CHAPTER VIII

ROBBERS OF THE SEAS

As the sea has furnished opportunities for so much good,—for manly

exertion, knowledge of the world, and acquaintance with people outside

of one’s own country, and for gaining wealth,—so it has given a chance

for unscrupulous men to show the worst that is in them; and the

guarding of shore towns and merchant vessels from piratical attacks has

always been a part of the usefulness and duty of a nation’s naval force.

As on land there are robbers and highwaymen, so on the ocean robber

ships have often been lying in wait for vessels loaded with treasure,

and have landed crews of marauders to make havoc with rich seaboard

provinces. Such robbers on the high seas are termed pirates, and their

crime was visited by the old laws with torturing punishments; yet they

were never more daring than when the laws against them were severest.

The word is Greek, and the first pirates who figure in history are

those of the Greek and Byzantine islands and coasts—bloody ruffians

who originated the amusing method of disposing of unransomed prisoners

by making them “walk the plank,” as has been done within the present

century.

The intricate channels and hidden harbors of the Ægean Sea long

remained a hiding-place of sea-robbers, and are still haunted by

them, though every few years, from Cæsar’s time till now, the kings

of the surrounding countries have sent expeditions to break them

up. In the sixteenth century piracy in that region was especially

prevalent. The crews then were chiefly Turkish, but the great leaders

were two renegade Greeks, the brothers Aruck and Hayradin Barbarossa

(“Redbeard”).

[Illustration: WALKING THE PLANK.]

It happened that Spain, having conquered the Moors of Granada in 1492

and pursued her victories across the straits, had gained control of

Algeria (at that time a collection of small Mohammedan states), and

held it until the death of King Ferdinand in 1516. Then the Algerians

sent an embassy to Aruck (sometimes spelled Horuk, or Ouradjh)

Barbarossa, requesting him to aid them in driving out the Spaniards,

and promising him a share in the spoils. He eagerly accepted this

proposition, seeing a great deal more in it than the Algerians saw;

and the moment the Spaniards had been beaten and expelled he murdered

the prince he had come there to help, seized upon the city and port

for himself, and made it the headquarters of that system of desperate

piracy which became the dread of all Europe. These robbers of the sea

called themselves _corsairs_, from an Italian word signifying “a race”;

and they generally won, because they had the best and swiftest vessels

of that time, such as feluccas, xebecs, and the like. The black flag

which they flew was not blacker than their reputations, so that even

yet to call a man as bad as a Barbary pirate is to mean that he could

not be much worse if he tried. The Spanish colonies in America, a few

years later, began sending home immense treasures dug in the silver-and

gold-mines of Peru and Mexico, and extorted from the natives or stolen

from the temples of those unhappy countries. A quantity of ingots and

gold and silver ornaments equal in value to fifteen million dollars

of our modern money was taken at one time by Pizarro, in Peru, as the

ransom of the Inca Atahualpa, and booty amounting to a similar sum

was gained in the sacking of various cities. This great inpouring of

wealth caused a general giving up of manufactures and trade in Spain,

and was one of the reasons of her final decline in power, and it had

the immediate bad effect of making piracy more attractive than ever.

The treasure-ships, though convoyed by war-ships, were often attacked

and captured by the corsairs. Barbarossa’s fleets were more like

armadas of a powerful nation than mere pirate craft; and whenever it

happened that his commanders were defeated, they would land upon the

nearest unprotected coast of Spain, France, or Italy, and pillage and

burn some town in revenge. How galling this was to all merchants and

travelers we can hardly understand in these days; but so strong were

the corsairs that the fleets and armies of various governments, and

even of the Pope, which were sent against them, could not gain their

stronghold nor suppress their cruisers, at least for more than a short

time. Charles V of Spain tried greatly to conquer them; but although

his forces, attacking Aruck Barbarossa from the province of Oran, near

Algiers, defeated and killed him, Hayradin (more properly spelled

Khair-ed-din) Barbarossa succeeded his brother, and, placing himself

under the protection of Turkey, continued to build up the power of

the pirates. His first care was to fortify the city of Algiers, and

he expended a great deal of money and labor on the perfection of the

harbor, compelling all his prisoners and thousands of citizens to work

as slaves on the defenses. Next he conquered Tunis, and was selected by

the sultan as the only fit man to sail against Andrea Doria, the great

Genoese naval commander of the Christians in their wars against the

Turks early in the sixteenth century. Mediterranean commerce became so

unsafe that watch-towers were built all along the coasts, and guards

were kept afoot to give alarm at the approach of the corsairs. Charles

V gathered together a powerful armament, and sailed to the rescue of

Tunis, recapturing it for its rightful sovereign in 1535; but he was

never able to capture Hayradin Barbarossa, who lived out his life in

Algiers as “a friend to the sea and an enemy to all who sailed upon

it.” After his time the power of the pirates continued under other

leaders; and not Algeria alone, but Tripoli, Morocco, and even Tunis,

harbored piratical vessels in every port, and the rulers shared their

spoils; piracy, indeed, was the source of their national revenues, and

was encouraged by the Sultan of Turkey inasmuch as all these states

were his vassals.

Every few years some European power—Spain, France, Venice, or

England—would lose patience, send a fleet, and open a campaign that

would be successful in destroying certain strongholds, releasing a

crowd of prisoners, and burning or sinking many ships. The city of

Algiers was bombarded almost into ruins in 1682, and the job completed

a year later, after the Algerians had tossed the French consul out to

the fleet, with their compliments, from the mouth of a mortar. They

were fond of such jokes. Nevertheless, the city speedily recovered, and

piracy, complicated by Moslem fanaticism and Turkish politics, harassed

commerce during all the next century, partly because Europe was so busy

in its own wars that it had no time for outside matters, and partly

because it was for the advantage of certain nations (particularly

of Great Britain, which, in possession of Gibraltar and Port Mahon,

might have suppressed this villainy) to let the corsairs prey upon

its foes—especially France. The actual result was that most or all of

the European powers fell into the custom of paying to Algiers, Tunis,

Tripoli, and other rulers of the Barbary (or Berber) States large sums

of money as annual tribute to restrain them from official depredations

upon their coasts and commerce, besides other large payments for the

ransom of such Christian prisoners as each sultan’s lively subjects

continued to take in spite of treaties.

In this shameful condition of affairs the newly independent United

States was obliged to join during the first years of its existence, to

secure immunity for our commerce in the Mediterranean, because we had

not yet had time to create a navy. By the end of the century, however,

the United States was able to defend itself at sea, and in 1801

answered the insults of Tripoli by bombarding its capital seaport until

the dey sued for mercy and promised to behave himself. Nevertheless,

he needed another lesson, and in 1803 a second American fleet was sent

to the Mediterranean, commanded by Preble, in the _Constitution_,

with such subordinate officers as Bainbridge, Decatur, Somers, Hull,

Stewart, Lawrence, and others that later became famous. One incident

of this campaign, which began by frightening the Sultan of Morocco at

Tangier into abject submission, but was especially directed against

Tripoli, is well worth remembering.

[Illustration: THE “ARGUS” CAPTURING A TRIPOLITAN PIRATE FELUCCA.]

Captain Bainbridge, going alone in the fine frigate _Philadelphia_ into

the harbor of the city of Tripoli, had unfortunately run aground, and

there, overpowered by the number of his enemies afloat and ashore,

had been compelled to give up his ship, and find himself and all his

crew taken prisoners. He managed to get word of his misfortune to

Commodore Preble at Malta, and that officer at once took his fleet to

Tripoli—Decatur, in the _Argus_, gallantly capturing on the way one

of the great lateen-sailed piratical crafts of the enemy, which later

proved a useful instrument in the contest. The fleet blockaded Tripoli

for a while, and shelled the fortifications somewhat, just to give the

bashaw a hint, and to encourage the poor prisoners; but none of the big

vessels was able to enter the narrow, tortuous, and ill-charted harbor

in the face of the many batteries, under whose guns the _Philadelphia_

could be seen at anchor with the Tripolitan flag at her main, so they

sailed away to Syracuse to make preparations for reducing this nest of

barbarians. Gunboats of light draft and mortar-vessels had to be fitted

out; but the first thing was to try to carry out a plan that Decatur

and all his friends had been maturing ever since they had arrived—the

destruction of the _Philadelphia_, not only because she had been

refitted into a powerful weapon in the hands of the enemy, but because

it was galling to national as well as naval pride to see her flying a

foreign flag. The plan was this:

Decatur was to take a picked crew of seventy officers and men on

the captured felucca (renamed _Intrepid_), and attempt at night to

penetrate to the inner harbor of Tripoli in the disguise of a trader,

supported as well as possible by the gun-brig _Siren_, also disguised

as a merchantman. As his pilot was an Italian and a competent linguist,

it was hoped the ketch could get near enough to set fire to the ship,

whirl a shotted deck-gun into position to send a shell down the main

hatch and through her bottom, fire it, and escape before the surprise

was over. The chances of failure were enough to daunt the bravest, yet

every man in the fleet wanted to go.

On February 15, 1804, Decatur in his felucca, and Somers commanding the

brig, found themselves, toward evening, again in sight of the town,

with its circle of forts crowned by the frowning castle. The great

_Philadelphia_ stood out in bold relief, closely surrounded by two

frigates and more than twenty gunboats and galleys. From the castle and

batteries 115 guns could be trained upon an attacking force, besides

the fire of the vessels, yet the bold tars on the _Intrepid_ did not

quail.

The crew having been sent below, the pilot Catalona took the wheel,

while Decatur stood beside him, disguised as a common sailor. It

was now nine o’clock, and bright moonlight. Standing steadily in,

they rounded to close by the _Philadelphia_, and, boldly hailing her

deck-watch, asked the privilege of mooring to her chains for the night,

explaining that they had lost their anchors in the late storm, and so

forth, until at last consent was given.

Having dragged themselves close to the frigate, it was the work of only

a moment to board her with a rush, overpower her surprised crew, and

make sure of her destruction by means of the combustibles and powder

they had brought with them. Before their task was done, however, they

had been discovered, and it is almost a miracle that they were able to

return to their felucca, and make their way out of the harbor, through

a rain of harmless cannon-balls; yet they did so, and Decatur was

justly honored for one of the most gallant exploits in naval annals.

A few weeks later Preble’s squadron shelled the pirate city and

fortresses into ruin, forced Tripoli as well as Algiers and Tunis

to respect them and thenceforth the American flag, and gave these

arrogant rulers the new sensation of paying instead of receiving money

for bad deeds. It put an end to the corsairs.

Turkish and Barbary pirates were not the only ones in the world,

however. Although the old Norwegian vikings and rough Norman barons did

not go under that name, they were scarcely anything else, in fact, as

the neighboring peoples could testify, though this was far back before

modern history began. But when the Spaniards and the French began

to colonize the West Indies, and to dig mines in South and Central

America, not only were the Barbary corsairs given a fresh incentive,

but a new set of pirates sprang up, the most daring that the world has

ever seen.

As the archipelago east of Greece had sheltered the hordes of the

Turkish sea-robbers, so the many islands, crooked channels, reefs

unknown to all but the local pilots, small harbors, and abundant food

of the Antilles, made the West Indies the safest place in the world

for pirates to pursue their work. To these new and wild regions, in

the sixteenth century, had flocked desperados and adventurers from all

over the world. When the wars with their chances of plunder died out

after the campaigns led by Cortés, Pizarro, Balboa, and the rest of the

Spanish _conquistadores_, many ruffians seized upon vessels by force,

or stole them, and turned into robbers of the sea. At first, as a

rule, they had farms and families on some island, and went freebooting

only a portion of the year. The island of Hayti, or Santo Domingo,

was then settled by farmers, hunters, and cattlemen, the last-named

of whom, mainly French, passed most of their time in the interior of

the island, capturing, herding, or killing half-wild cattle and hogs.

But the monopolies which Spain imposed upon the colonists interfered

with the market for their produce and induced an illicit trade, which

led to frequent encounters with the Spanish navy. As the constant wars

between Spain and France and England increased the difficulties of

trade, large numbers of the colonists joined the freebooters, who then

became extremely numerous and formidable, losing their old name and

becoming known by that of the cattlemen—buccaneers, from the French

word _boucanier_.

First Santo Domingo, then Tortugas, and finally Jamaica were

headquarters of the buccaneers, who were made up of men of all nations,

united by a desire to prey upon Spain as a common enemy. They were

thousands in number, possessed large fleets of ships and boats, were

well armed, and finally formed a regular organization with a chief and

under-officers. The most noted of these chiefs, perhaps, was Henry

Morgan, a Welshman, who was at one time captured and taken home to

England for trial. To his own surprise, instead of being executed,

he was knighted by Charles II, who had not been at all grieved at

seeing Spanish commerce harassed; and Morgan was returned to Jamaica

as commissioner of admiralty, where at one time he acted as deputy

governor, using his opportunity to make it unpleasant for those of

the buccaneers with whom he had formerly had disagreements as to the

distribution of prizes.

The earlier buccaneers found ample plunder in the Spanish fleets. They

patrolled the sea in the track of vessels bound to and from Europe, and

seized them, allowing or compelling the crews to become pirates, or

else to be killed or carried into slavery. This work, however, employed

only a portion of the buccaneers; and early in the seventeenth century,

as the commerce of Spain declined, it became too uncertain a means of

wealth to suit them. But the rich Spanish settlements still remained;

and often, therefore, they equipped a great fleet, enlisted men under

certain strict rules as to sharing the spoils, and sailed away to

pillage some coast. There was hardly an island in the West Indies from

which, in this way, they did not extort immense sums of money under

threat of destruction of the people. The mainland also suffered from

the marauders. Great cities, like Cartagena in Venezuela, Panama on

the Isthmus, Mérida in Yucatan, and Havana in Cuba, were attacked

by armies of buccaneers numbering thousands of men. Sometimes their

fortifications held good, and the enemy was beaten back; but sooner or

later all these cities, and others, smaller, were captured, robbed of

everything valuable that they contained, and burned or partly burned.

For years the buccaneers were the terror of the Caribbean region, and

after the famous sacking of Panama, under Morgan, in 1671, their power

spread across the Isthmus and scourged the southern seas. We have no

way of knowing the amount of the treasure which they captured from the

merchant vessels and from the coast of Peru; for the moment they got

home from an expedition they wasted all their booty in wild carousing,

so that the spoils earned by months of exposure, and wounds, and danger

of death, would be spent in a single week.

At last even England and France, after secretly favoring the

buccaneers, became roused to the necessity of controlling them, and

it was with this object in view that a certain Captain William Kidd

was fitted out at private expense toward the end of the seventeenth

century, and armed with King William’s commission for seizing pirates

and making reprisals, England being at war with France. Just why it

was, nobody has explained, but Captain Kidd spent his time in loitering

around the coast of Africa, where no pirates were to be found, until he

grew quite disheartened, and, fearing to be dismissed by his employers

and to be “mark’d out for an unlucky man,” he started a little pirate

business for himself, in which he gained more of a certain kind of

fame than any of the rest; for popular tradition supposes him to have

hoarded his booty and buried it. “Captain Kidd’s treasure” has been

sought for until the whole eastern coast of the United States is

honeycombed with diggings for it; but probably he had eaten and drunk

it up before 1701, when he was captured and executed in England. About

this time, however, and without his valuable aid, the combined naval

forces of all the nations interested in the commerce of the New World

broke the power of the buccaneers, and their depredations ceased. Their

story is one of the wildest, most romantic, and most terrible in the

history of the world.

[Illustration:

“In revel and carousing

We gave the New Year housing,

With wreckage for our firing,

And rum to heart’s desiring.”

]

The trade of piracy was carried on during the eighteenth century in the

region of the West Indies by unorganized bands of desperados who had

all the faults and none of the greatness of the men they succeeded, and

who received little attention from the world at large. At the beginning

of the nineteenth century the Barataria pirates came into notice on

the coast of Louisiana, taking the place of the buccaneers, but in a

much smaller way. Their leaders, Pierre and John Lafitte, carried on

business quite openly in New Orleans; and their settlements on the

marshy islands along the coast, and their “temple,” to which persons

came out from the city to buy goods, were open secrets. But in the

War of 1812, although the British tried to buy their services, they

redeemed themselves by standing true to the American government, which

had just been trying to exterminate them, and so they won public pardon

and an added glamour of romance.

For the same reasons as those in the case of other island systems, the

East Indies have always been infested with pirates, whose light, swift

vessels run in and out of the intricate channels among the dangerous

coral reefs, where government cruisers dare not follow, while the

people on shore sympathize more with the pirates than with the police.

The East Indian sea-robbers are, as a rule, natives of that

region—Malays, Borneans, Dyaks, and Chinese, with many half-savages

of the South Sea Islands. This is more like a continuance of savage

resistance to civilization than real piracy, since the pirates of the

Atlantic are civilized sailors in mutiny against their own people

and national commerce. The result is just as bad, however; for these

East Indians are as bloodthirsty and cruel as the others, and if they

do not kill their victims, or save them for some cannibal feast (as

would probably happen in the New Hebrides and some other islands),

they condemn them to a life of misery. But in these days of improved

sea-craft, piracy, even in Malayan waters, is weak. Our consuls and

government agents watch suspicious vessels; our telegraph warns the

naval authorities in a moment; our steam-cruisers outspeed the swiftest

craft of the black flag; our rifled guns silence their cheap artillery;

and our coast surveys furnish maps so accurate that the pirate no

longer holds the secret of channels and harbors where he can safely

retreat. If, therefore, the old “Redbeards” should come back to life

and try to be kings of the sea, as they rejoiced to be a couple of

centuries ago, their pride would soon be humbled, and they would gladly

return to their graves and their ancient glory.

There is a form of sea-roving which has been at times not very

different from piracy; it is called _privateering_, and history shows

a good many cases where it has degenerated into sea-robbery pure and

simple.

A privateer is a ship, owned by a private citizen or citizens, to which

authority is given by a government to act as an independent war-vessel.

Its commission is called a “letter of marque” (_lettre de marque_ in

French), entitling it to “take, burn, and destroy” a certain enemy’s

property on the sea or in its ports. It has no right, of course, to

attack any one else.

The object and plea of the government issuing commissions to privateers

is that thus a great many more armed vessels can be sent afloat

than the government has money to equip, and that consequently far

more damage will be done to the enemy, by crippling his trade and

resources, than regular men-of-war alone can accomplish. Private

capital has been willing to take the risk because rewarded by a large

share of the prizes; and from the end of the fifteenth to the middle of

the eighteenth century this was one of the most profitable of marine

industries, for then nearly universal wars made almost any capture

legitimate. In the earlier times even the limited regulation that came

later was absent, and there was small choice between a privateer and

a pirate. Queen Elizabeth found the hundreds of privateers which she

had commissioned against the Spanish and Dutch preying upon her own

people, and robbing fishermen, coasters, and small shore towns, to such

an extent that she had to suppress them as bandits. Those were the

times when Hawkins could use a royal fleet to wage war upon the Spanish

colonies for private reasons; and when his ablest lieutenant, Drake,

could make his notable journey around the world a history of robbery

and slaughter. On the west coast of South America he spent months in

destroying Spanish vessels and ravaging and burning settlements; yet

it was thought remarkable, when he returned from his circumnavigation

of the globe, that the Queen hesitated somewhat before recognizing his

great achievements as a seaman, for fear of complications with Spain!

[Illustration: MALAY PIRATES ATTACKING A STEAMER.]

Spain, in those days of first harvest from her American possessions

and the East Indies, was the prey of everybody on the high seas able

to rob her, and formalities were joyously disregarded by both sides.

Her galleons carried precious cargoes of spices, silks, and East India

goods around the Cape, and brought silver ingots and gold bars from the

Spanish Main. They were usually convoyed by regular war-ships, and had

to run the gantlet of the enemy’s fleets whenever Spain happened to be

openly at war with somebody, as was usually the case; and otherwise

must escape buccaneers in West Indian waters, Malayan and Chinese

pirates in the far East, and irregular sea-rovers along the West

African coast, while the corsairs made the Mediterranean route doubly

dangerous.

[Illustration: PAUL JONES’ FIGHT IN THE “BON HOMME RICHARD” WITH THE

“SERAPIS.”]

The gradual growth of organized navies, the development of

international law, and the increasing organization of the civilized

world generally, slowly tamed these wild practices and reduced

privateering to some sort of control. Thus Jean Bart, the popular

hero of French naval history, who flourished toward the end of the

seventeenth century, was recognized and supported by the French monarch

as a free-lance in the Mediterranean, because his humble birth

prohibited him from taking a commission in the regular navy, which

amounted to a sort of apology for his deeds.

During the wars of the United States with England privateering was

extensively practised on both sides, and was of especial value to the

Americans. Congress issued private commissions as early as March,

1776, and the ablest statesmen upheld it as a means of employing the

ships, capital, and thousands of seamen that must lie idle when the

enemy’s cruisers were ranging the ocean highways unless permitted to

arm themselves and assist the government in an irregular warfare,

trusting to the value of their captures for remuneration. That the

chance of such reward was enough inducement is shown by the fact that

during the first year of the Revolution nearly three hundred and fifty

British vessels were captured, chiefly West Indiamen, worth, with their

cargoes, five million dollars. As Great Britain did not recognize

the flag of the United States, not only these, but even our regular

naval officers, were regarded by them as pirates, rather than true

privateers—Paul Jones first of all; but she never acted on this theory

with the severity that would have been visited upon true pirates.

In the naval warfare that came later between the United States and

France, privateering again flourished, and was a source of immense

profit to the principal seaports whence these swift, effective Yankee

vessels were despatched. No less than three hundred and sixty-five

American privateers were sent out between 1789 and 1799, and swept the

seas almost clean of the French merchant flag.

Then came the second war with Great Britain, which was fought over

a question of the sea rather than of the land,—the right of search

claimed by the British,—and once more American and British privateers

swarmed upon the highways of commerce. Of our merchant ships in all

parts of the world, about five hundred were lost; but this was more

than paid for, since our two hundred and fifty privateers captured or

destroyed, during the three years and nine months of the conflict, no

less than sixteen hundred British merchant vessels of all classes.

This disparity of results was largely due to the greater number of

English merchant vessels, but is also to be credited to the superior

speed and handiness of the Yankee vessels, most of which were

“Baltimore clippers,” topsail-rigged schooners with raking masts, that

could outsail and out-manœuver anything afloat. “They usually carried

from six to ten guns, with a single long one, which was called ‘Long

Tom,’ mounted on a swivel in the center. They were usually manned with

fifty persons besides officers, all armed with muskets, cutlasses, and

boarding-pikes.”

An English writer, Mr. R. C. Leslie, is of the opinion that this type

of vessel grew out of models in vogue in the West Indies, long before,

for the small piratical craft that made those waters the terror of

travelers.

[Illustration:

DRAWN BY W. TABER. ENGRAVED BY HENRY WOLF.

UNITED STATES FRIGATE “CONSTELLATION” OVERHAULING THE SLAVER “CORA.”]

These Baltimore clippers, too, enlarged and square-rigged, but still

the fastest things on the western ocean, formed the craft with which

the slave-trade was continued between Africa and America long after

it had been condemned by the civilized world. For many years previous

to the American Civil War, which put an end to the larger part of the

traffic by destroying its market, England and the United States kept

squadrons patrolling the African coast to arrest the slavers and free

their “cargoes.”

What wild, wild tales of the sea do these reminiscences of piracy,

privateering, and the slave-chase bring to mind—tales of horror, and

yet full of such deeds of daring and romance and fierce delight as must

stir the heart in spite of brain and conscience!

Pirates are things of the past—no more to be feared except in a small

way in the Malayan and Chinese archipelagoes. The African slave-trade

is extinct, so far as shipment across the ocean is concerned, save

where, now and then, an Arab dhow steals with its black cargo along

the East African foreland, or flits across the Gulf of Aden or the Red

Sea. Privateering has been forbidden by international treaty among the

larger European powers, which now recognize that trade goods, even

of belligerents, must be held safe in the ships of neutrals (except

articles declared contraband of war), because the business of the

world cannot stop, or even be put in jeopardy, by a quarrel between

two nations. Privateering, therefore, has been abandoned in Europe

as a method of war since the treaty of Paris in 1856, though Prussia

came pretty near it in 1870, by organizing what she called a volunteer

fleet, and Spain reserves the privilege of commissioning privateers.

The United States, however, and some other countries whose policy

or ability forbid them to have a large navy, would not enter into

the European agreement above mentioned, mutually to abstain from

privateering, on the plea that to do so would be to yield the most

powerful weapon of a nation weak in naval armament and sea commerce,

against any of many possible enemies whose large sea-borne commerce

would expose it to the most serious wounds. In our Civil War the

President issued no letters of marque, although authorized to do so.

It was customary to speak of the Confederate cruisers _Alabama_,

_Shenandoah_, _Florida_, etc., as privateers, or even pirates, and

they actually played the part with a success woeful to us of the

North, and to Great Britain, which had to pay for the damages caused

by the _Alabama_; but, strictly speaking, they were neither, because

commissioned by a temporary but regular government, whose flag might

have been recognized if its arms had succeeded.

[Illustration: Cannon.]

More lately (1898) the United States has announced it as its policy to

refrain from privateering, though no formal signature has been given to

any international agreement to that effect.

[Illustration:

STEAM YACHT. “HALCYON.” SANDY HOOK LIGHT-SHIP. “VOLUNTEER.”

“MAYFLOWER.”

A SPIN OUT TO SEA.—WELL-KNOWN YACHTS ROUNDING THE SANDY HOOK LIGHT-SHIP.

(From the painting by J. O. Davidson, owned by F. A. Hammond, Esq.)]

The Book of the Ocean · 第 3 / 8 章