than six months; but when M. Jaures presented his scheme none foresaw
the fantastic character that the fighting would assume. If it had
presented its habitual physiognomy of massed movements in the open,
soldiers of six months' training would have been inadequate to the first
shock of battle. Though, as we have shown, there were points in the
speech that revealed acute observation and an accurate reading of the
times, the treatment of details was deplorable. Here and there his
inspiration failed him, as if his mentor, who was known to be Captain
Girard, a writer on military topics, had ceased to jog his elbow. One
of the least happy of his inventions was his proposal in regard to the
"cover." He considered that it was quite adequate with the protection
of the Eastern Forts. Again, the frontier departments, being rich and
highly industrialised, could organise their own defence. "If you have
confidence in the people, if you organise them in unities constituted
locally and ready to march at the first sound of the war tocsin, if you
launch all these living forces towards the frontier, this, indeed, is
the real cover." From this passage you may judge the character of his
pleading: the appeal to national sentiment and spontaneous enthusiasm,
as opposed to the laboured and essentially mechanical preparation of the
Germans. He went to military history to prove that, in 1813, Germany
was saved not by her generals formed in the school of Frederick the
Great, but by her _landwehr_, which constituted 60 per cent. of the
army--peasants hastily armed to defend the soil. Evidently he thought
that the old revolutionary spirit would flame forth again in France and
suffice against any wanton attack.
He was admirable in his description of the German plan to invade France
abruptly and to bring her to her knees by forced marches, by a rapid
succession of blows, and the occupation of her capital, and then to turn
swiftly towards Russia. Jaures found consolation--alas! unwarranted--in
the thought that Germany under Prussian domination would never make full
use of her reserves. She was afraid, he said, of a democratic army,
afraid of that spirit which had enabled France, amidst all her
difficulties and lack of preparation, to resist for seven months, in
'70, and had given Bismarck and Von Moltke a certain anxiety even after
Sedan. Better build strategic railways than barracks, he said, so that
an avalanche of men might be poured on the frontier to meet the German
mass--a conclusion which was wise enough.
Then there was M. Clementel, a former Minister of Colonies, with some
experience of army affairs, who had likewise his little plan to propose.
He wished to divide the reserve into eleven classes which would train
alternately, for a month at a time, during the year. Parliament
rejected it, not because it was fanciful, but because the transportation
of 200,000 men a month to their training camps would disarrange the
railway systems. M. Messimy--who was Minister of War, during the early
days of the Great Invasion, and, like Mr. Winston Churchill, resigned
his Cabinet functions to join the army--devised a method whereby the
youth of the country would be trained for twenty-six months. How he
proposed to bridge the gap between the departure of the time-expired men
and the arrival of the new recruits was never made clear. In the light
of his subsequent experience as a Colonel of troops, and wounded in
action, he probably thought better of his own plan.
General Pau clinched the matter by a series of irrefutable figures. His
style differed utterly from that of any other speaker. He showed the
quick temperament of a leader of the old school, who believed in a brisk
offensive. Taking umbrage, one day, at the remarks of a deputy, he
gathered up his papers and walked out of the House, to the consternation
of the Government. Wounded in the 1870 conflict and bearing the token
of it in an amputated arm, he looked and spoke with the abruptness of
the traditional soldier. As a leader of men he was impetuous and
brusque in his methods, rather than a cool calculator like the
Generalissimo. He told the House, with a certain impetuousness, that
the troops available for national defence were scarcely more than half
the German effectives. For, abstraction made of the number serving
overseas, France had only 480,000 in her active army, whilst Germany had
830,000. First-class reserve, territorials, and the reserve of the
territorials amounted to 3,978.000, of which a part had performed only
twelve months' service in accordance with the terms of the 1889 law. In
Germany, the reserve amounted to 4,370,000, giving an advantage to that
country of 400,000 men. The effectives were constantly growing in the
one country, with the advance in population, but remained stationary in
the other. Whilst France called up every available man for service,
Germany was in the happier position of being able to dispense with a
certain portion of her resources. Thus, automatically, an increase in
her peace establishment meant an increase in the reserve.
The German law of 1913 gave 63,000 more men to the active army and
increased the effectives to 5,400,000. The speaker was even more
impressive when, looking forward to 1937--in twenty-four years from that
date--he anticipated that the adverse balance in the reserve would
amount to one million and a half. "Since our numerical weakness is
undeniable, we must increase the value of our troops," declared the
veteran in the thunder of the House. And he added, that military value
was dependent upon cohesion and training. Those two advantages could be
obtained by increasing the effectives and prolonging the period under
arms. What had the law of 1913 given to Germany? It had given to her a
better quality of troops and permitted greater rapidity of mobilisation.
The cover troops represented, henceforth, about half the total effective
of the German Army. In a few hours, then, half the German Army could
enter the field. Out of twenty-three German army corps, eleven were up
to war strength and ready for instant service. Finally, this
unconsciously eloquent advocate of the momentous change in French
armament said that by incorporating a class and a half of their youngest
reserve, the German troops of the interior would reach their full
strength whilst the French had to receive four or five classes of
reserves--a fact which retarded, notably, the mobilisation.
I have given the discussion at length because it supplies the underlying
causes of Germany's military superiority. It explains why the "attaque
brusquee" succeeded up to a certain point; it explains, also, why the
Chamber, after listening to the most authoritative champion of
Three-Years, gave M. Barthou, whose courage throughout the tremendous
debate was proof against all assaults, an overwhelming majority, and
France an additional 180,000 men, whose presence with the colours was of
immense value in the Great Retreat a year later. It is acknowledged by
military experts that, had not thoroughly trained troops formed the base
of the army, the Generalissimo would not have found to his hand the
instrument needed to make the stand on the Marne. The fact is
undisputed, and to M. Barthou is due the honour of having refused to
disregard the logic of events, for which, alas! he had every precedent.
*CHAPTER III*
*THE DEVELOPMENT OF THE NATIONAL ARMY*
The national army arose suddenly out of the blood and turmoil of the
Revolution. The country was aflame with enthusiasm and informed with
the spirit of sacrifice. The urgency of the times was well represented
by the law of March 4, 1791, which declared in all the ardour of the
First Republic: "The service of the country is a civic and general
duty." That fine definition was born of the need of the nation to
defend itself against overwhelming odds; and thus, every citizen was
called to a place in the army. The King's forces, which existed before
the nation in arms, was composed, on the other hand, of French and
foreign mercenaries and a militia raised by royal authority. Though,
sometimes, these professionals espoused the popular cause and fought for
patriotic purposes, they were primarily engaged to defend the King's
interest, and the two were not necessarily identical. Not infrequently
it happened that the army was on one side of the barricade and the
people on the other. The recruiting sergeant had much to do with the
presence of men under the King's banner, and certain vigorous methods
reinforced his arts of persuasion. To the regular pay of the soldier
was added the prospect of unlimited pillage in foreign war. Generally
he fought because he was paid for it, and his royal master had no
particular need to enlist his sentimental interest in the enterprise.
But another change came when the Republic emerged from the glowing
brazier of Revolutionary France. The country was beset with numerous
enemies anxious to champion the lost cause of monarchy, though the
people of these nations, as the official text-books in France tell us,
had no quarrel with the people of France. And then, just as one hundred
and twenty years later, the German princes led the hosts against France
and the response was the uprising of the nation. Since the Revolution,
the nations of Europe have adopted national service in acceptance of the
principle laid down on March 4, 1791, that it was a "civic and general
duty." The Convention ordered levies _en masse_, and this principle was
embodied definitely in the enactment of March 23, 1793, which said that
from this moment until the territories of the Republic were free from
enemies, all Frenchmen were liable to serve; the 2nd Article decreed
that young men should fight, that the married men should forge arms and
transport material, the women to make tents and clothing and serve in
the hospitals, the children to convert old linen into surgeons' lint,
and the old men to be carried to the public squares to encourage the
warriors, to excite their hatred against the Kings, and promote unity in
the Republic. The annual drafts were fixed by the law of Fructidor 19
An VI, and they were recruited by drawing lots and by enrolment. A
later law of the Year VII allowed those drawn to purchase substitutes,
and it was under this law that Napoleon raised his armies. The system
lasted until 1814, when the fortunes of France were at a low ebb. The
country had become tired of a military Imperialism, which had
devitalised it and left it with monstrous debts. There was no further
taste for arms; voluntary engagements had practically ceased. Thus the
abrogation of conscription was tantamount to abolishing the army. The
wars of the First Empire had worked out the vein of militarism.
Compulsion, however, had to be re-established, in principle at least, on
March 18, 1818, by the Gouvion St. Cyr law. A certain number of men was
called up annually and the system existed side by side with voluntary
engagements. The annual contingent was fixed at 40,000. There was
further legislation on March 21, 1832, due to Marshal Soult. This
established that conscription was the normal method and engagements the
subsidiary one, but the principle of paying substitutes was admitted.
The service was for seven years. The army was divided into two classes:
the one performed the full term; the other was _en conge_, and
constituted the reserve. The business of finding substitutes rose to
such a pitch that agencies were founded to deal with it. It became a
crying scandal. Reform was necessary, and it was embodied in a law
dated April 26, 1855. By its provisions a fund was formed. Those who
wished to buy themselves out were obliged to contribute a certain sum
fixed each year by the Minister of War. This money was allocated to
bonuses paid to time-expired men to re-engage. The system was not as
brilliant as it looked and in practice it worked badly. It lowered the
status of the soldier in his own eyes and in those of public opinion,
for it gave to national service the character of a punishment or a
commercial transaction. Only those remained in the ranks who could not
find a substitute or because of a monetary inducement. Again, it was
bad because it created a permanent class of under-officer who regarded
the army as his perquisite and shut the door of promotion to the common
soldier. The plan, none the less, prevailed until 1868, when, like a
trumpet blast, startling Europe out of her sleep, came Prussia's
victories over Southern Germany.
The meaning was clear. It meant that, since Napoleon's amazing
successes, Prussia had adopted a military _regime_ which gave her
superiority over her neighbours. It was based on universal service. If
France realised how great were her own military shortcomings, she had
not the strength of mind necessary to institute a system involving
serious sacrifice. Even Marshal Niel, who presented a project to the
Imperial Legislature, did not prevail against a conspiracy of optimism
based on a total disregard of the facts. The Marshal, indeed, played
the ungrateful part of a Lord Roberts in warning his nation against an
illusory peace. His was the _vox clamantis in deserto_ calling in vain
for a real national service. His prophetic eyes had seen the storm,
which others preferred not to see. However, the law was altered in a
half-hearted effort to obtain reform, but the old facilities for
substitution remained. It was then decided to create a national Garde
Mobile composed of men excused from active service. Unfortunately,
there was no time to organise it before war with Germany broke out.
Though it lacked training and experience and was comparatively
ill-disciplined, it was not wanting in courage, and proved of utility in
the campaign. Lord Kitchener joined it as a young volunteer.
When the _debacle_ came, the whole of Europe was able to read the lesson
in the lurid light it flung to heaven. German dominance had been built
up on a conscripted army, against which a volunteer and partially
conscripted army struggled in vain. It was overborne by sheer weight of
numbers. England felt herself guarded by the inviolate sea, but the
other Powers of the Continent adopted the principle of national service.
In France itself, the law of 1872 was the logical outcome of the dread
experience of the _annee terrible_. The subsequent legislation, which
is dated 1889, 1905, and 1913 aimed at rendering military service more
complete and more in accord with Republican equality. The last law,
just before the war, imposed the same burden upon each citizen. But an
immense amount of discussion was necessary before reaching this simple
result, for alas! political interests in various specious guises had
interfered with the pure working out of national defence. As a
consequence, exemptions were always considerable. The broadest
interpretation was given to "higher education," and examinations,
useless from a national point of view or as a test of learning, existed
for the sole purpose of allowing the son of the bourgeois to curtail his
military service. It was obvious that a knowledge of some
out-of-the-way tongue could not be held to compensate, in a national
sense, for the loss of a man's service in the army.
A large number of exemptions arose through the laudable desire to
lighten the burden for widows and families dependent upon an only son.
But, as a result of it, two different categories of reservists were
created, those whom the _baccalaureat_ had excused after a year's
service, and that much larger class of comparatively unlettered lads who
escaped with the minimum term because of being only sons. In their case
the year's service was not as efficacious as in the other, where
education had made possible a more intensive process of training. And
two theories, affecting the use of reserves, see-sawed through the
Parliamentary debates for many years. One school held that it was
sufficient to season the mass of reservists with long-service soldiers,
whose influence and training would be strong enough to lead them to
victory on the day of battle; the other side maintained that salvation
lay in giving training to as large a proportion as possible, so that
units could act independently, and this theory eventually prevailed.
The Three-Years Law was the outcome of it.
The law of July 27, 1872, had reaffirmed the old Revolutionary principle
that every Frenchman was liable to serve. The military period was fixed
at twenty years--from twenty to forty. Thus considerable advance had
been made over the earlier legislation. There was no longer any question
of a limited contingent or of substitution by money payment, yet, as is
clear from my earlier paragraphs, the law did not establish equality.
The yearly contingent was divided into two parts; the one served for
five years, the other for one year or six months only. The drawing of
lots decided to which category a man belonged. Only sons, who supported
widowed mothers, the clergy, and members of the teaching profession were
excused; also, there existed a one-year service for young men who
volunteered before the yearly drawings, who had passed their
matriculation and had paid sixty pounds. I have touched already upon
the defects of this system and its doubtful advantage to education.
Then came the law of July 15, 1889, which established a Three-Years
service on a basis of absolute equality. It represented the principle
of training for everybody, whereas the earlier enactments had created a
nucleus of professionals to act as motor to the military machine. No
one served for five years under this new system, but then no one served
only for six months. The weakness of the measure resided in the wide
facilities given for "dispenses." After a year's effective service,
exemption could be obtained either for bread-winners or for the
theological and general student. Thus the real advantage of the Act was
whittled down to a partial instead of a total exemption. The old
_voluntariat d'un an_ was superseded by a special dispensation for
students, but there was no money payment. Yet the law of 1889 caused
heartburnings because of its invidious character. Examinations designed
to fulfil the letter but not the spirit of the enactment sprang up with
the express object of shortening military service. Even art workers and
students in commercial colleges were included in the dispensation.
And now comes the statute of March 21, 1905, which purported to promote
homogeneity of the reserves and to suppress exemptions so favourable to
the _fils a papa_. But its primary object was to reduce the period of
service to two years. It was a Revolutionary measure, daring and
insensate in its contempt for the danger involved by an obvious
reduction in the effectives. This danger was to be conjured in various
ways: by employing "auxiliaries" (or the medically unfit) in clerical
work; by suppressing exemptions, and limiting furloughs, and by giving
special advantages to re-engaged men.
One of the main objections to the change was that it prejudicially
affected the staff of army instructors, who were exposed to a dangerous
fluctuation. Just when greater intensity in the training was needed,
the quality and quantity of the instructors declined. It was the exact
opposite of the condition created by earlier legislation, which rendered
the corps of drill sergeants practically inaccessible to new blood. The
Bill offered special inducements to _sous-officiers_ to remain with the
colours, and gave to likely young men in the ranks an opportunity to
rise--the class, who, under the earlier laws, would have benefited by
the voluntariat. These previous efforts at army-making had created
masses of imperfectly trained reserves. The _soutiens de famille_
(supports of widows and poor families) represented, for instance,
60,000, which made 600,000 in a decade. Each man in this vast army had
had only a year's training, which, though adequate in some cases, was
inadequate in the mass. The two-years law sought to remedy this by
requiring a minimum of two years from every one. Another important
provision allowed grants to be paid to poor families deprived of their
sons, which shows that Parliament was solicitous for the weakest in the
community, even in such a matter as the national defence.
Finally, there was the law of 1913, passed by M. Barthou, the then
Premier, in the teeth of great opposition, and as a reply to the
formidable preparations of Germany. This we must leave to the next
chapter. Suffice it to say here that the Act provided for a three-years
service in the Active Army, eleven years in the First Class Reserve,
seven years in the Territorial Army, and seven in the Reserve of the
Territorial. Thus the citizen could be mobilised up to the age of
forty-eight. After that, he was no longer liable to be called up.
*CHAPTER IV*
*JOFFRE, HIS ORIGIN AND RECORD*
There is this satisfactory about a Frenchman--that rarely he disdains
his origin. He is not the sort of man who spurns the ladder by which he
mounted; rather does he contemplate with pleasure every rung of the way.
Joffre, in that sense, is typically French. He rejoices in the modest
origin which has given him the privilege of building his own fortune.
But his pride and his independence come, I think, from his racial
attributes. They are indigenous to the soil, to that fruitful soil of
the Roussillon, the old province of France which came under the French
crown in the reign of Louis XIV, in the middle of the seventeenth
century, and as a result of the Treaty of the Pyrenees. Known to-day as
the Eastern Pyrenees, and become one of the regular departments of
France, it has preserved much of its old Spanish character. It has
maintained a particular flavour, like the wine which grows in its
smiling vineyards and the peaches that stretch for twenty kilometres, a
vast and fertile garden, round Perpignan. The local capital is
peculiarly Southern: sunny, wide-spaced, prosperous, embowered in
handsome planes. The inhabitants wear the easy grace and captivating
manner of people who, under a blue sky, do not find life too hard.
Joffre's town of Rivesaltes is close by, connected by tram and rail. It
is less agreeable of aspect than Perpignan, there is less pride in
appearances; indeed, it is thoroughly Spanish in style, even if French
in the temper of its politics. The inhabitants speak Catalan like their
brethren on the further side of the Pyrenees, where newspapers are
produced in the tongue, but their sympathies are as wholly French as
those of their famous townsman. And what a cult of him there is! Every
cafe and most of the shops have a portrait of him on the large scale, as
if a small reproduction would not suffice for his reputation. The album
of a local tobacconist is a gallery of the great man in various stages
of his development. Old inhabitants contribute anecdotes more or less
authentic of his studious yet sturdy youth, of his kindness and modesty,
of his astonishing simplicity.
"Yes, he came here years ago and played _manille_ with his father and
his father's friends, and he would not allow his old acquaintances to
change their manner of speaking to him; they were to say 'thee' and
'thou' as in the old days. His father's bit of land had become flooded.
'You must cut trenches to drain off the water,' he said to Joffre pere,
'I know something about that; it is my metier.'..." When war broke out,
the inhabitants had no doubt about anything. The country was safe.
What was an invasion when Joffre was in command?
The future Generalissimo was a flaxen-haired boy, with a light
complexion and a firm, straightforward and kindly expression. There was
certainly little of the Southerner either in his face or in the
square-cut vigorous figure, but he had the independence of the Catalan
in his character. Though an excellent comrade and full of fun, he did
not like to be interfered with in his work, and was ready to fight his
tormentors to secure quiet. Later, the kind blue eyes, wide set beneath
the bushy eyebrows, grew steel-like in their expression when an
acquaintance tried to take advantage of his amiability to advance a
protege. Joffre has a horror of the recommendation. "Let the young man
make his own way as I have made mine," he would say; "that is the only
sound method." All his life he has been opposed to patronage; it annoys
him, he feels it to be unfair--a mean advantage. When he was appointed
Chief-of-Staff, and eventually Commander-in-Chief, in 1911, he received
visitors only once a fortnight at his office in the Invalides, because
he wished to avoid, as much as possible, bores and protectors of
interesting young men. Merit is the only channel which he recognises
for advancement. The knowledge of his utter impartiality has robbed his
decisions, often sternly disciplinary, of all personal sting. The army
felt that in him they had a final court of appeal, pure and fearless.