THE PALESTINE DETACHMENT.
I.
While the tanks of the 1st Brigade were fighting in mud and snow at
Arras, climatic problems of a very different type confronted a little
detachment of the Heavy Section nearer the Equator. After the Somme it
was decided to send a company of twelve tanks to Egypt to assist in
the advance on Syria.[14] Major Nutt, of E Company, who had been in
Egypt before with the armoured cars, was given the command. E Company
also supplied most of the personnel. The total combatant strength was
22 officers and 226 other ranks; while there was a workshop section
provided with two 120-h.p. Holt tractors, a number of sponson trolleys
and workshop trailers, two lorries, and the necessary complement
of spare parts. The detachment, in spite of its diminutive size,
would have to be self-supporting. It left Thetford in December 1916,
the personnel sailing from Devonport, and the tanks and workshops
from Avonmouth a week later. An extraordinary and inexcusable error
signalised the embarkation. Instead of twelve Mark II.’s, fresh from
the makers, eight old training machines, which had been in use for
months and were due to proceed to the new camp in Dorset, were shipped
at Avonmouth, while the Egyptian detachment’s tanks were on their way
to Bovington! Before the Admiralty could be informed of the mistake,
tons of cargo, including heavy guns, had been lowered on top of the
changelings in the ship, and then permission to unload the latter was
refused. The company, therefore, on its arrival in Egypt in January,
found itself with only two-thirds of its establishment of tanks, and
those not even new. Some of them, indeed, were nearly worn out, and all
were dirty; and the Thetford mud, baked hard by a month in a ship’s
hold close to the engine-room, had to be chipped out of the tracks with
chisels. It was a week or more before some of the machines could be
moved at all.
The secrecy which, in theory, shrouded their coming was so fallacious
that within six weeks photographs of them were found on a captured
Bedouin. This in itself was a small matter; but it was a pity that the
demonstrations carried out on the desert at Gilban, which advertised
to all and sundry the fact of the tanks’ arrival, were not devoted
to a better purpose than the satisfaction of the natural curiosity
of General officers and their staffs. No infantry took part in
these displays. Only after the second battle of Gaza were combined
rehearsals by the two arms instituted as a regular feature of training.
Nevertheless, the army in Egypt seems to have realised far sooner
than the army in France that without co-operation founded on mutual
familiarity with each others’ tactics and limitations, tanks and
infantry would never work together to the best advantage. In Egypt also
there was from the start less of the jealousy and obstruction which
hampered the heavy branch nearer home. The isolation of the detachment
put it to some extent out of reach of meddling interference, and
enabled it to solve its peculiar problems in its own way.
When the detachment arrived Sir Archibald Murray was already across
the Sinai desert and had reached the Egyptian frontier. While the
railway was being pushed up behind him along the coast to El Arish
and Rafa, the Turkish Army commanded by the German General von
Kressenstein withdrew to a prepared position in front of Gaza. This
position we attacked on 26th March, but a dense sea-fog at dawn upset
the time-table, and after suffering 4000 casualties, such ground as we
had gained was abandoned under pressure of heavy counter-attacks and
a threat against our flank by reinforcements from Beersheba. The tank
detachment, rushed up at a few hours’ notice on Egyptian 30-ton trucks
to take part in these operations, was delayed at El Arish, and it
detrained at Khan Yunus, fifteen miles south-west of Gaza, only to find
the battle over. At Khan Yunus it remained for ten days. On 6th April
the tanks trekked for eight miles across soft sand to Deir-el-Belah,
nearer to the line, preparatory to the second assault on the Gaza
position.
Gaza, a city of great age, acquainted with numerous battles and sieges,
stands amid vast fig-groves about two miles from the sea-shore, on the
old coast-road from Egypt to Syria. The Turkish position, defended
now by five infantry divisions, one cavalry division, and numerous
batteries--in all, perhaps 30,000 men--was one of great natural
strength, as we had discovered in March. Since our first attack miles
of new trenches had been dug and the whole front was very heavily
wired. It stretched from Sheikh Hassan, among the sand-dunes on the
coast, by El Arish Redoubt and Samson’s Ridge, to the Cairo road two
miles south of Gaza, and thence south-east along a series of hills to
the Atawineh Ridge. Within this line was the strongly fortified Ali
Muntar Ridge, immediately in front of Gaza. Detachments of cavalry and
infantry at Hereira, sixteen miles from the coast, protected the left
flank. The hills, seamed with gullies and old water-courses, where
infantry and machine-guns found perfect cover, were admirably adapted
to defence, and the trenches, under German supervision, had been
skilfully sited.
Sir Archibald Murray had four Territorial infantry divisions, the 52nd,
53rd, 54th, and 74th (dismounted Yeomanry), two mounted divisions, and
the Camel Corps. His line of communications was a single railway track
running for 150 miles across the Sinai Desert. Everything the army
needed, even water, came by this line out of Egypt.
The plan of the second attack on Gaza fell into two phases, divided
by an interval of forty-eight hours. In the first phase, while a
desert column attended to the Turkish left at Hereira, three infantry
divisions and the tank detachment were to carry the Sheikh Abbas and
Mansura Ridges, east of the Cairo road. The attack was fixed for
dawn on April 17th. After dusk on the 15th, the eight tanks trekked
northward again from Deir-el-Belah, and before daybreak had reached
their final lying-up positions along a dry water-course called the
Wadi Ghuzze, which ran parallel to our front line. By this time, after
three months’ experience in Egypt and Syria, all steps possible under
the circumstances had been taken to cope with the novel conditions
attending tank operations over sand. It was found, for example, that
the ordinary process of soaking the track links and rollers in oil
produced in the desert a perfect grinding mixture which wore out very
rapidly the driving sprockets. All such lubrication, therefore, was
abandoned. The tracks were run absolutely dry, and with satisfactory
results; for although the sprocket wheels were of the early soft-steel
type, they seem to have endured longer under these arid conditions than
in the mud of European battlefields. While the mud stuck everywhere,
and brought with it grit and stones which induced friction, sand merely
ran out of the tracks like water. From every point of view, indeed,
once this and a few other modifications of treatment and mechanism had
been introduced, the tanks showed a surprising aptitude for desert
warfare. Ditching was almost unknown: the sand ran away from under
the belly of the machine, while the tracks, with their broad bearing
surface, compressed it and got a grip; and for similar reasons the
steepest sand-dunes and hills were climbed with ease and at any angle.
The chief troubles were the heat and the difficulty of obtaining
water, and these were felt by every other arm, although, at least as
regards the former, not so severely. On account of the heat no movement
of tanks, save in battle or some other exceptional circumstance, took
place after eight o’clock in the morning.
Six tanks were detailed for the first phase of the battle. Four, if
required, were to assist the 52nd Division in the capture of the
Mansura Ridge. These advanced behind the assaulting infantry up the
Wadi el Nukhabir, a gully with high banks affording perfect cover which
ran, like a huge communication trench, downward from the ridge to the
Wadi Ghuzze. The tanks were not needed, however, for the enemy, taken
by surprise owing to the absence of any artillery preparation beyond
the ordinary counter-battery work, fled in confusion from the ridge,
which was in possession of the 157th Brigade soon after six o’clock.
Meanwhile, on the right, the other two tanks had led the troops of
the 54th Division toward Sheikh Abbas Ridge. Here also the Turks were
surprised, but they put up a stouter resistance than their fellows on
Mansura. The tanks, lacking such a covered approach as the big gully
on the left provided, came under observation soon after dawn, before
they had reached the enemy’s trenches, and one soon received a direct
hit. Two of the crew were killed, and the officer lost an eye from a
splinter. The hostile guns now concentrated on the derelict machine,
which, after it had been abandoned, was hit again and again, set on
fire and destroyed. The second tank, however, was able to carry out its
task of clearing the trenches to the north and north-west of the ridge,
giving the infantry valuable help. When the position was consolidated
the tank returned and rallied in the Wadi el Nukhabir, having covered
in all some 15,000 yards from the time it crossed the Wadi Ghuzze to
its return. The crew, who had been in the tank for fourteen hours, were
completely exhausted. In such conditions of heat as they suffered,
their gallantry and endurance were remarkable.
The second phase of the battle, which opened at 5.30 A.M. on the 19th,
was designed to capture the final positions covering Gaza--namely,
El Arish Redoubt and Samson’s Ridge, between the sea and the Cairo
road, and the Ali Muntar Ridge with its foot-hills to the south and
south-east of the city. From left to right the divisions and tanks
employed were as follows: 53rd Division (two tanks), 52nd (four tanks),
54th (one tank). To the right of the 54th, mounted divisions were to
carry out subsidiary operations as before against the Turkish left. The
French battleship _Réquin_ and two British monitors assisted from the
sea.
The forty-eight hours’ interval between our attacks, however
unavoidable, was unfortunate. The Turks, to some extent demoralised on
the 17th, had time to recover themselves again, and their main position
on Ali Muntar was one of exceptional strength. This ridge, ten or more
miles in length, is an attenuated spine of sandy hills, covered with
cactus scrub, which runs parallel to the coast just east of Gaza. It
forms roughly a right angle with the Mansura heights farther to the
east. Its loftiest crest, 265 feet above the sea, looks down on the
city from south of the Beersheba road. From this point the spine falls
away southward, by successive narrow hillocks known to us as Outpost
Hill, Lees Hill, Queen’s Hill, Kurd Hill, and so on, to the valley
of the Wadi Ghuzze. Two thousand yards west of the ridge, and also
parallel to it, is the Cairo road, beyond which Samson’s Ridge rises
fairly steeply to a height of 200 feet before descending to the low
sea-cliffs at Sheikh Ajlin. From Samson’s Ridge the Turkish trenches
ran north-east by El Arish Redoubt up the coast to Sheikh Hassan. These
seaward trenches were the objectives of the 53rd Division on the left,
with whose operations we will deal first.
[Illustration: SKETCH MAP TO ILLUSTRATE THE 2nd & 3rd BATTLES OF GAZA.]
For the whole of this battle I will paraphrase or quote textually the
official report on operations drawn up by Major O. A. Forsyth-Major,
second in command of the tank detachment, who writes as follows of the
events on the 53rd Division’s front. (Italics and interpolations in
brackets are my own.)
“Of the two tanks allotted to this division, one broke a track
soon after going into action and remained _hors de combat_ for
the ensuing operations. The other tank, the ‘Tiger,’ therefore
undertook the advance alone, and proceeded (in front of the
infantry) across the sand-dunes to Samson Ridge, where it
captured the redoubts, awaited the infantry’s arrival, and
thence advanced to attack El Arish Redoubt, being all this
time under concentrated enemy machine-gun fire. Having reached
this second objective, the tank was unable to swing, and the
officer in command, receiving no support whatsoever from the
infantry, which advanced no farther, owing to the changed
tactical situation occurring in the centre of the general
attack, returned over the sand-dunes _in reverse_ under shell
and machine-gun fire till it reached a point near Regent’s
Park (upwards of 5000 yards S.W. of El Arish), having fired
_27,000 rounds_ of ammunition during this action. All the
crew, including the officer, were wounded, and all, except
the officer, who took the driver’s place, were in a state of
complete collapse as a result of six hours’ continuous strain
under heavy fire.”
Further advance on this flank had been postponed owing to the failure
in the centre, where the 52nd Division, with four tanks, was to advance
from Mansura Ridge against Outpost Hill, the strong-point known as
the Labyrinth, and Ali Muntar itself. The tanks were ready, and their
routes taped to avoid the gullies which abounded, when, at the last
moment, the G.O.C. 52nd Division cancelled their orders. They were now
told to move from Mansura Ridge to the foot of Kurd Hill, 3000 yards to
the westward, and there await further orders. “It was pointed out to
the G.S.O.I.,” says the report, “that such a move in complete darkness
over unknown country might result in the tanks disappearing into the
deep gullies which intersected the suggested route, and that even if
the tanks reached Kurd Hill, it was highly impracticable to attack
positions which had never been observed in daylight and over ground
which had not been reconnoitred by the tank personnel.” The G.S.O.I.
was obdurate, however, and at 9 P.M. the four tanks started. In the
pitchy darkness which prevailed the cross-country route was considered
too risky, and accordingly they moved by the Wadi Nukhabir and the
Wadi Ghuzze--in other words, round three sides of a square. They did
not reach Kurd Hill until 2 A.M., zero being at 6.30. As the officers
were entirely ignorant as to what they were expected to do four hours
later, they had the temerity to arouse the G.O.C. 155th Brigade from
his sleep, but as he felt disinclined to discuss matters at that early
hour, they were told that all necessary instructions would be issued at
5.30 A.M. At six o’clock no instructions had been received: a subaltern
came from the brigade, however, to point out the route to the infantry
starting-point. Without waiting any longer, the tanks moved forward to
this line, reaching it just as the barrage fell at zero and the enemy
began to reply. No further orders of any kind had arrived, and the
second in command of the detachment spent the next hour galloping about
under fire, collecting information from the infantry, and by these
haphazard means determining what the tanks were expected to do. Two of
them, it appeared, were to remain in reserve at Kurd Hill. Of the other
pair, one was to help in the assault on Lees and Outpost Hills. This
tank, however, fell into a gully whose sides collapsed, and did not get
into action. The remaining machine, having been assigned an objective
on Ali Muntar, was recalled to Outpost Hill owing to the breakdown of
the tank on its left. It climbed the hill, killed a number of Turks in
the trenches there, and was still waiting for the infantry when it was
disabled by a direct hit. The infantry being unable to advance, one of
the reserve tanks was summoned; but although, after repeated attempts
and murderous losses, the crest at length was gained, it could not be
held; and our line eventually fell back to its original position on
Queen’s Hill. The first tank, lying derelict in the Turkish trenches,
had already been abandoned by its crew. The second returned in safety
to its companion in reserve.
[Illustration:
_By permission of_ Major O. A. FORSYTH-MAJOR.
Tank on Outpost Hill, Gaza.]
The report gives the following account of the loss of the remaining
tank, in action with the 54th Division on the right:--
“To the tank operating on this front had been assigned the
capture of the large redoubt north-west of Khirbet Sihan
(north of the Sheikh Abbas Ridge on the Beersheba road). As
instructions to this effect had only reached the tank commander
during the previous night, he was likewise confronted with
the task of attacking an unfamiliar objective over unfamiliar
ground. However, this tank finally reached the redoubt in
question and captured its Turkish garrison. Our infantry
then arrived and consolidated the new position. The tank had
no sooner swung round to return to its rallying-point at
Abbas, when a shell struck one of its tracks, whereupon it
was subjected to a systematic bombardment. The enemy then
counter-attacked and captured the British infantry and tank.
The commander and several members of the crew had meanwhile
been severely wounded. The officer and one other rank
subsequently died of wounds in a Turkish hospital.”
Except for a modified success on the left, the attack, although pressed
with extreme gallantry, had definitely failed. Sir Archibald Murray
wished to renew it the following morning, but was dissuaded from making
the attempt. With no superiority of numbers in the beginning, we had
lost 12,000 men: every one was exhausted: we were short of water; and
the Ali Muntar position, notwithstanding a bombardment by heavy guns of
every calibre, including those of the _Réquin_ and the 11-inch pieces
on the monitors, seemed little damaged, and plainly was impregnable to
a frontal assault with the means at our disposal. The army, therefore,
settled down on the ground it occupied at the close of the fighting.
For the next six months no further attempt was made to capture Gaza.
The tank detachment, after withdrawing across the Wadi Ghuzze to some
fig-groves west of Sheikh Nebhan, returned eventually to its old
quarters near Deir-el-Belah railhead. Its proportionate losses had
been heavy. Twenty-eight officers and men were killed, wounded, or
missing--40 per cent of the total engaged. Three tanks out of eight
were permanently disabled or lost. The report which I have used so
freely already concludes with some general observations on the work of
tanks in the battle. This work was fully appreciated by the infantry,
who “generously attributed their own success to the opportunities
created by the tanks.” The three divisional commanders also expressed
their admiration. That some of the fleeting openings made by the tanks
were not promptly seized “was less due to lack of initiative on the
part of infantry leaders than to the wholly unexpected intensity of the
enemy’s well-directed fire.” At the same time, further co-operative
training was shown to be very necessary. Reference, of course, is made
to the faulty staff work through which, on 19th April, the centre
section was left without any instructions after its original orders had
been cancelled at the eleventh hour. It is pointed out also (although
this perhaps was unavoidable) that the task allotted to the tanks was
far too ambitious for their numbers. The eight operated on a five-mile
front, where thirty or forty would not have been too many. The
successful assembly prior to zero was held to prove that “tanks which
are properly looked after by competent crews need not necessarily be
placed in forward positions,” as they can be trusted (accidents apart)
to accomplish up to time final approach-marches of considerable length.
And this brings us to what were, perhaps, the most notable features
of the operations--the actual distances covered by these obsolete and
worn-out machines and the absence of any mechanical breakdowns. In both
respects the work of the little detachment compares very favourably
indeed with that performed by the larger units in France. Some of
the tanks travelled forty miles and fought two actions between the
time they left Deir-el-Belah on the 15th and their final withdrawal
behind the Wadi Ghuzze five days later; and every machine which left
England got into action, or was ready to do so, on zero morning. Such
efficiency is a high testimonial to the labours of the commanding
officer and his combatant and engineering personnel.
II.
It will be convenient, at the expense of strict chronological sequence,
to carry the story of the Palestine detachment to its conclusion
in one chapter. Six months supervened between the second and third
battles of Gaza. During this period our dispositions were readjusted,
reinforcements arrived (including French, Italian, Indian, and West
Indian details), and Sir Archibald Murray having returned home, Sir
Edmund Allenby came from the 3rd Army in France to take over the
command. The surviving tanks, meanwhile, were overhauled and provided
with some especial roller-sprockets, constructed in the workshops of
the Egyptian State Railways. Requests for more and newer tanks had been
sent to England; but the only reinforcement received consisted of three
Mark IV.’s. One or more others of this type, together with a supply
of much-needed spare parts for the original Mark I.’s, were lost in a
torpedoed transport.
Towards the end of the autumn preparations for a renewed attempt on
Gaza had reached completion. Our line in front of the city still ran
where the second battle had left it--from Sheikh Ajlin, on the coast,
by Samson’s Ridge and the Mansura and Abbas Ridges, down to the Wadi
Ghuzze, and thence to the new railhead at Shellal on the right. The
Turkish defences on Ali Muntar had been strengthened still further; and
now that our increased forces permitted us to choose, it was decided
to avoid the hazards of another frontal assault. Instead, while the
enemy’s centre was kept employed with demonstrations, the main attacks
were to develop between Hereira and Beersheba and on the western flank,
from Gaza to the sea. The whole area of operations extended over forty
miles. “The Australian Corps and desert column were responsible for
the operations from Beersheba north-westwards to Hereira. Numerous
mounted and dismounted divisions were entrusted with the frontage from
and around Hereira towards Gaza, while a composite force of French,
Italian, and West Indian troops were assigned the task of executing
minor raids near Outpost Hill. The operations around Gaza were
entrusted to the 21st Army Corps, which began to make the necessary
preparations for a general assault on the defences between Umbrella
Hill (north of Samson’s Ridge) and the sea.”[15] This was to be the
main attack, with its left resting on the coast and its right on the
Cairo road. In the second phase of the last battle our only permanent
success had been won on this flank; and our extreme left at Sheikh
Ajlin was due west of Gaza. The general line of the assault therefore
was north-eastward, with the idea of so far enveloping the city as to
threaten its communications from the north. The distance from the Cairo
road to the sea was less than 5000 yards; and the initial penetration
aimed at was moderate--two miles up the coast on the extreme left, and
elsewhere an average of a mile. For this narrow frontage and depth of
attack four infantry brigades were available (the whole 54th Division
and one brigade of the 52nd), assisted by an Indian cavalry division,
the 54th Divisional Artillery, a machine-gun company, and the tank
detachment of eight machines. (The presence of a number of anti-tank
guns of 1¹⁄₂-inch calibre about Green and Outpost Hills led to the tank
operations being confined to the left sector.) The Navy again was to
co-operate from the sea. The whole area over which this advance was to
take place was a wilderness of sand-dunes, covered here and there with
coarse grass and cactus, and rising in places to a height of 150 feet.
There had been ample time on this occasion for reconnaissance and
other preliminaries. All tank commanders and N.C.O.’s surveyed the
enemy’s position both from the land and from a drifter off the coast.
In addition to combined rehearsals by tanks and infantry already
carried out during the summer, “officers and other ranks of the tank
detachment and the various infantry brigades with whom they were to
work were attached to each other for ten days in order personally to
get to know each other and study the characteristics of the other’s
particular arm.” _O si sic omnes!_ An adequate supply of large-scale
maps and aeroplane photographs was provided by the 21st Corps “I,”
together with a barrage table and map for every tank commander. Each
tank was to carry two pigeons, to be released at pre-arranged points;
and also a ton of R.E. supplies and ammunition for the infantry. The
whole question of supply was a serious one, as the only roads behind
our line in this coastal area were constructed by the simple process
of laying down wire-netting on the sand, which provided a surface
suitable for marching infantry or even light cars, but of no use for
heavy vehicles. The detachment workshops rendered a signal service by
improvising a number of tractor trucks out of old track-plates, driving
sprockets, and iron girders. The necessary dumps of oil and ammunition
were then formed near Sheikh Ajlin, lorries and tractors conveying the
material thither after dark by way of the beach. Finally, as the attack
itself was due to start in the night-time, the tanks were variously
camouflaged to suit the conditions amid which they might expect to find
themselves at dawn. Two were daubed with different colours, and another
pair were painted white and splashed with sand, while the remaining
four were disguised with imitation cactus.
As little as possible had been left to chance; and I have enumerated
the main features of this preparatory work both on account of its
thoroughness and forethought, and because it is a characteristic
example of the preliminaries to a tank action. Before such an action
there are always a hundred odd things of this kind to be seen to; and
in this case, unlike some others nearer home, they were seen to. The
labour expended over them was fully justified in the results.
The coming attack was divided into four phases, known on the map as
the Blue, Red, Green, and Yellow--a polychromatic scale which was to
proceed in succession from the south. The first or Blue phase was
concerned with the capture of Umbrella Hill, and was to start an hour
before midnight on 1st November. This was a distinct operation, to
be accomplished by the 156th Brigade without the help of tanks. At
3 o’clock in the morning a second zero would launch the second and
subsequent phases, constituting the main attack, the final or Yellow
phase pushing our left flank two miles up the coast to Sheikh Hassan,
north-west of Gaza. The tanks were allotted as follows: one with the
156th Brigade on the right, one with the 163rd in the centre, and four
with the 161st and 162nd on the left. Two in reserve were to follow up
1000 yards in rear and replace any disabled machines.
The detachment trekked from Deir-el-Belah to Sheikh Ajlin on the night
of 22nd October. On the last day of the month routes were taped to the
assembly positions selected for the battle. The following evening, as
the roar of the first zero broke out on the right, the tanks moved
forward under a full moon and reached these positions at 1.30 A.M. At
2.15 the six detailed to lead crept away again, and, passing through
the infantry starting line, drew up a couple of hundred yards ahead
in No Man’s Land. All were in position half an hour before the second
zero. In the meantime, under cover of a heavy barrage, Umbrella Hill
had been carried and the Blue phase was over. The enemy, anticipating
a general attack, at first retaliated by shelling violently the whole
of our front line; and the tanks experienced an unpleasant half-hour
while moving toward their assembly posts. None, fortunately, were
hit. As we made no further movement, the Turkish gunners presently
concentrated their fire on the captured hill, and about 2 o’clock,
misled by the continued quiet, ceased altogether. An hour later they
were disillusioned when our main barrage crashed down upon their whole
line, and tanks and infantry went forward under its cover.
A thick mist had risen, which, with the smoke of the barrage,
completely obscured the moon, upon whose light we had been counting.
The tanks, however, advancing on compass-bearings, successfully
reached their first objectives within three minutes, well ahead of the
infantry. In the prevailing gloom some of the latter lost direction
almost at once; and a tank officer, observing from a point called
Windy Post, on our front line, collected some hundreds of men of one
battalion and directed them to their objective. The first Turkish line,
nevertheless, was carried without difficulty, the attack coming as a
complete surprise. Behind the creeping barrage the tanks and infantry
pressed on; and although the two brigades in the centre met with stiff
opposition on the second line, and lost ground before a succession of
counter-attacks, on both flanks, and especially on the all-important
left, everything went more or less according to programme. By 6 o’clock
the 162nd Brigade had consolidated its final objective at Sheikh
Hassan. On the right El Arish Redoubt had at last been captured, and
our troops were on the edge of the fig-groves which shelter Gaza to the
south-west.
The tanks had done all, and more than all, that was expected of them.
On the right two had helped in the taking of El Arish. It was still
dark when they pushed on into the maze of trenches beyond, and both
became ditched, one eventually being disabled by a shell. The crews
took out their machine-guns and joined the infantry. Numbers 3 and
4, next on the left, working with the 161st Brigade, attacked and
carried with the latter the Rafa Redoubt and the trenches to the
north-west. Owing to the mist they had great difficulty in reaching
their further objectives, and finding that the infantry had been unable
to advance beyond the redoubt, they returned to the rallying-point,
having deposited their spare ammunition and R.E. stores. Number 5
broke a track at Beach Post, its first objective, and was unable to
assist in the next phase. On the extreme left Number 6 had a varied
and exciting career. To quote from the report, it “captured Sea Post
(close to the beach), moved along the enemy’s trench line, crushing the
wire as far as Beach Post, turned north and attacked Cricket Redoubt,
then proceeded to Gun Hill and Tortoise Hill, both of which positions
it subjected to 6-pounder and machine-gun fire, and finally reached
Sheikh Hassan, where it deposited its load of R.E. stores. Thence
it descended to the beach and endeavoured to attack A5 (a Turkish
strong-point on the coast beyond our farthest objective), but in
scaling the cliff broke a track. The crew removed all machine-guns,
rendered the engine useless, removed the 6-pounder wedges, and retired
to Sheikh Hassan, where they reported to the infantry commander.” As
the abandoned tank was several hundred yards in advance of our front,
the enemy was able during the ensuing night to creep up and place a
charge beneath it, the explosion of which, in addition to effecting
other damage, bent the crank-shaft. When, after the retreat of the
Turkish Army a few days later, it was possible to move the machine,
it was found necessary to remove the engine and tow the hull back to
Deir-el-Belah.
In the meantime the reserve tanks, Numbers 7 and 8, had come into
action. At 4 A.M. they received orders to support the infantry on
the right, beyond El Arish redoubt. Both tanks were loaded with R.E.
material, and, unfortunately, were carrying empty sandbags on the
roof. Number 7 was set on fire from this cause as it reached its first
objective, east of the captured redoubt. While it was attempting to
return to shelter, the tracks jumped and broke the switches, and the
tank was left ablaze between the lines. Number 8 also caught fire. It
was now broad daylight, and the tank was in view of the enemy, who
proceeded to shell it; but being screened to some extent by vegetation,
with which its own camouflage blended, it was never hit.
By 8 o’clock, three tanks had rallied at Sheikh Ajlin, and a fourth
returned three hours later. During the battle some machines had been
in action for five hours, and had covered upwards of 10,000 yards; but
the casualties in personnel were extraordinarily light, only one man
being killed and two wounded. At this trifling cost the tank detachment
had helped materially to place our left flank in such a position that
the Turkish Army around Gaza was seriously endangered. On the right,
progress had been made also, and the double threat was enough. Within a
few days the enemy evacuated the city and the position he had held so
long, and retreated toward Jaffa and Jerusalem.
With the third battle of Gaza the work of the tanks in Palestine came
to a fitting end. Although most of the machines were soon prepared for
action again, all were manifestly worn out, and it was felt that they
would be of little use in the limestone hills of Judah, amid which
the army was now advancing. On the other hand, the need was felt for
some light and swift machine to help the mounted columns in the desert
area; and to this end Major Nutt and the second in command were sent
to France early in 1918 to ask for a detachment of the new Medium A’s,
or Whippets, which were then lying idle. The arrival of this mission
at Bermicourt, however, coincided with the great German offensive on
21st March. In the strain consequent upon that blow, and the others
which followed it, not a Whippet could be spared. The two officers
returned to Syria, and after further consideration it was decided to
disband the detachment. The tanks were handed in to the ordnance depot
at Alexandria, where probably they still remain, while the personnel
returned to England.
I have gone at some length into these oriental adventures for various
reasons. One of the chief, perhaps, was the pleasure to be gained in
working from a narrative so lucid and well arranged as the official
“Report on Operations,” &c., which I have used with such freedom. This
may not be a good reason for discursiveness, but after exhausting
struggles with the loose jumble of irrelevancies and misstatements
which constitute the normal unit history, much may be forgiven. And,
indeed, the Palestine detachment has other and far better claims to a
resurrection from the obscurity in which its accomplishments have lain
hidden. There is no need to labour those claims again here. They speak
for themselves in the energy and courage, the foresight, adaptability,
and fertility of invention which overcame all the obstacles that a
strange country and climate could add to an initial poverty of means.