_Bellum ita suscipiatur, ut nihil aliud nisi Pax quaesita videatur._[3]
I am satisfied, that no reasonable man of either party, can justly be
offended at any thing I said in one of my papers relating to the Army;[4]
from the maxims I there laid down, perhaps many persons may conclude,
that I had a mind the world should think, there had been occasion given
by some late abuses among men of that calling; and they conclude right.
For my intention is, that my hints may be understood, and my quotations
and allegories applied; and I am in some pain to think, that in the
Orcades on one side, and the western coasts of Ireland on the other, the
"Examiner" may want a key in several parts, which I wish I could furnish
them with. As for the French king, I am under no concern at all; I hear
he has left off reading my papers, and by what he has found in them,
dislikes our proceedings more than ever, and intends either to make great
additions to his armies, or propose new terms for a peace: So false is
that which is commonly reported, of his mighty satisfaction in our change
of ministry: And I think it clear that his late letter of "Thanks to the
Tories of Great Britain,"[5] must either have been extorted from him
against his judgment, or was a cast of his politics to set the people
against the present ministry, wherein it has wonderfully succeeded.
But though I have never heard, or never regarded any objections made
against that paper, which mentions the army; yet I intended this as a
sort of apology for it. And first, I declare, (because we live in a
mistaking world) that in hinting at some proceedings, wherein a few
persons are said to be concerned, I did not intend to charge them upon
the body of the army. I have too much detested that barbarous injustice
among the writers of a late party, to be ever guilty of it myself; I mean
the accusing societies for the crimes of a few. On the other side, I must
take leave to believe, that armies are no more exempt from corruptions
than other numbers of men. The maxims proposed were occasionally
introduced by the report of certain facts, which I am bound to believe is
true, because I am sure, considering what has passed, it would be a crime
to think otherwise. All posts in the army, all employments at court, and
many others, are (or ought to be) given and resumed at the mere pleasure
of the prince; yet when I see a great officer broke, a change made in the
court or the ministry, and this under the most just and gracious Princess
that ever reigned, I must naturally conclude it is done upon prudent
considerations, and for some great demerit in the sufferers. But then; is
not the punishment sufficient? Is it generous or charitable to trample on
the unfortunate, and expose their faults to the world in the strongest
colours? And would it not suit better with magnanimity as well as common
good-nature, to leave them at quiet to their own thoughts and repentance?
Yes without question, provided it could be so contrived that their very
names, as well as actions, might be forgotten for ever; _such_ an act of
oblivion would be for the honour of our nation, and beget a better
opinion of us with posterity; and then I might have spared the world and
myself the trouble of _examining_. But at present, there is a cruel
dilemma in the case: The friends and abettors of the late ministry are
every day publishing their praises to the world, and casting reflections
upon the present persons in power. This is so barefaced an aspersion upon
the Q[ueen], that I know not how any good subject can with patience
endure it, though he were ever so indifferent with regard to the opinions
in dispute. Shall they who have lost all power and love of the people, be
allowed to scatter their poison; and shall not those, who are, at least,
of the strongest side, be suffered to bring an antidote? And how can we
undeceive the deluded remainder, but by letting them see, that those
discarded statesmen were justly laid aside, and producing as many
instances to prove it as we can? not from any personal hatred to them,
but in justification to the best of queens. The many scurrilities I have
heard and read against this poor paper of mine, are in such a strain,
that considering the present state of affairs, they look like a jest.
They usually run after the following manner: "What? shall this insolent
writer presume to censure the late ministry, the ablest, the most
faithful, and truest lovers of their country, and its constitution that
ever served a prince? Shall he reflect on the best H[ouse] of C[ommons]
that ever sat within those walls? Has not the Queen changed both for a
ministry and Parliament of Jacobites and highfliers, who are selling us
to France, and bringing over the Pretender?" This is the very sum and
force of all their reasonings, and this their method of complaining
against the "Examiner." In _them_ it is humble and loyal to reflect upon
the Q[ueen] and the ministry, and Parliament she has chosen with the
universal applause of her people; in _us_ it is insolent to defend her
Majesty and her choice, or to answer their objections, by shewing the
reasons why those changes were necessary.
The same style has been used in the late case relating to some gentlemen
in the army;[6] such a clamour was raised by a set of men, who had the
boldness to tax the administration with cruelty and injustice, that I
thought it necessary to interfere a little, by shewing the ill
consequences that might arise from some proceedings, though without
application to particular persons. And what do they offer in answer?
Nothing but a few poor common-places against calumny and informers, which
might have been full as just and seasonable in a plot against the sacred
person of the Q[ueen].
But, by the way; why are these idle people so indiscreet to name those
two words, which afford occasion of laying open to the world such an
infamous scene of subornation and perjury, as well as calumny and
informing, as I believe is without example: when a whole cabal attempted
an action, wherein a condemned criminal refused to join with them for
the reward of his life?[7] Not that I disapprove their sagacity, who
could foretell so long before, by what hand they should one day fall, and
therefore thought any means justifiable by which they might prevent it.
But waiving this at present, it must be owned in justice to the army,
that those violences did not proceed so far among them as some have
believed; nor ought the madness of a few to be laid at their doors. For
the rest, I am so far from denying the due praises to those victorious
troops, who did their part in procuring so many victories for the allies,
that I could wish every officer and private soldier had their full share
of honour in proportion to their deserts; being thus far of the
Athenians' mind, who when it was proposed that the statue of Miltiades
should be set up alone in some public place of the city, said they would
agree to it, _whenever he conquered alone_, but not before. Neither do I
at all blame the officers of the army, for preferring in their hearts the
late ministry before the present; or, if wishing alone could be of any
use, to wish their continuance, because then they might be secure of the
war's continuance too: whereas, since affairs have been put into other
hands, they may perhaps lie under some apprehensions of a peace, which no
army, especially in a course of success, was ever inclined to, and which
all wise states have in such a juncture, chiefly endeavoured. This is
a point wherein the civil and military politics have always disagreed.
And for that reason, I affirmed it necessary in all free governments,
that the latter should be absolutely in subjection to the former;
otherwise, one of these two inconveniencies must arise, either to be
perpetually in war, or to turn the civil institution into a military.
I am ready to allow all that has been said of the valour and experience
of our troops, who have fully contributed their part to the great
successes abroad; nor is it their fault, that those important victories
had no better consequences at home, though it may be their advantage. War
is their trade and business: to improve and cultivate the advantages of
success, is an affair of the cabinet; and the neglect of this, whether
proceeding from weakness or corruption, according to the usual
uncertainty of wars, may be of the most fatal consequence to a nation.
For, pray let me represent our condition in such a light, as I believe
both parties will allow, though perhaps not the consequences I shall
deduce from it. We have been for above nine years, blessed with a QUEEN,
who besides all virtues that can enter into the composition of a private
person, possesses every regal quality that can contribute to make a
people happy: of great wisdom, yet ready to receive the advice of her
counsellors: of much discernment in choosing proper instruments, when she
follows her own judgment, and only capable of being deceived by that
excess of goodness which makes her judge of others by herself. Frugal in
her management in order to contribute to the public, which in proportion
she does, and that voluntarily, beyond any of her subjects; but from her
own nature, generous and charitable to all that want or deserve; and in
order to exercise those virtues, denying herself all entertainments of
expense which many others enjoy. Then if we look abroad, at least in
Flanders, our arms have been crowned with perpetual success in battles
and sieges, not to mention several fortunate actions in Spain. These
facts being thus stated, which none can deny, it is natural to ask how we
have improved such advantages, and to what account they have turned? I
shall use no discouraging terms. When a patient grows daily worse by the
tampering of mountebanks, there is nothing left but to call in the best
physicians before the case grows desperate: But I would ask, whether
France or any other kingdom, would have made so little use of such
prodigious opportunities, the fruits whereof could never have fallen to
the ground, without the extremist degree of folly and corruption, and
where those have lain, let the world judge? Instead of aiming at peace,
while we had the advantage of the war, which has been the perpetual maxim
of all wise states, it has been reckoned factious and malignant even to
express our wishes for it; and such a condition imposed, as was never
offered to any prince who had an inch of ground to dispute; _Quae enim
est conditio pacis; in qua ei cum quo pacem facias, nihil concedi
potest?_[8]
It is not obvious to conceive what could move men who sat at home, and
were called to consult upon the good of the kingdom, to be so utterly
averse from putting an end to a long expensive war, which the victorious,
as well as conquered side, were heartily weary of. Few or none of them
were men of the sword; they had no share in the honour; they had made
large fortunes, and were at the head of all affairs. But they well knew
by what tenure they held their power; that the Qu[een] saw through their
designs, that they had entirely lost the hearts of the clergy; that the
landed men were against them; that they were detested by the body of the
people; and that nothing bore them up but their credit with the bank and
other stocks, which would be neither formidable nor necessary when the
war was at an end. For these reasons they resolved to disappoint all
overtures of a peace, till they and their party should be so deeply
rooted as to make it impossible to shake them. To this end, they began to
precipitate matters so fast, as in a little time must have ruined the
constitution, if the crown had not interposed, and rather ventured the
accidental effects of their malice, than such dreadful consequences of
their power. And indeed, had the former danger been greater than some
hoped or feared, I see no difficulty in the choice, which was the same
with his, who said, "he had rather be devoured by wolves than by rats." I
therefore still insist that we cannot wonder at, or find fault with the
army, for concurring with a ministry who was for prolonging the war. The
inclination is natural in them all, pardonable in those who have not yet
made their fortunes, and as lawful in the rest, as love of power or love
of money can make it. But as natural, as pardonable, and as lawful as
this inclination is, when it is not under check of the civil power, or
when a corrupt ministry joins in giving it too great a scope, the
consequence can be nothing less than infallible ruin and slavery to a
state.
After I had finished this Paper, the printer sent me two small pamphlets,
called "The Management of the War,"_[9] written with some plausibility,
much artifice, and abundance of misrepresentation, as well as direct
falsehoods in point of fact. These I have thought worth _Examining_,
which I shall accordingly do when I find an opportunity.
[Footnote 1: No. 23 in the reprint. [T.S.]]
[Footnote 2: I.e. 1710-11. [T.S.]]
[Footnote 3: Cicero, "De Officiis," i. 23: "In the undertaking of a war
there should be such a prospect, as if the only end of it were peace."--
SIR R. L'ESTRANGE. [T.S.]]
[Footnote 4: See "Examiner," No. 21. [T.S.]]
[Footnote 5: Scott mistakes this as the pretended letter quoted in "The
Medley," No. 14. Swift refers to a half sheet printed for A. Baldwin in
the latter part of 1710, and entitled: "The French King's Thanks to the
Tories of Great-Britain." It was ascribed to Hoadly.
In this print Louis XIV. is made to thank the Tories for "what hath given
me too deep and lasting impressions of respect, and gratitude, ever to be
forgotten. If I should endeavour to recount all the numerous obligations
I have to you, I should not know where to begin, nor where to make an
end.... To you and your predecessors I owe that supineness and negligence
of the English court, which, gave me opportunity and ability to form and
prosecute my designs." Alluding to William III. he says: "To you I owed
the impotence of his life and the comfort of his death. At that juncture
how vast were my hopes?... But a princess ascended your throne, whom you
seemed to court with some personal fondness ... She had a general whom
her predecessor had wrought into the confidence and favour of the
Allies.... It is with pleasure I have observed, that every victory he
hath obtained abroad, hath been retrieved by your management at home....
What a figure have your tumults, your addresses, and the progresses of
your Doctor, made in my Gazettes? What comfort have I received from
them?... And with what impatience do we now wait for that dissolution,
with the hopes of which you have so long flattered us ?... Blessed be the
engines, to which so glorious events are owing. Republican,
Antimonarchical, Danger of the Church, Non-resistance, Hereditary and
Divine Right, words of force and energy!... How great are my obligations
to all these!" In a postscript, King Louis is made to say further: "My
Brother of England [i.e. the Pretender] ... thanks you for ... your late
loyal addresses; your open avowal in them of that unlimited non-resistance
by which he keeps up his claim," etc. [T.S.]]
[Footnote 6: "Lieut.-Gen. Meredith, Major-Gen. Macartney, and Brigadier
Honeywood were superseded, upon an information laid before the Q----,
that these three gentlemen had, in their cups, drank Damnation and
Confusion to the new ministry, and to those who had any hand in turning
out of the old."--TINDAL, iv. 195. See also No. 21 and note, p. 127.
[T.S.]]
[Footnote 7: William Gregg, a clerk in Harley's office, who was convicted
of a treasonable correspondence with France. See Swift's "Some Remarks,"
etc., in vol. v., p. 38, of present edition. [T.S.]]
[Footnote 8: "For what condition of peace is that in which nothing is
conceded him with whom you are making peace?" [T.S.]]
[Footnote 9: The two pamphlets referred to were both written by Dr.
Francis Hare, chaplain-general to the Duke of Marlborough, and afterwards
Bishop of Chichester. The first was dated November 23rd, 1710, and
was entitled, "The Management of the War. In a Letter to a Tory-Member."
The second was called, "The Management of the War. In a Second Letter to
a Tory-Member," and was dated November 30th, 1710. The pamphlets are again
referred to in the twenty-ninth number of "The Examiner," where the writer
states that on second thoughts he has decided to deal with them "in a
discourse by itself." This he did. See note on p. 184. [T.S.]]