FROM THURSDAY DECEMBER 14, TO THURSDAY DECEMBER 21, 1710.

_----Pugnacem scirent sapiente minorem._[2]

I am very much at a loss how to proceed upon the subject intended in this

paper, which a new incident has led me to engage in: The subject I mean,

is that of soldiers and the army; but being a matter wholly out of my

trade, I shall handle it in as cautious a manner as I am able.

It is certain, that the art of war hath suffered great changes, almost in

every age and country of the world; however, there are some maxims

relating to it, that will be eternal truths, and which every reasonable

man will allow.

In the early times of Greece and Rome, the armies of those states were

composed of their citizens, who took no pay, because the quarrel was

their own; and therefore the war was usually decided in one campaign; or,

if it lasted longer, however in winter the soldiers returned to their

several callings, and were not distinguished from the rest of the people.

The Gothic governments in Europe, though they were of military

institution, yet observed almost the same method. I shall instance only

here in England. Those who held lands _in capite_ of the king, were

obliged to attend him in his wars with a certain number of men, who

all held lands from them at easy rents on that condition. These fought

without pay, and when the service was over, returned again to their

farms. It is recorded of William Rufus, that being absent in Normandy,

and engaged in a war with his brother, he ordered twenty thousand men to

be raised, and sent over from hence to supply his army;[3] but having

struck up a peace before they were embarked, he gave them leave to

disband, on condition they would pay him ten shillings a man, which

amounted to a mighty sum in those days.

Consider a kingdom as a great family, whereof the prince is the father,

and it will appear plainly that mercenary troops are only servants armed,

either to awe the children at home; or else to defend from invaders, the

family who are otherwise employed, and choose to contribute out of their

stock for paying their defenders, rather than leave their affairs to be

neglected in their absence. The art of making soldiery a trade, and

keeping armies in pay, seems in Europe to have had two originals. The

first was usurpation, when popular men destroyed the liberties of their

country, and seized the power into their own hands, which they were

forced to maintain by hiring guards to bridle the people. Such were

anciently the tyrants in most of the small states in Greece, and such

were those in several parts of Italy, about three or four centuries ago,

as Machiavel informs us. The other original of mercenary armies, seems to

have risen from larger kingdoms or commonwealths, which had subdued

provinces at a distance, and were forced to maintain troops upon them, to

prevent insurrections from the natives: Of this sort were Macedon,

Carthage and Rome of old; Venice and Holland at this day; as well as most

kingdoms of Europe. So that mercenary forces in a free state, whether

monarchy or commonwealth, seem only necessary, either for preserving

their conquests, (which in such governments it is not prudent to extend

too far) or else for maintaining a war at distance.

In this last, which at present is our most important case, there are

certain maxims that all wise governments have observed.

The first I shall mention is, that no private man should have a

commission to be general for life,[4] let his merit and services be ever

so great. Or, if a prince be unadvisedly brought to offer such a

commission in one hand, let him (to save time and blood) deliver up his

crown with the other. The Romans in the height and perfection of their

government, usually sent out one of the new consuls to be general against

their most formidable enemy, and recalled the old one, who often returned

before the next election, and according as he had merit was sent to

command in some other part, which perhaps was continued to him for a

second, and sometimes a third year. But if Paulus Aemilius,[5] or

Scipio[6] himself, had presumed to move the Senate to continue their

commissions for life, they certainly would have fallen a sacrifice to the

jealousy of the people. Caesar indeed (between whom and a certain

general, some of late with much discretion have made a parallel) had his

command in Gaul continued to him for five years, and was afterwards made

perpetual Dictator, that is to say, general for life, which gave him the

power and the will of utterly destroying the Roman liberty. But in his

time the Romans were very much degenerated, and great corruptions crept

into their morals and discipline. However, we see there still were some

remains of a noble spirit among them; for when Caesar sent to be chosen

consul, notwithstanding his absence, they decreed he should come in

person, give up his command, and _petere more majorum._[7]

It is not impossible but a general may desire such a commission out of

inadvertency, at the instigation of his friends, or perhaps of his

enemies, or merely for the benefit and honour of it, without intending

any such dreadful consequences; and in that case, a wise prince or state

may barely refuse it without shewing any marks of their displeasure. But

the request in its own nature is highly criminal, and ought to be entered

so upon record, to terrify others in time to come from venturing to make

it.

Another maxim to be observed by a free state engaged in war, is to keep

the military power in absolute subjection to the civil, nor ever suffer

the former to influence or interfere with the latter. A general and his

army are servants hired by the civil power to act as they are directed

from thence, and with a commission large or limited as the administration

shall think fit; for which they are largely paid in profit and honour.

The whole system by which armies are governed, is quite alien from the

peaceful institutions of states at home; and if the rewards be so

inviting as to tempt a senator to take a post in the army, while he is

there on his duty, he ought to consider himself in no other capacity. I

know not any sort of men so apt as soldiers are, to reprimand those who

presume to interfere in what relates to their trade. When they hear any

of us in a coffeehouse, wondering that such a victory was not pursued,

complaining that such a town cost more men and money than it was worth to

take it; or that such an opportunity was lost, of fighting the enemy;

they presently reprove us, and often with justice enough, for meddling in

matters out of our sphere, and clearly convince us of our mistakes in

terms of art that none of us understand. Nor do we escape so; for they

reflect with the utmost contempt of our ignorance, that we who sit at

home in ease and security, never stirring from our firesides, should

pretend from books, and general reason, to argue upon military affairs;

which after all, if we may judge from the share of intellectuals in some

who are said to excel that way, is not so very profound or difficult a

science. But if there be any weight in what they offer, as perhaps there

may be a great deal; surely these gentlemen have a much weaker pretence

to concern themselves in matters of the cabinet, which are always either

far above, or much beside their capacities. Soldiers may as well pretend

to prescribe rules for trade, to determine points in philosophy, to be

moderators in an assembly of divines, or direct in a court of justice, as

to misplace their talent in examining affairs of state, especially in

what relates to the choice of ministers, who are never so likely to be

ill chosen as when approved by them. It would be endless to shew how

pernicious all steps of this nature have been in many parts and ages of

the world. I shall only produce two at present; one in Rome, and the

other in England. The first is of Caesar, when he came to the city with

his soldiers to settle the ministry, there was an end of their liberty

for ever. The second was in the great rebellion against King Charles the

First. The King and both Houses were agreed upon the terms of a peace,

but the officers of the army (as Ludlow relates it) sets a guard upon the

House of Commons, took a list of the members, and kept all by force out

of the House, except those who were for bringing the King to a trial.[8]

Some years after, when they erected a military government, and ruled the

island by major-generals, we received most admirable instances of their

skill in politics. To say the truth, such formidable sticklers[9] can

have but two reasons for desiring to interfere in the administration; the

first is that of Caesar and Cromwell, of which, God forbid, I should

accuse or suspect any body; since the second is pernicious enough, and

that is, to preserve those in power who are for perpetuating a war,

rather than see others advanced, who they are sure will use all proper

means to promote a safe and honourable peace.

Thirdly, Since it is observed of armies, that in the present age they are

brought to some degree of humanity, and a more regular demeanour to each

other and to the world, than in former times; it is certainly a good

maxim to endeavour preserving this temper among them, without which

they would soon degenerate into savages. To this end, it would be prudent

among other things, to forbid that detestable custom of drinking to the

damnation or confusion of any person whatsoever.

Such desperate acts, and the opinions infused along with them, into heads

already inflamed by youth and wine, are enough to scatter madness and

sedition through a whole camp. So seldom upon their knees to pray, and so

often to curse! This is not properly atheism, but a sort of anti-religion

prescribed by the Devil, and which an atheist of common sense would scorn

as an absurdity. I have heard it mentioned as a common practice last

autumn, somewhere or other, to drink damnation and confusion[10] (and

this with circumstances very aggravating and horrid) to the new ministry,

and to those who _had any hand_ in turning out the old; that is to say,

to those persons whom her Majesty has thought fit to employ in her

greatest affairs, with something more than a glance against the Qu[een]

herself. And if it be true that these orgies were attended with certain

doubtful words of standing by their g[enera]l, who without question

abhorred them; let any man consider the consequence of such dispositions,

if they should happen to spread. I could only wish for the honour of the

Army, as well as of the Qu[een] and ministry, that a remedy had been

applied to the disease, in the place and time where it grew. If men of

such principles were able to propagate them in a camp, and were sure of a

general for life, who had any tincture of ambition, we might soon bid

farewell to ministers and parliaments, whether new or old.

I am only sorry such an accident has happened towards the close of a war,

when it is chiefly the interest of those gentlemen who have posts in the

army, to behave themselves in such a manner as might encourage the

legislature to make some provision for them, when there will be no

further need of their services. They are to consider themselves as

persons by their educations unqualified for many other stations of life.

Their fortunes will not suffer them to retain to a party after its fall,

nor have they weight or abilities to help towards its resurrection. Their

future dependence is wholly upon the prince and Parliament, to which they

will never make their way, by solemn execrations of the ministry; a

ministry of the Qu[een]'s own election, and fully answering the wishes of

her people. This unhappy step in some of their brethren, may pass for an

uncontrollable argument, that politics are not their business or their

element. The fortune of war hath raised several persons up to swelling

titles, and great commands over numbers of men, which they are too apt to

transfer along with them into civil life, and appear in all companies as

if it were at the head of their regiments, with a sort of deportment

that ought to have been dropt behind, in that short passage to Harwich.

It puts me in mind of a dialogue in Lucian,[11] where Charon wafting one

of their predecessors over Styx, ordered him to strip off his armour and

fine clothes, yet still thought him too heavy; "But" (said he) "put off

likewise that pride and presumption, those high-swelling words, and that

vain-glory;" because they were of no use on the other side the water.

Thus if all that array of military grandeur were confined to the proper

scene, it would be much more for the interest of the owners, and less

offensive to their fellow subjects.[12]

[Footnote: 1: No. 20 in the reprint. [T.S.]]

[Footnote 2: Ovid, "Metamorphoses," xiii. 353:

"Well assured, that art

And conduct were of war the better part."

J. DRYDEN.

[T.S.]]

[Footnote 3: A.D. 1093. See Matthew Paris. [T.S.]]

[Footnote 4: Lord Campbell, in his "Lives of the Chancellors" (vol. iv.,

p. 322), states that Marlborough, in order to increase the confidence of

the allies, proposed "he should receive a patent as commander-in-chief

for life." On consulting with Lord Chancellor Cowper he was told

that such a proceeding would be unconstitutional. Marlborough, however,

petitioned the Queen, who rejected his application. [T.S.]]

[Footnote 5: Aemilius Paulus, the celebrated Roman general, and conqueror

of Macedonia, was twice consul, and died B.C. 160. [T.S.]]

[Footnote 6: Scipio Africanus, the greatest of Roman generals and the

conqueror of Carthage, who died _c._ B.C. 184. [T.S.]]

[Footnote 7: Julius Caesar "applied to the Senate to be exempted from the

usual law, and to become a candidate in his absence" ("Dict. of Greek and

Roman Biog."). This was strongly opposed; so that to be a candidate it

was necessary for him "to solicit after the custom of his ancestors."

[T.S.]

The "Examiner" seems to allude to the remarkable, and, to say the least,

imprudent, article in "The Tatler," No. 37. Such a passage, published by

so warm an adherent of Marlborough as Steele, gives credit to

Macpherson's assertion, that there really was some intention of

maintaining the Duke in power, by his influence in the army. It is even

affirmed, that under pretence his commission under the great seal could

not be superseded by the Queen's order of dismissal, it was designed that

he should assemble the troops which were in town, and secure the court

and capital. To prevent which, his commission was superseded by another

under the great seal being issued as speedily as possible. The

industrious editor of "The Tatler," in 1786, is of opinion, that the

article was written by Addison; but the violent counsels which it

intimates seem less congenial to his character than to that of Steele, a

less reflecting man, and bred a soldier. It is worthy of notice, that

the passage is cancelled in all subsequent editions of "The Tatler,"

till restored from the original folio in that of 1786. This evidently

implies Steele's own sense, that more was meant than met the ear; and

it affords a presumptive proof, that very violent measures had at least

been proposed, if not agreed upon, by some of Marlborough's adherents.

[S.]]

[Footnote 8: General Ireton and Colonel Pride placed guards outside the

entrances to the House of Commons "that none might be permitted to pass

into the House but such as had continued faithful to the public interest"

(Ludlow's "Memoirs," vol. i., p. 270). [T.S.]]

[Footnote 9: The judges of the field, in a formal duel, whose duty it was

to interfere when the rules of judicial combat were violated, were called

sticklers, from the wooden truncheons which they held in their hands.

Hence the verb to _stickle_. [S.]]

[Footnote 10: In his "Journal to Stella" Swift writes, under date

December 13th, 1710: "You hear the havoc making in the army: Meredyth,

Macartney, and Col. Honeywood, are obliged to sell their commands at half

value, and leave the army, for drinking destruction to the present

ministry," etc. (see vol. ii., p. 71, of present edition). [T.S.]]

[Footnote 11: "Dialogues of the Dead. X. Charon, Hermes, and a number of

Ghosts." Hermes required Lampichus to leave behind him his pride, folly,

insolence, etc. [T.S.]]

[Footnote 12: Of this paper "The Medley," No. 14 (January 1st, 1710

[_sic_]), says: "He not only writes whatever he believes or knows to be

false, but plainly shows 'tis his business and duty to do so, and that

this alone is the merit of his service." [T.S.]]

The Prose Works of Jonathan Swift, D.D. — Volume 09 Contributions to The Tatler, The Examiner, The Spectator, and The Intelligencer · 第 67 / 133 题