So much for A Company. C Company, in the_The tank in action

started with seven tanks, of which one was hit and set on fire. “The

others, having seen the infantry consolidated on the final objective

across the Cambrai-Esnes road, were returning to the rallying-point

when the German counter-attack began. On the extreme left, L 54, a

female tank commanded by 2nd Lieut. T. B. Walters, encountered the

enemy’s tanks which already had been engaged with A Company’s section.

Lieut. Walters at once attacked two female tanks, fired several

thousand rounds at them, silenced their guns, and drove them off the

field. One was subsequently knocked out by shell-fire. While this

brisk little battle was in progress, a couple of male tanks, L 45 (2nd

Lieut. Clark) and L 49 (2nd Lieut. Sherratt), had the good fortune

to meet, near a sunken road east of Seranvillers, two hostile female

tanks firing on our infantry, who had been driven back from the second

objective. The 6-pounders made short work of this pair, hitting them

repeatedly and setting them on fire. As the survivors of their crews

scrambled out, the Lewis guns were turned on them....”

These hostile tanks formed the backbone of the counter-attack, being

very badly supported by their infantry. Nevertheless, only the presence

of our own machines averted a serious local disaster, for the men

of the 63rd Division had broken completely and were running back,

until the tank battle gave them time to rally; while the Germans had

reoccupied the high ground beyond Niergnies, and were pushing on into

that village. After the repulse of their tanks they were easily driven

off. A Company, owing to the natural misunderstanding when the German

machines appeared out of the smoke, lost three tanks out of four; but

after the action, General Blacklock, commanding the 63rd Division,

expressed to all ranks his appreciation of their services, which had

saved his infantry heavy losses. The intense gratitude of the infantry

themselves (for what, but for the smoke, would have been a simple

business, as we had several more male tanks than the Germans) was an

earnest of the severe fright they had suffered, and should have brought

home to their superiors in a trenchant fashion the moral value of the

weapon which they were so fortunate as to have almost exclusively at

their disposal. A few hundred German tanks, instead of a dozen or so,

would have made our progress, even at this late hour, a much slower

and more difficult matter. So far as the Tank Corps was concerned, the

only lesson to be drawn from the encounter at Niergnies was one already

learnt at Villers-Bretonneux--namely, the advisability, in view of

further similar meetings, of fitting every tank with a 6-pounder gun.

It was as a result of these two actions that a number of Mark V. and V.

Star females were converted into composite or “hermaphrodite” machines,

with a 6-pounder sponson on one side. The occasion for which they were

designed, however, did not recur. Although the Germans used one or two

tanks in subsequent counter-attacks, our machines did not meet them

again.

III.

On October 10th, when the Canadian line was several miles beyond

Cambrai, the 7th Battalion sent a composite detachment of four fighting

tanks and a wireless machine, which I accompanied, to Escadœuvres,

a suburb of the town to the north-east, on the road to Iwuy. This

involved crossing the Canal de L’Escaut and two parallel streams by a

series of narrow bridges (two of them temporary structures) between

Morenchies and Ramillies. Escadœuvres was a working-class suburb, and

its small houses, many of which were shattered, were littered with the

poor belongings of its inhabitants, who had not been evacuated many

days. The Germans, before they left, had flung everything about in a

final hunt for loot, or in sheer destructiveness, and, thorough to the

last in small details, had put a bullet through every mirror, clock,

and piano which was not already broken. The tanks were here for two

days and nights, the officers occupying a tiny house of one room and

a cellar which had been used by the German _Ortskommandant_. As the

enemy was still holding on to the Douai front, the 1st Army now had a

left flank twelve or fifteen miles long, extending from Thun-Levêque

on the canal to somewhere near Etaing, at a right angle to the rest

of the line; and in Escadœuvres we were shelled persistently by a

high-velocity gun which fired from a point well behind us across the

Sensée. This was an annoyance, but a greater tragedy to me was the

loss of my valise, which was cut off from the back of the Major’s car

as he was bringing it at night through the packed traffic in Cambrai.

My servant had of course filled it with things I did not want at

Escadœuvres and could not replace--old cherished garments and other

oddments such as one feels a positive affection for.

The detachment was withdrawn from Escadœuvres on the 12th, as the

country in front, seamed with small rivers, was unsuitable for serious

tank operations, and a few days later the battalion was placed in

G.H.Q. Reserve and concentrated at Fontaine-Notre-Dame. This was

preparatory to a return, when railway exigencies permitted, to the

Bermicourt area, for a complete refit with Mark V.’s. Another party of

officers and men had left to stiffen the new battalions in England,

and I was expecting to follow in a few days. On 16th October, however,

I learnt that I had been posted as Battalion Reconnaissance Officer

to the 12th Battalion. The next day I said good-bye to the 7th, with

which I had worked and fought for two years, and joined my new unit at

Cattenières, south of the Cambrai-Le Cateau road.

On this front the enemy had fallen back everywhere to the Selle river.

Douai at last had been abandoned, and the 5th Army was approaching

Lille. We had now entered a new type of country, which to those

accustomed to four years of fighting backwards and forwards over the

devastated area seemed almost unnatural. During one’s visits to England

on leave, the first sight from the train of the Kentish orchards and

hop-fields always left a strange illusion, as of something lacking,

which was caused in fact by the absence of shell-holes; and the

country beyond Cambrai affected one at first in a similar manner.

It was so unlike war as we had known it. Every inch of the land was

under cultivation. Immense fields of cabbage and beet, unbroken by any

hedgerows, rolled onward for miles; the villages and farms were of

great size and often untouched, and, with the little towns, such as

Caudry, Le Cateau, and Solesmes, completed a picture that proclaimed in

every article a previous state of comfort and prosperity. Before the

war this region must have been one of the most flourishing in France.

And, except that for the moment it was deserted, it was flourishing

still. The Germans had seen to that, and had taken the profits. It was

indeed a novelty to enter house after house where roofs, windows, and

furniture remained untouched, and where, only a day or two before,

civilians had been living. A little later, and we had moved forward

again to places where half-starved women, dressed tidily in black, who

had lived without meat for upwards of four years and without hope for

almost as long, still cowered in cellars while the fighting passed by

overhead, and who, when they were rescued and moved out of the gas and

shelling to safer quarters, could yet find time (as I saw myself) to

lay flowers on those of our dead that were lying in their streets. This

was in St Python, a little suburb of Solesmes; and Solesmes itself, by

way of contrast, provided a stupefying sidelight upon the minds of the

most extraordinary people that ever inhabited this earth, for it was

gay with new tricolour flags, manufactured, imported, and sold to the

inhabitants by the Germans themselves in readiness for their defeat....

In many respects these last weeks were the most interesting of all,

but I will not attempt to describe them here. There is a limit to the

irrelevant matter permissible in any book, and I have more than a

suspicion that I have exceeded it already. So far as tank operations

are concerned, there is very little more to be said. When I joined the

12th Battalion at Cattenières, it was still working with three corps

of the 3rd Army, its companies being at Avesnes-les-Aubert, Quiévy,

and Viesly, all to the north of the Le Cateau road; and preparations

were in hand for the forcing of the Selle river on 20th October. By

this time the battalion, in spite of a reinforcement of 4 old Mark

IV.’s from Erin, had only 12 tanks fit for action; and as 78 officers

and men had just left for England, it was no less short of personnel,

particularly of experienced drivers. As it happened, there was little

chance of tanks being used in this region. A succession of rivers,

running northward into the Scheldt--the Selle, the Harpies, the St

Georges, the Ecaillon, and the Rhonelle--lay parallel to our front, and

(except the St Georges, a mere brook) could only be crossed by tanks

when the engineers had built bridges to replace those which the enemy

was certain to destroy. Farther up these streams, where the 11th and

other tank battalions were co-operating with the right of the 3rd Army

and the whole of the 4th, they ceased to be insuperable obstacles; and

on 17th October, tanks of the 4th Brigade crossed the Selle with the

help of cribs. In the big attack of the 20th, four machines of the

11th Battalion got over near Neuvilly by means of an ingenious bridge

made of sleepers, which was sunk in the river by the engineers the

night before. Being under water, this bridge was not discovered by the

Germans during the day, although the Selle approximated to No Man’s

Land. But for our part, being faced by these various waterways where

they were broader and deeper, we had a cheerless prospect of endless

trekking with very little probability of arriving anywhere in time for

action. Only once, in fact, were our tanks engaged. The attack on the

20th was entirely successful, except at Beaurain, a small village on

very high ground a couple of miles due east of Solesmes, where the

Germans continued to hold out for two days after the rest of their

line had been forced back to the Harpies. Our tanks having been got

across the Selle at St Python and Briastre, B Company was detailed to

assist the 5th Division in the capture of Beaurain on the 23rd. Owing

to accidents, only two tanks were available, and neither of these was

mechanically fit. One had a cracked sleeve, and could only travel at

low speed. The little action which ensued possesses one or two points

of interest.

From the Selle Valley at Briastre the ground rose steeply in a series

of ridges, each slightly higher than the last, to Beaurain, which

was on the summit. Our outpost line was just east of the farm and

road-junction at Marou, 2000 yards in front of the village. Between the

two places was a spur of ground called the Grand Champ Ridge, where the

Germans had a great number of machine-guns in pits. The two tanks were

to clear this ridge, which was the enemy’s main line of resistance,

and then proceed to mop up in Beaurain if required. They reached the

valley in front of Marou at 10 P.M. on the 22nd, zero being at 3.20

in the morning. At 1 o’clock the enemy put down a heavy barrage along

our front line, and the assaulting infantry suffered several hundred

casualties and were thrown into great confusion. Expecting an attack,

they sent up S.O.S. signals, while the tanks prepared for action.

Nothing came of this bombardment, however, and it died down after half

an hour to the normal intermittent shelling; but the infantry was so

shaken that only the presence of the tanks induced them to go forward

at zero. The Germans fought with desperate courage on the Grand Champ

Ridge, where the machine-gunners fired until they were run over, and

where the engine of L 13 (the tank with the cracked sleeve) stopped and

could not be restarted for forty-five minutes. Our infantry being some

way behind, the enemy swarmed round the tank, one officer bringing a

machine-gun into the road within a few yards of it. The other tank,

L 23, was having an equally hard task on the ridge, finding it very

difficult in the mist and twilight to locate the hostile machine-guns;

and the two were fighting alone for a quarter of an hour before the

infantry at length came up, having collected on the way some fifty

prisoners who had surrendered to the tanks. The latter had broken the

back of the enemy’s resistance on the ridge, and the advance now went

forward rapidly. Beaurain was cleared with little trouble, neither of

the tanks being required, which was just as well, as one was broken

down and the second pulling very badly. The officer and one man in L

23 were wounded, and the crew of L 13 was badly gassed, so that the

company commander, walking forward from the rallying-point to meet the

machines, found it crawling homeward out of control, the tank commander

and driver being unconscious. Considering that both tanks went into

action labouring under mechanical defects, their performance would

have been highly creditable in any circumstances; and it fell out that

in addition they alone carried the operation through, as the infantry

concerned fully recognised. The latter, disorganised and badly shaken

by the barrage which caught them before zero, and by a second which

fell among them in the first minutes of the advance, would have made

no progress against the nests of machine-guns on the Grand Champ Ridge

if the tanks had not been there to take the lead and draw the enemy’s

attention to themselves.

B Company was now left without any tanks fit to move. A Company, with

four machines, was at Haussy, on the Selle north of Solesmes, and

remained there. C Company alone, with three tanks, continued for two

or three days to follow the Guards Division in its advance. It had

been pointed out that the decrepit condition of these tanks, added to

the series of obstructions formed by the rivers, made their chances

of affording practical help very remote; but the Guards insisted on

their following up as far as possible, on account of the great moral

effect the mere knowledge of their presence had on the men! On the

24th, therefore, C Company had reached Capelle, at the junction of

the Ecaillon and St Georges, our line being then within a mile of Le

Quesnoy. On the following day orders came through from Tank Corps

Headquarters for the withdrawal of the battalion. All companies, having

patched up their machines, began the long trek back to the entraining

railhead at Marcoing on the Canal de L’Escaut, a tedious process, as

some of the tanks had to be towed most of the way. On 1st November I

went on ahead to take over our winter quarters, a hutted camp in the

devastated area at Ecurie, near Arras. Here we remained for six months,

in extreme discomfort; and then, made up to strength from disbanded

units of the corps, and provided with 24 Mark V.’s, entrained for

Cologne.

The last tank battles of the war were fought on the 4th, 5th, 6th, and

7th November, just before the Armistice, around the Forest of Mormal.

An idea of the lamentable state to which the corps was reduced will be

gathered from the number of tanks and units employed on the first day.

The 6th, 9th, 10th, and 14th Battalions were engaged. At full strength

they would have mustered between them 168 tanks, they could now raise

only 37. An interesting feature of the day’s fighting was that three

supply-tanks, armed with one Hotchkiss gun apiece and carrying bridging

material for the 25th Division, came into action near Landrecies. Our

infantry was held up on the west bank of the Sambre Canal, and the

officer in charge of the supply-tenders decided to see what he could

do to help them. One tank was knocked out. The other two, followed by

the infantry as if they had been fighting tanks, forced the German

machine-gunners to surrender. During the next day eight Whippets of the

6th Battalion helped the 3rd Guards Brigade in the difficult enclosed

country north of the Forest; and with two further actions on the

Maroilles-Avesnes road, the Tank Corps’ active share in the war came to

an end.

“Ninety-six days of almost continuous battle had now taken place

since the great tank attack at Amiens was launched by the 4th Army on

the 8th August, since when many officers and men of the Tank Corps

had been in action as many as 15 and 16 times. During this period

no less than 1993 tanks and tank armoured-cars had been engaged on

39 days in all, 887 machines had been handed over to salvage, 313

of these being sent to the Central Workshops, and 204 having been

repaired and reissued to battalions. Of the above 887 tanks, only 15

had been struck off the strength as unsalvable. Casualties against

establishment had been heavy, 598 officers and 2826 other ranks being

counted amongst killed, wounded, missing, and prisoners; but when

it is considered that the total strength of the Tank Corps on the

7th August (9500 of all ranks in France) was considerably under that

of an infantry division, and that in the old days of the artillery

battles, such as the first battle of the Somme, an infantry division

frequently sustained 4000 casualties in twelve hours’ fighting, the

tank casualties were extraordinarily light. From this we may deduce

our final and outstanding lesson from all these battles--namely, that

iron mechanically moved is an economiser of blood, that the tank is an

economiser of life....”[46]

[Illustration: Captured English Tanks being used during the Revolution

in Berlin.]

[Illustration: Mark V. Tanks of the 12th Battalion at Cologne.]

IV.

In the first days of November, when the Tank Corps was endeavouring to

withdraw all its crippled battalions for a reorganisation and refit,

pressure was put upon it to maintain some units in the field. The Army,

in fact, discovered that it could not go on without tanks, in spite of

the demoralisation which plainly was spreading among the enemy. The

cavalry, provided at last with all the conditions most favourable to

their use, were as helpless as ever, and the infantry still needed

the moral support which the presence of tanks afforded, even if the

latter were hardly ever used. It was decided, therefore, that each tank

brigade should send forward one composite battalion. Orders to this

effect had just reached us at Ecurie (the whole of the 1st Brigade

being now concentrated in this area), when the Armistice was signed.

For some time after 11th November, however, the Tank Corps, in common

with every other branch of the service, was still busy preparing

for further eventualities. The composite battalions were no longer

immediately required, and only the armoured-cars went forward into

Germany; but at Bermicourt and Erin there was no relaxation of effort

until the occupation of the Rhine bridge-heads, and the enemy’s

surrender of his fleet and artillery rendered any serious resumption

of hostilities impossible. At the same time, the criminal outcry for

instant demobilisation which disgraced still further (if that was

possible) our unscrupulous press, hit the corps in France especially

hard. No sooner had the battalions been brought again to something

like full strength by drafts of conscripted miners, strikers, and

professional footballers, who might in time have been knocked into

shape, than all these arrivals, who had been only a few months in

the Army, were released again--a business which caused very natural

discontent among the original rank and file who had done all the

fighting and who were still retained.

In the meantime, during the last month of the war, further developments

in the composition of the corps had been authorised and carried

into effect. The 6th Tank Brigade was formed in October, consisting

nominally of the 16th, 18th, and 301st (American) Battalions. The

18th Battalion had just come out from England. This brigade was

never in action as a whole. There were now forming at Bovington the

19th, 20th, 21st, 22nd, 23rd, 24th, and 25th Battalions, but none of

these would be available before the early spring of 1919. By that

date, however, eight tank brigades, with a total strength (if up to

establishment) of upwards of 15,000 officers and men and 1000 tanks,

should be ready for immediate action. At least two new types of tank,

known as the Medium C and Mark IX., were under construction; but the

former was not very satisfactory, although fast, and the latter was

an infantry-carrying machine; and most of the battalions would be

armed with the Mark V. or an improved Whippet. It was hoped, however,

provided personnel was available and labour conditions satisfactory,

to so expand the battalions as to put a great many more than 1000

machines into the field at once. The dream of the Tank Corps, and

one which probably would have materialised if the war had continued,

was a vast smashing attack by 4000 or 5000 tanks. With this prospect

in view, the organisation of the corps, which threatened to become

unwieldy, was also to be expanded, and two days before the Armistice

three new formations came into existence, the 1st, 2nd, and 3rd Groups,

each consisting of two brigades under a Major-General. Whether this

multiplication of large staffs was the best solution of the problem

is a matter of opinion. It smacks rather too much of the usual Army

method of making any excuse serve for inventing new sinecures, and

there was no ambiguity about the manner in which it was rushed through

just before the Armistice, so that every staff officer in the Tank

Corps got a step in rank (and sometimes two) while yet these pleasant

fruits of office were going begging. Bermicourt now began to look like

a poppy-field for red hats. At the same time, a more indefensible

scheme of centralisation was applied to the technical side, by the

formation of what were called Group Inspectorates. This high-sounding

title merely concealed the fact that battalions were deprived of

their engineer staffs, which were lumped together in itinerant and

irresponsible posses, whose business was to supervise all mechanical

work in the field. In other words, a fresh set of semi-independent

staffs was created.

In the matter of the groups, it is possible of course that it was

not intended to increase the number of brigades, but merely to add

battalions to them. I have no information about this, but it does not

appear very probable. In any case, as the tank fighting unit is still

the company, tank battalions being the administrative equivalents

of infantry brigades, it would seem that the object aimed at would

have been better attained by increasing the strength of battalions

and abolishing altogether the intermediate tank brigades. The French

system of forming their tank units into regiments of three battalions,

on the Continental infantry basis, is yet more practical. All these

plans may appear to be but variations of the same theory; but in fact

there is a great gulf fixed between the regimental outlook and that of

a higher formation, and one of the curses of the British Army is the

way in which staffs tend to spring up like mushrooms on the slightest

provocation.

This discussion, however, is now become academic. Groups and brigades

alike have vanished for the present into the limbo of lost hopes,

and what is left of the Tank Corps hangs in a state of suspended

animation, conscious of a great past and a very uncertain future. After

innumerable tentative schemes for a post-bellum establishment as part

of the regular Army, the corps was fixed definitely a few months ago

at one brigade of five regular battalions. General Elles remained as

Brigadier, and five lieutenant-colonels were selected by seniority from

the original group and brigade commanders. Although five battalions was

an inadequate force, it appeared as if the war had taught us something,

if not overmuch. Remembering what had happened during hostilities,

one really had expected to find officers from the Camel Corps or the

Life Guards appointed to command tank units in a peace establishment.

But when it came to the junior commissioned ranks, the old Adam

reappeared with a vengeance. A large number of subalterns temporarily

commissioned into the old Tank Corps wished to stay on in the new

one, as professional soldiers; and as many of them had one or two

years’ experience of tank warfare, the retention of the most suitable

would seem to be, to a reasonable being, a matter of course, setting

aside all arguments of decency or propriety. But this would have been

carrying common-sense too far. The War Office, as usual, had a trump

up its sleeve. It had granted regular commissions in the infantry and

other arms (but never in the Tank Corps itself) on such a prodigal

scale during the war that the reduction of the Army left something

like 7000 of these officers surplus to establishment. Billets must be

found for them, and it occurred to some one that the new Tank Corps

would accommodate several hundred. The old tank officers, therefore,

having at first been encouraged to apply for regular commissions, were

now told that they were not wanted. Sandhurst and the surplus must be

considered before suitability.

This was the state of affairs at the end of 1919. What has happened

since, or what the end of it will be, I do not know at the time of

writing. There was a rumour, just when I was leaving the Army, that

everything was to be changed once more, that all tank battalions were

to be abolished, and that only a small training and experimental depot

was to be maintained at Bovington or Wareham. Every infantry officer,

on the other hand, was to pass through a tank course ...! Whatever

the basis of truth in this circumstantial report (and it has received

confirmation in recent newspaper paragraphs), so pernicious a scheme

is beyond comment. In the meantime, the new regular brigade has come

into being, and so far continues to exist; and since the authorities

have discovered the value of tanks during industrial disturbances and

in Ireland, they may harden their hearts against the Treasury, and the

Tank Corps may tide over this bad hour with the help of Trade Unions

and Sinn Fein! It will be the first time that either institution has

served a useful purpose.

In the long-run, of course, we shall have to equip ourselves with a

large Tank Corps again. Everything depends upon whether we do so before

the next war or in the middle of it. Other nations will have tanks, and

in large numbers. The French are providing for a corps of 30,000 men,

and the Americans (who designed a tank of their own during the war)

have also, I believe, taken up the question in earnest. Just as the

origins of modern warfare at sea, and of all the scientific methods by

which it is carried on, are to be found in the _Gloire_ and the little

_Monitor_ of the early ’sixties, so it is no less certain that future

warfare on land will be dominated by the successors of the Mark I. tank

which struggled through the mud of the Somme battlefields. For once

this country has taken the lead in military invention; and it has now

at its disposal a preponderant body of experience in this new method.

It remains to be seen whether the advantage will be maintained, or

whether it will be lost by the diversion to political schemes of even

the comparatively small annual outlay of money which is essential for

adequate experiment.[47]

What form tank development will take is a subject beyond the scope of

this book, and one on which I am not competent to speak. We are still

on the threshold of the new enterprise, and there seem to be no limits

at present to what may be achieved. We have already a tank which will

float, and speeds of twenty and twenty-five miles an hour have been

attained long ago with experimental machines. Colonel Fuller, who was

G.S.O. 1 Tank Corps in France, points out in his new book[48] that, in

future wars, land will become “a solid sea, as easily traversable in

all directions as ice is by a skater; the battles in these wars will

therefore more and more approximate to naval actions.” And he goes on

to remark that “from the present-day tank to one which can plunge in

the Channel at Calais at four in the morning, land at Dover at six

o’clock, and be outside Buckingham Palace for an early lunch, will not

probably require as many as the fifty-two years which have separated

the _Merrimac_ from the _Tiger_ or the _Queen Elizabeth_.”

When one has written a book of this kind, frankly partisan in

character, it is peculiarly gratifying to find one’s arguments

supported to the letter by independent testimony from another and far

more authoritative quarter. I have kept this evidence to the last, in

the manner (I believe) of the practised advocate; but, to be honest,

the arrangement is due more to luck than judgment. It was only when

this book was almost finished that I read General Sir Frederick

Maurice’s short volume called ‘The Last Four Months: the End of the

War in the West.’ It is so complete a confirmation of the case I have

attempted to put forward that I cannot make a better end than by

quoting some of its conclusions.

General Maurice, after discussing the various tactical expedients

adopted by either side in their offensives, and the ultimate failure

of all these methods to achieve the desired “break-through,” describes

briefly the invention and early employment of tanks and the opinion

held of them by the enemy. “It does not appear,” he says, “that

Ludendorff was particularly impressed with the value of tanks before

the events of 1918 taught him wisdom in this respect.” We then come

to a consideration of the means the Allies had at their disposal for

their counter-offensive in the summer of that year. Speaking of Sir

Douglas Haig’s plans and resources, General Maurice points out that

“in particular the great improvements which had been made in the tanks

since their first appearance in battle and the quantities of them

available, gave him just the means he needed for carrying through

his scheme. Cambrai had proved that tanks could replace the long

bombardment and obviate all the slow preparation which it involved.”

The action at Hamel is then described: “With this fortunate experiment

faith in the tanks spread. The commanders already believed in them, and

now that belief in their power to ‘make good’ spread to the ranks.”

(Some of the commanders, it must be added, dissembled their belief very

successfully until after Hamel!) General Maurice continues: “Tanks made

surprise, that greatest weapon of generalship, much easier than it had

been: they saved life and economised troops, and, therefore, that quick

succession of punches for which Foch was seeking his opportunity became

possible. The artist had his materials to hand. Honour to him that he

knew how to use them.”

Of the great tank attack on 8th August, we read that “the tanks did

invaluable service in cutting the German telegraph and telephone

communications.... The work begun at Hamel was completed, and the moral

ascendancy established by tanks, artillery, and infantry, working in

combination, affected both private and General in the German Army.”

Later in the book General Maurice sums up the influences which

together broke down the German _moral_, and again he insists upon the

predominant part played by the tanks.

“The tanks had proved their efficacy in the preparations for

Armageddon, now they were to take their part in the culmination toward

which Foch had been working, and few things helped us more in the

decisive struggle than the moral ascendancy which the success of

the tanks in the preliminary battles had given us over the Germans.

Captured German orders and other documents bear testimony to the dread

with which the enemy regarded tanks at this time....” Here follows an

extract from one such order, already quoted in an earlier chapter of

this book. General Maurice continues: “This is the type of order which

is the refuge of authority when caught napping. The German leaders

had delayed too long to study the possibilities of tanks and the most

effective means of meeting them. The ‘counter-measures’ presented in

this order might have availed against tanks alone. They were useless

against tanks, artillery, and infantry working in combination. They

were, in fact, worse than useless, they were harmful, for they served

to demonstrate to the German soldier, who was already in mortal fear of

tanks and prepared to make their appearance an excuse for surrender,

that his chiefs were as frightened of them as he was, and that they had

no effective reply ready.”

And finally, the author makes this definite assertion: “It is certain

that neither Foch’s skilful preparation for the great battle, nor the

valour of the infantry, would have brought us victory if we had had

to rely upon bombardment alone in order to batter down the German

defences.”

These extracts read like a literal, if more sober, repetition of

the theses at which I have been hammering, in and out of season,

throughout this history; and they are uttered with an authority

to which I have no pretence. It would have been difficult to find

confirmatory evidence more apt and decisive than chance threw in my

way, a fortnight before these lines were written, when I picked up

General Maurice’s little volume. I would commend it to Sir Arthur

Conan Doyle, among other people. The tank, in one sense, needs no

advertisement now, any more than the first successful steam-engine

or aeroplane needed one: ever since Cambrai, at the latest, all who

had adequate acquaintance with the facts realised that it had come,

not only to stay, but to predominate. It is one thing, however, to

be convinced, and quite another to admit it, even to oneself. In a

professional army, which (like any other close corporation) is a body

made up of cliques, conservatism, and personal jealousy, held together

by interest, no gratitude is felt for innovations once the immediate

occasion for their usefulness is past. General officers who called for

tanks at all hours in the field, because they could not rely upon their

infantry going forward unless tanks were there to lead them, lost all

interest in these auxiliaries the moment the Armistice was signed.

And further, recognition which cannot be denied to some instrument is

often withheld from the hand which directs it. It is for these reasons

that unbiassed acknowledgment of the services rendered by the Tank

Corps is peculiarly valuable at this time. People talk about tanks,

and read more or less worthless books in which these machines figure

occasionally as comic and semi-animate monsters moving capriciously

here and there without method or principle; but while it is dimly

recognised that they influenced powerfully the course of the war, it is

hardly suspected that they are governed, like any other military arm,

by tactical considerations, that they are not irresponsible units but

parts of an organised whole, and that every action they have fought

has been planned as carefully as any infantry assault or artillery

barrage. Still less attention is paid to the men who fought in them,

and whose skill and gallantry, displayed often amid circumstances of

horror peculiar even in this conflict, forged in three years, from

insignificant and disheartening beginnings, so vast and efficient a

weapon as the Tank Corps eventually became. It is these aspects of the

case, among others, that I have tried especially to set out in this

book.

FOOTNOTES:

[1] The first reply to this memorandum from the Engineer-in-Chief was

characteristic. After a few preliminary objections, General Fowke

concluded as follows: “I therefore think that before considering this

proposal we should descend from the realms of imagination to solid

facts.”

[2] ‘The Tank Corps.’ C. A. Williams-Ellis.

[3] Although the Navy has specialised in the science of mechanical

warfare, and although the very idea of the “landship” involves the

application on land of some of the principles of war at sea, the Army,

as soon as it assumed control of the tanks, refused to profit by the

expert knowledge at its disposal. Had it been possible, no doubt every

trace of the tanks’ original parentage would have been sedulously

erased. As it was, the sponson and the 6-pounder gun, for which no

feasible military equivalents could be proposed, necessarily were

retained; but on such technical questions as ventilation, the use of

telegraphs, and the various mechanical contrivances in respect of which

the tank, in its small way, resembles the engine-room of a ship, all

the suggestions put forward by experienced nautical engineers were

contemptuously rejected.

[4] Steel plates, with pinhole perforations, replaced the prisms in the

Mark IV.

[5] For protection against these splinters, and against the “splash”

from ordinary bullets hitting crevices round the gun shields, crews

were provided with small vizors of steel and chain mail.

[6] The tactical recommendations set out in this document were

disregarded completely by the general staff until the compulsion

of events enforced their adoption. Colonel Swinton insisted on the

necessity of tanks leading the attack in masses, and pointed out

that, to ensure the rapid exploitation of any opening they should

make, a very large force of infantry must be launched at once behind

them. “Not only,” he says, “does it seem that the tanks will confer

the power to force successive complete and unbattered defence lines,

but, as has been explained, the more speedy and uninterrupted their

advance, the greater the chance of their surviving sufficiently long

to do this. _It is possible, therefore, that an effort to break right

through the enemy’s defensive zone in one day may now be contemplated

as a feasible proposition._” Cambrai, notwithstanding the half-hearted

support afforded, proved absolutely the justice of these contentions;

and in 1918 they were accepted as a matter of course--without, however,

any acknowledgment of their origin. Colonel Swinton also pointed

out that field artillery was the tank’s chief danger, and one which

could be countered only by the help of other arms. Numerous minor

recommendations, such as the use of case-shot, smoke, and wireless, the

necessity of intelligent co-operation by infantry and artillery, and

questions of administration, supply, and transport in the field, were

either turned down at once by the general staff or were disregarded;

yet every one of them subsequently had to be adopted.

[7] Now, I believe, Sir Philip Gibbs and Sir Beach Thomas.

[8] The spirit of prophecy must have inspired this remark, as it was

written some months before the creation of Air Marshals and other

heavenly bodies.

[9] ‘A Company of Tanks,’ by Major W. H. L. Watson, D.C.M., chapter

iv., ‘Blackwood’s Magazine’ for June 1919.

[10] ‘A Company of Tanks,’ by Major Watson.

[11] This was written in the spring of 1919, when the bones of horses

and a great accumulation of rotting cavalry equipment still lay thick

in front of Monchy.

[12] Orange Hill, strictly speaking, is only a spur of the height on

which Monchy stands, and is separated from the latter by a slight

depression.

[13] The cavalry also ran into the hostile barrage which fell on our

front line as soon as the tanks advanced.

[14] The idea of employing tanks in Egypt and Syria originated with

Colonel Swinton, who proposed that they should be used in the advance

on El Arish, early in the campaign. The authorities laughed at the idea

of tanks operating over sand; and it was only after the fall of El

Arish that the suggestion was grudgingly adopted. In this connection

I would like to point out that in the “Report on the Advance of the

Egyptian Expeditionary Force,” an official publication edited by

Lieut.-Colonel Pirie Gordon, which professes to give the name and

details of every unit connected, however remotely, with the Third

Battle of Gaza, and which actually includes in the list A.S.C. depots

at Alexandria, the Tank Department is not so much as mentioned!

[15] Report on Tank Operations in Egypt and Palestine, &c.

[16] Apologies perhaps are due for the continual use of this book

(‘Nelson’s History of the War’) as a stalking-horse; but in spite of

the difficulties attending its production, and its claim to be no more

than a popular history, Colonel Buchan had exceptional opportunities of

gaining information, and the work is in fact the only full and reliable

account of the war as yet in print.

[17] ‘The Tank Corps.’ C. A. Williams-Ellis.

[18] See William III. and Bishop Walker at the Boyne.

[19] ‘The Tank Corps’ (Williams-Ellis), from which the whole incident

is paraphrased.

[20] M’Elroy, of 19 Company, won the D.S.O. at Havrincourt in

remarkable circumstances. The leading tanks and infantry had passed

through the village, which was believed to be cleared of the enemy.

M’Elroy’s machine, following behind, caught fire just as about 100

Germans appeared round it from various hiding-places. Two of the crew,

jumping out of one door to escape the flames, were killed instantly.

The remainder, except the tank commander, scrambled out of the other

door into a shell-hole. The Germans bombed them and killed one man,

and then came and looked down into the shell-hole, where the survivors

pretended also to be dead. M’Elroy, in the meantime, had remained in

the tank and extinguished the fire. He then drove off the Germans with

machine-gun fire and kept them at bay for nearly an hour until some

infantry arrived. All this time other tank crews, a few hundred yards

away, were walking about outside their machines, unconscious of the

little battle going on behind them.

[21] ‘Weekly Tank Notes.’

[22] ‘Tank Corps Intelligence Summary.’

[23] ‘Tank Corps Intelligence Summary.’

[24] Ibid.

[25] ‘Intelligence Summary.’

[26] Ibid.

[27] Also quoted by General Maurice, ‘The Last Four Months.’

[28] ‘The Tank Corps’ (Williams-Ellis).

[29] ‘Weekly Tank Notes.’

[30] The Whippet was nearly as long as the heavy tank. The engine was

in front, under an armoured bonnet. A small cab perched in rear held

three men and two Hotchkiss machine-guns. The speed of the Whippet was

seven miles an hour.

[31] ‘Weekly Tank Notes.’

[32] Sir Douglas Haig’s Despatch.

[33] This action appears to be known officially by us as that of

Moreuil. That village, however, was not even one of the objectives.

[34] Sir D. Haig’s Despatch. For a trustworthy estimate of the value

of tanks in this and all subsequent attacks, and of their influence

upon the course of the war, see ‘The Last Four Months,’ by General Sir

Frederick Maurice, quoted in the last chapter of this book.

[35] Sir J. Monash, ‘The Australian Victories in 1918.’

[36] ‘Weekly Tank Notes.’

[37] Sir J. Monash, ‘The Australian Victories in 1918.’

[38] ‘Weekly Tank Notes.’

[39] This may have been the battery which a Whippet caught and

destroyed on the 23rd.

[40] ‘Weekly Tank Notes.’

[41] The Hindenburg Line, it may be noted, was a generic term used by

us to cover the whole series of defence systems called by the Germans

the Siegfried, Hunding, Wotan Lines, &c.

[42] It was found that, for several hundred yards between Mœuvres

and Inchy, the Germans had cut in the eastern bank a vertical wall

nine feet deep, evidently as an anti-tank obstacle. Tanks of the 15th

Battalion succeeded in climbing this.

[43] Trials at Erin and elsewhere had proved that a tank will support

another on its roof; but these experiments were made in conditions

differing greatly from those which obtain in action.

[44] ‘Weekly Tank Notes.’

[45] On the whole, however, the German retreat was conducted with great

skill to the very end. There was no general demoralisation, and one saw

very few prisoners except after set attacks on a large scale.

[46] ‘Weekly Tank Notes.’

[47] Since writing the above, a Memorandum has been issued (23rd

Feb. 1920) by the Secretary of State for War dealing with the Army

Estimates. It contains the following reference to the Tank Corps, which

shows that our worst apprehensions are confirmed: “It has been decided

that there will be no separate Tank Corps for the present, and that,

though non-commissioned officers and men will be posted permanently to

tank units as a nucleus, officers will be seconded instead of being

transferred to these units for stated periods. The main difficulty

which confronts reorganisation is the dearth of regular officers with

knowledge of tanks. To some extent this may be overcome by granting

regular commissions to temporary officers. Considerable progress has

been made with the design of tanks during 1919, a new machine having

been produced with a speed of over twenty miles an hour, and which has

mechanically a long life. In a trial run of 1000 miles practically no

wear has resulted. This type is being further developed. Two other

machines have been despatched to India for the purpose of experiment

under tropical conditions.”

[48] ‘Tanks in the Great War,’ Lieut.-Colonel J. F. C. Fuller. (Murray.)

INDEX.

A5, Turkish post at, 87.

Ablainzevelle, 372, 375, 376, 380-381.

Acheux, 39.

Achiet-le-Grand, 59, 343, 373, 375, 382-384, 429;

stockade at, 299.

Achiet-le-Petit, 374, 375, 382-383, 390, 391.

Adinfer Wood, 377.

Admiral’s Road, 110, 160.

Admiralty, experiments by, 12.

Agache river, 432, 434, 439.

Aire, 320.

Air Force, Royal, 120-124.

Albert, 258, 308.

Alberta, 132, 179.

Ali Muntar ridge, 73, 76, 78, 79, 82.

Allenby, General Sir E., 82.

Amiens, battle of. See Somme, 3rd battle of.

Anley, General G., 57.

Anthoine, General, 111.

Annequin, 334, 335.

Anneux, 270, 276, 277, 281, 449, 455.

Anti-tank machine-gun, 299-300.

Anti-tank measures, general, 289-300.

Anti-tank rifle, 297.

Approach-marches, difficulties of, 140-142, 199-203.

Armin, General von, 110.

“Armour, attack by,” 11, 16.

Armour-piercing bullets, 22.

Army, American, 428;

1st, 488.

Army, Belgian, 103, 488.

Army, British--

1st, 59, 309, 353, 356, 403, 416, 432, 459, 495.

2nd, 90, 103, 344, 356, 459.

3rd, 59, 251, 257, 265-268, 315, 342, 372-375, 387, 403, 414, 416,

432, 459, 491, 497.

4th, 31, 103, 352, 372, 387, 403, 432, 459, 488.

5th, 31, 59, 61-62, 103, 183-184, 341, 460, 495.

Army, French--

1st, 103, 351, 352.

3rd, 352, 366, 459.

4th, 488.

5th, 459, 488.

6th, 304.

10th, 459, 488.

Army, German--

2nd, 268, 293.

4th, 110.

6th, 319.

17th, 414.

18th, 293, 357.

Army Council, trials before, 14.

Arras, battle of, 58-69.

Aubvillers, 351.

Australian Corps, 61-64, 92, 349, 350, 352, 353, 356.

Avesnes-les-Aubert, 497.

Avesnes-les-Bapaume, 393, 401.

Ayette, 372.

Azincourt, 370.

Bacon, Admiral Sir R. H. S., 10, 12.

Baker-Carr, Colonel, 54, 59.

Bancourt, 405, 412.

Banteux, 264.

Bantigny, 466.

Bapaume, battle of, 373;

capture of, 403.

Barastre, 343.

Bauer, Colonel, 295.

Bazèque Wood, 371.

Beach Post, 86.

Beaucourt-en-Santerre, 363.

Beaucourt-sur-Ancre, 40-41, 375.

Beaumetz-les-Loges, 247-248.

Beaumont Hamel, 40-41.

Beauquesne, 47.

Beaurain, action at, 498-499.

Bécordel, 309.

Beersheba, 73, 82.

Behagnies, 390, 400, 429.

Bellevue, 195, 204.

Bellicourt tunnel, 459.

Below, General von, 414.

Bermicourt, 51, 89, 98.

Bertincourt, 258.

Béthune, 319, 322, 324, 330, 337.

Beugnâtre, 403, 405, 406.

Beugny, 342;

first attack on, 404-413;

second attack, 417, 420-421;

third attack, 421-425.

Biefvillers, 390, 392.

Bienvillers-au-Bois, 371, 372.

“Big Willie,” 13, 14.

Bihucourt, 389, 396, 429.

Bingham, Major the Hon. J. D. Y., 188.

Bisley, 24, 25.

Blangy-sur-Ternoise, 369.

Blécourt, 466.

Boche Castle, 115, 131, 159.

Boesinghe, 101, 118, 140.

Bois de Bouvigny, 312.

Bois de l’Abbé, 345.

Bois d’Olhain, 312.

Bois des Neufs, 270.

Bombardment, preliminary, effects of, 6, 16;

on the Somme, 33;

at Arras, 59;

at Ypres, 103, 132-133, 155, 159-160, 217-218.

Bombing, hostile, 120, 135-136, 457.

Bouchoir, 366.

Boundary Road, 160, 200.

Bourlon, 282, 438-439, 449, 452, 456, 457.

Bourlon Wood, 264, 276, 277, 282, 439, 449, 462.

Bouvigny-Boyeffles, 311.

Bovington, 50.

Bradley, Colonel, 24, 28.

Bray, 283, 343.

Briastre, 498.

Bridge Four, 114.

Brielen, 109, 117, 118.

Briqueterie, the, 32.

Broome, Major, 195, 308.

Brough, Colonel, 28.

Bruay coal-fields, defence of, 310.

Brutinel’s Brigade, 463, 474.

Buchan, Colonel J., 36, 58, 61, 64, 94, 360, 361, 417.

Bucquoy, 343, 347-348, 371, 372, 375, 383.

Buffs Road, 178, 200.

Bullecourt, 61-64, 69, 265, 278, 431, 454.

Bulkeley-Johnson, General, 65.

Bus-les-Artois, 342, 351.

Byng, General Sir J., 251, 265, 278.

Cachy, the Whippets at, 345-346.

Callwell, General, 250.

Cambrai, proposed attack on, 95-97;

first battle of, 249-284;

second battle, 432-491.

Cambrin, 334.

Canadian Corps, 60, 312-313, 352, 353, 356, 363, 403, 416, 432, 433,

440, 452-453 (and see Divisions).

Canadian Farm, 110, 132, 155.

Canal de L’Escaut, 264, 274, 433, 459, 491.

Canal du Nord, 264, 403, 432-433, 434-438;

crossing of, 451.

Capelle, 500.

Capper, General Sir J., 57.

Cars, armoured. See 17th Tank Battalion.

Carter, Colonel, 358.

Cartigny, 342.

Cattenières, 495.

Cavalry, at Monchy-le-Preux, 64-67;

at Cambrai, 266, 267, 278-279, 283;

on 8th August, 354, 359-361.

Cavillon, 356.

Cayeux Wood, 361.

Château des Prés, 331-332.

Chaulnes, 352, 366.

Cheddar Villa, 177, 208.

Chipilly, 362, 364, 366.

Choques, 324.

Chuignolles, 359.

Churchill, Winston S., the Right Hon., letter to the War Office,

11-12;

forms Landship Committee, 13;

memorandum on “Variants of the Offensive,” 14.

Clapham Junction, 91.

Cockcroft, the, 197, 208, 228-229;

significance of action, 231, 234.

Cojeul river, 68.

Contay, 351.

Courage, Colonel, 54;

Brigadier-General, 351.

Courcelette, 31, 34.

Courcelles, 375.

Crèvecoeur, 270.

Cricket Redoubt, 86.

Crinchon river, 60.

Debeney, General, 351, 352, 363.

Deir-el-Belah, 73, 74, 81.

Deligny Mill, 453.

“Delta scheme, the,” 323.

Delville Wood, 32.

Demuin, 357.

Dessart Wood, 262, 268, 284.

D’Eyncourt, Sir E. T., 13.

Diplock, Mr, 10.

“Ditching,” frequency of, 43-45.

Divisions, British Infantry--

Guards, 140, 266, 281, 283, 389, 499, 500.

1st, 186, 325, 334.

3rd, 268, 389, 405, 412, 413, 414, 418-419.

4th, 416, 417.

5th, 394, 404, 405, 413, 415, 417, 420, 422, 498, 499.

6th, 268, 270.

11th, 198, 206, 228.

12th, 270.

20th, 270.

21st, 36-38.

25th, 500.

29th, 268, 270, 283.

36th, 92, 268.

37th, 375, 380, 383, 389, 392, 491.

39th, 131.

40th, 268, 282.

42nd, 419.

48th, 198, 206, 230.

51st, 131, 268, 270, 275, 280, 281.

52nd, 73, 75, 76-79, 83-87.

53rd, 73, 76-78.

54th, 73, 75, 76, 80, 83-87.

56th, 414.

62nd, 270, 274, 275-276, 414.

63rd, 40, 380, 382-383, 393, 401, 443, 493.

74th, 73.

Divisions, Australian. See Australian Corps.

Divisions, Canadian--

1st, 416, 439.

3rd, 456

4th, 416, 439.

5th, 440.

And see Canadian Corps.

Divisions, New Zealand, 34, 92, 390, 394, 398, 405, 412, 429, 491.

Doignies, 342.

Doyle, Sir A. Conan, 482-485.

Dranoutre, 91.

Drocourt-Quéant Switch, 63, 68, 416, 417-418.

Duddridge, Sergeant, gallantry of, 413, 475-478.

Dury, 417.

Ecaillon river, 497.

Ecoust, 405, 412, 414.

Ecurie, 59, 500, 502.

El Arish, 71 (note 14), 73.

El Arish Redoubt, 73, 76-78.

Elles, Colonel H. J., 14, 46, 47-48, 51;

Brigadier-General, 89, 108, 251, 271, 272-273, 351, 504;

Major-General, 48.

English Trees, 115.

Enguinegatte, 339-340.

Epehy, 258, 342;

battle of, 433.

Erin, central stores and workshops at, 51-52.

Ervillers, 390.

Escadœuvres, 494-495.

Essarts, 372, 376.

Esnes, 491.

Estienne, Colonel, 301, 305.

Etaing, 417.

Fanny’s Farm, 93.

Favreuil, 393, 401.

Feuchy Chapel, 65, 66.

Fins, 283.

Flammenwerfer, 9.

Flers, 31, 34.

Flesquières, 264, 270, 275, 277, 455.

Fontaine-Notre-Dame, 270, 280, 281.

Forsyth-Major, Major O. A., 76.

Fort Garry Horse, 279.

Forward Cottage, 113, 151, 154.

Fouquières, 322-327.

Foster, Messrs, 14, 25.

Foster tractor, trials by, 12.

Framerville, 358, 363, 366.

Fremicourt, 404, 405, 412.

Frascati Farm, 109, 113, 136, 147-149, 178, 179.

French, General Sir J., 12, 13.

Freyburg, Colonel, 40.

Frezenberg, 111, 182.

Fuller, Colonel J. C. F., 507.

Gas, poison, 9.

Gavrelle, 403.

Gaza, 73;

first battle of, 73;

second battle of, 74-80;

third battle of, 82-88.

Gueudecourt, 31, 35, 36-38.

Ghent Cottages, 191, 198.

Gilban, 72.

Gird Trench, 36-38.

Givenchy-les-La-Bassée, 322, 330, 335.

Glasgow, General W., 57.

Glencorse Wood, 236.

Gommecourt, 389, 429.

Gonnelieu, 265, 283.

Gough, General Sir H., 31, 103, 235.

Gouzeaucourt, 262, 269, 283, 433.

Graincourt, 270, 276, 449, 455.

Grévillers, 390, 392, 393.

Guémappe, 403.

Guilleaucourt, 361, 362.

“Gun-pits, The,” 207, 218-221.

Haig, Field-Marshal Sir D., 253, 281.

Halfway House, 113, 137, 143-144, 193.

Hamel, action at, 349-350.

Hamelincourt, 389.

Hammond’s Corner, 150, 200.

Hampshire Farm, 110, 132, 155.

Hangard Wood, 346.

Hankey, Colonel E. B., 149, 208, 268, 308;

Brigadier-General, 309.

Hannescamps, 347, 372.

Harbonnières, 358, 361.

Harp, the, 61.

Harpies river, 497.

Hatfield, trials at, 14.

Haussy, 499.

Havrincourt, 270, 273;

battle of, 433.

Havrincourt Wood, 264, 268.

Haynecourt, 439, 466.

Heninel, 68, 389.

Hereira, 73, 74, 82.

Hersin, 320.

Hervilly Wood, 342.

Hesdigneul, 325, 328, 331.

Hesdin, 370.

Hetherington, Major, 10, 12.

Hendecourt, 63.

Hill 70, 310, 312.

Hill 145, 60.

Hillock Farm, 207, 220, 230.

Hill Top Farm, 149.

Hindenburg Line, 58, 61-63, 251-252, 261, 264-265, 433.

Hindenburg, Marshal von, 295.

Hinges, 324.

Hirondelle river, 298, 434.

Holt tractor, trials of, 12.

Hooge, 111.

Hooglede, 139.

Houthoulst Forest, 90, 111.

Hospital Farm, 113, 125, 138.

Hotblack, Captain, 30, 40.

Hutier, General von, 292, 357.

Imperial Defence, Committee of, 10, 11.

Inchy-en-Artois, 298, 434, 443.

Infantry co-operation, lack of, 29, 70.

Infantry, training with, 6;

in Palestine, 84;

before Cambrai, 259-261;

with Canadians, 320, 339, 340;

with Australians, 349;

with French, 351.

Iveagh, Lord, 25.

Joint Committee, 13.

Journalists, misrepresentations by, 42, 232, 271.

Joye Farm, 93.

Kemmel, 90, 330.

Kahn Yunus, 73.

Khirbet Sihan, 80.

Kitchener’s Wood, 109, 115, 131, 133, 157, 159.

Kressenstein, General von, 73.

Kultur Farm, 131, 157.

Kurd Hill, 76-79.

La Bassée Canal, 330, 335.

La Brique, 109, 114, 116, 178.

La Cauchie, 343.

La Folie Farm, 60.

La Vacquerie, 264, 274.

Lagnicourt, 416.

Landrecies, 500.

Landships Committee, 13, 14.

Langemarck, 107, 115, 194.

Lateau Wood, 274.

Le Quesnel, 361, 363.

Le Quesnoy, 500.

Le Tréport, Tank Corps Depot at, 52, 340.

Les Bœufs, 31, 33.

Les Trois Tours, 132, 138.

Lees Hill, 76-79.

Lens, 311-313.

Lihons, 366.

Lillers, 320.

“Little Willie,” 13, 16.

Lloyd, Colonel Hardress, 54.

Logeast Wood, 375, 382, 388.

Longatte, 405, 412, 414-415.

Lone Tree, 115, 157.

Loop, the, 32.

Loos, battle of, 9, 15.

Loupart Wood, 390, 392, 393-395.

Lovie Château, 101, 102, 119-120.

Luce river, 363.

Ludendorff, Marshal von, 294-295, 364, 365.

Lulworth, 50.

Lys, the, battle of, 318-319.

Machine Gun Corps, Heavy Section, formation of, 24;

departure for France, 27;

for Palestine, 71;

expansion, 47-57;

reconstituted as Tank Corps, 306;

original companies--A and B, 26, 27, 53;

C and D, 26, 27, 32, 33, 53;

E, 27, 50, 53, 71;

F, 27, 50, 53, 127.

Maison du Hibou, 197, 207, 208, 229.

Mansura Ridge, 74, 75, 78, 82.

Marcelcave, 357.

Marcoing, 264, 270, 274, 500.

Marengo Causeway, 109, 113, 145-146, 199.

Marquion, 433.

Marquion, Sains-les-, 433, 439, 453.

Martinpuich, 31.

Marwitz, General von der, 268, 292.

Masnières, 270, 274.

Maurice, General Sir F., 486, 507-509.

Maxse, General Sir I., 108, 194, 235.

Meaulte, 308-309.

Mechanical Warfare Supply Department, 14, 56.

Merlimont, 52, 368, 369.

Messines, battle of, 90-94.

Meteren, 344.

Middelkerke, proposed landing at, 90, 109, 186-190.

Miraumont, 372.

Mœuvres, 282, 433, 434, 455.

Monash, General Sir J., 357-359, 360-361.

Monchy-le-Preux, capture of, 64-67;

abandoned, 316;

recaptured, 403.

Montdidier, 366.

Mont St Eloi, 312.

Monument Wood, 401.

Morchies, 342, 416, 418, 430, 431-432.

Moreuil, 352 (note 33).

Mormal Forest, 500.

“Mother,” 13, 16.

Moyenneville, 373, 375, 387.

Munitions, Ministry of, 14.

Murat Farm, 113, 199.

Nelson’s History of the War, 94 (note 16).

So much for A Company. C Company, in the meantime, had fared better. It