On the 7th September the Battalion made a forced march from Tonquin

to Rebais, where there was a German column, but the advance-guard of

the Brigade was held up at St. Simeon till dark and the Battalion

had to bivouac a couple of miles outside Rebais. The German force

withdrew from Rebais on the afternoon of the 7th, and on the 8th the

Brigade’s advance continued through Rebais northward in the direction

of Boitron, which lay just across the Petit Morin River. Heavy

machine-gun fire from some thick woods along the rolling ground,

across the river, checked the advance-guard (the 3rd Coldstream) and

the two companies of the Irish Guards who supported them. The woods,

the river valley, and the village of Boitron were searched by our

guns, and on the renewal of the attack the river was crossed and

Boitron occupied, the enemy being heavily shelled as he retired. Here

the Battalion re-formed and pressed forward in a heavy rainstorm,

through a flank attack of machine-guns from woods on the left. These

they charged, while a battery of our field-guns fired point-blank

into the thickets, and captured a German machine-gun company of six

guns (which seemed to them, at the time, a vast number), 3 officers,

and 90 rank and file. Here, too, in the confusion of the fighting

they came under fire of our own artillery, an experience that was

to become familiar to them, and the C.O. ordered the companies

to assemble at Ferme le Cas Rouge, a village near by where they

bivouacked for the night. They proudly shut up in the farm-yard the

first prisoners they had ever taken; told off two servants to wait

upon a wounded major; took the parole of the two other officers and

invited them to a dinner of chicken and red wine. The Battalion,

it will be observed, knew nothing then except the observances of

ordinary civilized warfare. 2nd Lieutenant A. Fitzgerald and a draft

arrived that day.

This small affair of Boitron Wood was the Irish Guards’ share of the

immense mixed Battle of the Marne, now raging along all the front.

Its result and the capture of the machine-guns cheered them a little.

The next five days--September 9 to 13--had nothing but tedious

marching and more tedious halts and checks, due to the congestion

of traffic and the chaos in the villages that had been entered,

sacked, defiled and abandoned by the enemy. The Marne was crossed

on the 9th at Charly, where--the inhabitants said that the Germans

detailed for the job had been too drunk to effect it--a bridge had

been left ready for demolition, but intact, and by this means the

First and Second Divisions crossed the river. The weather turned wet,

with heavy showers; greatcoats had been lost or thrown aside all

along the line of retreat; billets and bivouacs made filthy by the

retreating Germans; and there was general discomfort, enlivened with

continuous cannonading from the front and the appearance of German

prisoners gathered in by our cavalry ahead. And thus, from the Marne

the Battalion came by way of Trenel, Villers-sur-Marne, Cointicourt,

Oulchy-le-Château, Courcelles and St. Mard to the high banks of the

Aisne, which they crossed by the pontoon bridge at Pont d’Arcy on the

morning of September 14 and advanced to Soupir in the hollows under

the steep wooded hills.

That day, the 2nd Grenadiers formed the advance-guard of the

Brigade, followed by the 3rd Coldstream, the Irish Guards, and the

2nd Coldstream. After they had cleared Soupir village, the force

was shelled and an attack was made by the 3rd Coldstream, the Irish

Guards in support, on a steep ridge near La Cour de Soupir farm,

which stood on the crest of the bluff above the river. The heavily

wooded country was alive with musketry and machine-gun fire, and the

distances were obscured by mist and heavy rain. The 3rd Coldstream,

attacking the farm, found themselves outflanked from a ridge on their

right, which was then attempted by three companies of the Irish

Guards. They reached to within a couple of hundred yards of a wood

cut up by rides, down which, as well as from the trenches, heavy

rifle-fire was directed. Here Captain J. N. Guthrie (No. 2 Company)

was wounded and Captain H. Hamilton Berners killed, while Lieutenant

Watson, R.A.M.C., was shot and wounded at close quarters attending

a wounded man. Here, too, the Battalion had its first experience of

the German use of the white flag; for Lieutenant J. S. FitzGerald

with No. 8 Platoon and a party of Coldstream under Lieutenant

Cotterel-Dormer found some hundred and fifty Germans sitting round

haystacks and waving white flags. They went forward to take their

surrender and were met by a heavy fire at thirty yards’ range,

which forced them to fall back. Lieutenant E. B. Greer, machine-gun

officer, now brought up his two machine-guns, but was heavily fired

at from cover, had all of one gun-team killed or wounded and, for the

while, lost one gun. He reorganized the other gun-team, and called

for volunteers from the Company nearest him to recover it. After dark

Corporal Sheridan and Private Carney of No. 3 Company and Private

Harrington, a machine-gunner of No. 1 Company, went out with him and

the gun was brought in. A further advance was made in the afternoon

to the edge of the wood in order to clear out the snipers who held it

and commanded the cultivated fields outside. Towards dusk, Captain

Lord Guernsey, who was Acting Quartermaster, reported himself to the

C.O., who posted him to No. 2 Company, then engaged in clearing out

the snipers, in place of Captain Guthrie, who had been wounded. He

went forward to assist Captain Lord Arthur Hay in command, and both

were immediately shot dead.

The Battalion bivouacked in battle-outpost formation that night

on the edge of the wood, and got into touch with the 60th Rifles

on their right and the 2nd Grenadiers on their left. Here, though

they did not know it, the advance from the Marne was at an end. Our

forces had reached the valley of the Aisne, with its bluffs on either

side and deep roads half hidden by the woods that climbed them.

The plateaux of the north of the river shaped themselves for the

trench-warfare of the years to come; and the natural strength of the

positions on the high ground was increased by numberless quarries and

caves that ran along it.

THE HALT AT SOUPIR

On the 15th September patrols reported that the enemy had fallen back

a little from his position, and at daylight two companies entrenched

themselves on the edge of the wood. Judged by present standards those

trenches were little more than shallow furrows, for we did not know

that the day of open battle was ended, and it is curious to see how

slowly our people broke themselves to the monotonous business of

trench construction and maintenance. Even after they had dug the

casual ditch which they called a trench, it cost some time and a few

lives till they understood that the works could not be approached in

the open as had been war’s custom. Their first communication-trench

was but three hundred yards long, and it struck them as a gigantic

and almost impossible “fatigue.”

The enemy had not fallen back more than a thousand yards from the

Cour de Soupir farm which they were resolute to retake if possible.

They fired on our burying-parties and shelled the trenches all

through the 16th September. Patrols were sent out at dawn and

dusk--since any one visible leaving the trenches was fired upon by

snipers--found hostile infantry in full strength in front of them,

and the Battalion had to organize its first system of trench-relief;

for the Diary of the 18th September remarks that “Nos. 1 and 4

Companies relieved 2 and 3 Companies in the trenches and were again

shelled during the day.”

Sniping on Hun lines was a novel experience to the Battalion. They

judged it strange to find a man apparently dead, with a cloth over

his face, lying in a hollow under a ridge commanding their line, who

turned out to be quite alive and unwounded. His rifle was within

short reach, and he was waiting till our patrols had passed to get to

his work. But they killed him, angrily and with astonishment.

On the morning of the 18th September Lieut.-Colonel Lord Ardee,

Grenadier Guards, arrived and took over command from Major Stepney.

The following officers--the first of the long line--also arrived as

reinforcements:

Major G. Madden; Captain Norman Orr-Ewing, Scots Guards, attached;

Captain Lord Francis Scott, Grenadier Guards, attached; Captain the

Hon. J. F. Trefusis, Lieutenants George Brooke, L. S. Coke, R. H.

Ferguson, G. M. Maitland, C. R. Harding, and P. Antrobus.

The Battalion reorganized as follows after less than four weeks’

campaign:

Lieut.-Colonel Lord Ardee C.O.

Major Herbert Stepney Senior Major.

Capt. the Hon. J. Trefusis Adjutant.

Lieut. E. J. Gough Transport Officer.

Lieut. C. A. S. Walker Quartermaster (acting).

Capt. Hon. A. E. Mulholland O.C. No. 1 Company.

Capt. N. Orr-Ewing O.C. No. 2 Company.

Capt. Lord Francis Scott O.C. No. 3 Company.

Major G. Madden O.C. No. 4 Company.

The trench-war was solidifying itself; for the Diary of that same day

notes that the enemy “shelled the trenches and the two howitzer-guns

which were in position below.” Ours was an army, then, which could

count and place every gun that it owned. As many as three howitzer

batteries per division had accompanied the Expeditionary Force, and

more were being sent from home.

The night of the 19th was very wet. They were relieved by the 3rd

Coldstream, and went into billets at Soupir, “having been in the

trenches for five days.” There was an alarm in the afternoon, and

the machine-guns and 100 men of No. 1 Company were sent to help the

Coldstream in the trenches, whilst the rest of the Battalion marched

at 6 P. M. to be ready to assist the 2nd Grenadiers on the left of

Cour de Soupir farm. Only “the machine-guns,” however, came into

action, and the Battalion returned to its billets at 10 P. M.

Much the same sort of thing occurred on the 20th--a furious fusillade

from the trenches, the despatch of reinforcements up a “muddy

lane,” not yet turned into a communication-trench, to help the 3rd

Coldstream, while Nos. 2 and 4 Companies went out to reinforce the

Oxfordshire Light Infantry and to hold the road at the back of it

“in case of a retirement,” and the rest of the Battalion with the

machine-guns stayed as a reserve in Soupir market-square. But beyond

shrapnel bursting over the village and the wounding of two men by

stray machine-gun bullets, there were no special incidents. Major G.

Madden this day had to return to England, ill.

On the 21st the Battalion relieved the 2nd Grenadiers on the left

at Soupir farm at 3.30 A. M.--the safest hour, as experience was to

prove, for reliefs. Nos. 2 and 3 Companies were in trenches, and Nos.

1 and 4 about 300 yards in the rear, with the Headquarters in one of

the caves, which are a feature of the country. The word “dug-out” had

not yet been invented. The nearest approach to it is a reference in

a private letter to “a shelter-recess in the side of the trench to

protect one from shrapnel.” The Diary marks that the “usual alarms

occurred at 6.30 when the patrol went out and the enemy fired a good

deal of shrapnel without effect.” Soupir, like many French villages,

was full of carefully planted spies of singular audacity. One was

found in an officer’s room. He had appeared from a cellar, alleging

that he was an invalid, but as the Gunners’ telephone-wires near the

cellar had been cut and our movements had been reported to the enemy

with great regularity, his explanation was not accepted, nor were his

days long in that land.

Patrols, too, were elastic affairs. One of them, under Lieutenant R.

H. Ferguson, went out on the night of the 21st, came on the enemy’s

trenches half a mile out, lay down to listen to the conversation

there, were all but cut off by a wandering section of snipers, and

returned to their lines unmolested, after the lieutenant had shot the

leading pursuer with his revolver.

On the 22nd September the Battalion--both entrenched and in reserve

in the caves behind--experienced four hours’ high-explosive howitzer

fire, which “except for the effect on the nerves did very little

damage.” (They had yet to learn what continuous noise could do to

break men’s nerve.) This was followed by a heavy fusillade, varied by

star-shells, rockets, and searchlights, which lasted intermittently

throughout the night. The rocket-display was new to the men.

Searchlights, we know, they had seen before.

On the 23rd a telephone-line between Battalion Headquarters and

the advanced trenches was installed (for the first time). Nos. 2

and 3 Companies relieved Nos. 1 and 4 in the trenches, and a man

bringing back a message from No. 4 Company was killed by a sniper.

The Battalion was relieved by the 3rd Coldstream in the evening and

returned to its billets in the barns and lofts of Soupir village,

where next day (September 24) the Diary observes they spent “a quiet

morning. The men got washed and shaved, and company officers were

able to get at their companies. There are so many new officers who

do not know their men that any rest day should be made use of in

this manner.” They relieved the 3rd Coldstream again that evening,

and “digging operations to improve existing trenches and make

communication-trenches were at once begun.” (Here is the first direct

reference in the Diary to communication-trenches, as such.)

Snipers were active all through the 25th September. The trenches were

heavily shelled in the afternoon, and “one man was hit in the leg

while going to fetch water.” They returned to Soupir in the evening

and spent the 26th standing to, in anticipation of enemy attacks

which did not develop into anything more than an artillery duel, and

in digging trenches for the defence of Soupir village. This work,

however, had to be stopped owing to heavy shell-fire brought to bear

on the working-parties--presumably through information from the many

spies--and after a wearing day relieved the 3rd Coldstream in the

trenches at night. The Diary gives no hint of the tremendous strain

of those twenty-four hours’ “reliefs” from being shelled in a trench

to being shelled in a village, nor of the inadequacy of our artillery

as it strove to cope with the German guns, nor of the rasping

irritation caused by the knowledge that every disposition made was

reported almost at once to the enemy.

On September 27--a Sunday--the enemy’s bands were heard playing up

and down the trenches. Some attempt was made by a British battalion

on the right to move out a patrol covered by the fire of No. 2

Company, but the enemy shells and machine-guns smothered every

movement.

On the 28th September (their day in billets) stakes were cut out of

the woods behind Soupir, while the Pioneers collected what wire they

could lay hands on, as “the Battalion was ordered to construct wire

entanglements in front of their trenches to-night.” The entanglements

were made of two or three strands, at the most, of agricultural

wire picked up where they could find it. They heard heavy fighting

throughout the night on their right--“probably the First Division.”

Both sides by now were feeling the strain of trench-work, for which

neither had made preparations, and the result was an increasing

tension manifesting itself in wild outbursts of musketry and

artillery and camp rumour of massed attacks and breaks-through.

On the 30th September, F.-M. Lord Roberts’s birthday, a

congratulatory telegram was sent to him; and “a great quantity of

material was collected out of which huts for the men could be built.”

These were frail affairs of straw and twig, half dug in, half built

out, of the nearest banks, or placed under the lee of any available

shelter. The very fabric of them has long since been overlaid with

strata of fresh wreckage and the twig roofs and sides are rotted

black under the grass or ploughed in.

The month closes with the note that, as it was a very bright

moonlight night, the Battalion’s usual relief of the Coldstream was

“carried out up the communication-trenches.” Some men still recall

that first clumsy trench-relief.

October 1 was spent in perfecting communication-trenches and

shelters, and “the Brigadier came up in the morning and was taken

round the trenches.” Two officers were sent to Chavonne to meet the

5th Brigade--one to bring the Worcesters to the Battalion’s trenches,

the other to show the Connaught Rangers their billets in Soupir. The

3rd Coldstream marched out of Soupir and took up the line to the left

of the 2nd Grenadiers near Vailly, and next day, 2nd October, No. 1

Company of the Irish Guards dug a connecting-trench between those

two. Otherwise, for the moment, life was smooth.

It may be noted for the instruction of generations to come that

some of the Reservists grumbled at orders not to talk or smoke

in the trenches, as that drew fire; and that a newly appointed

platoon-officer, when he had admonished them officially, fell them

out and informed them unofficially that, were there any more trouble,

he would, after the C.O. had dealt with the offenders, take them on

for three rounds “boxing in public.” Peace and goodwill returned at

once.

On the 3rd October, a platoon was despatched to help the Royal

Engineers in the construction of a road across a new bridge they

had put up between Soupir and Chavonne. The Battalion relieved the

3rd Coldstream in its new position three-quarters of a mile east

of Vailly, and next day “quietly improved trenches and head-cover,”

which latter is mentioned for the first time. It was all casual

timber picked up off the country-side.

On the 5th October a patrol explored through the wood, in front of

the right trenches, but found only dead Germans to the number of

thirty and many half buried, as well as five British soldiers killed

in some lost affair of a fortnight before. Private O’Shaughnessy,

No. 1 Company, was shot dead by a sniper when on observation-post

at the end of this wood. He had only arrived that morning with a

draft of one hundred men, under Lieutenant Gore-Langton, and had

asked to be allowed to go out on this duty. In the afternoon three

shells burst on the road near Battalion Headquarters, and fatally

wounded Lieutenant G. Brooke, who was on his way to Soupir to take

over the transport from Lieutenant E. J. Gough. He was sent in to

Braisne, where he died on the 7th October. The Diary notes “he

would not have been found so soon had not the shells broken the

telephone-wire to Headquarters. A message was coming through at the

time and when communication was stopped the Signalling Sergeant

sent two men to repair the wire and they found him.” He was brought

in to the A.D.S. at Vailly-sur-Aisne by his own men, who made the

R.A.M.C. stretcher-bearers walk behind as they would allow none but

themselves to carry him. They bade him farewell before they returned

to their trenches, and went out openly weeping. When he was sent to

Braisne that evening, after being dressed, his own men again got an

ambulance across the pontoon-bridge, which had been hitherto reckoned

impassable, for his convenience. His last words to them were that

they were to “play the game” and not to revenge his death on the Hun.

On the afternoon of the 6th October, which was cold and misty, the

Germans pushed a patrol through the wood and our standing-patrol went

out and discovered one German under-officer of the 64th (Imperial

Jäger Guards) dead, and the rifle of another man.

The enemy sent out no more patrols. Men had grown to be cunning

among the timber, and noticed every tree they moved under. When the

Coldstream relieved the Battalion that night, one of our patrols

found a felled tree had been carefully placed across their homeward

path by some unknown hand--it might have been the late Jäger

under-officer--who had expected to attack the patrol while it was

climbing over the obstacle.

On the 7th the Battalion rested in Soupir all day, and on the 8th

Lieutenant G. Brooke’s body was brought in from Braisne and buried in

Soupir cemetery.

The 9th was a quiet day except for an hour’s shelling, and a good

deal of cheering from the German trenches in the evening, evidently

in honour of the fall of Antwerp. It annoyed our men for the reason

that they could not retaliate. Our guns had not a round to throw away.

THE MOVE TOWARD THE SEA

The opposing lines had been locked now for close upon a month and,

as defences elaborated themselves, all hope of breaking-through

vanished. Both sides then opened that mutually outflanking movement

towards the west which did not end till it reached the sea. Held up

along their main front, the Germans struck at the Flanders plain, the

Allies striving to meet the movement and envelop their right flank as

it extended. A British force had been sent to Antwerp; the Seventh

Division and the Third Cavalry Division had been landed at Zeebrugge

on the 7th October with the idea of helping either the Antwerp force

or co-operating with the Allied Armies as circumstances dictated.

Meantime, the main British force was being held in the trenches of

the Aisne a hundred and twenty miles away; and it seemed good to

all concerned that these two bodies of British troops should be

consolidated, both for purposes of offence, command and, by no means

least, supply, on the Flanders flank covering the Channel. There

were obvious dangers in moving so many men from high ground across a

broad river under the enemy’s eye. It could only be effected at night

with all precautions, but as the western pressure developed and was

accentuated by the fall of Antwerp, the advantage of the transfer

outweighed all risk. Our cavalry moved on the 3rd October by road

for Flanders, and a few days later the infantry began to entrain for

St. Omer. The Second Corps was the first to leave, the Third Corps

followed, and the First was the last.

Orders came to the Battalion on Sunday, October 11, to be prepared

to move at short notice, and new clothes were issued to the men, but

they did not hand over their trenches to the French till the 13th

October, when they marched to Perles in the evening and entrained on

the 14th at Fismes a little after noon, reaching Hazebrouck _via_

(the route is worth recording) Mareuil-sur-Ourcq, Ormoy, St. Denis,

outside Paris, Epluches, Creil, Amiens (10.15 P. M.), Abbeville (3.15

A. M.), Etaples, Boulogne, Calais and St. Omer, every stone of which

last six was to be as familiar to them as their own hearths for years

to come.

At 5 P. M. on the 15th the Battalion went into billets at Hazebrouck.

It was a sharp change from the soft wooded bluffs and clean chalky

hills above the Aisne, to the slow ditch-like streams and crowded

farming landscape of Flanders. At Hazebrouck they lay till the

morning of the 17th, when they marched to Boeschepe, attended church

parade on Sunday the 18th, and marched to untouched Ypres _via_ St.

Kokebeele, Reninghelst and Vlamertinghe on the 20th with the Brigade,

some divisional troops and the 41st Battery, R.F.A. The Brigade

halted at Ypres a few hours, seeing and being impressed by the beauty

of the Cloth Hall and the crowded market-place. The 2nd Coldstream

and the 2nd Battalion Grenadiers being eventually sent forward,

the remainder of the Brigade billeted in St. Jean, then described

impersonally as “a small village about one and a half kilometres east

of Ypres.” They halted at the edge of the city for dinner, and the

men got out their melodeons and danced jigs on the flawless pavé.

Much firing was heard all day, and “the 2nd Coldstream came into

action about 4 P. M. and remained in the trenches all night.”

That was the sum of information available at the moment to the

Battalion--that, and orders to “drive the enemy back wherever

met.” So they first were introduced to the stage of the bloody and

debatable land which will be known for all time as “The Salient.”

The original intention of our Army on the Flanders flank had been

offensive, but the long check on the Aisne gave the enemy time to

bring forward troops from their immense and perfectly prepared

reserves, while the fall of Antwerp--small wonder the Germans had

cheered in their trenches when the news came!--released more.

Consequently, the movement that began on the Allies’ side as an

attempt to roll up the German right flank before it could reach the

sea, ended in a desperate defence to hold back an overwhelmingly

strong enemy from sweeping forward through Belgium to Calais and the

French sea-board. Out of this defence developed that immense and

overlapping series of operations centring on Ypres, extending from

the Yser Canal in the north to La Bassée in the south, and lasting

from mid-October to the 20th November 1914, which may be ranked as

the First Battle of Ypres.

It will be remembered that the Second and Third British Army Corps

were the first to leave the Aisne trenches for the west. On the 11th

October the Second Army Corps was in position between the Aire and

Béthune and in touch with the left flank of the Tenth French Army at

La Bassée.

On the 12th of October the Third Army Corps reached St. Omer and

moved forward to Hazebrouck to get touch with the Second Army Corps

on its right, the idea being that the two corps together should wheel

on their own left and striking eastward turn the position of the

German forces that were facing the Tenth French Army. They failed

owing to the strength of the German forces on the spot, and by

October 19, after indescribably fierce fighting, the Second and Third

Army Corps had been brought to a standstill on a line, from La Bassée

through Armentières, not noticeably differing from the position which

our forces were destined to occupy for many months to come. The

attempted flank attacks had become frontal all along the line, and in

due course frontal attacks solidified into trench-warfare again.

The Irish Guards in the Great War, Volume 1 (of 2) · 第 2 / 28 段