_Observations and Directions for facilitating the Passage of future
Navigators round Cape Horn._
The improper season of the year in which we attempted to double Cape
Horn, and to which is to be imputed the before-recited disappointment,
in falling in with Terra del Fuego, when we reckoned ourselves above
an hundred leagues to the westward of that coast, and consequently
well advanced into the Pacific Ocean, to which we were necessitated by
our too late departure from England, was the fatal source of all the
misfortunes we afterwards experienced. For, from hence proceeded the
separation of our ships, the destruction of so many of our people, the
ruin of our project against Baldivia, and of all our other views on
the Spanish settlements, and the reduction of our squadron, from the
formidable condition in which it passed the Straits of Le Maire, to a
couple of shattered half-manned cruizers and a sloop, so exceedingly
disabled that, in many climates, they scarcely durst have put to
sea. To prevent, therefore, as much as in me lies, the recurrence of
similar calamities to all ships bound hereafter to the South Seas,
I think it my duty to insert in this place such observations and
directions, as either my own experience and reflection, or the
conversation of the most skilful navigators on board the squadron,
could furnish me with, as to the most eligible manner of doubling Cape
Horn, whether in regard to the season of the year, the course proper
to be steered, or the places of refreshment both on the eastern and
western sides of South America.
To begin with the proper place for refreshment on the eastern side of
South America. For this purpose the island of St Catharines has been
usually recommended by former writers, and on their authority we put
in there; but the treatment we experienced, and the small store of
refreshments we could procure their are sufficient reasons to render
all ships very cautious in future how they trust to the government of
Don Jose Sylva de Paz; for they may assuredly depend on having their
strength, condition, and designs betrayed to the Spaniards, as far as
the knowledge the governor can procure of these particulars may enable
him. As this treacherous conduct was inspired by the views of private
gain, in the illicit commerce carried on to the river Plate, rather
than by any natural affection between the Portuguese and Spaniards,
the same perfidy may perhaps be expected from most of the governors on
the coast of Brazil, since these smuggling engagements are doubtless
very general and extensive; and, though the governors themselves
should detest so faithless a procedure, yet, as ships are perpetually
passing from one or other of the Brazilian ports to the Rio Plata,
the Spaniards could scarcely fail of receiving intelligence, by this
means, of any British ships being on the coast; and, however imperfect
such intelligence might be, it might prove injurious to the views and
interests of cruizers thus discovered.
As the Spanish trade in the South Seas is all in one direction, from
north to south, or the direct reverse, with very little deviation
to the eastward or westward, it is in the power, of two or three
cruisers, properly stationed on different parts of this track, to
possess themselves of every ship that puts to sea. This, however,
can only be the case so long as they continue concealed from the
neighbouring coast; for, the moment that an enemy is known to be in
these seas, all navigation is prohibited, and all chance of capture
is consequently at an end; as the Spaniards, well aware of these
advantages to an enemy, send expresses all along the coast, and lay
a general embargo on all trade; which measure they know will not
only prevent their vessels from being taken, but must soon oblige
all cruisers, that have not sufficient strength to attempt their
settlements on shore, to quit these seas for want of provisions. Hence
the great importance of carefully concealing all expeditions of this
kind is quite evident; and hence too it is obvious how extremely
prejudicial such intelligence must prove as that communicated by the
Portuguese to the Spaniards in our case, in consequence of touching at
the ports of Brazil. Yet it will often happen that ships, bound beyond
Cape Horn, may be obliged to call there for wood, water, and other
refreshments; in which case, St Catharines is the very last place I
would recommend; both because the proper animals for a live stock at
sea, as hogs, sheep, and fowls, are not to be procured there, for want
of which we found ourselves greatly distressed, being reduced to live
almost entirely on salt provisions; and because, from that port being
nearer the Rio Plata than many others of the Portuguese settlements,
the inducements and conveniences for betraying us to the Spaniards
were so much the stronger. The place I would recommend is Rio Janeiro,
where two of our squadron put in, after separating from us in passing
Cape Horn. At this place, as I was informed by a gentleman on board
one of these ships, any quantity of hogs and poultry can be procured;
and as it is more distant from the Rio Plata, the difficulty of
sending intelligence to the Spaniards is somewhat increased, and
consequently the chance of continuing there undiscovered is so much
the greater. Other measures, which may effectually obviate all these
embarrassments, will be considered more at large hereafter.
I proceed, in the next place, to consider of the proper measures to
be pursued for doubling Cape Horn: And here, I think I am sufficiently
authorized, by our own fatal experience, and by a careful comparison
and examination of the journals of former navigators, to give the
following advice, which ought never, in prudence, to be departed from:
Which is, That all ships bound to the South Seas, instead of passing
through the Straits of Le Maire, should constantly pass by the
eastward of Staten-Land, and should be invariably bent on running as
far as the latitude of 61° or 62° S. before they endeavour to stand to
the westwards; and ought then to make sure of a sufficient westing
in or about that latitude, before commencing a northern course. But,
since directions diametrically opposite to these have been formerly
given by other writers, it is incumbent on me to produce my reasons
for each part of this maxim.
First then, as to the propriety of passing to the eastward of
Staten-Land. Those who have attended to the risk we ran in passing
the Straits of Le Maire, the danger we were in of being driven upon
Staten-Land by the current, when, though we happily escaped being
driven on shore, we were yet carried to the eastward of that island:
those, I say, who reflect on this and the like accidents which have
happened to other ships, will surely not esteem it prudent to
pass through these straits and run the risk of shipwreck, and find
themselves, after all, no farther to the westward, the only reason
hitherto given for this practice, than they might have been, in the
same time, by a more secure navigation in an open sea. And next, as
to the directions I have given for running into the latitude of 61°
or 62° S. before any endeavour is made to stand to the westward. The
reasons for this precept are, that, in all probability, the violence
of the current setting from the westward will be thereby avoided,
and the weather will prove less tempestuous and uncertain. This
last circumstance we experienced most remarkably; for after we had
unexpectedly fallen in with the land at Cape Noir, we stood away
southward to get clear of it; and were no sooner advanced into the
lat. of 60° S. or upwards, than we met with much better weather and
smoother water than in any other part of this whole passage. The air
indeed was very sharp and cold, and we had strong gales, but they were
steady and uniform, and we had at the same time sunshine and a clear
sky: whereas in the lower latitudes, the wind every now and then
intermitted, as it were, to recover new strength, and then returned
suddenly in the most violent gusts, threatening at every blast to blow
away our masts, which must have proved our inevitable destruction.
Also, that the currents in this high latitude would be of much
less efficacy than nearer the land, seems to be evinced by these
considerations: That all currents run with greater violence near the
shore than out at sea, and that at great distances from the land
they are scarcely perceptible. The reason of this seems sufficiently
obvious, if we consider that constant currents, in all probability,
are produced by constant winds; the wind, though with a slow and
imperceptible motion, driving a large body of water continually before
it, which, being accumulated on any coast that it meets with in its
course, must escape along the shore by the endeavours of the surface
to reduce itself to the level of the rest of the ocean. It is likewise
reasonable to suppose, that those violent gusts of wind which we
experienced near the shore, so very different from what we found in
the lat. of 60° S. and upwards, may be owing to a similar cause; for a
westerly wind almost perpetually prevails in the southern part of
the Pacific Ocean, and this current of air being interrupted by the
enormously high range of the Andes, and by the mountains on Terra del
Fuego, which together bar up the whole country as far south as Cape
Horn, a part only of the wind can force its way over the top of
these prodigious precipices, while the rest must naturally follow the
direction of the coast, and must range down the land to the southward,
and sweep with an impetuous and irregular blast round Cape Horn, and
the southermost part of Terra del Fuego. Without placing too
much reliance on these speculations, we may assume, I believe, as
incontestable facts, that both the rapidity of the currents, and the
violence of the western gales, are less sensible in lat. 61° or 62° S.
than nearer the coasts of Terra del Fuego.
Though satisfied, both from our own experience and the relations of
other navigators, of the importance of the precept here insisted on,
of proceeding to lat. 61° or 62° S. before any endeavours are made to
stand to the westwards, yet I would also advise all ships hereafter
not to trust so far to this management as to neglect another most
essential maxim: Which is, to make this passage in the height of the
_antarctic summer_, or, in other words, in the months of December and
January, which correspond exactly to the months of June and July in
our northern or arctic hemisphere: and the more distant the time
of passing may be from this season, so much the more disastrous the
passage may reasonably be expected to prove. Indeed, if the mere
violence of the western winds be considered, the time of our passage,
which was about the antarctic autumnal equinox, was perhaps the most
favourable period of the whole year. But then it must be considered
that there are, independent of the winds, many other inconveniences to
be apprehended in the depth of winter, which are almost insuperable.
For, at that season, the severity of the cold, and the shortness of
the days, would render it impracticable to run so far to the southward
as is here recommended. The same reasons would also greatly augment
the danger and alarm of sailing, at that season, in the neighbourhood
of an unknown shore, dreadful in its appearance, even in the midst of
summer, and would render a winter navigation on this coast, beyond all
others, most dismaying and terrible. As I would, therefore, advise all
ships to make their passage, if possible, in December and January,
so I would warn them never to attempt doubling Cape Horn, from the
eastward, after the month of March, which is equivalent to our August.
As to the remaining consideration, in regard to the most proper place
for cruizers to refit at, on their first arrival in the South Seas,
there is scarcely any choice, the island of Juan Fernandez being the
only place that can be prudently recommended for that purpose. For,
although there are many ports on the western side of Patagonia,
between the Straits of Magellan, one of which I shall particularly
notice in the sequel, in which ships may ride in great safety, and may
also recruit their wood and water, and procure some few refreshments,
yet that coast is in itself so extremely dangerous, owing to its
numerous rocks and breakers, and to the violence of the western winds,
which blow upon it continually, that it is by no means advisable
to fall in with that coast, at least till the roads, channels, and
anchorages in each part of it have been accurately surveyed, and both
the perils and shelters with which it abounds are more distinctly
known.
Having thus given the best directions in my power, for the success of
our cruizers that may be hereafter bound to the South Seas, it might
be expected that I should now resume the narrative of our voyage. Yet
as, both in the preceding and subsequent parts of this work, I have
thought it my duty not only to recite all such facts, and to inculcate
such maxims, as had even the least appearance of proving beneficial to
future navigators, and also to recommend such measures to the public
as seemed adapted to promote the same laudable purpose, I cannot
desist from the present subject without beseeching those persons to
whom the conduct of our naval affairs is confided, to endeavour
to remove the many perplexities and embarrassments with which the
navigation to the South Sea is at present encumbered. An effort of
this kind could not fail of proving highly honourable to themselves,
and extremely beneficial to their country; for it is sufficiently
evident, that whatever improvements navigation shall receive, either
by the invention of methods by which its practice may be rendered less
hazardous, or by the more accurate delineation of the coasts, roads,
and harbours already known, or by the discovery of new countries and
nations, or of new species and sources of commerce, the advantages
thence arising must ultimately redound to the emolument of Great
Britain. Since, as our fleets are at present superior to those of the
whole world united, it must be a matchless degree of supineness or
meanness of spirit, if we permit any of the advantages deriveable from
new discoveries, or from a more extended navigation, to be ravished
from us.
Since it appears, from what has been already said, that all our future
expeditions to the South Seas must run a considerable risk of proving
abortive, while we remain under the necessity of touching at Brazil
in our passage thither, the discovery of some place more to the
southward, where ships might refresh, and supply themselves with the
necessary sea stock for their passage round Cape Horn, would relieve
us from this embarrassment, and would surely be a matter worthy of
the attention of the public. Neither does this seem difficult to be
effected, as we already have an imperfect knowledge of two places,
which might perhaps prove, on examination, extremely convenient for
this purpose. One of these is Pepy's Island, in the latitude of 47°
S. and laid down by Dr Bailey about eighty leagues to the eastward
of Cape Blanco, on the coast of Patagonia.[1] The other is Falkland's
Islands, in lat. 51° 30' S.[2] nearly south of Pepy's Island.
[Footnote 1: Isla Grande, supposed to be the Pepy's Island discovered
by Cowley, is in lat. 46° 34' S. and is placed by Mr Dalrymple in
long. 46° 40' W. while the illustrious navigator Cook makes its long.
35° 40' W. a difference of longitude of no less than eleven degrees.]
[Footnote 2: The centre of Falkland's Islands is in 51° 45' S.
Janson's Islands, the most north-westerly of the group, or the
Sebaldines, is in 51°; and Beauchene's Isle, the most southerly, in
53° S.--E.]
The first of these was discovered by Captain Cowley in 1683, during
his voyage round the world, and is represented by that navigator as a
commodious place for ships to wood and water at, being provided with a
good and capacious harbour, where a thousand sail of ships might ride
at anchor in great safety, being also the resort of vast numbers of
fowls; and as its shores consist of either rocks or sands, it seems
to promise great plenty of fish. Falkland's Islands have been seen by
many navigators, both French and English. It is laid down by Frezier,
in his chart of the extremity of South America, under the name of
the New Islands. Woods Rogers, who ran along the N.E. coasts of these
islands in 1708, says they extend about two degrees in length,[3] and
appeared with gentle descents from hill to hill, seeming to be good
ground, interspersed with woods, and not destitute of harbours.
[Footnote 3: The west extremity of this group is in long. 62° W. and
the east extremity in 56° 43' W. so that their extent is 5° 12' in
difference of longitude.--E.]
Either of these places, being islands at a considerable distance from
the continent, may be supposed, from their latitude, to be situated
in a sufficiently temperate climate. They are both, it is true, too
little known at present to be recommended as the most eligible
places of refreshment for ships bound to the South Seas: But, if the
admiralty should think proper to order them to be surveyed, which
might be done at a very small expence, by a vessel fitted out on
purpose; and if, on examination, either one or both should appear
proper for serving the end in view, it is scarcely possible to
conceive how exceedingly important so convenient a station might
prove, so far to the southward, and so near Cape Horn. The Duke and
Duchess of Bristol, under Woods Rogers, were only thirty-five days
from losing sight of Falkland's Islands to their arrival at Juan
Fernandez, in the South Sea; and, as the return back is much
facilitated by the western winds, a voyage might doubtless be made
from Falkland's Islands to Juan Fernandez and back again in little
more than two months. Even in time of peace, this station might be of
great consequence to the nation; and in time of war, would render us
masters of those seas.
As all discoveries of this kind, though extremely honourable to
those who direct and promote them, may yet be carried on at an
inconsiderable expence, since small vessels are much the most proper
to be employed in this service, it were greatly to be wished that
the whole coasts of Patagonia, Terra del Fuego, and Staten-Land, were
carefully surveyed, and the numerous channels, roads, harbours, and
islands, in which they abound, accurately examined, described, and
represented. This might open to us vast facilities for passing into
the South Seas, such as hitherto we have no knowledge of, and would
render the whole of that southern navigation greatly more secure than
it is at present: Particularly as exact draughts of the western coast
of Patagonia, from the Straits of Magellan to the Spanish settlements,
might furnish us with better and more convenient ports for
refreshment, and better situated, both for the purposes of war and
commerce, than Juan Fernandez, as being above a fornight's sail nearer
to Falkland's Islands.
The discovery of this coast was formerly thought of so much
importance, by reason of its neighbourhood to the _Araucos_ and other
Indians of Chili, who are generally at war, or at least on ill
terms, with the Spaniards, that, in the reign of Charles II. Sir John
Narborough was purposely fitted out to survey the Straits of Magellan,
the neighbouring coast of Patagonia, and the Spanish ports on that
frontier, with directions, if possible, to procure some intercourse
with the Chilese Indians, and to establish a commerce and lasting
correspondence with them. His majesty's views, on this occasion, were
not solely directed to the advantage he might hope to receive from an
alliance with these savages, in restraining and intimidating the king
of Spain, but he even conceived, independent of these considerations,
that an immediate traffic with these Indians might prove highly
advantageous to the nation; for it is well known that Chili, at its
first discovery by the Spaniards, abounded in vast quantities of
gold, much beyond what it has ever produced since it came into their
possession. Hence it has been generally believed, that the richest
mines are carefully concealed by the Indians, as well knowing that
their discovery would excite in the Spaniards a greater thirst for
conquest and tyranny, and would render their own independence more
precarious. But, in regard to their commerce with the English, could
that be established, these reasons would no longer influence them;
since it would be in our power to supply them with arms and ammunition
of all kinds, together with many other conveniences, which their
intercourse with the Spaniards has taught them to relish. They would
then, in all probability, open their mines, and gladly embrace a
traffic of such mutual advantage to both nations: For their gold,
instead of proving an incitement to enslave them, would then procure
them weapons with which to assert their liberty, to chastise their
tyranny, and to secure themselves for ever from falling under the
Spanish yoke; while, with our assistance, and under our protection,
they might become a considerable people, and might secure to us that
wealth, which was formerly most mischievously lavished by the house of
Austria, and lately by the house of Bourbon, in pursuit of universal
monarchy.
It is true, that Sir John Narborough did not succeed in opening this
commerce, which promised, in appearance, so many advantages to
the nation: But his disappointment was merely accidental; and his
transactions on that coast, besides the many advantages he furnished
to geography and navigation, are rather an encouragement for future
trials of this kind, than any objection against them. His principal
misfortune was in losing a small bark that accompanied him, and having
some of his people trepanned at Baldivia. It even appeared, by the
fears and precautions of the Spaniards, that they were fully convinced
of the practicability of the scheme he was sent to execute, and were
extremely alarmed with apprehensions for its consequences. It is
said that Charles II. was so far prepossessed with the belief of the
advantages that might redound to the public from this expedition, and
was so eager to be informed of the event, on receiving intelligence of
Sir John Narborough passing through the Downs on his return, that he
had not patience to wait till his arrival at court, but went himself
in his barge to meet him at Gravesend.
The two most famous charts hitherto published, [i.e. in 1745,] of
the southern parts of South America, are those of Dr Halley, in his
General Chart of the Magnetic Variation, and of Frezier, in his Voyage
to the South Seas. Besides these, there is a chart of the Straits of
Magellan and some parts of the adjacent coast, by Sir John Narborough,
which is doubtless infinitely more exact in that part than Frezier's,
and even in some parts superior to Halley's, particularly in regard to
the longitudes of different places in these straits. We were in some
measure capable of correcting, by our own observations, the coast from
Cape Blanco to Terra del Fuego, and thence to the Straits of Le
Maire, as we ranged along that coast, generally in sight of land. The
position of the land to the northward of the Straits of Magellan, on
the western side of Patagonia, is doubtless laid down very imperfectly
in our charts; and yet I believe it to be much nearer the truth than
any hitherto published; as it was drawn from the information of some
of the crew of the Wager, which was shipwrecked on that coast; and
as it pretty nearly agrees with what I have seen in some Spanish
manuscripts. The channel, called Whale Sound, dividing Terra del
Fuego, towards the western extremity of the Straits of Magellan, was
represented by Frezier; but Sir Francis Drake, who first discovered
Cape Horn, and the south-west parts of Terra del Fuego, observed that
the whole coast was indented by a great number of inlets, all of which
he conceived to communicate with the Straits of Magellan: And I do
not doubt, when this country shall be thoroughly examined, that this
conjecture will be verified, and that Terra del Fuego will be found to
consist of several islands.
I must not omit warning all future navigators against relying on the
longitude of the Straits of Le Maire, or of any part of that coast,
as laid down by Frezier; the whole being from eight to ten degrees
too far to the eastward, if any faith can be given to the concurrent
evidences of a great number of journals, verified, in some
particulars, by astronomical observations. For instance, Sir John
Narborough places Cape Virgin Mary in long. 65° 42' W. from the
Lizard, or about 71° 20' from London. The ships of our squadron,
taking their departure from St Catharines, where the longitude was
rectified by an observation of an eclipse of the moon, found Cape
Virgin Mary to be from 70° 15' to 72° 30' W. from London, according to
their different reckonings; and, as there were no circumstances in
our run that could Tender it considerably erroneous, it cannot be
estimated in less than 71° W. from London;[4] whereas Frezier makes
it only 66° W. from Paris, which is little more than 63° from London.
Again, our squadron found the difference of longitude between Cape
Virgin Mary and the Straits of Le Maire to be not more than 2° 30',
while Frezier makes the difference nearly 4°,[5] by which he enlarged
the coast, from the Straits of Magellan to the Straits of Le Maire, to
near double its real extent.[6]
[Footnote 4: Only 67° 40' W. from Greenwich.--E.]
[Footnote 5: The Straits of Le Maire are in long. 65° 30' W. so that
the difference is 2° 10'.]
[Footnote 6: Some farther critical observations on the geographical
positions, as laid down by Frezier, Sir John Narborough, and Dr
Halley, are here omitted, as tending to no use or information; these
things having been since ascertained with much more accuracy.--E.]