interest in its relation to the much disputed question of the character
of the later government of Venice. It is the assertion by that
government of its belief that Justice only could be the foundation of
its stability; as these stones of Justice and Judgment are the
foundation of its halls of council. And this profession of their faith
may be interpreted in two ways. Most modern historians would call it, in
common with the continual reference to the principles of justice in the
political and judicial language of the period, [Footnote: Compare the
speech of the Doge Mocenigo, above,--"first justice, and _then_ the
interests of the state:" and see Vol. III. Chap. II Section LIX.]
nothing more than a cloak for consummate violence and guilt; and it may
easily be proved to have been so in myriads of instances. But in the
main, I believe the expression of feeling to be genuine. I do not
believe, of the majority of the leading Venetians of this period whose
portraits have come down to us, that they were deliberately and
everlastingly hypocrites. I see no hypocrisy in their countenances. Much
capacity of it, much subtlety, much natural and acquired reserve; but no
meanness. On the contrary, infinite grandeur, repose, courage, and the
peculiar unity and tranquillity of expression which come of sincerity or
_wholeness_ of heart, and which it would take much demonstration to
make me believe could by any possibility be seen on the countenance of
an insincere man. I trust, therefore, that these Venetian nobles of the
fifteenth century did, in the main, desire to do judgment and justice to
all men; but, as the whole system of morality had been by this time
undermined by the teaching of the Romish Church, the idea of justice had
become separated from that of truth, so that dissimulation in the
interest of the state assumed the aspect of duty. We had, perhaps,
better consider, with some carefulness, the mode in which our own
government is carried on, and the occasional difference between
parliamentary and private morality, before we judge mercilessly of the
Venetians in this respect. The secrecy with which their political and
criminal trials were conducted, appears to modern eyes like a confession
of sinister intentions; but may it not also be considered, and with more
probability, as the result of an endeavor to do justice in an age of
violence?--the only means by which Law could establish its footing in
the midst of feudalism. Might not Irish juries at this day justifiably
desire to conduct their proceedings with some greater approximation to
the judicial principles of the Council of Ten? Finally, if we examine,
with critical accuracy, the evidence on which our present impressions of
Venetian government are founded, we shall discover, in the first place,
that two-thirds of the traditions of its cruelties are romantic fables:
in the second, that the crimes of which it can be proved to have been
guilty, differ only from those committed by the other Italian powers in
being done less wantonly, and under profounder conviction of their
political expediency: and lastly, that the final degradation of the
Venetian power appears owing not so much to the principles of its
government, as to their being forgotten in the pursuit of pleasure.