made of the extravagant cost of the European
military organization, and sent it confidentially to the German Kaiser,
who took no notice of it.
In 1896, Lord Salisbury lays before the Czar of Russia all the
information he has obtained on the question of militarism in Europe. On
the 28th of August, 1898, the Emperor of Russia addressed to the world
his celebrated Manifesto in favour of peace. It urged, first, the
necessity of a truly permanent peace; second, the limitation of military
preparation which, in its ever increasing development, was causing the
economic ruin of the nations.
The conferences of The Hague in favour of an international agreement for
the maintenance of peace were the direct result of the initiative of the
British Prime Minister, who foresaw the frightful consequences for
Humanity of the enormous development of militarism by the German
Empire.
All the great Powers of Europe and America, together with the secondary
states, at once heartily concurred with the proposition of the Czar of
Russia. Unfortunately, there were two sad exceptions to the consent to
consider the salutary purpose so anxiously desired by those who valued
as they should all the benefits the world would have derived from an
international system assuring permanent peace. Germany and Austria, the
latter already for years dominated by the former, opposed the patriotic
move of the Emperor of Russia, suggested to him by Great Britain. They
agreed to be represented at the Conferences for the only object of
thwarting the efforts in favour of a satisfactory enactment of new rules
of International Law to henceforth protect the world against a general
conflagration, and to free the nations from the crushing burdens of a
militarism daily developing more extravagant.
Ministerial changes in Great Britain in no way altered this part of the
foreign policy of the Mother Country. In 1905, Mr. Campbell-Bannerman
became Prime Minister of England. He was well known to be an ardent
pacifist. Deprecating the mad increase of unchecked militarism, he said,
in his ministerial program:--
"_A policy of huge armaments keeps alive and stimulates and feeds the
belief that force is the best, if not the only, solution of
international differences._"
On the 8th of March, 1906, Lord Haldane, then Minister of War, declared
in the British House of Commons:--
"_I wish we were near the time when the nations would consider together
the reduction of armaments.... Only by united action can we get rid of
the burden which is pressing so heavily on all civilized nations._"
The second Conference of The Hague which took place in July and October,
1907, was then being organized. Russia was again its official promoter.
Well aware of the uncompromising stand of Germany on the question of
reduced armaments, she had not included that matter in the program she
had decided to lay before the Conference. The British Government did all
they could to have it placed on the orders to be taken into
consideration. A member of the Labor Party, Mr. Vivian, moved in the
House of Commons, that the Conference of The Hague be called upon to
discuss that most important subject. His motion was unanimously and
enthusiastically carried.
Informing the House that the Cabinet heartily approved the Resolution,
Sir Edward Grey, Secretary for Foreign Affairs, said:--
"_I do not believe that at any time has the conscious public opinion in
the various countries of Europe set more strongly in the direction of
peace than at the present time, and yet the burden of military and naval
expenditure goes on increasing. No greater service could it (the Hague
Conference) do, than to make the conditions of peace less expensive
than they are at the present time.... It is said we are waiting upon
foreign nations in order to reduce our expenditure. As a matter of fact,
we are all waiting on each other. Some day or other somebody must take
the first step.... I do, on behalf of the Government, not only accept,
but welcome such a resolution as this as a wholesome and beneficial
expression of opinion._"
In July, 1906, a most important meeting of the Inter-Parliamentary Union
took place in London. Twenty-three countries, enjoying the privileges,
in various proportions, of free institutions, were represented at this
memorable Congress of Nations. In the course of his remarkable opening
speech of the first sitting, Mr. Campbell-Bannerman, Prime Minister,
said:--
"_Urge your Governments, in the name of humanity, to go into The Hague
Conference as we ourselves hope to go, pledged to diminished charges in
respect of armaments._"
A motion embodying the views so earnestly pressed by the British
Government was unanimously carried.
On the fifth of March, 1907, only four months before the opening of the
Second Hague Conference, Mr. Campbell-Bannerman, affirming the bounden
duty of England to propose the restriction of armaments, said, in the
British House of Commons:--
"_Holding the opinion that there is a great movement of feeling among
thinking people in all the nations of the world, in favor of some
restraint on the enormous expenditure involved in the present system so
long as it exists.... We have desired and still desire to place
ourselves in the very front rank of those who think that the warlike
attitude of powers, as displayed by the excessive growth of armaments is
a curse to Europe, and the sooner it is checked, in however moderate a
degree, the better._"
Unfortunately, German hostility to reduced armaments prevented any good
result from the second Hague Conference in the way of checking
extravagant and ruinous military organization. There was sad
disappointment in all the reasonable world and specially in England at
this deplorable outcome. Mr. Campbell-Bannerman expressed it as
follows:--
"_We had hoped that some great advance might be made towards a common
consent to arrest the wasteful and growing competition in naval and
military armaments. We were disappointed._"
Unshaken in her determination to do her utmost to protect Civilization
against the threatening and ever increasing dangers of German
militarism, England persisted with the most laudable perseverance in her
noble efforts to that much desired end. But all her pleadings, however
convincing, were vain. Germany was obdurate. Finally, on the 30th of
March, 1911, speaking in the Reichstag, the German Imperial Chancellor
threw off the mask, and positively declared that the question of
reduced armaments admitted of no possible solution "_as long as men were
men and States were States_."
A more brutal declaration could hardly have been made. It was a cynical
challenge to the World. Times were maturing and Germany was anxiously
waiting for the opportunity to strike the blow which would stagger
Humanity.
Through all the great crisis of July and August, 1914, directly
consequent upon the odious crime of Sarajevo, England exhausted all her
efforts to maintain peace, but unfortunately without avail.
Knowing very well how much England sincerely wished the maintenance of
peace, the German Government was to the last moment under the delusion
that it could succeed in having Great Britain to remain neutral in a
general European war. They were not ashamed to presume they could bribe
England. Without blushing they made to the British Government the
infamous proposition contained in the following despatch from Sir E.
Goschen, the British Ambassador at Berlin, to Sir Edward Grey, the
Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs:--
Sir E. Goschen to Sir Edward Grey (Received July 29).
Berlin, July 29, 1914.
(Telegraphic.)
I was asked to call upon the Chancellor to-night. His Excellency
had just returned from Potsdam.
He said that should Austria be attacked by Russia a European
conflagration might, he feared, become inevitable, owing to
Germany's obligation as Austria's ally, in spite of his
continued efforts to maintain peace. He then proceeded to make
the following strong bid for British neutrality. He said that it
was clear, so far as he was able to judge the main principle
which governed British policy, that Great Britain would never
stand by and allow France to be crushed in any conflict there
might be. That, however, was not the object at which Germany
aimed. Provided that neutrality of Great Britain was certain,
every assurance would be given to the British Government that
the Imperial Government aimed at no territorial acquisitions at
the expense of France should they prove victorious in any war
that might ensue.
I questioned his Excellency about the French colonies, and he
said he was unable to give a similar undertaking in that
respect. As regards Holland, however, his Excellency said that,
so long as Germany's adversaries respected the integrity and
neutrality of the Netherlands, Germany was ready to give His
Majesty's Government an assurance that she would do likewise. It
depended upon the action of France what operations Germany might
be forced to enter upon in Belgium, but when the war was over,
Belgian integrity would be respected if she had not sided
against Germany.
His Excellency ended by saying that ever since he had been
Chancellor the object of his policy had been, as you were aware,
to bring about an understanding with England; he trusted that
these assurances might form the basis of that understanding
which he so much desired. He had in mind a general neutrality
agreement between England and Germany, though it was of course
at the present moment too early to discuss details, and an
assurance of British neutrality in the conflict which present
crisis might possibly produce, would enable him to look forward
to realisation of his desire.
In reply to his Excellency's inquiry how I thought his request
would appeal to you, I said that I did not think it probable
that at this stage of events you would care to bind yourself to
any course of action and that I was of opinion that you would
desire to retain full liberty.
Our conversation upon this subject having come to an end, I
communicated the contents of your telegram of to-day to his
Excellency, who expressed his best thanks to you.
To the foregoing outrageous proposition, the Government of Great Britain
gave the proud and noble reply which follows, for all times to be
recorded in diplomatic annals to the eternal honour and glory of the
Ministers who incurred the responsibility of, and of the distinguished
diplomat who drafted, that memorable document:--
Sir Edward Grey to Sir E. Goschen.
(Telegraphic.)
Foreign Office, July 30, 1914.
Your telegram of 29th July.
His Majesty's Government cannot for a moment entertain the
Chancellor's proposal that they should bind themselves to
neutrality on such terms.
What he asks us in effect is to engage to stand by while French
colonies are taken and France is beaten so long as Germany does
not take French territory as distinct from the colonies.
From the material point of view such a proposal is unacceptable,
for France, without further territory in Europe being taken from
her, could be so crushed as to lose her position as a Great
Power, and become subordinate to German policy.
Altogether, apart from that, it would be a disgrace for us to
make this bargain with Germany at the expense of France, a
disgrace from which the good name of this country would never
recover.
The Chancellor also in effect asks us to bargain away whatever
obligation or interest we have as regards the neutrality of
Belgium. We could not entertain that bargain either.
Having said so much, it is unnecessary to examine whether the
prospect of a future general neutrality agreement between
England and Germany offered positive advantages sufficient to
compensate us for tying our hands now. We must preserve our full
freedom to act as circumstances may seem to us to require in any
such unfavourable and regrettable development of the present
crisis as the Chancellor contemplates.
You should speak to the Chancellor in the above sense, and add
most earnestly that the only way of maintaining the good
relations between England and Germany is that they should
continue to work together to preserve the peace of Europe; if we
succeed in this object, the mutual relations of Germany and
England will, I believe, be =ipso facto= improved and
strengthened. For that object His Majesty's Government will work
in that way with all sincerity and good-will.
And I will say this: if the peace of Europe can be preserved,
and the present crisis safely passed, my own endeavour will be
to promote some arrangement to which Germany will be a party, by
which she could be assured that no aggressive or hostile policy
would be pursued against her or her allies by France, Russia,
and ourselves, jointly or separately. I have desired this and
worked for it, as far as I could, through the last Balkan
crisis, and, Germany having a corresponding object, our
relations sensibly improved. The idea has hitherto been too
Utopian to form the subject of definite proposals, but if this
present crisis, so much more acute than any that Europe has gone
through for generations, be safely passed, I am hopeful that the
relief and reaction which will follow may make possible some
more definite rapprochement between the Powers than has been
possible hitherto.
The British Government could not take a more dignified stand and express
their indignation at the infamous proposal in stronger and more noble
terms.
Let us now read the indignant protest of Mr. Asquith, the British Prime
Minister, against the outrageous German proposition, addressed to the
House of Commons, where it raised a storm of applause, proclaiming to
the World the dogged determination of England to wage war rather than
agree to the dishonourable German proposal:--
What does that amount to? Let me just ask the House. I do so,
not with the object of inflaming passion, certainly not with the
object of exciting feeling against Germany, but I do so to
vindicate and make clear the position of the British Government
in this matter. What did that proposal amount to? In the first
place, it meant this: That behind the back of France--they were
not made a party to these communications--we should have given,
if we had assented to that, a free license to Germany to annex,
in the event of a successful war, the whole of the extra
European dominions and possessions of France. What did it mean
as regards Belgium? When she addressed, as she has addressed in
the last few days, her moving appeal to us to fulfil our solemn
guarantee of her neutrality, what reply should we have given?
What reply should we have given to that Belgian appeal? We
should have been obliged to say that without her knowledge we
had bartered away to the Power threatening her our obligation to
keep our plighted word. The House has read, and the country has
read, of course, in the last few hours, the most pathetic appeal
addressed by the King of Belgium, and I do not envy the man who
can read that appeal with an unmoved heart. Belgians are
fighting and losing their lives. What would have been the
position of Great Britain to-day in the face of that spectacle
if we had assented to this infamous proposal? Yes, and what are
we to get in return for the betrayal of our friends and the
dishonour of our obligations? What are we to get in return? A
promise--nothing more; a promise as to what Germany would do in
certain eventualities; a promise, be it observed--I am sorry to
say it, but it must be put upon record--given by a Power which
was at that very moment announcing its intention to violate its
own treaty, and inviting us to do the same. I can only say, if
we had dallied or temporized, we, as a Government, should have
covered ourselves with dishonour, and we should have betrayed
the interests of this country, of which we are trustees.
After quoting and eulogizing the telegraphic despatch of Sir Edward Grey
to Sir E. Goschen, dated July 30, 1914, Mr. Asquith proceeded as
follows:--
That document, in my opinion, states clearly, in temperate and
convincing language, the attitude of this Government. Can any
one who reads it fail to appreciate the tone of obvious
sincerity and earnestness which underlies it; can any one
honestly doubt that the Government of this country in spite of
great provocation--and I regard the proposals made to us as
proposals which we might have thrown aside without consideration
and almost without answer--can any one doubt that in spite of
great provocation the right hon. gentleman, who had already
earned the title--and no one ever more deserved it--of Peace
Maker of Europe, persisted to the very last moment of the last
hour in that beneficent but unhappily frustrated purpose. I am
entitled to say, and I do so on behalf of this country--I speak
not for a party, I speak for the country as a whole--that we
made every effort any Government could possibly make for peace.
But this war has been forced upon us. What is it we are
fighting for? Every one knows, and no one knows better than the
Government the terrible incalculable suffering, economic,
social, personal and political, which war, and especially a war
between the Great Powers of the world must entail. There is no
man amongst us sitting upon this bench in these trying
days--more trying perhaps than any body of statesmen for a
hundred years have had to pass through, there is not a man
amongst us who has not, during the whole of that time, had
clearly before his vision the almost unequalled suffering which
war, even in just cause, must bring about, not only to the
peoples who are for the moment living in this country and in the
other countries of the world, but to posterity and to the whole
prospects of European civilization. Every step we took with that
vision before our eyes, and with a sense of responsibility which
it is impossible to describe. Unhappily, if in spite of all our
efforts to keep the peace, and with that full and overpowering
consciousness of the result, if the issue be decided in favour
of war, we have, nevertheless, thought it to be the duty as well
as the interest of this country to go to war, the House may be
well assured it was because we believe, and I am certain the
Country will believe, we are unsheathing our sword in a just
cause.
If I am asked what we are fighting for I reply in two sentences.
In the first place to fulfil a solemn international obligation,
an obligation which, if it had been entered into between private
persons in the ordinary concerns of life, would have been
regarded as an obligation not only of law but of honour, which
no self-respecting man could possibly have repudiated. I say,
secondly, we are fighting to vindicate the principle which, in
these days when force, material force, sometimes seems to be the
dominant influence and factor in the development of mankind, we
are fighting to vindicate the principle that small nationalities
are not to be crushed, in defiance of international good faith,
by the military will of a strong and overmastering Power. I do
not believe any nation ever entered into a great
controversy--and this is one of the greatest history will ever
know--with a clearer conscience and stronger conviction that it
is fighting, not for aggression, not for the maintenance even of
its own selfish interest, but that it is fighting in defence of
principles, the maintenance of which is vital to the
civilisation of the world. With a full conviction, not only of
the wisdom and justice, but of the obligations which lay upon us
to challenge this great issue, we are entering into the
struggle.
The German Government refusing to order their army to retire from the
Belgian territory it had violated, at midnight, 4th to 5th August, 1914,
the whole British Empire was at war with the whole German Empire.
Surely, there is not the slightest necessity to argue any more that in
the terrific war raging for the last four years, Justice and Right are
on the side of England and her Allies. No war was ever more just, waged
with equal honour for the triumph of Liberty and Civilization, for the
protection of Humanity against the onslaught of barbarism developed to
the cruelty of the darkest ages of History.