A delegation of the Cherokees, with John Ross at their head, was
quartered in Washington during the greater part of the winter of
1832-'33, bringing to bear in behalf of their nation every possible
influence upon both Congress and the Executive. A voluminous
correspondence was conducted between them and the War Department upon
the subject of their proposed removal. In a communication on the 28th
of January, 1833, they ask leave to say that, notwithstanding the
various perplexities which the Cherokee people had experienced under
the course of policy pursued toward them, they were yet unshaken in
their objections to a removal west of the Mississippi River. On the
question of their rights and the justice of their cause, their minds
were equally unchangeable. They were, however, fully sensible that
justice and weakness could not control the array of oppressive power,
and that in the calamitous effects of such power, already witnessed,
they could not fail to foresee with equal clearness that a removal to
the west would be followed in a few years by consequences no less fatal.
They therefore suggested for the consideration of the President,
whether it would not be practicable for the Government to satisfy the
claims of Georgia by granting to those of her citizens who had in the
lotteries of that State drawn lots of land within Cherokee limits
other lands of the United States lying within the Territories and
States of the Union, or in some other way.
_The President urges their assent to removal._--The Secretary of War,
in replying for the President (February 2,1833), was unable to see that
any practicable plan could be adopted by which the reversionary rights
held under the State of Georgia could be purchased upon such terms as
would justify the Government in entering into a stipulation to that
effect. Nor would it at all remove the difficulties and embarrassments
of their condition. They would still be subject to the laws of Georgia,
surrounded by white settlements and exposed to all those evils
which had always attended the Indian race when placed in immediate
contact with the white population. It was only by removing from these
surroundings that they could expect to avoid the fate which had already
swept away so many Indian tribes.
_Reply of John Ross._--Ross retorted, in a communication couched
in diplomatic language, that it was with great diffidence and deep
regret he felt constrained to say, that in this scheme of Indian
removal he could see more of expediency and policy to get rid of
the Cherokees than to perpetuate their race upon any permanent,
fundamental principle. If the doctrine that Indian tribes could not
exist contiguous to a white population should prevail, and they should
be compelled to remove west of the States and Territories of this
republic, what was to prevent a similar removal of them from there for
the same reason?
Without securing any promises of relief, and without reaching
any definite understanding with the executive authorities of the
Government, the delegation left for their homes in March, 1833. They
agreed, however, to lay before their national council in the ensuing
May a proposition made to them by the President, offering to pay them
$2,500,000 in goods for their lands, with the proviso that they should
remove themselves at their own expense.[392] This proposition, it
is hardly necessary to remark, was not favorably considered by the
council, though the Secretary of War designated[393] Mr. Benjamin F.
Curry to attend the meeting and urge its acceptance.
_Alleged attempted bribery of John Ross._--In this connection a story
having been given currency that the Government had offered Chief Ross a
bribe, provided he would secure the conclusion of a treaty of cession
and removal, the Commissioner of Indian Affairs denied it as being
"utterly without foundation, and one of those vile expedients that
unprincipled men sometimes practice to accomplish an evil purpose,"
and as being "too incredible to do much injury."[394] While this
story was perhaps without solid foundation in fact, its improbability
would possibly have been more evident but for the fact that only five
years earlier the Secretary of War had appointed secret agents and
authorized them to expend $2,000 in bribing the chiefs for this very
purpose, and had made his action in this respect a matter of public
record.