II.

But the adoption of secession ordinances and the assumption of

independent authority was not enough for the Cotton Republic. Though

they hoped to evade civil war, still they never forgot for a moment that

a conflict was not only possible, but even probable. Their prudence told

them that they ought to prepare for such an emergency by at once taking

possession of all the arms and military forts within their borders.

At this time there was a large navy-yard at Pensacola, Florida; from

twelve to fifteen harbor forts along the Atlantic and Gulf coasts;

half-a-dozen arsenals, stocked with an aggregate of one hundred and

fifty thousand arms (transferred there about a year before from Northern

arsenals, by Secretary Floyd); three mints; four important

custom-houses; three revenue cutters, on duty at leading Southern

seaports, and a vast amount of valuable miscellaneous property,--all of

which had been purchased with the money of the Federal Government.

The land on which the navy-yards, arsenals, forts, and, indeed, all the

buildings so purchased and controlled, stood, was vested in the United

States, not alone by the right of eminent domain, but also by formal

legislative deeds of cession from the States themselves, _wherein

they_ were located. The self-constituted governments of these State

now assumed either that the right of eminent domain reverted to them, or

that it had always belonged to them; and that they were perfectly

justified in taking absolute possession, "holding themselves responsible

in money damages to be settled by negotiation." The Federal Government

and the sentiment of the North regarded this hypothesis false and

absurd.

In due season the governors of the Cotton States, by official orders to

their extemporized militia companies, took forcible possession of all

the property belonging to the Federal Government lying within the

borders of these States. This proceeding was no other than _levying

actual war against the United States_. There was as yet no bloodshed,

however, and for this reason: the regular army of the United States

amounted then to but little over seventeen thousand men, and, most of

these being on the Western frontier, there was only a small garrison at

each of the Southern forts; all that was necessary, therefore, was for a

superior armed force--as a rule, State militia--to demand the surrender

of these forts in the name of the State, and it would at once, though

under protest, be complied with. There were three notable exceptions to

this peaceable evacuation,--first, no attempt was made against Fort

Taylor, at Key West; Fort Jefferson, on Tortugas Island; and Fort

Pickens, at Pensacola, on account of the distance and danger; second,

part of the troops in Texas were eventually refused the promised

transit, and were captured; third, the forts in Charleston harbor

underwent peculiar vicissitudes, which will be recounted later on.

The conspiracy which, for a while at least, seemed destined to overcome

all obstacles, was not confined to South Carolina or the Cotton States.

Unfortunately it had established itself in the highest official circles

of the National Government. Three members of President Buchanan's

cabinet--Cobb, of Georgia, Secretary of the Treasury; Floyd, of

Virginia, Secretary of War; and Thompson, of Mississippi, Secretary of

the Interior--were rank and ardent disunionists. To the artful

machinations of these three arch-traitors, who cared more for self than

they did for the South, the success of the conspiracy was largely due.

Grouped about them was a number of lesser functionaries, willing to lend

their help. Even the President did not escape the suspicion of the taint

of disloyal purpose.

The first and chief solicitude of the disunionists of South Carolina was

to gain possession of the forts. A secret caucus was held. "We must have

the forts," was its watchword; and, ere long, from every street corner

in Charleston came the impatient echo: "The forts must be ours."

To revert to the beginning. On the 1st of October, 1860, the Chief of

Ordnance wrote to Secretary Floyd, urging the importance of protecting

the ordnance and ammunition stored in Fort Sumter, Charleston harbor,

providing it met the approval of the commanding officer of Fort

Moultrie. The Secretary had no objections; but the commanding officer of

Fort Moultrie, while giving a very hesitating approval of the

application, expressed "_grave doubts of the loyalty and reliability

of the workmen engaged on the fort_," and closed his letter (dated

November 8th) by recommending that the garrison of Fort Moultrie should

be reinforced, and that both Fort Sumter and Castle Pinckney should be

garrisoned by companies _sent at once_ from Fortress Monroe, at old

Point Comfort. A few days later he ordered the ordnance officer at the

Charleston office to turn over to him, for removal to Fort Moultrie, all

the small arms and ammunition which he had in store. The attempt to make

this transfer was successfully resisted by the Charleston mob.

This evidence of loyalty on the part of the commanding officer of the

troops in Charleston harbor was not appreciated at Washington. His

removal was promptly ordered by the Secretary of War. The officer thus

summarily dealt with was Lieutenant-Colonel J.C. Gardner, First

Artillery, U.S.A., a native of Massachusetts, and an old veteran of the

war of 1812. Thus, so far as history reveals, was a son of the old Bay

State the _first_ to resist the encroachments of the Southern

conspiracy. It is worthy of note, also, that the removal of Col. Gardner

was in a measure due to the recommendation of Major (afterwards General)

Fitz John Porter.

Major Robert Anderson was ordered, on November 15th, to take command of

Fort Moultrie. He was chosen probably in the belief that, being a

Southern man, he would eventually throw his fortunes with the South. On

the 21st of November Major Anderson arrived at the fort, and on the 23d

of the same month he wrote to Secretary Floyd as follows:--

Fort Sumter and Castle Pinckney _must_ be garrisoned immediately

if the government determines to keep command of the harbor.[2]

In the same letter he also expressed the opinion that the people of

South Carolina intended to seize all the forts in Charleston harbor by

force of arms as soon as their ordinance of secession was published.

The faith of Secretary Floyd must, indeed, have been shaken while

reading such words! He might have ordered the removal of the writer of

them had not a rather unexpected incident now occurred to divert his

attention.

The Secretary of State, the venerable Lewis Cass of Michigan, at once

denounced submission to the conspiracy as treasonable, and insisted that

Major Anderson's demand for reinforcements should be granted. This

episode was a political bomb-shell in the camp of the enemy. The

President became a trifle alarmed, and sent for Floyd. A conference

between the President and the Secretary was held, when the latter

"pooh-poohed" the actual danger. "The South Carolinians," said he, "are

honorable gentlemen. They would scorn to take the forts. They must not

be Irritated." But the President evinced restlessness; he may have

suspected the motive of his cabinet officer. Floyd, too, grew restless;

the obstinacy of the executive alarmed him. He was only too glad to

consent to the suggestion that General Scott should be consulted.

General Scott rose from his sick-bed in New York, and hastened to

Washington, on the 12th of December. On the 13th he had an interview

with the President, in which he urged that three hundred men be sent to

reinforce Major Anderson at Fort Moultrie. The President declined, on

the ground, first, that Major Anderson was fully instructed what to do

in case he should at any time see good reason to believe that there was

any purpose to dispossess him of any of the forts; and, secondly, that

at this time (December 13th) he--the President--believed that Anderson

was in no danger of attack.

The President acted his own will in the matter. On the 15th General Cass

tendered his resignation, and retired from official life, for the avowed

reason that the President had refused to reinforce Anderson, and was

negotiating with open and avowed traitors. Secretary Cobb had resigned a

few days before. Black, the Attorney-General, was now made Secretary of

State; Thomas, of Maryland, Secretary of the Treasury; and Edwin M.

Stanton was appointed Attorney-General. The President believed, and

undoubtedly honestly, that, by his concession to Floyd and the other

conspirators, he had stayed the tide of disunion in the South. It now

appears how quickly and unexpectedly he was undeceived. While these

events were transpiring, a paper addressed "To our Constituents," and

urging "the organization of a Southern Confederacy," was being

circulated for signature through the two houses of Congress. It was

signed by about one-half of the Senators and Representatives of North

and South Carolina, Georgia, Florida, Alabama, Mississippi, Louisiana,

Texas, and Arkansas, and bore the date, "Washington, December 15, 1860."

It is to be remembered as the official beginning of the subsequent

Confederate States, just as Governor Gist's October circular was the

official beginning of South Carolina secession and rebellion.

On the 20th of December, South Carolina, as has been previously stated,

passed its ordinance. The desire, several times already expressed, to

hold possession of the forts in Charleston harbor now took the form of

a demand. The State Convention appointed three Commissioners to proceed

to Washington to "treat for the delivery of the forts, magazines,

light-houses, and other real estate, for an apportionment of the public

debt, for a division of all other property, and generally to negotiate

about other measures and arrangements." The Commissioners arrived in

Washington on the 26th of December, and, by special appointment, were to

meet the President at one o'clock on the following day. Before that hour

arrived an unlooked-for event occurred.

The Bay State Monthly, Volume 3, No. 4 · 第 7 / 65 题