the invaders' plans been realised, Paris would have been occupied and
the French opposition paralysed in a fortnight. But this was reckoning
without Joffre, without England, and without "General Chance," one of
the most important factors in any war. Ammunition, by reason of its
vast role, became as engrossing and as vitally important as the actual
fighting. For it soon became apparent that in this war of _materiel_ he
would win who could most quickly assemble the largest quantity of guns
and shot and shell. The Germans began with an immense advantage, for
they had accumulated secretly a mass of machine-guns estimated at
50,000, leaving the Allies hopelessly in the rear in this respect. But
even their perverse intelligence did not fully grasp the logical outcome
of their own preparations, or foresee that, their first plan having
failed, they would be caught inevitably in their own toils.
To the eternal credit of the French, they realised with great rapidity
the character of the war, and set themselves with methodical speed to
adapt themselves to its unexpected features. Factories sprang up all
over the country, some created out of boards and bricks; others
existing, but "controlled" in the English sense, with Army officers
assisting the civilian directors; and a vast business of production was
ordered and marshalled as if the French had never done anything else in
their lives. At one bound, they developed into a manufacturing nation,
though the term would have been refused them, in the long yesterday of
the war, by England, the United States, and Germany. Their faculty for
seeing clearly and acting quickly, so apparent in their history, again
came to their aid. It was their distinguishing mark during the Great
Revolution. Having seized the essentials of the problem, they acted
upon their insight with startling rapidity and resolution. Of course
they committed excesses of a dreadful kind, but their excuse was the
gigantic character of the evil which they sought to remedy. Much the
same spirit of swift determination, happily without its fearful
manifestations, came upon the French people, and with all the old
Republican ardour they set themselves, with a sort of grim alacrity, to
face the crisis. The old stern common sense, which has always lain at
the bottom of apparent volatility, again came to their rescue; and in no
way did the French show a greater grasp of the situation than in their
handling of munitions.
It had been supposed that they were wanting in order and method, and
that their dramatic achievements were due to the impulse of the moment.
But, even if this were ever wholly true, it was certainly not true of
the second great struggle with Germany. The magnificent effort of France
was the outcome, not of improvisation, but of the will to conquer and to
adopt the proper means to secure that end. Nor was a Press campaign
necessary, as in England, to bring home to the people the peculiar
importance of war-work in the factories. It is true that M. Albert
Thomas, who took charge of Munitions in the circumstances which I shall
describe, made speeches to factory workers in his visits of inspection,
but it was never necessary to wrestle with labour and cause it to
abrogate its proud pretensions, months after the war had broken out.
Conscription would have settled that question even if a vivid sense of
realities had not rendered unnecessary any exhortation from Ministerial
lips. The vital character of the war had penetrated to every
intelligence; it had not stopped half-way through the social strata, as
appeared to be the case in England. And the disposition of the working
man in England towards conscription was only intelligible on the
assumption that he did not understand. In France, the war was too
deadly real, too close at hand for any to affect an attitude of
light-hearted detachment.
The fact that men in the factories like those on the railways, were
mobilised, simplified matters a great deal. A man could not desist from
his labour on the pretext of claiming higher pay without running the
risk of being treated as a deserter--a thing unthinkable in time of war.
His duty, then was the soldier's--to remain where he was until relieved
by order. "We have had no strike since the war began." How well I
recall the pride with which those words were uttered by a functionary at
the Ministry of Munitions. If it spoke well for the patriotism of the
working-class, it spoke equally well for conscription as a scientific
basis for waging war. For it had cast its net over the whole nation, and
by its means the munitions worker took his place in the factory as did
the combatant in the trench. But there were certain complications which
arose, none the less, in practice. If there was no disturbance of the
labour market to exercise the conciliatory powers of the Minister,
production did not yet reach its maximum until long after the war had
broken out. This was due to the unexampled demand made on munitions and
to the logical completeness of conscription. It required many months to
adjust a plan whereby the skilled worker was placed in his rightful
position in the factory, whilst those who had wrongly usurped his name
and functions were sent to the trenches. The most unlikely people had
described themselves as mechanics; and one found lawyers, sculptors,
school-teachers, painters, writers and a host of semi-professional
people masquerading as munition-workers. On the other hand, numbers of
highly trained specialists, some distinguished chemists and engineers,
had to be extricated from the trenches to take up their natural
positions in the factories, in the interests of national defence. This
_chasse-croisse_, inevitable in such a country as France, where
Government must be based upon equality, took some time to effect.
Indeed, the chief duty of the publicist during the second year of the
war seemed to be to urge an equitable and intelligent application of the
Dalbiez law, which was aimed expressly at the shirker.
Nor did private patronage and political "pull" wholly disappear, even in
the stringent atmosphere of a national crisis. This was, perhaps, to
expect too much of human nature. And so the Minister of Munitions
constantly received recommendations for factory employment from persons
whose intervention it was hard to resist. On the one hand, the Minister
was asked by important deputies to bring back this or that worker from
the Front; on the other, he was warned by groups of Republican zealots
of the danger to democracy of showing partiality and conniving at the
existence of the shirker. In a laudable effort to strike the happy
medium, M. Thomas decided to receive no more nominations to the factory,
and decreed that only the indispensable man was to be kept in the rear.
Even the good workman, if of military age, must become a combatant; his
place in the factory would be taken by an older man. But there remained,
naturally, a certain rivalry between the trench and the workshop, not
unconnected with the fact that assiduous munition-workers also received
their _Croix de Guerre_--a decoration that, assuredly, should have been
reserved for deeds of gallantry on the battle-field. But these various
difficulties, which M. Thomas settled with habitual celerity and _savoir
faire_, were, after all, only questions of detail, and in no way
affected the broad principle of conscription or the working of the new
Act against the _embusques_. There was no quarrel with compulsion, for
each worker recognised the right of the nation to ask him to suspend his
individual rights at such a moment. "We are at war; the vital interests
of the country are at stake." This was a sufficient argument. And so
all energies were directed to increasing the output. In connection with
the establishment of factories, the "white coal" or water-falls of the
mountains were harnessed to the work, and engineer shops were set up
under the falls themselves to employ the power directly. Inventors were
given _carte blanche_ to work out their ideas and valuable improvements
resulted in the opportunity given to scientific brains to simplify
processes, and thus effect economies in manufacture. For the first time
France had begun to explore and develop her own scientific estate, which
she had left, hitherto, largely to the Germans. For, if the latter were
foremost in chemistry, they had learned not a little from the researches
of Berthelot and Pasteur. The great bacteriologist's study of ferments
contributed sensibly to the growth of the German brewing industry.
Under the direction of scientific soldiers and officials, production
rose to immense heights, and it soon reached more than 100,000 shells a
day, at a time when, according to Mr. Lloyd George, the English output
was scarcely more than 15,000 a day. M. Charles Humbert, Senator for
the Meuse and editor of the _Journal_, preached in his columns the need
of more guns and shells, and his gospel was enforced by other writers;
but the root argument laid in the comprehension of the people themselves
and in their instinctive realisation of what there was to be done and
how to do it. Latin brains and Latin culture triumphed in an absolutely
new field.
The genius of Munitions was M. Albert Thomas, who sprang into prominence
from the unlikely beginnings of a schoolmaster and parliamentarian with
Socialistic leanings. His assets were youth and vigour and a large
stock of learning. He had graduated from the "Higher Normal School,"
the training ground for secondary teachers, with an _agregation_ in
history--equivalent to a Fellowship Examination in England--and then
became tutor to a grandson of Victor Hugo. In the family were
steelworks situated in the Loire, and the tutor's active mind became
interested in the fascinating processes which turned the unwrought metal
into shining implements of labour. This knowledge, strengthened by many
visits, stood him in good stead when he became a deputy, and thereafter
Reporter to the State Railways Committee. His constituency was Sceaux,
on the outskirts of the capital, and therein was his native commune,
Champigny, where he was born of humble shopkeepers and continued to
reside. In the Chamber his connection with the railways brought him
into contact with M. Claveille, then coming into fame as administrator
of the Ouest-Etat line. M. Thomas must be impressed by the catenation
of events, for, on arriving at the Ministry of Munitions, he bethought
him of the railway manager and installed him first as his master of
contracts and, then, at the head of manufacture. So that the guns began
to arrive at their appointed place with the same punctuality with which
the trains on the State Railway, under the reforming zeal of M.
Claveille, began to steam into the Gare St. Lazare.
At the outbreak of the war, M. Thomas, torn from peaceful Socialistic
propaganda in _L'Humanite_, where he supported M. Jean Jaures in his
opposition to Three-Years, went to the Front as a lieutenant of reserve.
After a few weeks in the trenches, he joined his General's Staff and
then was summoned to Bordeaux, whither the Government had retired from
threatened Paris. "Will you organise Munitions?" he was asked. The
battle of the Marne had revealed not only their primordial necessity,
but the grievous shortage of France, and it was said that had she been
better provided, the Germans would have had no chance of re-establishing
themselves on the line of the Aisne. So M. Thomas, faced with the crude
need of the hour, undertook the post and flung himself into it with his
accustomed energy. His acquaintance with steel, both in the works he
had studied and the railway he had controlled, fortified his resolution
to undertake the responsibility. Day and night he passed rapidly, from
point to point, in his motor-car, organising munition work and exhorting
and advising the engineers of the country engaged in it, until,
gradually, the production was screwed up to a point where, with the
shells made in England, it equalled the output of the German factories.
Here was a strange destiny for a man whose reading and reflection had
induced him to believe that the tide of humanity was set towards
universal brotherhood. Looking as little like a professor of war as
could be possibly imagined--a little plethoric, a little heavy in face
and figure, and glancing out upon the world through kindly
spectacles--this new embodiment of Mars accepted his position with a
frank and systematised zeal that led directly to success. In a short
time, the tree brought forth prodigious fruit. He worked ceaselessly,
turning Sundays into days of labour; his only relaxation from exhausting
office was to undertake further journeys of inspection.
There was advantage in the fact that he was a man of wide general views
and not an expert. Had he been a gunner, he would have thought
exclusively of the pointing of his piece; as an engineer he would have
reflected on the life-history of the gun from its early inception to its
appearance as a finished article of destruction. But being the
intelligent amateur, he was able, like an airman, to soar over
intercepted space, and think of the problem in its wider aspects: how to
obtain the ore and transport it from the other ends of the earth; how to
procure the quickest output from the arsenals; how to adjust factory
labour to the new law against the shirker; how to provide a sufficiency
of food for the monsters he was evolving; how to cultivate the
scientific _terrain_ of the war; and finally, how he could deliver his
deadly wares into the hands of those who would use them against the
enemy. There were a hundred different problems arising out of the great
military post which the war had given him, and he managed them all with
the ease and optimism that belong to rapid assimilation combined with
poise, with _sang-froid_, and decision of character. All these virtues
contributed to the success of M. Thomas. He was rewarded by official
appointment to the post of Under Secretary of State for Munitions,
specially created for him by M. Millerand, the then Minister of War.
The honour was unique in the history of the Third Republic, which does
not always advantage those who serve it best.
All the departments connected with guns had to be concentrated at the
Ministry of Munitions in the Champs Elysees. At the outbreak of war the
building was a cosmopolitan hotel on the verge of opening; the
Government, needing quarters for its new department of State, acquired
it, and there amidst Louis XVI chairs and Empire cabinets were installed
M. Thomas and his coadjutors. The Socialist pacifist had become the
Grand Armourer of France, the licensed provider of artillery, in a house
of luxury built for the wealthy classes.... In his chain of duties,
however, was a broken link. He was not given charge of the powder,
though it was essential to his full usefulness; and officials in that
department corresponded directly with the Minister of War. But
Gallieni, when he came to the Rue St. Dominique, saw the faults of the
system and immediately invested his titular subordinate with the
necessary powers. It was at this moment, when work was piling high upon
his willing shoulders, that M. Thomas gave M. Claveille authority over
the construction of the guns. And the railway manager's experience
proved invaluable in his new post.
France had every reason to be proud of her organisation of Munitions,
and for the spirit which the crisis prompted amongst her functionaries
and workers. As a University man of distinction, M. Thomas placed his
faith in higher education and was surrounded by men who had achieved
distinction in science and letters. A Sorbonne professor of Romance
languages, M. Roques, acted as his chief secretary; and a scholar of
European reputation occupied unremunerated leisure in conducting the
correspondence of the Department. Thus the Ministry provided another
example of public spirit in France and of Gallic accessibility to new
ideas.
Quite apart from the attitude of labour, admirably attuned to the
circumstances, there arose the material difficulty of finding men. The
Loi Dalbiez was rigorous in its application, and there was a dearth of
young and vigorous men, both skilled and unskilled, in the factories. I
have spoken of some of the methods adopted by M. Thomas to meet the
case: now he went to the colonies and employed Arabs and Kabyles,
Annamites, and other friendly nationals from France overseas. This
exotic labour worked harmoniously with the dominant race. Wages were on
a far less generous scale than in England, and no worker, however
skilled, obtained L8 a week or even half that amount. Such prices were
unthought of. The common wage for unskilled labour was five francs for a
ten-hour day for men and women. Where the operations were perfectly
simple and required only adroitness, the wages for female labour were
sometimes only 3 frs. a day. Even the trained mechanic earned no more
than 15 frs., the highest price being generally 13 frs. 50. Thus, you
see, there was a vast difference between the English and the French
positions, and it is clear that the cost to the country of shell
production was infinitely less in France, even at a moment when the
output was infinitely greater. There were no lady workers in the
factories--"heureusement non"--said the official, with an expressive
shrug, when I asked the question, and the whole scheme of production was
worked on carefully considered, economical, and patriotic lines.
Certainly, the worker made very little profit out of his labour, and the
intensity of it in France, as in England, put a considerable strain upon
his health.
A veritable scientific mobilisation was necessary in the Champs Elysees.
Highly trained brains were needed for the delicate calculations
essential to the manufacture of explosives and to the creation of new
types of guns. It meant the installation of eminent specialists at the
Ministry and the carrying out of elaborate experiments in laboratories
and open-air trial grounds. The syndicates, I repeat, made no
difficulty for the Minister by adherence to rules framed for peace; but,
of course, the power of these bodies in France over their fellow-workers
is less pronounced than across the Straits. But, though it has its
stringent rules, it raised no finger of protest against the speeding-up
of production, the continuous shifts, the employment of women and
children and of coloured labour. The difficulty that existed was
entirely due to the fear of creating any suspicion of favouritism
amongst those who were fighting the country's battles by any arbitrary
selection of men for employment in the factories. None the less, the
munitions worker had to be recruited on a large scale, for the
consumption of shot and shell exceeded all belief and emphasised the
fantastic character of the conflict.
No doubt the physical existence of the Channel was answerable for the
difference in attitude of French and English labour. It was difficult
for our workers to visualise the situation in France with its invaded
departments, its devastated villages, its ruined industries, its
strangulated commerce and those other disabilities which weigh upon a
nation that has suffered defilement from the foe. But the French soon
came to see that the loyalty of the British working man was not in
question because of his reluctance to accept a system which, however,
both Abraham Lincoln and Cromwell found necessary in the raising of
armed forces for the carrying out of national purposes. And yet neither
could be accused of being indifferent to the claims of democracy.
*CHAPTER IX*
*FRENCH DISCIPLINE AND LEADERSHIP*
A certain number of political students had come to the discouraging
conclusion that discipline could not exist side by side with a pure
democracy. The two things, they said, were incompatible. Trade Union
leaders in England were for a long time apparently under the same
illusion. Joffre, whom I have tried to show as the perfect democrat,
will not accept any such view. In a frank and engaging mood of
communicability, he explained to an American writer, Mr. Owen Johnson,
who visited him at Headquarters, that democracy was by no means the
uneasy bedfellow of discipline; the two could exist in the most perfect
harmony. "Where a nation is truly Republican, I do not think there is
any danger to the spirit of democracy in military preparation," said
Joffre, in reply to the suggestions that the existence of a large army
was a constant incitement to war, and opposed, therefore, to those
pacific principles upon which a modern republic must be founded.
Military discipline does not undermine democracy: that is his argument.
"In a republic where the need of individual liberty is always strong,
military service gives the citizen a quality of self-discipline which he
needs, perhaps, to respect the rights of others, as well as to act in
organised bodies." And then he added that if America--and the remark
applies, of course, to England--dreaded military service, it was because
the citizen had his eyes fixed on the German ideal rather than on the
French. The distinction between the French Army and the German was a
difference in the conception of the role of the soldier. The German
system made a man into a machine. It was based on fear, and robbed him
of his initiative. It explained the attack in close formation, the
stupendous throwing away of life, and an officer class, a veritable
Brahmin caste, that did not transmit orders directly, but through
sergeants and corporals. The French spirit, on the other hand, implied
fraternity. The officer was interested in the welfare of his men and
regarded them as his children. Nothing was indifferent to him which
affected them morally or materially. The German system was the revolver
at the head, the French the word of encouragement, the smile, the _bonne
camaraderie_.
General Joffre's distinction happily expresses the fundamental character
of the two systems; it goes to the root of army psychology. The French
method requires a knowledge of the temperament of the men; for, though
you may drive the dull and high-spirited in much the same way, provided
you are brutal enough, to lead successfully requires knowledge of mental
characteristics and a certain power of appeal which elicits the best
efforts in your men. French officers, therefore, have to be
psychologists, understanding the character of those they lead and the
subtle differences that divide the townsman from the peasant. They must
vary indefinably the address when they talk to one or the other. These
two broad classes are moved by different springs of action, and the
commander has to find out the best way of firing the lethargic and
attracting the fiery nature.
A French friend, who commanded a battalion of engineers, gave me some
explanation of the methods he employed in dealing with a difficult
class, the town-bred mechanic. His battalion was composed of men from
provincial centres, with a sprinkling of skilled workmen from Paris. He
played off one against the other. When the Parisian was inclined to
show slackness or insubordination he remonstrated with him in a tone of
raillery and mock commiseration. It was certainly regrettable that he
could not attain to the same level of conduct or efficiency as those
excellent fellows from the provinces, who, after all, had not enjoyed
the same advantages. Rarely had he to speak twice to the same
delinquent; the man's _amour propre_ was aroused; from that moment, he
commenced to mend his ways. To the provincial he said that he was
surprised that a man of his energy and parts should allow himself to
take second place to the Parisian. Then it was true that the countryman
could not hold his own with workers from the capital? This, again,
proved admirably adapted to the particular mentality of his hearer; his
pride was piqued; he gave no more trouble. Thus, to command under the
French system requires considerable adroitness and intelligence.