COMPREHENSION AND IDEA.
I.
Everything, to be known, must be thought as belonging to a system. This
result was the conclusion of Chapter VI. To illustrate: acid is that
which hungers for a base; its sharp taste is the hunger itself; it
exists only in a tension. Hence to think an acid we must think a base;
the base is ideally in the acid, and is the cause of its sharpness. The
union of the acid and base gives us a salt, and in the salt we cannot
taste the acid nor the base distinctly, for each is thoroughly modified
by the other, each is _cancelled_. We separate the acid and base again
and there exist two contradictions—acid and base—each calling for the
other, each asserting its complement to be itself. For the properties of
a somewhat are its _wants_, i. e. what it lacks of the total.
Such elements of a total as we are here considering, have been called
“_moments_” by Hegel. The total is the “_negative unity_” (See Chap.
IV.)
In the illustration we have salt as the negative unity of the moments,
acid and base. The unity is called _negative_ because its existence
destroys each of the moments by adding the other to it. After the
negative unity exists, each of the moments is no longer in a tension,
but has become thoroughly modified by the other. The negative unity is
_ideal_ when the moments are held asunder—it is then potential, and
through it each moment has its own peculiar properties.
More generally: every somewhat is _determined_ by another; its
characteristic, therefore, is the manifestation of its other or of the
complement which makes with it the total or negative unity.
The complete thought of any somewhat includes the phases or moments, as
such, and their negative unity. This may properly be called the
_comprehension_. To comprehend [_Begreifen_] we must seize the object in
its totality; com-prehend = to seize together, just as con-ceive = to
take together; but conception is generally used in English to signify a
picture of the object more or less general. Not the totality, but only
some of its characteristics, are grasped together in a conception. Hence
conceptions are _subjective_, i. e. they do not correspond to the true
object in its entirety; but comprehension is _objective_ in the sense
that everything in its true existence is a comprehension. With this
distinction between conception and comprehension most people would deny,
at once, the possibility of the latter as an act of human intelligence.
Sensuous knowing—for the reason that it attributes validity to isolated
objects—does not comprehend. Reflective knowing seizes the reciprocal
relations, but not in the negative unity. Comprehension—whether one ever
can arrive at it or not—should be the thought in its totality, wherein
negative unity and moments are thought together. Thus a true
comprehension is the thought of the self-determined, and we have not
thoroughly comprehended any thing till we have traced it back through
its various presuppositions to self-determination which must always be
the form of the total. (See chapters IV. & V.)
II.
The name “Idea” is reserved for the deepest thought of Philosophy.[64]
In _comprehension_ we think a system of dependent moments in a negative
unity. Thus in the comprehension the multiplicity of elements, thought
in the moments, is destroyed in its negative unity, and there is,
consequently, only one independent being or totality. Let, once, each of
these moments develop to a totality, so that we have in each a
repetition of the whole, and we shall have a comprehension of
comprehensions—a system of totalities—and this is what Hegel means by
“_Idee_,” or Idea. Plato arrives at this, but does not consistently
develop it. He deals chiefly with the standpoint of comprehension, and
hence has much that is _dialectical_. (The Dialectic is the process
which arises when the abstract and incomplete is put under the form of
the true, or the apodeictic. To refute a category of limited
application, make it universal and it will contradict itself. Thus the
“Irony” of Socrates consists in generously (!) assuming of any category
all that his interlocutor wishes, and then letting it refute itself
while he applies it in this and that particular instance with the air of
one who sincerely believes in it. Humor is of this nature; the author
assumes the validity of the character he is portraying in regard to his
weak points, and then places him in positions wherein these weaknesses
prove their true nature.) Aristotle, on the other hand, writes from the
standpoint of the _Idea_ constantly, and therefore treats his subjects
as systematic totalities independent of each other; this gives the
appearance of empiricism to his writings. The following illustration of
the relation of comprehension to idea may be of assistance here:
Let any totality = T be composed of elements, phases or moments = a + b
+ c + d, &c. Each of these moments, a, b, c, &c., differs from the
others and from the total; they are in a negative unity just as acid and
base are, in a salt. The assertion of the negative unity cancels each of
the moments. The negative unity adds to _a_ the _b_, _c_, and _d_, which
it lacks of the total; for a = T - b - c - &c.; and so too b = T - a - c
- d - &c., and c = T - a - b - &c. Each demands all the rest to make its
existence possible, just as the acid cannot exist if its tension is not
balanced by a base. So far we have the Comprehension. If, now, we
consider these moments as being able to develop, like the Monads of
Leibnitz, we shall have the following result: _a_ will absorb _b_ + _c_
+ _d_ + _&c._, and thus become a totality and a negative unity for
itself; _b_ may do likewise, and thus the others. Under this supposition
we have, instead of the first series of moments (a + b + c + d + &c.) a
new series wherein each moment has developed to a total by supplying its
deficiencies thus: a b c d &c., + b a c d &c., + c a b d &c., + d a b c
&c. In the new series, each term is a negative unity and a totality, and
hence no longer exists in a tension, and no longer can be cancelled by
the negative unity. Such a system of terms would offer us a manifold of
individuals, and yet a profound unity. This is the unity of the Idea,
and it affords a concrete multiplicity. Leibnitz gives to his Monads the
power of reflection, so that each is the mirror of the universe; hence,
in each is found the whole, and the Totality is endlessly repeated;
“everywhere the one and the all”—and this is the “preestablished
harmony,” no doubt. This is the highest point of view in philosophy—true
multiplicity and true unity coexisting. Plato reaches it in his
statement in the Timaeus, that “God has made the world most like
himself, since he _in nowise possesses envy_.” The ultimate purpose of
the universe is the reflection of God to himself. In this reflection,
the existence of independent self-determining totalities is presupposed;
to all else he is a negative unity, and therefore destructive. To the
righteous, i. e. to those who perfect themselves by performing for
themselves the function of negative unity, He says: “In you I am well
pleased; I am reflected in you.” But to the wicked he is a consuming
fire, for they do not assume the function of negative unity, but leave
it to be used toward them from outside. Thus, too, the lower orders of
existence perish through this, that their negative unity is not within
but without. If God is conceived merely as the negative unity, and the
creature not as self-determining, we have the standpoint of Pantheism.
It is the Brahm which becomes all, and all returns into him again. If we
had such a God we should only _seem_ to be, for when he looked at us and
“placed us under the form of Eternity” we should vanish. But in culture
each of us absorbs his “not me,” just as “a,” in the illustration given
above, became a b c d &c. Its _a_-ness was destroyed by its modifying
(“rounding off”) its own peculiarity by the peculiarities of the rest,
and thus becoming “cosmopolitan.” This is justly esteemed the
profoundest and most sacred dogma of the Christian Religion when stated
as the doctrine of the Trinity. The completest unity there obtains of
independent individualities. All higher forms of spirit repeat the same
thought. Government, e. g. is the Legislative, the Judiciary, and the
Executive. Resist the Judiciary and it can, in the exercise of its
function, assume executive powers. Each power is the entire organism
viewed from the standpoint of one of its phases, just as _a b c_, _b a
c_, _c a b_, are the same totality, but with different starting points
assumed.
The self-determining being is the being which is its own other, and
hence is its own negative unity. Thus it can never be a simple moment of
a higher being, but is essentially a _reflection_ of it. Recognition is
the highest deed; it belongs to the standpoint of the Idea. Upon the
plane of comprehension, the unity and multiplicity are mutually
destructive; upon the plane of Idea they are mutually affirmative. The
more creatures in whom he can be reflected, the more affirmations of God
there are. The human spirit grows solely through recognition.
* * * * *
_Remark._ This is the only standpoint that is absolutely affirmative—all
others being more or less negative, and, as a consequence, self-opposed.
The stage of _human culture_ is the most concrete illustration of it.
Three human beings—A, B, and C—meet and form a community. As physical
beings they exclude, each the others. The more one eats, the less the
others have to eat. But spiritually it is the reverse: each has a
different experience, and their giving and taking, instead of
diminishing any one’s share, _increases_ it. The experience of A is
imparted to B, and conversely; and so also both share with C. By this, C
grows through the culture of A and B, and becomes C B A; B develops to B
C A, and A to A C B; all is gain: no loss, except of _poverty_.
Limitation by another makes a finite being. But self-determination is
the process of being one’s own “other” or limit, and hence all
self-determined beings are totalities or microcosms, which, though
independent, reflect each other, i. e. they make themselves in the same
image. Hence the “Preëstablished Harmony” exists among such beings. Each
is its own negative. Cognition or mind is the form of being which
embodies this.
In culture we have an absolutely affirmative process, for the reason
that the _negative_, involved in the cancelling of one’s own
idiosyncracies, is a negative of what is already negative. Hence the
unity of God is not in anywise impaired by the existence of a
continually increasing number of perfected beings. In proportion to
their perfection they reflect Him, and their complete self-determination
is just that complete realization of Him which completes his
self-consciousness. This has been called Pantheism by those who confound
this standpoint with that of the Comprehension. Pantheism is impossible
with a proper insight into the nature of self-consciousness. A blind
force fulfilling its destiny, and giving rise to various orders of
beings which are to be re-absorbed by it,—if one fancies this to be God,
call him a Pantheist, for God is then merely a negative unity, and
creation is only a series of _moments_. But if one considers God to
be the Absolute Person, and deduces all Theology from His
self-consciousness, as Hegel does, he cannot be called a Pantheist
consistently by any one who believes in the Gospel of St. John. It is
easy to see why Hegel has been and still is regarded as a Pantheist.
When he asserts the self-consciousness of the creature to be the
completion of the Divine self-consciousness, Hegel merely states the
logical constituents of the Christian idea of the Trinity. The
“creature” is the _Son_, which is “in the beginning.” All time must have
presented and still presents the development of creatures into
self-conscious beings. Our planet began a short time since to do this.
“The fullness of time had come,” and the final stage of reflection
(which must always have existed in the Universe) began on the earth, or,
to state it theologically, “The Son was sent to redeem this world.” To
think that Hegel could regard God as becoming conscious in time—as
passing from an unconscious state to a conscious one—is to suppose him
the weakest of philosophers. _Self-consciousness_ cannot be “in time,”
for it is the “form of eternity,” and thus time is not relative to it.
The “fleeting show” of History does not touch the self-consciousness of
God, nor does it touch any self-conscious being “whose soul is builded
far from accident.”