IF PRESIDENT BUCHANAN HAD ENFORCED THE LAW IN NOVEMBER, 1860
Speaking of the lighting of the fires of civil war in this country in
the years 1860 and 1861, Charles Francis Adams said, in 1873, "One
single hour of the will displayed by General Jackson would have stifled
the fire in its cradle." The metaphor in the last phrase is peculiar,
and strangely Celtic for a Yankee, but the history is true.
Montgomery Blair expressed the idea with greater plainness and vividness
in that same year, 1873, in these words, "If we could have held Fort
Sumter, there never would have been a drop of blood shed." Both these
remarks were made by men who had been in some sense actors in the events
to which they referred, and made after years of reflection upon the
circumstances.
It does not seem to Americans of the present generation that there was
ever a moment, after the election of Abraham Lincoln, when the Civil War
could have been averted. It appears, in retrospect, to have been
absolutely inevitable. Yet there was certainly one moment when, if
President Buchanan had had the courage to apply the general views which
he himself advanced in his annual message to Congress of December 3,
1860, and his special message of January 8, 1861, which explicitly
denied the right of secession, a halt might have been called to the
growing rebellion.
The secession movement was at first concentrated in the State of South
Carolina. That State, all through the winter of 1860-1861, was
presenting to the rest of the South an object lesson of successful
nullification.
In 1833 South Carolina had ordained nullification, but its ordinance was
so instantly and heavily repressed by President Andrew Jackson that the
State was absolutely unable to carry it out, or to move hand or foot.
But now, in 1860, it did not merely ordain nullification--it enacted it.
Every Federal judge, every judicial servant, and nearly every Federal
official, in South Carolina, resigned, and the nation was left without
an agent to enforce its laws, for no new ones were sent in. The United
States authority in the State was at an end, save for the custom house
at Charleston and Fort Moultrie in Charleston harbor.
As long as South Carolina was let alone, her case plainly said to all
the other slave States, "You see we can withdraw from the Union; we have
withdrawn from the Union; and the Union takes no step to keep us in;
you can do the same thing."
At this time North Carolina and Virginia were opposed to secession.
Governor Sam Houston, of Texas, stood like a rock against it. Kentucky,
Maryland, Missouri, never seceded. Other States were wavering. A great
deal depended on the degree of success which South Carolina, the leader
in the revolt, might have. And it was Buchanan who permitted South
Carolina's success to become apparently complete, though in the message
to which I have referred the president declared that secession was
"wholly inconsistent with the Constitution," that "no human power could
absolve him (the president) from his duty to enforce the laws," and that
the danger of national disruption was upon the country. Buchanan, in his
December message, actually quoted Jackson's solemn denunciation of the
doctrine that a State had a right to separate itself from the Union.
But while he was making these terrible admissions of his own duty, what
was Buchanan doing? Instead of holding up the hands of the nation's
representatives in South Carolina, he was weakening them. Instead of
strengthening the Federal garrison in Charleston harbor, he permitted
it to dwindle until it was powerless to take a single step. Not one act,
indeed, did he perform, but contented himself with calling on Congress
for legislation to meet the emergency. And out of Congress, of course,
he could get nothing, for the Southern representatives would vote for no
such legislation, and the Republican members were bent upon waiting
until Lincoln, who had been elected president, came in in March, and the
northern Democrats were paralyzed with pusillanimity.
So South Carolina went on proving to the other slave States that it
could "go it alone." One after another these other States seceded from
the Union. Northern arsenals were stripped of arms. Southern officers
went out of the army one by one, and made ready to organize the army of
the new Confederacy which was forming under the president's nose.
It was a time for the strong arm, and for quick, decisive, Jacksonian,
and not at all squeamish, action. But no such action was taken. The
golden moment was lost, and when, three months afterward, Lincoln came
in at last, war, with all its horrors, was upon the country.
If the young rebellion had been truly nipped in the bud, as it might
have been, by a rigid enforcement, in November and December, 1860, of
Federal judicial processes in South Carolina; if the laws of the United
States had been enforced in that State at the point of the bayonet, if
need be; if a Federal functionary, sustained by an ample force of United
States troops, had torn South Carolina's ordinance of secession into
shreds on the steps of the capitol at Columbia, with no tender regard
for South Carolina's interpretation of the Constitution, is it likely
that South Carolina's sister States would have been so prompt at
seceding?
Very likely it might not have been necessary to do any of these things.
If Buchanan had merely stood up and said, as Jackson did in 1833, "I
shall enforce the laws of the United States in spite of any and all
resistance that may be made," there might well have been no more of
secession in 1860 or 1861 than there had been of real nullification in
1833.
And if this step had been taken, and there had been no war, what then?
What about slavery? it may be asked. Is it conceivable that northern
sentiment would have permitted chattel slavery to continue? Was not war
inevitable on that main question alone? Let us see. The sentiment for
absolute and sudden emancipation was the product of the war. Lincoln
was not an Abolitionist. The Republican party was not Abolitionist.
Without war, but with the Southern States held within the Union,
sentiment in the North would have been favorable to a compromise which
would have prevented the extension of slavery; and events would surely
have brought about a gradual liberation of the blacks in the South, as
events soon ended slavery in Brazil and Cuba. The institution was
doomed, morally and economically.
But there would have been no negro suffrage. That was enforced by
conditions which grew out of the war. The South would not have been
impoverished, and it could have afforded a gradual education of the
negro in such a way as to fit him for free industry, and, in a limited
way, for the exercise of the suffrage. There would have been no
disturbing reversal of the position of the two races, to be followed by
a violent restoration of white supremacy and an accompanying
development of inveterate hostility between whites and blacks. The
sections would not have drifted apart in industrial conditions and
social constitution as they did under the influence of the war; we
should not have had, perhaps, a money-mad North to counterbalance a
ruined, desolated, disheartened South.
And where, at Antietam, at Gettysburg, at Fredericksburg, at
Chattanooga, and on many humbler fields, the flags wave over the even
ranks of myriads of soldier graves, the mocking-birds would sing in
thickets which the bullet's hiss and the shriek of the shell had never
profaned, while their teeming populations of dead men would either be
alive to-day or entombed among their loved ones after lives of peaceful
usefulness.