_Occurrences from our Departure from Payta to our Arrival at Quibo._
Setting sail from the road of Payta about midnight of the 16th
November, we stood to the westward, and next morning the commodore
caused the squadron to spread, on purpose to look out for the
Gloucester, as we drew near the station where Captain Mitchell had
been directed to cruise, and we hourly expected to get sight of him,
yet the whole day passed without seeing him.
At this time a jealousy between those who had gone ashore to the
attack of Payta, and those who had continued on board, grew to such a
height, that the commodore became acquainted with it, and thought
it necessary to interpose his authority for its abatement. This was
occasioned by the plunder taken at Payta, which those who acted on
shore had appropriated to themselves, considering it as due to the
risks they had run, and the resolution they had shewn on that service.
But those who had remained on board, deemed this a very partial and
unjust procedure; urging, that they also would have preferred acting
on shore if it had been left to their choice; that their duty on
board was extremely fatiguing while their comrades were on shore; for,
besides the labour of the day, they were forced to remain all night
under arms to secure the prisoners, who were more numerous than
themselves, and of whom it was then necessary to be extremely
watchful, to prevent any attempts they might have planned at that
critical conjuncture. They insisted, also, that it was undeniably as
necessary to the success of the enterprize to have an adequate force
on board as on shore in its execution, and, therefore, that those who
remained on board could not be deprived of their share in the plunder,
without manifest injustice. These contests were carried on with great
heat on both sides; and though the plunder in question was a mere
trifle, in comparison with the treasure taken, in which there was no
doubt that those on board had an equal right, yet, as the obstinacy
of sailors is not always regulated by the importance of the matter in
dispute, the commodore thought it necessary to put a speedy stop to
this commotion. Accordingly, on the morning of the 17th, he ordered
all hands to assemble on the quarter-deck, when, addressing his
discourse to those who had been detached on shore, he highly commended
their gallant conduct, and thanked them for their services on that
occasion. He then represented to them the reasons that had been urged
by those who continued on board, for an equal distribution of the
plunder, telling them that he thought these reasons were conclusive,
and that the expectations of their comrades were justly founded; and
he insisted, therefore, that not only the men, but all the officers
also, who had been employed in the capture of Payta, should
immediately produce the whole of their plunder upon the quarter-deck,
and that it should be impartially divided among the whole crew,
proportionally to the rank and commission of each. To prevent those
who had been in possession of this plunder from murmuring at this
decision, and the consequent diminution of their shares, he added,
as an encouragement to those who might be afterwards employed on
like services, that he gave up his entire share, to be distributed
exclusively among those who had been detached to attack the place.
Thus this troublesome affair, which might perhaps have had mischievous
consequences if permitted to go on, was soon appeased by the prudence
of the commodore, to the general satisfaction of all. Some few,
indeed, whose selfish dispositions were uninfluenced by the justice of
this procedure, and who were incapable of discerning the equity of the
decision, were dissatisfied, as it tended to deprive them of what they
had once possessed.
This important affair employed the best part of the day after leaving
Payta; and at night, having seen nothing of the Gloucester, the
commodore made the squadron bring to, that we might not pass her in
the dark. Next morning we again spread on the look-out, and saw a sail
at 10 a.m. to which we gave chase, and which we came near enough by
two p.m. to observe to be the Gloucester, having a small vessel in
tow. We joined her in about an hour after, when we learnt that Captain
Mitchell had only taken two small prizes during the whole of his
cruise. One was a small snow, the cargo of which consisted chiefly
of wine, brandy, and olives in jars, with about 7000l. in specie. The
other was a large boat or launch, taken near shore by the Gloucester's
barge. The prisoners on board this boat alleged that they were very
poor, and that their loading consisted only of cotton; though the
circumstances under which they were surprized, seemed to insinuate
that they were more opulent than they pretended; for they were found
at dinner on a pigeon-pye, served up in silver dishes. The officer who
commanded the barge, having opened several of the jars in the prize,
to satisfy his curiosity, found nothing as he thought but cotton,
which inclined him to believe the account given by the prisoners; but
when these jars were examined more strictly in the Gloucester, they
were agreeably surprised to find the whole a very extraordinary piece
of deception; as in every jar there was a considerable quantity of
double doubloons and dollars, artfully concealed among the cotton, to
the amount in all of near 12,000l. This treasure was going to Payta,
and belonged to the same merchants who were proprietors of most of
the money we had taken there; so that, if this boat had escaped the
Gloucester, her cargo would probably have fallen into our hands.
Besides these two prizes, the Gloucester had been in sight of two or
three other ships, which had escaped them; and one of them, from some
of our intelligence, we had reason to believe was of immense value.
It was now resolved to stand to the northwards, and to make the best
of our way either for Cape St Lucas, in California, or Cape Corientes
on the coast of Mexico. When at Juan Fernandez, the commodore had
resolved to touch somewhere in the neighbourhood of Panama, to
endeavour to get some correspondence overland with the fleet under
Admiral Vernon. For, on our departure from England, we left a fleet
at Portsmouth intended for the West Indies, to be employed there in
an expedition against some of the Spanish settlements. Taking for
granted, therefore, that this enterprise had succeeded, and that
Portobello might then be garrisoned by British troops, the commodore
conceived he might easily procure an intercourse with our countrymen,
on the other side of the isthmus of Darien, either by means of
the Indians, who are greatly disposed to favour us, or even by
the Spaniards themselves; some of whom might be induced, by proper
rewards, to carry on this correspondence; which, when once begun,
might be continued with little difficulty. By this means, Mr Anson
flattered himself that he might procure a reinforcement of men from
the other side, and that, by settling a prudent plan of co-operation
with our commanders in the West Indies, he might even have taken
Panama. This would have given the British nation the command of the
isthmus, by which we should in effect have become masters of all the
wealth of Peru, and should have held an equivalent in our hands
for any demand, however extraordinary, that might have been thought
advisable to make on either branch of the Bourbon family.
Such were the magnificent projects which the commodore revolved in his
mind, when at the island of Juan Fernandez, notwithstanding the feeble
condition to which his force was then reduced; and, had the success
of the expedition to the West Indies been answerable to the general
expectation, these views had certainly been the most prudent that
could have been devised. But, on examining the papers found on board
the Carmelo, our first prize, it was then learnt, though I deferred
mentioning it till now, that the attempt on Carthagena had failed, and
that there was no probability of our fleet in the West Indies engaging
in any new enterprise that could at all facilitate this plan. Mr
Anson, therefore, had relinquished all hope of being reinforced across
the isthmus, and consequently had no inducement to proceed at present
for Panama, being incapable of assaulting that place; and there was
reason to believe there was now a general embargo over all the coast
of the South Sea. The only feasible measure that now remained, was to
steer as soon as possible for the southern parts of California, or the
adjacent coast of Mexico, and there to cruise for the Manilla galleon,
which was now known to be at sea on her voyage to Acapulco; and we had
no doubt of being able to get upon that station in sufficient time to
intercept her, as she does not usually arrive at Acapulco till
towards the middle of January, and, being now only about the middle of
November, we did not suppose our passage thither would cost us above
a month or six weeks, so that, in our opinion, we had nearly twice as
much time as was necessary.
There was one business, however, which we knew must occasion some
delay, but which we hoped might be accomplished in four or five days.
This was to recruit our water; for the number of prisoners we had to
maintain, ever since we left Juan Fernandez, had so far exhausted our
stock, that it was impossible to think of venturing upon a passage to
the coast of Mexico, till we had procured a fresh supply; especially
as we had not found enough at Payta for our consumption while there.
It was for some time a matter of deliberation with the commodore,
where we might take in this necessary article; but, by consulting the
accounts of former navigators, and examining our prisoners, he at last
resolved for the island of Quibo, beyond the bay of Panama. There was
indeed a small island called _Cocos_, less out of our way than Quibo,
where some of the Buccaneers pretended to have found water: But none
of our prisoners knew any thing of that island, and it was thought too
hazardous to risk the safety of the squadron, by exposing ourselves to
the chance of not finding water at that place, on the mere authority
of these legendary writers, of whose misrepresentations and falsities
we had almost daily experience. Besides, we were not without hopes
that in going to Quibo some of the enemies ships bound to or from
Panama might fall into our hands, particularly such of them as were
put to sea, before they had intelligence of our squadron; we therefore
directed our course to the northward, being eight sail, and so
having the appearance of a very formidable fleet; and on the 19th
at day-break, we discovered Cape Blanco, bearing S.S.E. 1/2 E. seven
miles distant. This cape lies in the latitude of 4° 15' south, and is
always made by ships bound either to windward or to leeward, so that
it is a most excellent station to cruise upon the enemy. As our last
prize, the Solidad, was far from answering the character given her of
a good sailer, and she and the Santa Teresa delayed us considerably,
the commodore ordered them to be cleared of every thing that might
prove useful to the rest of the ships, and then to be burnt. We then
proceeded in our course for Quibo, and, on the 22d in the morning,
saw the island of Plata bearing east, distant four leagues. One of our
prizes, which was ordered to stand close in, both to discover if there
were any ships between that island and the continent, and likewise to
look out for a stream of fresh water reported to be there, returned
without having seen any ship, or finding any water. At three in the
afternoon point Manta bore S.E. by E. seven miles distant; and there
being a town of the same name in the neighbourhood, Captain Mitchell
took this opportunity of sending away several of his prisoners
from the Gloucester in the Spanish launch. The boats were now daily
employed in distributing provisions on board the Tryal and other
prizes, to complete their stock for six months; and, that the
Centurion might be the better prepared to give the Manilla ship (one
of which we were told was of immense size) a warm reception, the
carpenters were ordered to fix eight stocks in the main and fore-tops
for the mounting of swivel guns.
On the 25th we had a sight of the island of Gallo, bearing E.S.E. 1/2
E. four leagues distant; from hence we crossed the bay of Panama with
a N.W. course, hoping that this would have carried us in a direct line
to the island of Quibo. But we afterwards found that wrought to have
stood more to the westward, for the winds in a short time began to
incline to that quarter, and made it difficult for us to gain the
island. And now, after passing the equinoctial on the 22d, leaving the
neighbourhood of the Cordilleras, and standing more and more towards
the isthmus, where the communication of the atmosphere to the eastward
and the westward was no longer interrupted, we found, in a few
days, an extraordinary alteration in the climate. Instead of uniform
temperature, we had, for several days together, close and sultry
weather, resembling what we had met with between the tropics on the
eastern side of America. We had besides frequent calms and heavy
rains, which we at first ascribed to the neighbourhood of the line,
where this kind of weather is found to prevail; but, observing that it
attended us to the latitude of seven degrees north, we were induced
to believe that the stormy season, or, as the Spaniards call it, the
Vandevals, was not yet over; though many positively assert, that it
begins in June, and is ended November.
On the 27th Captain Mitchel's largest prize being cleared, was
scuttled, and set on fire, and as the remaining five ships were all
good sailers, so we never occasioned any delay to each other. Being
now in a rainy climate, which we had been long disused to, we found
it necessary to caulk the decks and sides of the Centurion, to prevent
the rain-water from running into her.
On the 3d of December we had a view of the island of Quibo, the
east end then bearing N.N.W. four leagues distant, and the island of
Quicara W.N.W. at about the same distance. Here we struck ground with
sixty-five fathom of line, and found the bottom to consist of grey
sand, with black specks. When we got sight of the land, we found the
wind to hang westerly, and therefore thought it adviseable to stand
off till morning, as there are said to be some shoals in the entrance
of the channel. At six the next morning, point Mariato bore N.E. 1/2
N. three or four leagues distant. In weathering this point, all the
squadron, except the Centurion, were very near it, and the Gloucester,
being the leewardmost ship, was forced to tack and stand to the
southward, so that we lost sight of her. At nine, the island Sebaco
bore N.W. by N. four leagues distant; but the wind still proving
unfavourable, we were obliged to ply on and off for the succeeding
twenty-four hours, and were frequently taken a-back. However, at
eleven the next morning the wind happily settling in the S.S.W. we
bore away for the S.S.E. end of the island, and about three in the
afternoon entered Canal Bueno, passing round a shoal which stretches
off about two miles from the south point of the island. This Canal
Bueno, or Good Channel, is at least six miles in breadth; and as we
had the wind large, we kept in a good depth of water, generally from
twenty-eight to thirty-three fathom, and came not within a mile and a
half distance of the breakers, though, in all probability, if it had
been necessary, we might have ventured much nearer without incurring
the least danger. At seven in the evening we came to an anchor in
thirty-three fathom, muddy ground; the south point of the island
bearing S.E. by E. a remarkable high part of the island W. by N. and
the island Sebaco E. by N.