statement referred to above):
“On January 4, 1933, Hitler, von Papen, Hess, Himmler and
Keppler came to my house in Cologne. Hitler, von Papen and I
went to my den where we were closeted in a discussion lasting
about two hours. Hess, Himmler and Keppler did not participate
in this discussion but were in the next room. Keppler, who had
helped arrange this meeting, came from Berlin; von Papen came
alone from his home in the Saar; and Hitler brought Hess and
Himmler with him, as they were traveling with him to Lippe in
connection with the election campaign. The discussion was only
between Hitler and Papen; I personally had nothing to say in the
discussion. The meeting started about 11:30 A.M. and the first
question was raised by Hitler as to why it was necessary to
punish the two Nazis who had killed the Communist in Silesia.
Von Papen explained to Hitler that it had been necessary to
punish these two Nazis, although they had not been put to death,
because the law was on the books and all political offenders
under the law must have some punishment. He further explained to
Hitler that it might be possible to get a pardon from President
Hindenburg to give serious consideration to making Hitler the
Chancellor at the time that Hindenburg met with Hitler and von
Papen and that he had understood that Hindenburg was perfectly
willing to discuss this matter with Hitler at that time. He said
that it came as a great surprise and shock to him when
Hindenburg was unwilling to do so and he felt that someone,
probably von Schleicher, was responsible for the change in
Hindenburg’s point of view. Next, von Papen told Hitler that it
seemed to him the best thing to have the conservatives and
nationalists who had supported him join with the Nazis to form a
government. He proposed that this new government should, if
possible, be headed by Hitler and von Papen on the same level.
Then Hitler made a long speech in which he said if he were made
Chancellor, it would be necessary for him to be head of the
government but that supporters of Papen could go into his
(Hitler’s) government as ministers when they were willing to go
along with him in his policy of changing many things. These
changes he outlined at this time included elimination of Social
Democrats, Communists and Jews from leading positions in Germany
and the restoration of order in public life. Von Papen and
Hitler reached an agreement in principle so that many of the
points which had brought them in conflict could be eliminated
and they could find a way to get together. They agreed that
further details would have to be worked out and that this could
be done in Berlin or some other convenient place.
“I understand they met later with von Ribbentrop and worked out
further details.
“The meeting broke up about 1:30 and the three of us joined
Hess, Himmler and Keppler at lunch, during which there was
general conversation which lasted until about four o’clock when
they, all the guests, departed.”
Having reached an understanding with Hitler, von Papen directed his
energy toward convincing President Hindenburg to allow Hitler to form a
new government. In this task he had to overcome Hindenburg’s fears that
this appointment would lead to domestic oppressions and risk of war
(according to a statement of Otto Meissner, Nurnberg, 28 November 1945).
Von Papen himself subsequently admitted the important role he played in
bringing Hitler to power. At Berchtesgaden on 12 February 1938,
immediately after Hitler had forced Schuschnigg to sign the document
which led to the Austrian Anschluss, Hitler turned to Papen and
remarked:
“Herr von Papen, through your assistance I was appointed
Chancellor of Germany and thus the Reich was saved from the
abyss of communism. I will never forget that.”
Papen replied:
“_Ja, wohl, Mein Fuehrer._” (_2995-PS_)
C. _AS VICE-CHANCELLOR, VON PAPEN USED HIS POSITION AND PERSONAL
INFLUENCE TO FACILITATE THE CONSOLIDATION OF NAZI CONTROL OVER GERMANY._
(1) _In the first critical year and a half of Nazi consolidation of
control over Germany, von Papen was second only to Hitler in the Cabinet
which established the legal basis for furtherance of the Nazi program._
As Vice-Chancellor, van Papen was the only member of the government
empowered to act for the Fuehrer in his absence.
(2) _Von Papen actively participated in the general abolition of civil
liberties by promoting legislation which paved the way for the Nazi
police state._ At the first meeting of Hitler’s Cabinet, there was
intensive discussion concerning the possibility of securing passage of
an Enabling Law which in practical effect would liquidate the Reichstag
and make the Nazi Cabinet the supreme law-making power of the Reich. The
conspirators, including von Papen, at this meeting clearly indicated
that they did not at the time hold sufficient power to achieve this
measure by normal constitutional methods (_351-PS_).
Seizing the Reichstag fire as a pretext, the Cabinet forthwith arranged
for the suspension of those fundamental civil liberties (including
freedom of speech, press, assembly and association) which would protect
citizens who dared to oppose the plans of the conspirators. The
suspension of civil liberties was accomplished by issuance of a
Presidential decree, which presumably, according to German usage, was
proposed to the Reich President by the Cabinet and countersigned by
those Ministers whose departments were involved (_1390-PS_; _2050-PS_).
This basic law was only the first of a series which placed the
individual dissenter at the mercy of the Nazi state. As if to underscore
explicitly the basic policy behind this legislation, von Papen
personally signed the decree which implemented this legislation by
creating Special Courts to enforce its provisions. This decree abolished
rights, including the right of appeal, which had previously
characterized the administration of justice by the German judicial
system. It thus constituted also the first legislative measure for the
Nazification of the German judiciary (_2076-PS_).
The subsequent creation of the dreaded _Volksgericht_ and the wholesale
Nazification of the German system of criminal law was merely the logical
development of these earlier steps. This too was achieved by decree of
the Cabinet in which von Papen was Vice-Chancellor (_2014-PS_).
(3) _Von Papen actively participated in substitution of the Nazi Cabinet
for the Reichstag as Germany’s supreme law-giving authority,
notwithstanding his doubts as to the advisability of giving Hitler such
extensive power._ Von Papen actively participated in the Cabinet
deliberations concerning the proposed so-called Enabling Act, and
concerning the means by which it might be made law (_351-PS_; _2962-PS_;
_2963-PS_).
The enactment of this law deprived the Reichstag of its legislative
functions, so that legislative as well as executive powers were
concentrated in Hitler and his Cabinet (_2001-PS_).
Enactment of the law was made possible only by the application of Nazi
pressure and terror against the potential opponents of this legislation,
and by taking advantage of the Presidential decree of 28 February 1933,
suspending constitutional guarantees of freedom. (See section 2 of
Chapter VII on the Acquisition of Totalitarian Political Control.)
As if to indorse the methods by which this legislation was enacted, von
Papen personally signed the Amnesty Decree of 21 March 1933, liberating
all persons who had committed murder between 30 January and 21 March
1933 against anti-Nazi politicians, writers, and Reichstag Deputies
(_2059-PS_).
Von Papen participated in this program notwithstanding the fact that he
foresaw at that time the implications of granting to Hitler the complete
powers conferred by the Enabling Act. He has so testified (in an
interrogation at Nurnberg, 3 September 1945):
“Q. After Hitler became Chancellor, when for the first time did
you have any doubts about the wisdom of having allowed him to
become Chancellor?
“A. Well, that’s difficult to say. I mean the first doubt
certainly I had when the Reichstag gave in to his request for
the law, to enable him to rule the country without parliament.”
(4) _Von Papen not only participated in the seizure by the cabinet of
supreme power for the Nazis, but as a member of the cabinet participated
in the systematic elimination of all potential enemies of the Nazi
conspiracy._ The Reichstag fire and the ensuing suppression of civil
liberties marked the beginning of the destruction of all rival political
parties. The immediate elimination of the legally elected Communist
members from the Reichstag was merely the forerunner of the rapid and
complete liquidation of all political parties other than the National
Socialists (_2403-PS_; _1396-PS_; _2058-PS_; _1388-PS_). By these
measures the suppression of all democratic opposition became complete,
within one year of the time when von Papen was warning his countrymen of
the dangers of authoritarianism.
Having substituted the autocracy of the Hitler cabinet for the
democratic force of the Reichstag, the cabinet proceeded immediately to
enact a series of laws abolishing the states and coordinating them with
the Reich (_2004-PS_; _2005-PS_; _2006-PS_). The enactment of these
laws, which had been clearly indicated by point 25 of the Party program,
removed all possible retarding influences which the German federal
States might have exerted against the overwhelming centralization of
power in Hitler’s Reich Cabinet.
The importance of this step, as well as the role played by Papen, is
reflected in an exchange of letters between Reichs President Hindenburg,
von Papen in his capacity as Reichskommissar for Prussia, and Reichs
Minister Goering. The exchange occurred in connection with the recall of
the Reichskommissar and the appointment of Goering to the post of
Minister President of Prussia. In tendering his resignation, on 7 April
1933, von Papen wrote to Hitler:
“With the draft of the law for the coordination of the states
with the Reich, passed today by the Reich Chancellor,
legislative work has begun which will be of historical
significance for the political development of the German state.
The step taken by the Reich Government, which I headed at the
time, is now crowned by this new inter-locking of the Reich.
You, Herr Reich Chancellor, will now, as once Bismarck, be able
to coordinate in all points the policy of the greatest of German
states with that of the Reich. Now that the new law enables you
to appoint a Prussian Prime Minister I ask you to inform the
Reich President that I return to his hands my post of Reichs
Commissar for Prussia.” (_3357-PS_)
In transmitting this resignation request to President Hindenburg, Hitler
stated:
“Vice-Chancellor von Papen has sent a letter to me which I
enclose for your information. Herr von Papen already informed me
within the last few days that he agreed with Minister Goering to
resign on his own volition, as soon as the unified conduct of
the governmental affairs in the Reich and in Prussia would be
assured by the new law on coordination of policy in the Reich
and the states [_Laender_].
“On the eve of the day when the new law on the institution of
Reich governors [_Reichs-Statthalter_] was adopted, Herr von
Papen considered this aim as having been attained and he
requested of me to undertake the appointment of the Prussian
Prime Minister, when at the same time he would offer his full
time services in the Reich Government.
“Herr von Papen, in accepting the commission for the Government
of Prussia in these difficult times since 30 January, has
rendered a very meritorious service to the realization of the
idea of coordinating the policy in the Reich and the States. His
collaboration in the Reich cabinet, for which he now offers all
his strength, is infinitely valuable; my relationship to him is
such a heartily friendly one, that I sincerely rejoice at the
great help I shall thus receive.
“For profound reverence,
“A.H.” (_3357-PS_)
The enactment of this legislation followed repeated declarations in
which Papen had warned his countrymen of the dangers of the exaggerated
degree of centralized authority which would result from abolition of the
federal system. These warnings began before Hitler’s accession to power
and continued by implication in the reassurances which Papen gave in
February 1933 to Bavarian political leaders who expressed their fears of
Nazi centralized authority (_Cuno Horkenbach, Das Deutsche Reich von
1918 bis Heute._ (The German Reich from 1918 until today) (Berlin 1933),
p. 44). As late as 3 March 1933, in an election speech at Stuttgart, von
Papen warned that:
“Federalism saves us from centralism, that organizational form
which concentrically draws all the vital forces of a people to
one point, as a mirror will do with the rays of the sun. No
people is less suited for being governed centralistically than
the German people.” (_3313-PS_)
Less than one month after its seizure of the legislative power, the
cabinet of which von Papen was a member enacted the first of a series of
laws aimed at establishing firm Nazi control over the entire civil
service and judiciary (_2012-PS_; _1400-PS_; _1398-PS_). Having been a
public servant himself, von Papen was aware of the far-reaching effect
of these first legislative and administrative steps in attaining full
totalitarian control over the entire governmental machinery of Germany.
The cabinet of which von Papen was a member embarked upon a state policy
of persecution of the Jews. The first organized act in this program was
the boycott of Jewish enterprises on 1 April 1933, which was approved by
the entire cabinet. This was followed by a series of laws beginning the
systematic elimination of the Jews from public and professional life in
Germany. (See Section 7 of Chapter VII on the Program for Persecution of
Jews.)
All these suppressive measures were in line with long-standing basic
objectives of the NSDAP to which von Papen had agreed in his January
conference with Hitler and von Schroeder.
(5) _To complete its suppression of all rival influences, the Cabinet of
which von Papen was a member enacted a series of decrees which
strengthened the Nazi movement by conferring upon it a para-governmental
status._ Followers of the Party, through a decree signed personally by
von Papen, were granted amnesty “for penal acts committed in the
material revolution of the German People, in its preparation of the
fight for the German soil” (_2059-PS_). The perpetrators of Nazi
terrorism were thereby placed above the law, and a pattern was
established for the subsequent handling of Nazi excesses.
This cabinet enacted measures which gave legal protection to the status
and symbols of the Party and its formations (_1652-PS_; _2759-PS_).
This cabinet enacted a series of measures to assure the Nazi movement’s
spiritual control over Germany (_2029-PS_; _2030-PS_; _2415-PS_;
_2083-PS_; _2078-PS_; _2088-PS_).
Having first outlawed all political parties other than the NSDAP, the
cabinet of which von Papen was a member formally decreed that:
“1. After the victory of the National Socialistic Revolution,
the National Socialistic German Labor Party is the bearer of the
concept of the German State and is inseparably the state.
“2. It will be a part of the public law. Its organization will
be determined by the Fuehrer.” (_1395-PS_).
Having granted para-governmental status to the Nazi party, and having
assured legal unity of the Party’s Fuehrer and the Reich’s Chancellor,
the Nazis next step was to combine in the same person the Presidency of
the German Reich. This was accomplished by merging the offices of
President and Chancellor, by means of a decree signed by von Papen
(_2003-PS_). An important consequence of this law was to give to Hitler
the supreme command of the German armed forces, always a perquisite of
the Presidency (_2050-PS_).
(6) _Despite disagreements as to detail, von Papen fundamentally agreed
with basic Nazi objectives and publicly endorsed the regime for which he
shared responsibility as Vice Chancellor._ Von Papen’s basic political
philosophy was not so divergent from Nazism as to preclude an easy
bridging of the gap. In 1932, while still Chancellor, von Papen had been
willing to head a government in which Nazism would be strongly
represented. By January 1933 he found it possible—as a price for his
restoration to a position of public prominence—to submerge his
differences with Hitler and to direct his energies to the installation
of a Nazi regime (see B above).
In addition to his participation as a cabinet member in the process of
Nazifying Germany, von Papen’s devotion to the Nazi cause was repeatedly
demonstrated throughout this period by public statements and acts both
by himself and by Hitler. Thus, as noted above in connection with his
role in the elimination of the _Laender_ as a political force, von Papen
wrote Hitler in April 1933, that
“You, Herr Reich Chancellor, will now, as once Bismarck, be able
to coordinate in all points the policy of the greatest of German
states with that of the Reich,”
And Hitler on that occasion took notice of Papen’s services by declaring
that
“His collaboration in the Reich cabinet, for which he now offers
all his strength, is infinitely valuable; my relationship to him
is such a heartily friendly one, that I sincerely rejoice at the
great help I shall thus receive.” (_3357-PS_).
And again on 2 November 1933, speaking from the same platform with
Hitler and Gauleiter Terboven, in the course of the campaign for
Reichstag election and the referendum on Germany’s withdrawal from the
League of Nations, von Papen declared:
“Ever since Providence called upon me to become the pioneer of
national resurrection and the rebirth of our homeland, I have
tried to support with all my strength the work of the national
socialist movement and its leader; and just as I at the time of
taking over the chancellorship have advocated to pave the way to
power for the young fighting liberation movement, just as I on
January 30 was selected by a gracious fate to put the hands of
our chancellor and Fuehrer into the hand of our beloved field
marshal, so do I today again feel the obligation to say to the
German people and all those who have kept confidence in me:
“The kind Lord has blessed Germany by giving it in times of deep
distress a leader who will lead it, through all distresses and
weaknesses, through all crisis and moments of danger, with the
sure instinct of the statesman into a happy future.”
* * * * * *
“Let us in this hour say to the Fuehrer of the new Germany that
we believe in him and his work.” (_3375-PS_).
By this time as noted above, the cabinet of which Papen was a member had
abolished the civil liberties which were a condition to any effective
protest against Nazism, had sanctioned political murder committed in aid
of Nazism’s seizure of power, had substituted itself for the Reichstag
as Germany’s supreme law-making authority, had destroyed all rival
political parties, had enacted the basic laws for abolition of the
political influence of the _Laender_, had provided the legislative basis
for purging the civil service and judiciary of anti-Nazi elements, had
embarked upon a state policy of persecution of the Jews, had legislated
Nazi influence into the cultural life of the German nation, and had
taken its first steps toward conferring a para-governmental status upon
the Nazi party and its principal formations.
Even after von Papen’s Marburg speech of June 1934, in which he again
showed some understanding of the dangers of Nazism, he remained a pillar
of Nazi policy and influence. Thus Hitler himself, in attempting to
justify the Blood Purge of 30 June 1934, tacitly admitted that Papen was
still considered a loyal member of the regime:
“The allegations [of foreign newspapers] that Vice-Chancellor
von Papen, Reichsminister Seldte, or other gentlemen of the
Reich Cabinet had entertained connections with the rebels is
refuted by the fact that one of the first intentions of the
rebels was to assassinate these men.” (_Hitler Reichstag_
address, 18 July 1934, as quoted in _Das Archiv_, Vol. IV, pp.
495, 507.)
The Fuehrer thus made a tacit bid for the continuing loyalty of von
Papen. Von Papen’s subsequent career demonstrated that this was not a
vain expectation. He left the vice-chancellorship only to assume the new
task of special emissary of the Fuehrer to Austria. But before leaving,
while still Vice Chancellor, von Papen signed the decree combining the
positions of President and Reichs Chancellor on 1 August 1934, and on 5
August 1934 he delivered the document—the so-called Hindenburg
Testament—which purported to confer the revered president’s dying
blessing upon Hitler and the Nazi regime (_Notice concerning delivery of
Hindenburg’s testament by Vice Chancellor von Papen, Das Archiv_, Vol.
V, page 648).
D. _AS GERMANY’S MOST FAMOUS CATHOLIC LAYMAN AND AS NEGOTIATOR OF THE
VATICAN CONCORDAT, VON PAPEN USED HIS POSITION AND PERSONAL INFLUENCE TO
PARTICIPATE IN THE CONSOLIDATION OF NAZI CONTROL OVER GERMANY AND IN
NAZI PREPARATION FOR AGGRESSION._
(1) _Immediately upon Nazi seizure of power within Germany, von Papen
endeavored to weld German Catholicism into a powerful body of support
for the Nazi state._ When Naziism seized control of Germany in January
1933, its relations with the church were at a low ebb. The period of the
Reichstag elections of July and November 1932 was marked by certain
widely circulated anti-Nazi pronouncements of the German bishops,
especially in such Catholic papers as _Germania_, _Koelnische
Volkszeitung_, and the _Rhein-Mainische Volkszeitung_. These bishops
discerned the fundamental incompatibility between the Church and the
Nazis’ own declarations of State policy. They accordingly publicly
stigmatized the Nazi movement as anti-Christian, forbade the Catholic
clergy to participate in any ceremonies (such as funerals) in which the
Nazi Party was officially represented, refused the sacraments to Party
officials, and in several pastorals expressly warned the faithful
against the danger to German Catholicism created by the Party
(_3389-PS_).
Immediately upon seizure of power, the main concern of the new regime
was to liquidate political opposition. Achievement of this objective was
predicated upon the strategy of “divide and rule”. A first step in this
strategy was to convince conservatives that the efforts of the
government were being directed primarily against the Communists and
other forces of the extreme Left, and that their own interests would
remain safe in Nazi hands as long as they would consent to refrain from
political activity. The result was a brief but active period of
rapprochement between Church and Party. Von Papen was a leader in this
strategy. The minutes of the Reich cabinet meeting of 15 March 1933
contain the following notation in connection with discussions on the
Enabling Act:
“The Vice Chancellor and Reich Commissar for the State of
Prussia said it is of decisive importance to integrate into the
new State the masses standing behind the Parties. He said that
the question of coordination of political Catholicism into the
new State is of special importance.” (_2962-PS_)
Eight days later, speaking at the second meeting of the Reichstag of
1933, on 23 March 1933, Hitler asked for adoption of the Enabling Act.
In this speech he declared:
“While the government is determined to carry through the
political and moral purging of our public life, it is creating
and insuring prerequisites for a truly religious life. The
government sees in both Christian confessions the factors most
important for the maintenance of our Folkdom. It will respect
agreements concluded between them and the states. However, it
expects that its work will meet with a similar appreciation. The
government will treat all other denominations with equal
objective justice. However, it can never condone that belonging
to a certain denomination or to a certain race might be regarded
as license to commit or tolerate crimes. The Government will
devote its care to the sincere living together of Church and
State.” (_3387-PS_).
The immediate effect of this assurance was action by the conference of
German bishops, meeting in Fulda on 28 March 1933. This conference
lifted restrictions imposed on members of the church adhering to the
Nazi movement. In a cautious statement which placed full faith and
credit in the Papen-inspired Hitler assurances, the bishops declared:
“The high shepherds of the dioceses of Germany in their dutiful
anxiety to keep the Catholic faith pure and protect the
untouchable aims and rights of the Catholic Church have adopted,
for profound reasons, during the last years, an oppositional
attitude toward the National Socialist movement, through
prohibitions and warnings, which was to be in effect as long and
as far as those reasons remained valid.
“It must now be recognized that there are official and solemn
declarations issued by the highest representative of the Reich
Government—who at the same time is the authoritarian leader of
that movement—which acknowledge the inviolability of the
teachings of Catholic faith and the unchangeable tasks and
rights of the church, and which expressly assure the full value
of the legal pacts concluded between the various German States
and the Church.
“Without lifting the condemnation of certain religious and
ethical errors implied in our previous measures, the Episcopate
now believes it can entertain the confidence that those
prescribed general prohibitions and warnings may not be regarded
as necessary any more.” (_3389-PS_)
This action opened the door for mass Party adherence by practicing
Catholics. All those German Catholics who were inclined to adopt Nazi
political views and had hesitated only because of the anti-Nazi attitude
of the hierarchy hastened now to join the victorious party of the
“National Revolution”. This tendency was marked by a tremendous and
sudden burst of activity by the so-called “bridge-builders,” who rushed
to close the gap between the Church and the Nazi State. Von Papen, who
only a short time before had been willing to use armed force to suppress
the Nazis, was foremost among these “bridge-builders”, who not only
claimed an ideological affinity between the Nazi system and the alleged
anti-liberal character of Catholic politics, but affirmatively
apologized for excesses of the State which even then had begun to shock
the world.
Existing agencies were used for this purpose. Thus, the Union of
Catholic Germans (_Arbeitsgemeinschaft Katholischer Deutscher_), of
which von Papen was president, insisted in its program that the church,
like the Nazi movement itself, was guided by the leadership principle
(Cuno Horkenbach, _Das Deutsche Reich von 1918 bis Heute_ (The German
Reich from 1918 Until Today) (Berlin 1935), pp. 436, 504). The same
organization, in the course of the election campaign which preceded
adoption of the Enabling Act, had bitterly criticized the Catholic
political opposition to Marxism and urged that Catholics “by all means
vote unanimously the National Socialist ticket”, because “We Catholics
do not wish to be denied to march in the lead in this election campaign”
(Election Appeal, _Voelkischer Beobachter_, 23 February 1933, p. 2).
Later, on the eve of the Nazis’ first anti-Jewish boycott, this same
organization played its part in the extensive campaign replying to
foreign newspaper reports concerning atrocities committed against German
Jews. On 1 April 1933 it published through the Prussian News Service, an
“Appeal to all Christians”, viewing “with great indignation” this
“irresponsible campaign against Germany” which “continues in spite of
official German declarations and corrections”. This “Appeal”
characterized the foreign reports as “intentional lies and
falsifications” and “a reckless, crafty campaign of destruction
conducted by the Jewish world alliance and moneyed powers against the
right of self-determination of all peoples and against the entire
Christian civilization”. It called upon “the Christians of all
countries, irrespective of denominations, to form a world-wide front of
defense against that Jewish conspiracy disturbing the true peace”
(“_Appeal to All Christians_”, _Voelkischer Beobachter_ (People’s
Observer), 30 March 1933, p. 2).
Notwithstanding the force of these activities, this Nazification by
existing agencies was not deemed adequate to the task of organizing
Catholic lay support. The result was the creation, in early April 1933,
under the sponsorship of von Papen, of a new “Bund” of Catholic Germans
called “Cross and Eagle” (“_Kreuz und Adler_”) which made it its task
“to contribute enthusiastic devotion to the upbuilding of the future
Reich” (Gerd Ruehle, _Das Dritte Reich_ (The Third Reich), p. 250).
This whole program of rapprochement between Church and Party manifests
the Papen “touch”—the same quality of handiwork which had manifested
itself in Hitler’s accession to power and which later was to reappear in
Austria: First, gentle hints by Papen as to strategy, followed within
eight days by reassurances in Hitler’s Reichstag speech. Next, again
following merely by days, the formal lifting of the restrictions on Nazi
membership by the leaders of the Church of which von Papen was the most
famous lay member. Finally, again within a few days, the open campaign
by which Papen-sponsored organizations endeavoured to align Church and
Party. The close timing of these events was not a coincidence.
(2) _Having achieved initial successes in consolidating Catholic support
within Germany, von Papen undertook international consolidation of
Nazi-Church relationships by negotiation of a Concordat with the
Vatican._ The program of rapprochement and the public declarations
bridging the gap between the Church and the Nazi movement were merely
advertising media by which Nazi-minded Catholics were herded into the
movement, and slogans by which the conspirators might placate the
Catholic hierarchy. Throughout this period there continued an
undercurrent of anti-Catholic activity. A thorough job was done in
purging Reich, state, and municipal administrations of officials
appointed for their adherence to the Centre or Bavarian People’s
parties. Former leaders of those parties, including priests, joined
Communists and Social Democrats in the concentration camps, and the
campaign of hatred against the “black” was resumed. By April 1933 the
bishops were making appeals for clemency toward former civil servants,
who, they pointed out, were not able to join the celebration of national
awakening because they had been dismissed from positions in which they
had given their best to the community of the German people. And on 31
May 1933, a meeting of the Bavarian bishops adopted a solemn statement
directed against the tendency of attributing to the State alone the
right of educating, organizing, and leading ideologically the German
youth (_Dismissal of Catholics_, Excerpts from _Voelkischer Beobachter_,
February-March 1933; _Excerpt, Voelkischer Beobachter_, 19 April 1933
(Munich ed.), p. 2).
By this maintenance of a certain amount of pressure against Catholic
interests, the hierarchy was reminded of the dangers of not coming to a
definite agreement with the Nazi State. The stage was thus set for von
Papen’s negotiation of a Concordat with the Vatican.
At the time of these activities, the government of which von Papen was
Vice Chancellor had already launched its program to mold the state
machinery into the Nazi image. The Enabling Act had become law, and the
general outlines of the Nazi State were already manifest.
Notwithstanding the doubts created in his mind by Hitler’s insistence
upon the Enabling Act, von Papen undertook negotiations with the
Vatican. In fact, he since has claimed that these fears gave rise to the
negotiation of the Concordat (Interrogation at Nurnberg, 3 Sept. 1945):
“I became alarmed, you remember, somewhere in June when I went
to Rome to negotiate a concordat because I certainly feared that
the particular powers of the Hitler Party would create
difficulties on the religious side. So that with the consent of
Hitler I went to Rome to make that concordat.”
It is clear, however, that these alleged fears of the Enabling Act were
not fears at all. They were merely an understanding of the threat they
carried to all persons and instrumentalities antagonistic to the Nazi
system. Von Papen understood the significance of these developments.
What he actually feared was that the rest of the world would also
understand Nazi methods and would erect barriers to the consummation of
the plans of the conspirators. The situation plainly called for a
neutralizing of these potential barriers to Nazi plans. One method of
achieving this result at that time was the negotiation of solemn
agreements whereby other powers would commit themselves to a policy of
non-intervention by either armed or moral force.
When von Papen concluded the Concordat with the Vatican, the political
objectives of furthering the purposes of the Nazi conspiracy were thus
foremost in his mind. Even at that time, in the first half of 1933, von
Papen had in mind, in concluding this Concordat, not only the
consolidation of Catholicism behind the Nazi regime within Germany, but
also the psychological build-up of the Austrians in preparation for
Anschluss. Von Papen’s own words eloquently characterize these
manoeuvres (monograph entitled “Austria” written at Nurnberg, 1945):
“Although the ‘_Heimwehr_’ movement [in Austria] had brought
these patriotic elements together before this, and had fought
with them to free the country from strong Socialistic pressure,
yet they were armed only from the standpoint of domestic
politics and remained aloof from all ambitions for a greater
Germany. The cause lay mostly in the Catholic nature of the
country, and in the strong influence of the clergy in political
leadership. The Reich was considered a bulwark of Protestantism,
despite its twenty million Catholics. The anti-clerical wave,
which was dominant in the Reich under the leadership of Prussia,
itself led by Socialists, appeared to have verified the fears of
the Austrian clergy. For in spite of Catholics at the head of
the Reich—Wirth, Marx, Bruening—the Centre Party had always
put through its cultural demands by logrolling with the
Socialists. There were at least two Socialist officials,
university professors or teachers for every Catholic appointee.
In contrast to the obviously badly functioning Weimar
Constitution, there was an effort in Austria, under clerical
leadership and with the strong support of the Vatican, to
develop into a corporate state.
“Those were serious obstacles on both sides. When, after the
seizure of power of the NSDAP in 1933, as the first remedy
against a new ‘_Kulturkampf_’, I safely concluded the Concordat
of the New Reich with the Holy See, my thoughts at the time were
not focused only on the Reich. For a peaceful evolution of the
German-Austrian question it was of the greatest importance that
the doubts of the clergy on the Austrian side be completely
eliminated.”
* * * * * *
“It was my first purpose in the diplomatic field to deprive the
Austrian problem of its European character, and to develop it
gradually into an exclusively internal problem between the Reich
and Austria.
“It therefore had to be my primary aim to convince the Vatican
that a union could not endanger the Vatican’s interests. A
Concordat of the Reich with the Vatican had been my first
attempt to prevent religious difficulties arising from Nazism’s
revolutionary doctrine; the attempt had obviously failed. Under
the growing influence of his Party, Hitler sabotaged the
Concordat. Rome was deeply disappointed and in the greatest
excitement.”
On 20 July 1933 the Reich Concordat with the Vatican was signed by von
Papen as representative of the Nazi Government of Germany. This
instrument was an international treaty which purported to give the
church an official guarantee of all the church rights it had sought. In
addition it purported to confer freedom for Catholic organizations,
maintenance of parochial schools, and preservation of the general
influence of the church on the education of the German Catholic youth.
Among the 33 articles of the Concordat, 21 treated exclusively the
rights and prerogatives accorded to the church. Reciprocation consisted
only in a pledge of loyalty by the clergy to the Reich Government and a
promise that Catholic religious instruction would emphasize the
patriotic duties of the Christian citizen and insist on a loyal attitude
toward the Fatherland. Since it had always been the practice of the
Catholic church to abide by established governments and to promote
patriotic convictions among the faithful, these stipulations of the
Concordat were no more than legalizations of an existing custom. They
were no more than a guarantee of goodwill betokening harmonious
Church-State relations (_2655-PS_).
(3) _The signing of the Concordat was only an interlude in the church
policy of the Nazi Conspirators, which was a policy of reassurances and
repression._ The signing of the Concordat merely marked the beginning of
evasions and violations of both its spirit and letter. The ink was
hardly dry before it became necessary for the Vatican to complain about
a false interpretation of the text, made by the Nazi government in its
own favour. (See Section 6 of Chapter VII on Suppression of the
Christian Churches.)
By action taken only ten days after the signing of the Concordat, and
despite its provision for the continuance of the Catholic Youth
Association, simultaneous membership in the Hitler Jugend and the
Catholic Youth Association was forbidden, and the campaign to smash the
latter organization thereby commenced (_2456-PS_).
These first steps were merely a foretaste of a long series of violations
which were to commence almost immediately and eventually to result in
papal denunciation and serious excesses committed against the clergy
(_3280-PS_).
The continuing character of the conspirators’ church policy—and of von
Papen’s participation in it—is further revealed by von Papen’s action
of 19 September 1934, when, as president of the Union of Catholic
Germans (_Arbeitsgemeinschaft Katholischer Deutscher_), he ordered
dissolution of this organization. By this time the Nazis were dropping
all pretext that rival organizations might be permitted to exist, and
were well along in their plans for the integration of all German
institutions into the Nazi system. The official published announcement
of dissolution is a revealing document:
“Since the Reich Party Leadership through its department for
spiritual peace increasingly and immediately administers all
cultural problems and those concerning the relationship of State
and Churches, the tasks at first delegated to the Union of
Catholic Germans are now included in those of the Reich Party
Leadership in the interest of a stronger coordination.
“Vice-Chancellor von Papen, up to now the Leader of the Union of
Catholic Germans, declared about the Dissolution of this
organization that it was done upon his suggestion, since the
attitude of the national socialist State toward the Christian
and Catholic Church had been explained often and inequivocally
through the leader and chancellor himself.” (_3376-PS_).
E. _AS ENVOY AT VIENNA, VON PAPEN USED HIS POSITION AND INFLUENCE
DELIBERATELY TO WEAKEN THE AUSTRIAN GOVERNMENT, AND PARTICIPATED IN THE
POLITICAL PLANNING AND PREPARATION FOR MILITARY AGGRESSION AGAINST
AUSTRIA._
(1) _Von Papen accepted appointment as envoy at Vienna knowing he would
“front” for a Nazi fifth column in Austria._ In July 1934, the Austrian
policy of the Nazi government of Germany was in bad odor throughout the
civilized world. The historical record of this period was written in the
newspaper headlines of the day. A period of Nazi pressure and terror
culminated on 25 July 1934 in an attempted revolutionary putsch, the
murder of the Austrian Chancellor Dollfuss, in which the German
Minister, Reith, was implicated. (See Section 3 of Chapter IX on
Aggression Against Austria.) The situation was such as to call for
removal of the German Minister, Reith, and for the prompt substitution
of a man who was an enthusiast for Anschluss with Germany, who could be
tolerant of Nazi objectives and methods, but who could lend an aura of
respectability to official German representation in Vienna. Hitler’s
reaction was immediate. He chose von Papen as quickly as he heard the
news of the Dollfuss murder. Writing of this event in 1945 after his
arrest by Allied authorities, von Papen dramatically describes the
Fuehrer’s response to the situation (monograph on “Austria” referred to
above):
“Suddenly, at three o’clock in the morning, there was a loud
ringing of my doorbell. SS men demanded admission. My son and I
were of the opinion that I was going to be imprisoned. We went
to the front door armed with pistols. Our suspicions were
unfounded. The SS men declared that they had come from the
Chancellery with the order to put through a telephone connection
between Hitler and myself.
“Hitler was in Bayreuth and had been trying for hours without
success to get in touch with me. The connection was made.
“Hitler started, ‘You know of course what has happened in
Vienna. You must go there immediately and try to set things in
order.’
“I replied, ‘I have no idea what has happened in Vienna. I have
just returned from the country and I don’t understand what you
want with me in Vienna. I am in the act of packing my trunk to
leave Berlin once and for all.’
“Hitler, highly excited, gave thereupon a short description of
the dramatic events in Vienna which led to the murder of
Dollfuss, and continued, ‘You are the only person who can save
the situation. I implore you to carry out my request.’”
As a result of this telephone call, von Papen flew immediately to join
Hitler at Bayreuth. There it was clear that the Nazi leadership feared
international repercussions from their Austrian policy and felt
themselves in dire need of a respectable “front” man. Von Papen has
described this meeting:
“There I found Hitler and his entire entourage, excited as an
ant-hill. It was difficult to get anything approaching an exact
picture of the Vienna ‘_Putsch_’ and the role of Hitler’s
promoters. Even if one had come into this gathering in complete
ignorance of the different circumstances involved, one could
have gathered with one look that they had a very bad conscience
and now were fearing the consequences. From the very first
moment I was certain that the immoderate policy of the Austrian
NSDAP under the leadership of Hitler’s condottiere, Habig, had
led to this coup d’etat.
“This was, then, a few days after the 30 June, the second bloody
excess of the Party which had promised to bring Germany by
peaceful means to social tranquility, welfare, and respect. It
was obvious that both events had made a deep impression on the
entire world, and that the governmental methods of the Party
must damage most seriously the political credit of the Reich”.
At this meeting it was Papen himself who drafted the letter of
appointment. This letter was a masterpiece of deceit, calculated to
conceal completely Hitler and Papen’s goal of annexation. It stated:
“As a result of the events in Vienna I am compelled to suggest
to the Reichs-President the removal of the German Minister to
Vienna, Dr. Reith, from his post, because he, at the suggestion
of Austrian Federal Ministers and the Austrian rebels
respectively consented to an agreement made by both these
parties concerning the safe conduct and retreat of the rebels to
Germany without making inquiry of the German Reich Government.
Thus the Minister has dragged the German Reich into an internal
Austrian affair without any reason.
“The assassination of the Austrian Federal Chancellor which was
strictly condemned and regretted by the German Government has
made the situation in Europe, already fluid, more acute, without
any fault of ours. Therefore, it is my desire to bring about if
possible an easing of the general situation, and especially to
direct the relations with the German Austrian State, which have
been so strained for a long time, again into normal and friendly
channels.
“For this reason, I request you, dear Mr. von Papen, to take
over this important task, just because you have possessed and
continue to possess my most complete and unlimited confidence
ever since we have worked together in the Cabinet.
“Therefore, I have suggested to the Reichs-President that you,
upon leaving the Reich-Cabinet and upon release from the office
of Commissioner for the Saar, be called on special mission to
the post of the German Minister in Vienna for a limited period
of time. In this position you will be directly subordinated to
me.
“Thanking once more for all that you have at a time done for the
coordination of the Government of the National Revolution and
since then together with us for Germany, I remain.” (_2799-PS_).
The actual mission of von Papen was stated more frankly, shortly after
his arrival in Vienna, in the course of a private conversation with the
American Minister, George S. Messersmith. Mr. Messersmith has described
this meeting:
“When I did call on von Papen in the German Legation, he greeted
me with ‘Now you are in my Legation and I can control the
conversation’. In the baldest and most cynical manner he then
proceeded to tell me that all of Southeastern Europe, to the
borders of Turkey, was Germany’s natural hinterland, and that he
had been charged with the mission of facilitating German
economic and political control over all this region for Germany.
He blandly and directly said that getting control of Austria was
to be the first step. He definitely stated that he was in
Austria to undermine and weaken the Austrian Government and from
Vienna to work towards the weakening of the Governments in the
other states to the South and South East. He said that he
intended to use his reputation as a good Catholic to gain
influence with certain Austrians, such as Cardinal Innitzer,
towards that end. He said that he was telling me this because
the German Government was bound on this objective of getting
this control of Southeastern Europe and there was nothing which
could stop it and that our own policy and that of France and
England was not realistic.
“The circumstances were such, as I was calling on him in the
German Legation, that I had to listen to what he had to say and
of course I was prepared to hear what he had to say although I
already knew what his instructions were. I was nevertheless
shocked to have him speak so baldly to me and when he finished I
got up and told him how shocked I was to hear the accredited
representative of a supposedly friendly state to Austria admit
that he was proposing to engage in activities to undermine and
destroy that Government to which he was accredited. He merely
smiled and said, of course this conversation was between us and
that he would, of course, not be talking to others so clearly
about his objectives. I have gone into this detail with regard
to this conversation as it is characteristic of the absolute
frankness and directness with which high Nazi officials spoke of
their objectives.” (_1760-PS_)
(2) _Von Papen proceeded forthwith to accomplish his mission—the
maintenance of an outward appearance of non-intervention while keeping
appropriate contacts useful in the eventual overthrow of the Austrian
government._ Throughout the earlier period of his mission to Austria,
von Papen’s activity was characterized by the assiduous avoidance of any
appearance of intervention. His true mission was reaffirmed with
clarity, several months after its commencement, when he was instructed
by Berlin that “during the next two years nothing can be undertaken
which will give Germany external political difficulties”. Every
“appearance” of German interference in Austrian affairs “must be
avoided” (_1760-PS_). As von Papen himself stated to Berger-Waldenegg,
the Austrian Foreign Minister:
“Yes, you have your French and English friends now and you can
have your independence a little longer.” (_1760-PS_).
Throughout this period, the Nazi movement was gaining strength in
Austria without openly-admitted German intervention, and Germany needed
more time to consolidate its diplomatic position. These reasons for
German policy were frankly expressed by the German Foreign Minister von
Neurath in conversation with the American Ambassador to France
(_L-150_).
Von Papen accordingly restricted his public activity to the normal
ambassadorial function of cultivating all respectable elements in
Austria and ingratiating himself in these circles—particularly if they
were well-disposed (but not too obviously) to notions of Pan-Germanism.
In these efforts he was particularly careful to exploit his background
as a former professional officer and a Catholic (_1760-PS_).
Meanwhile, however, the Austrian Nazis continued illegal organization in
anticipation of the possibility of securing their objectives by force if
necessary. In these efforts they were aided by Germany, which permitted
the outlawed Austrian Nazis to meet and perfect their plots within
Germany and with German Nazi assistance; which harbored the Austrian
Legion; which made funds available to National Socialists in Austria;
and which established appropriate contact with them through the Reich
Propaganda Ministry and through “respectable” Austrian “front”
personalities (_1760-PS_; _812-PS_). (See also Section 3 of Chapter IX
on Aggression Against Austria.)
Von Papen was fully aware of the existence and activities of these
groups, and of their potentialities in effecting an Anschluss. Thus, in
a report to Hitler dated 27 July 1935, entitled “Reflections on the
Anniversary of Dollfuss’ Death”, he reviewed the activities of these
illegal groups and concluded that National Socialism could “certainly
become the rallying point of all racially German units beyond the
borders”. In this report he declared:
“The Third Reich will be with Austria, or it will not be at all.
National Socialism must win it or it will perish, if it is
unable to solve this task.” (_2248-PS_).
These sentiments concerning the role of National Socialism were
something more than idle speculation. Von Papen knew that the presence
of the Austrian Legion in Germany in itself produced incidents, and that
the Austrian Nazi movement was dependent on German support. He has so
testified (at an interrogation in Nurnberg, 13 October 1945). In fact,
despite his facade of strict non-intervention, he remained in contact
with subversive and potentially subversive elements within Austria.
Thus, in a report to Hitler dated 17 May 1935 he advised concerning the
Austrian Nazi strategy as proposed by Captain Leopold, leader of the
illegal Austrian Nazis (_2247-PS_). In subsequent statements he has
revealed his _modus operandi_ in the use of his embassy staff. This
method provided him with an opportunity to disclaim responsibility if
these activities should be questioned. Thus, his military attache, Mutz,
“maintained good relations with the Army circles which were inclined
towards National Socialism”. Von Papen’s all-around contact man with the
Austrian Nazis was a member of his staff, Baron von Kettler, who “had
always maintained intimate contact with a group of young Austrian
National Socialists who, as we both agreed, had a conservative coating
and fought for a healthy development within the Party”. The practical
effect of these contacts has been clarified in questioning of von Papen
(at Nurnberg, 8 October 1945):
“* * * A. As I told you, I charged one of my younger people of
the Embassy, von Kettler—he was made the go-between with these
Nazi people, to smooth them down and talk with them. Personally
I had not very much to do with them.
“Q. Well, I know that. That is what you always said. But the
result of your time in Austria was that their interests were
furthered through your office. Whether you did it personally or
somebody working for you did it, I don’t think it is too
important for what we have in mind here tonight; do you?
“A. No.
“Q. Now, isn’t it a fact that their interests were furthered
through your office, if not through you as an individual during
those years that you were there?
“A. Yes, I wanted to know about their doings, you see. I must
have been informed what was going on.”
(3) _Conclusion of the Agreement of 11 July 1936 merely constituted
another step towards Anschluss._ Prior to 1936, sponsorship of political
subversion was not the only pressure applied by Germany in its efforts
to gain control of Austria. The German Government in addition had placed
certain economic barriers against trade between German and Austrian
subjects, the most serious of which was the 1000 mark law, which
crippled the Austrian tourist traffic by levying a 1000 RM tax on any
German citizen crossing the border into Austria. The effect of these
pressures was to induce the Austrian Chancellor, Kurt von Schuschnigg,
to seek from Hitler an agreement to “lift the 1000 Mark barrier he had
levied against Austria and reassure Austria that he had no political
designs concerning our state, Austria” (_2994-PS_).
The result was the agreement of 11 July 1936 between Germany and
Austria, which was negotiated by von Papen as Hitler’s representative.
The published form of this agreement provided:
“Being convinced that they are making a valuable contribution
towards the whole European development in the direction of
maintaining peace, and in the belief that they are thereby best
serving the manifold mutual interests of both German States, the
Governments of the Federal State of Austria and of Germany have
resolved to return to relations of a normal and friendly
character. In this connection it is declared—
“(1) The German Government recognizes the full sovereignty of
the Federal State of Austria in the spirit of the pronouncements
of the German Fuehrer and Chancellor of May 21, 1935.
“(2) Each of the two Governments regards the inner political
order (including the question of Austrian National-Socialism)
obtaining in the other country as an internal concern of that
country, upon which it will exercise neither direct nor indirect
influence.
“(3) The Austrian Federal Government will constantly follow in
its policy in general, and in particular towards Germany, a line
in conformity with leading principles corresponding to the fact
that Austria regards herself as a German State.
“By such a decision neither the Rome Protocols of 1934 and their
additions of 1936, nor the relationships of Austria to Italy and
Hungary as partners in these protocols, are affected.
Considering that the detente desired by both sides cannot become
a reality unless certain preliminary conditions are fulfilled by
the Governments of both countries, the Austrian Federal
Government and the German Government will pass a number of
special measures to bring about the requisite preliminary state
of affairs.” (_TC-22_).
More interesting was the secret part of this agreement, the most
important provisions of which have been summarized by Mr. Messersmith:
“Austria would (1) appoint a number of individuals enjoying the
Chancellor’s confidence but friendly to Germany to positions in
the Cabinet; (2) would devise means to give the ‘National
opposition’ a role in the political life of Austria and within
the framework of the Patriotic Front, and (3) would amnesty all
Nazis save those convicted of the most serious offenses.”
(_1760-PS_)
Especially interesting was the manner in which this agreement contained
German economic concessions and further solemn assurances regarding
Austrian independence and integrity, on the one hand, alongside
far-reaching political concessions to the Nazi movement (_2994-PS_). The
effect was to place Austria completely at the mercy of German good
faith. Von Papen has correctly described it (in an interrogation at
Nurnberg, 8 October 1945) as “the first step” toward preparation for
Anschluss, notwithstanding his clear understanding at the time that the
Austrian government desired and intended to retain its independence.
The Germans lost no time in making the most of their new opportunities,
solemn assurances notwithstanding. The agreement merely heralded a new
era in “legitimizing” the German fifth column in Austria. Thus, the
immediate amnesty to political prisoners in itself presented serious
police problems. The freedom granted to political demonstrations and
organization by German Nazis made it difficult to police the
propagandizing of Austrians. And the agreement specifically gave the
German Nazis an opening wedge to representation in the Austrian
government. The terroristic activities and pressure of the illegal Nazis
continued without interruption under German sponsorship, until their
hand was strengthened to the point of openly asking for official
recognition (_812-PS_; _1760-PS_; _2994-PS_).
The importance of this agreement to the Germans was underscored by the
promotion of its negotiator from _Gesandter_ to _Botschafter_, at the
time of its signing (Announcement, _Das Archiv_, XXVIII, p. 571).
Von Papen himself participated in this pressure game by maintaining
contact with the illegal Nazis, by trying to influence appointments to
strategic cabinet positions, and by attempting to secure official
recognition of Nazi “front” organizations. Reporting to Hitler shortly
after conclusion of the 11 July 1936 agreement, he succinctly summarized
his program for “normalizing” Austro-German relations under the regime
of the new agreement:
“The progress of normalizing relations with Germany at the
present time is obstructed by the continued persistence of the
Ministry of Security, occupied by the old anti-National
Socialistic officials. Changes in personnel are therefore of
utmost importance. But they are definitely not to be expected
prior to the conference on the abolishing of the Control of
Finances [_Finanzkontrolle_] at Geneva. The Chancellor of the
League has informed Minister de Glaise-Horstenau, of his
intention, to offer him the portfolio of the Ministry of the
Interior. As a guiding principle [_Marschroute_] I recommend on
the tactical side, continued, patient psychological
manipulations, with slowly intensified pressure directed at
changing the regime. The proposed conference on economic
relations, taking place at the end of October will be a very
useful tool for the realization of some of our projects. In
discussion with government officials as well as with leaders of
the illegal party (Leopold and Schattenfreh) who conform
completely with the concordat of July 11, I am trying to direct
the next developments in such a manner to aim at corporative
representation of the movement in the fatherland front
[_Vaterlaendischen Front_] but nevertheless refraining from
putting National-Socialists in important positions for the time
being. However such positions are to be occupied only by
personalities, having the support and the confidence of the
movement. I have a willing collaborator in this respect in
Minister Glaise-Horstenau.” (_2246-PS_).
This activity continued through 1937. In fact, by 14 January 1937 the
negotiations with the Austrian Minister of Security and the development
of “front” organizations had proceeded so far that “a very intensive
crisis has arisen for the illegal party” with respect to its future
program. In urging a patient attitude toward these problems, von Papen
appeared less concerned with the legitimacy of their position under the
11 July 1936 agreement than with his fear that
“a too strong and far-reaching connection (with a proposed
conservative ‘German Action’ front organization) would be
understood neither in our own ranks nor could it be of use to
the action itself.” (_2831-PS_)
On the other hand when an Austrian cabinet minister failed to show
sufficient energy to suit von Papen’s purpose, he showed no hesitancy,
under the terms of his 11 July 1936 agreement, to urge replacement by a
more cooperative individual. Thus, von Papen has summarized his efforts
to remove the Austrian Minister of the Interior (monograph “Austria”):
“I had tried to persuade Schuschnigg to appoint another minister
to his cabinet beside Herr von Glaise, who was not very active.
The new minister was to act as trusted liaison man between the
two governments, able to work on innumerable problems directly
without diplomatic intervention. This simplification would also
bring the men on both sides of the fence closer together.”
By the beginning of 1938, the Nazi hand had been so strengthened in
Austria, and the differences and misunderstandings regarding the
agreement of 11 July had become so serious and frequent, that Chancellor
Schuschnigg found it expedient to accept von Papen’s invitation to meet
Hitler at Berchtesgaden, notwithstanding serious misgivings on the part
of Schuschnigg (_2995-PS_). Von Papen showed no hesitancy in extending
this invitation despite the fact that he knew Hitler’s “idea to swallow
Austria”, despite his knowledge of Schuschnigg’s distrust of Hitler, and
despite his own doubts concerning the value of Hitler’s word.
Notwithstanding the situation, he found it possible even to urge
Schuschnigg that Hitler was a man upon whom Schuschnigg could rely. And
in making these representations, he was fully aware of the extent of
German rearmament and of its possible use as a diplomatic pressure
device (according to interrogations, Nurnberg, 19 September and 8
October 1945).
On 11 February 1938, Schuschnigg left for Berchtesgaden to meet Hitler.
At this meeting the severest pressure was exerted to extort far-reaching
concessions from Austria, including reorganization of the cabinet,
appointment of Seyss-Inquart as Minister of Security and the Interior,
and a general amnesty to Nazis convicted of crimes (_2995-PS_;
_2461-PS_; _1544-PS_; _1780-PS_).
It was at this meeting that Papen urged upon Hitler the appointment of
Seyss-Inquart as Minister of Security and the Interior (according to
monograph “Austria”).
Thoroughly entrenched in the government, the Nazis were now able to
seize upon Schuschnigg’s plebiscite as an excuse to seize power, and to
call for military intervention by Germany (_812-PS_; _2996-PS_). (See
also Section 3 of Chapter IX on Aggression Against Austria.)
Thereafter it was only a matter of hours before Austria became a
province of the Reich—by a law signed by von Papen’s man, Seyss-Inquart
(_2307-PS_).
* * * * *
LEGAL REFERENCES AND LIST OF DOCUMENTS RELATING TO FRANZ VON PAPEN
│ │ │
Document │ Description │ Vol. │ Page
│ │ │
│Charter of the International Military │ │
│ Tribunal, Article 6. │ I │ 5
│International Military Tribunal, │ │
│ Indictment Number 1, Section IV (H);│ │
│ Appendix A. │ I │ 29, 63
│ ———— │ │
│Note: A single asterisk (*) before a │ │
│document indicates that the document │ │
│was received in evidence at the │ │
│Nurnberg trial. A double asterisk (**)│ │
│before a document number indicates │ │
│that the document was referred to │ │
│during the trial but was not formally │ │
│received in evidence, for the reason │ │
│given in parentheses following the │ │
│description of the document. The USA │ │
│series number, given in parentheses │ │
│following the description of the │ │
│document, is the official exhibit │ │
│number assigned by the court. │ │
│ ———— │ │
*351-PS │Minutes of First Meeting of Cabinet of│ │
│Hitler, 30 January 1933. (USA 389) │ III │ 270
│ │ │
*812-PS │Letter from Rainer to Seyss-Inquart, │ │
│22 August 1939 and report from │ │
│Gauleiter Rainer to Reichskommissar │ │
│Gauleiter Buerckel, 6 July 1939 on │ │
│events in the NSDAP of Austria from │ │
│1933 to 11 March 1938. (USA 61) │ III │ 586
│ │ │
1388-PS │Law concerning confiscation of │ │
│Property subversive to People and │ │
│State, 14 July 1933. 1933 │ │
│Reichsgesetzblatt, Part I, p. 479. │ III │ 962
│ │ │
1390-PS │Decree of the Reich President for the │ │
│Protection of the People and State, 28│ │
│February 1933. 1933 Reichsgesetzblatt,│ │
│Part I, p. 83. │ III │ 968
│ │ │
*1395-PS │Law to insure the unity of Party and │ │
│State, 1 December 1933. 1933 │ │
│Reichsgesetzblatt, Part I, p. 1016. │ │
│(GB 252) │ III │ 978
│ │ │
1396-PS │Law concerning the confiscation of │ │
│Communist property, 26 May 1933. 1933 │ │
│Reichsgesetzblatt, Part I, p. 293. │ III │ 979
│ │ │
1398-PS │Law to supplement the Law for the │ │
│restoration of the Professional Civil │ │
│Service, 20 July 1933. 1933 │ │
│Reichsgesetzblatt, Part I, p. 518. │ III │ 986
│ │ │
1400-PS │Law changing the regulations in regard│ │
│to public officer, 30 June 1933. 1933 │ │
│Reichsgesetzblatt, Part I, p. 433. │ III │ 987
│ │ │
*1544-PS │Von Papen’s notes, 26 February 1938, │ │
│on his parting visit with Chancellor │ │
│Schuschnigg. (USA 71) │ IV │ 103
│ │ │
1652-PS │Decree of the Reich President for │ │
│protection against treacherous attacks│ │
│on the government of the Nationalist │ │
│movement, 21 March 1933. 1933 │ │
│Reichsgesetzblatt, Part I, p. 135. │ IV │ 160
│ │ │
*1708-PS │The Program of the NSDAP. National │ │
│Socialistic Yearbook, 1941, p. 153. │ │
│(USA 255, USA 324) │ IV │ 208
│ │ │
*1760-PS │Affidavit of George S. Messersmith, 28│ │
│August 1945. (USA 57) │ IV │ 305
│ │ │
*1780-PS │Excerpts from diary kept by General │ │
│Jodl, January 1937 to August 1939. │ │
│(USA 72) │ IV │ 360
│ │ │
2001-PS │Law to Remove the Distress of People │ │
│and State, 24 March 1933. 1933 │ │
│Reichsgesetzblatt, Part I, p. 141. │ IV │ 638
│ │ │
2003-PS │Law concerning the Sovereign Head of │ │
│the German Reich, 1 August 1934. 1934 │ │
│Reichsgesetzblatt, Part I, p. 747. │ IV │ 639
│ │ │
2004-PS │Preliminary law for the coordination │ │
│of Federal States under the Reich, 31 │ │
│March 1933. 1933 Reichsgesetzblatt, │ │
│Part I, p. 153. │ IV │ 640
│ │ │
2005-PS │Second law integrating the “Laender” │ │
│with the Reich, 7 April 1933. 1933 │ │
│Reichsgesetzblatt, Part I, p. 173. │ IV │ 641
│ │ │
2006-PS │Law for the reconstruction of the │ │
│Reich, 30 January 1934. 1934 │ │
│Reichsgesetzblatt, Part I, p. 75. │ IV │ 642
│ │ │
2012-PS │First regulation for administration of│ │
│the law for the restoration of │ │
│professional Civil Service, 11 April │ │
│1933. 1933 Reichsgesetzblatt, Part I, │ │
│p. 195. │ IV │ 647
│ │ │
2014-PS │Law amending regulations of criminal │ │
│law and criminal procedure, 24 April │ │
│1934. 1934 Reichsgesetzblatt, Part I, │ │
│p. 341. │ IV │ 648
│ │ │
2029-PS │Decree establishing the Reich Ministry│ │
│of Public Enlightenment and │ │
│Propaganda, 13 March 1933. 1933 │ │
│Reichsgesetzblatt, Part I, p. 104. │ IV │ 652
│ │ │
2030-PS │Decree concerning the Duties of the │ │
│Reich Ministry for Public │ │
│Enlightenment and Propaganda, 30 June │ │
│1933. 1933 Reichsgesetzblatt, Part I, │ │
│p. 449. │ IV │ 653
│ │ │
2050-PS │The Constitution of the German Reich, │ │
│11 August 1919. 1919 │ │
│Reichsgesetzblatt, Part I, p. 1383. │ IV │ 662
│ │ │
2058-PS │Decree for the securing of the State │ │
│Leadership, 7 July 1933. 1933 │ │
│Reichsgesetzblatt, Part I, p. 462. │ IV │ 699
│ │ │
2059-PS │Decree of the Reich President relating│ │
│to the granting of Amnesty, 21 March │ │
│1933. 1933 Reichsgesetzblatt, Part I, │ │
│p. 134. │ IV │ 701
│ │ │
2076-PS │Decree of the Government concerning │ │
│formation of Special Courts, 21 March │ │
│1933. 1933 Reichsgesetzblatt, Part I, │ │
│pp. 136-137. │ IV │ 705
│ │ │
2078-PS │Decree concerning establishment of │ │
│Ministry for Science, Education and │ │
│Popular Culture, 1 May 1934. 1934 │ │
│Reichsgesetzblatt, Part I, p. 365. │ IV │ 706
│ │ │
2083-PS │Editorial control law, 4 October 1933.│ │
│1933 Reichsgesetzblatt, Part I, p. │ │
│713. │ IV │ 709
│ │ │
2088-PS │Decree relating to tasks of Reichs │ │
│Ministry for Education, 11 May 1934. │ │
│1934 Reichsgesetzblatt, Part I, p. │ │
│375. │ IV │ 718
│ │ │
*2246-PS │Report of von Papen to Hitler, 1 │ │
│September 1936, concerning Danube │ │
│situation. (USA 67) │ IV │ 930
│ │ │
*2247-PS │Letter from von Papen to Hitler, 17 │ │
│May 1935, concerning intention of │ │
│Austrian government to arm. (USA 64) │ IV │ 930
│ │ │
*2248-PS │Report of von Papen to Hitler, 27 July│ │
│1935, concerning National Socialism in│ │
│Austria. (USA 63) │ IV │ 932
│ │ │
*2307-PS │Law concerning reunion of Austria with│ │
│German Reich, 13 March 1938. 1938 │ │
│Reichsgesetzblatt, Part I, p. 237. (GB│ │
│133) │ IV │ 997
│ │ │
2403-PS │The End of the Party State, from │ │
│Documents of German Politics, Vol. I, │ │
│pp. 55-56. │ V │ 71
│ │ │
2415-PS │First decree for the implementation of│ │
│law relating to The Reich Chamber of │ │
│Culture, 1 November 1933. 1933 │ │
│Reichsgesetzblatt, Part I, p. 797. │ V │ 89
│ │ │
2456-PS │Youth and the Church, from Complete │ │
│Handbook of Youth Laws. │ V │ 198
│ │ │
*2461-PS │Official German communique of meeting │ │
│of Hitler and Schuschnigg, 12 February│ │
│1938, published in Documents of German│ │
│Politics, 1939, Vol. VI, Part I. (GB │ │
│132) │ V │ 206
│ │ │
2512-PS │Hitler’s Testimony Before the Court │ │
│for High Treason, published in │ │
│Frankfurter Zeitung, 26 September │ │
│1931. │ V │ 246
│ │ │
2541-PS │Extracts from German Publications. │ V │ 285
│ │ │
2633-PS │Extracts from Constitutional Law of │ │
│the Greater German Reich, 1939. │ V │ 344
│ │ │
2655-PS │Concordat between the Holy See and the│ │
│German Reich, Article 31. 1933 │ │
│Reichsgesetzblatt, Part II, pp. 679, │ │
│687-8. │ V │ 364
│ │ │
2742-PS │Passage written by Frick in National │ │
│Socialist Yearbook, 1927, p. 124. │ V │ 383
│ │ │
2759-PS │Law for the protection of Nationalist │ │
│Symbols, 19 May 1933. 1933 │ │
│Reichsgesetzblatt, Part I, p. 285. │ V │ 394
│ │ │
2771-PS │U. S. State Department, National │ │
│Socialism, published by U. S. │ │
│Government Printing Office, 1943. │ V │ 417
│ │ │
**2799-PS │Letter from Hitler to von Papen, 26 │ │
│July 1934, published in Documents of │ │
│German Politics, Vol. II, p. 83, No. │ │
│38. (Referred to but not offered in │ │
│evidence.) │ V │ 441
│ │ │
*2830-PS │Letter from von Papen to Hitler, 12 │ │
│May 1936, concerning May Rally of │ │
│Freedom Union. (GB 243) │ V │ 496
│ │ │
2831-PS │Letter from Office of Extraordinary │ │
│and Plenipotentiary Ambassador of │ │
│German Government to Reich │ │
│Chancellery, inclosing report on │ │
│Political situation in Austria, 14 │ │
│January 1937. │ V │ 498
│ │ │
2902-PS │Statement of von Papen, 13 November │ │
│1945, prepared by his defense lawyer. │ │
│(GB 233) │ V │ 569
│ │ │
*2962-PS │Minutes of meeting of Reich Cabinet, │ │
│15 March 1933. (USA 578) │ V │ 669
│ │ │
*2963-PS │Minutes of meeting of Reich Cabinet, │ │
│20 March 1933. (USA 656) │ V │ 670
│ │ │
**2994-PS │Affidavit of Kurt von Schuschnigg, │ │
│former Chancellor of Austria, │ │
│concerning Austrian-German Treaty of │ │
│11 July 1936. (USA 66) (Objection to │ │
│admission in evidence upheld.) │ V │ 703
│ │ │
2995-PS │Affidavit of Kurt von Schuschnigg, │ │
│former Chancellor of Austria, │ │
│concerning his visit to Berchtesgaden │ │
│on 12 February 1938. │ V │ 709
│ │ │
2996-PS │Affidavit of Kurt von Schuschnigg, │ │
│former Chancellor of Austria, │ │
│concerning events of 11 March 1938. │ V │ 713
│ │ │
*3280-PS │Extract from Papal Encyclical “Mit │ │
│Brennender Sorge”, set forth in │ │
│Appendix II, p. 524, of “The │ │
│Persecution of the Catholic Church in │ │
│the Third Reich”. (USA 567) │ V │ 1079
│ │ │
*3313-PS │Von Papen, Appeal to the German │ │
│Conscience, Stuttgart speech of 3 │ │
│March 1933. (GB 240) │ VI │ 1
│ │ │
*3314-PS │Von Papen’s address as Chancellor, 28 │ │
│August 1932, published in Frankfurter │ │
│Zeitung, 29 August 1932. (GB 234) │ VI │ 2
│ │ │
*3317-PS │Von Papen’s address as Chancellor, 12 │ │
│October 1932, published in Frankfurter│ │
│Zeitung, 13 October 1932. (GB 235) │ VI │ 3
│ │ │
*3318-PS │Visit of von Papen as Chancellor in │ │
│Munich, 11 October 1932, published in │ │
│Frankfurter Zeitung, 12 October 1932. │ │
│(GB 241) │ VI │ 4
│ │ │
3357-PS │Exchange of letters, │ │
│Papen-Hitler-Hindenburg, from │ │
│Documents of German Politics, Vol. I, │ │
│p. 158. (GB 239) │ VI │ 85
│ │ │
*3375-PS │Von Papen’s speech at Essen, 2 │ │
│November 1933, published in │ │
│Voelkischer Beobachter, Southern │ │
│German Edition, 4 November 1933. (GB │ │
│245) │ VI │ 101
│ │ │
*3376-PS │Dissolution of Union of Catholic │ │
│Germans, published in The Archives, │ │
│September 1934, Vol. VI, pp. 767-768. │ │
│(GB 244) │ VI │ 103
│ │ │
*3387-PS │Hitler Reichstag speech, 23 March │ │
│1933, asking for adoption of Enabling │ │
│Act, from Voelkischer Beobachter, 24 │ │
│March 1933, p. 1. (USA 566) │ VI │ 104
│ │ │
*3389-PS │Fulda Declaration of 28 March 1933, │ │
│from Voelkischer Beobachter, 29 March │ │
│1933, p. 2. (USA 566) │ VI │ 105
│ │ │
3463-PS │Extracts from Dates from the History │ │
│of the NSDAP by Dr. Hans Volz. │ VI │ 165
│ │ │
*D-472 │Ribbentrop’s actions as Foreign │ │
│Minister, from International │ │
│Biographical Archives, 22 April 1943. │ │
│(GB 130) │ VII │ 59
│ │ │
*D-631 │Decree of Reichs president against │ │
│political excesses, 14 June 1932. 1932│ │
│Reichsgesetzblatt, Part I, pp. │ │
│297-300. (GB 236) │ VII │ 101
│ │ │
*D-632 │Biography of Papen, from International│ │
│Biographical Archives, 26 October │ │
│1944. (GB 237) │ VII │ 102
│ │ │
D-633 │Letter from von Papen to Hitler, 13 │ │
│November 1932. (GB 238) │ VII │ 106
│ │ │
*D-634 │Letter from Hitler to von Papen, 16 │ │
│November 1932. (GB 238) │ VII │ 107
│ │ │
*D-635 │Radiogram from von Papen to Board of │ │
│Trade for German-American Commerce, 27│ │
│March 1933. (Translation published in │ │
│New York Times.) (GB 242) │ VII │ 111
│ │ │
*D-660 │Extracts from Hutchinson’s Illustrated│ │
│edition of Mein Kampf. (GB 128) │ VII │ 164
│ │ │
*L-83 │Affidavit of Gerhart H. Seger, 21 July│ │
│1945. (USA 234) │ VII │ 859
│ │ │
*L-150 │Memorandum of conversation between │ │
│Ambassador Bullitt and von Neurath, │ │
│German Minister for Foreign Affairs, │ │
│18 May 1936. (USA 65) │ VII │ 890
│ │ │
*TC-22 │Agreement between Austria and German │ │
│Government and Government of Federal │ │
│State of Austria, 11 July 1936. (GB │ │
│20) │ VIII │ 369
19. ARTUR SEYSS-INQUART
Within the Nazi conspiracy Seyss-Inquart became the expert manipulator
and subjugator of countries to be invaded or already invaded by the Nazi
conspirators, first of Austria, later of Poland and The Netherlands. For
the benefit of the Nazi conspirators he enslaved these countries, making
them vassals of the Nazi regime.
A. _POSITIONS HELD BY SEYSS-INQUART._
(1) _Positions Held by Artur Seyss-Inquart in the Order Set Forth
in the Indictment._
(_a_) Member of the NSDAP (Nazi Party), 13 March 1938 to 8 May
1945.
(_b_) General in the SS, 15 March 1938 to 8 May 1945.
(_c_) State Councillor of Austria, May 1937 to 12 February 1938.
(_d_) Minister of Interior and Security of Austria, 16 February
1938 to 11 March 1938.
(_e_) Chancellor of Austria, 11 March 1938 to 15 March 1938.
(_f_) Member of the Reichstag, April 1938 to 8 May 1945.
(_g_) Member of the Reich Cabinet, 1 May 1939 to 1945.
(_h_) Reich Minister without Portfolio, 1 May 1939 to September
1939.
(_i_) Chief of the Civil Administration of South Poland, early
September 1939.
(_j_) Deputy Governor-General of the Polish Occupied Territory, 12
October 1939 to 18 May 1940.
(_k_) Reich Commissar for Occupied Netherlands 18 May 1940 to 8
May 1945. (_2910-PS_)
(2) _Positions Held in Addition to Those Set Forth in the
Indictment._
(_a_) Reich Governor of Austria, 15 March 1938 to 1 May 1939.
(_2910-PS_)
(_b_) President of the German Academy, Munich, 1943. (_3457-PS_)
(3) _Previous Occupations of Seyss-Inquart._
(_a_) Commissioned officer in a Tyrol-Kaiserjaeger Regiment of the
Austrian Army in World War I, 1914-1918.
(_b_) Lawyer in Vienna, Austria. (_3425-PS_)
B. _SEYSS-INQUART USED HIS POSITIONS AND INFLUENCE SO AS TO PROMOTE THE
NAZI SEIZURE AND CONSOLIDATION OF CONTROL OVER AUSTRIA._
(1) _Seyss-Inquart was a member of the Nazi Party and held the rank of
General in the SS._ Seyss-Inquart has admitted that he became a member
of the Nazi Party on 13 March 1938; that he was made a General in the SS
on 15 March 1938, and held both membership and rank until 8 May 1945.
(_2910-PS_)
Seyss-Inquart, in a letter to Goering, on 14 July 1939, asserted that he
had been a member of the Nazi Party since 1931. The following is an
excerpt from that letter:
“Until July 1934, I conducted myself as a regular member of the
Party. And if I had quietly in whatever form paid my membership
dues, the first one according to a receipt, I paid in December
1931.” (_2219-PS_)
In a voluntary statement signed by Seyss-Inquart, with the advice of his
counsel, he discussed his affiliation with the Nazi Party as follows:
“I supported also the National Socialist Party as long as it was
legal, because it declared itself with particular determination
in favor of the Anschluss. From 1932 onward I made financial
contributions to this Party, but I discontinued financial
support when it was declared illegal in 1934.” (_3425-PS_)
In contrast with the foregoing assertions of the defendant,
Seyss-Inquart wrote a letter to Heinrich Himmler on 19 August 1939 in
which he confirmed the fact that he became a member of the Nazi Party in
1931 and also stated that he continued his membership in the Nazi Party
even after it was declared illegal in Austria. The following is an
excerpt from that letter:
“Concerning my membership in the Nazi Party, I want to state
that I never was asked to enter the Nazi Party but I asked Dr.
Kier in December 1931 to take care of my relation to the Party.
At that time I saw the basis of the solution of the Austrian
question only in the Party. I wrote this already in the year
1929 to Dr. Neubacher to adjust his hopes which he had put in
the Austria-German Volksbund. After that, I paid my membership
fees and, as I remember, direct to the Gau Wien. The payments
were made even after the party was forbidden. Some time later, I
got in direct touch with the _Ortsgruppe_ in Dornbach. The
membership fees were paid by my wife but the Blockwart couldn’t
possibly have any doubt that those payments were for my wife and
myself since the amount of the fees, S 40 [40 Schillings] a
month, was a sure indication of this fact and I was treated in
every respect as a Party member. Besides that, I was, since
1932, a member of the _Steirischen Heimatschutzes Kammerhofer_.
In this organization I made every effort to absorb the
_Steirische Heimatschutz_ in the Party and mainly on account of
my efforts, von Habicht declared that the members of the
_Steirische Heimatschutz_ were members of the Party. That proves
that I felt myself, in every respect, as a member of the Party
and I was regarded as belonging to the Party and as I said
before, already in December 1931.” (_3271-PS_)
(2) _Seyss-Inquart, even before he became a member of the Nazi Party,
belonged to an organization conceived and founded upon principles which
later became those of the Nazi Party._ Seyss-Inquart has stated in
writing that he had been a member of a secret organization known as the
“German Brotherhood” (_Deutsche Gemeinschaft_). This is evidenced by the
following excerpts from his letter to Himmler of 19 August 1939:
“It must be known to you that at the time of the Black-Red
Coalition, there existed an extremely secret organization under
the name of ‘German Community.’ Here met all sorts of
Nationalists and Catholic elements who, at least at that time,
were anti-Semitic and anti-Marxists. Dr. Doelter, who was my
office chief, was one of the leaders of this association and
through him I came into this movement. Dolfuss was also active
here. He was of my age and was a very active anti-Semitic. It is
through success of the activities of this organization that the
Black-Red Coalition was broken and the Marxists never came back
in the government. After the establishment of National
Socialism, this organization was dissolved.” (_3271-PS_)
The secret organization, “German Brotherhood”, (_Deutsche
Gemeinschaft_), was organized to promote the anti-Semitic and anti-Free
Mason doctrines later adopted by the Nazi Party. This fact is evidenced
by Seyss-Inquart’s copy of the minutes of a meeting of this organization
on 28 December 1918 and by its constitution and by-laws, a portion of
which appear in the following quotation:
“The purpose of this organization is the liberation of the
German people from Jewish influences, and combat against Jewry
with all available means. The organization is secret. Since a
contact of the organization with the public can’t be avoided it
has to be done under pretense of unsuspicious purposes and
without showing the actual set-up.” (_3400-PS_)
New members of this organization were required to make a sworn
statement, i.e.:
“As a German man, I assure with my honor, as far as I know,
there is no Jewish blood in my descendency. Furthermore, I am
not connected by marriage with a wife or other companion of
Jewish descendency, and I never will have relation with one of
those. I am not a Free Mason, I assure to be forever a good
member of the Deutsche Gemeinschaft and I will always represent
the interest of the German people against the Jewish people and
I am willing to fight the Jewish people with all my power, any
place and at any time. I promise to obey all orders and decrees
of the leadership of the organization and to preserve complete
secrecy about their institution, about the persons of the
organization, and the events within it, as long as I live.”
(_3400-PS_)
New members were also asked the question: “In case you will be accepted,
are you willing to employ only Aryan physicians, attorneys, and
businessmen?” (_3400-PS_)
(3) _Seyss-Inquart, after the Austrian Nazi Party was declared illegal
in July 1934, posed as a non-member of the Nazi Party but continued to
support it in its activities, principles, and objectives in a subversive
manner._
Seyss-Inquart has stated that:
“Before the Anschluss, I worked for the legal, political
activities of the Austrian Socialists under the conditions laid
down in the Austrian Constitution. * * * From 1932 onwards I
made financial contributions to this party but I discontinued
financial support when it was declared illegal in 1934. From
July 1934 until the year 1936 I supported individual National
Socialists as lawyer and in collaboration with the welfare work
Langoth in Linz. From July 1936 onwards, I endeavored to help
the National Socialists to regain their legal status and finally
to participate in the Austrian Government. * * * I was
sympathetic towards the efforts of the Austrian Nazi Party to
gain political power and corresponding influence because they
were in favor of the Anschluss. * * * On 10 March 1938 I
suggested to Chancellor Schuschnigg, as a solution to the
difficulties resulting from his plebiscite plan, that the
National Socialists be appointed to the Cabinet, after I became
in May 1937 State Councillor and then on 16-2-1938 Minister of
Interior and Security.” (_3425-PS_)
Seyss-Inquart was an official in the Austrian Government, yet he
rendered services, and physical and moral support to the illegal
Austrian Nazi Party during those years, knowing that the radical
elements engaged in terroristic acts.
“During this time, particularly after the Party was forbidden in
July 1934, I knew that the radical element of the Party was
engaged in terroristic activities, such as the attacks on
railroads, bridges, telephone communications, etc. I knew that
the governments of both Chancellors Dolfuss and Schuschnigg,
although they held the same total German viewpoint in principle,
were opposed to the Anschluss then because of the National
Socialist regime in the Reich. I was sympathetic towards the
efforts of the Austrian Nazi Party to gain political power and
corresponding influence, because they were in favor of the
Anschluss. On the day of the unsuccessful ‘putsch,’ 25 July
1934, I was at my home in Stannern near Iglau, Czechoslovakia. I
learned later that the murder of Chancellor Dolfuss on that day
was the outcome of a ‘putsch’ plan, in which SS circles were
mainly involved, to arrest the Chancellor and put in an Austrian
government with National Socialist participation. Eight or ten
days before this unsuccessful ‘putsch’ Chancellor Dolfuss sent
for me. We discussed the disturbances and troubled state of
affairs created in Austria by the radical element of the
Austrian National Socialists. I advised Chancellor Dolfuss to
make an arrangement with Hitler because the Austrian National
Socialists and even this radical element would obey Hitler’s
orders. I conjectured—later I found confirmation—that these
terroristic activities had a certain support from the Reich.
Chancellor Dolfuss told me he would think the matter over and
made a tentative future appointment for a further discussion. I
informed among others, also acquaintances, of this conversation
whom I knew had influence among the Austrian National
Socialists. About one week later Chancellor Dolfuss informed me
that at the moment he had no time for further discussion.”
(_3425-PS_)
(4) _Seyss-Inquart derived personal benefits and political power as the
result of the subversive manipulations and terroristic activities of his
fellow Nazi collaborators._ He was appointed State Councillor of Austria
in May 1937, and Minister of the Interior and Security of that country
as the direct result of Nazi manipulation. These facts he has admitted:
“My appointment as State Councillor was the result of an
agreement between Austria and Germany on 11-7-1936. My
appointment as Minister of the Interior and Security was one of
the results of the conference between Chancellor Schuschnigg and
Hitler at Berchtesgaden on 12-2-1938.” (_3425-PS_)
Another result of the Berchtesgaden conference was that Austrian Nazis
were thereafter allowed openly to demonstrate their conviction, an
advantage which they exploited to the full.
“The Austrian National Socialists must certainly have taken my
appointment as Minister of Interior and Security as an
indication of their right to activity. Still more, however, the
outcome of the agreement of 12-2-1938 allowed them to
demonstrate their convictions. This right they utilized in more
and more widespread demonstrations.” (_3425-PS_)
(5) _Seyss-Inquart used his affiliation with the Nazis to promote the
absorption of Austria into the Greater German Reich, according to plan
as conceived by his fellow Nazi conspirators._ Seyss-Inquart had had a
continuous and constant interest in the union of Austria and Germany for
twenty years, and during all that time worked, planned, and collaborated
with others until the union became an accomplished fact.
“In 1918 I became interested in the Anschluss of Austria with
Germany. From that year on I worked, planned, and collaborated
with others of a like mind to bring about a union. * * * It was
my desire to effect this union of the two countries—in an
evolutionary manner and by legal means. Among my Austrian
collaborators were Dr. Neubacher, City Councillor Speiser, the
University Professor Hugelmann, and Dr. Wilhelm Bauer, Professor
Wettstein and others. Later, during the rise of National
Socialism, Dr. Friedrich Rainer, Dr. Jury, Glaise-Horstenau,
Major Klausner, Dr. Muehlmann, Globotschnigg, and others. * * *
After I became State Councillor, I discussed several times with
von Papen, the German Ambassador, the possibilities of an
understanding between the Austrian government and the Austrian
National Socialists, respectively the Reich. We did not talk of
the Anschluss as an actual program. However, we were both of the
opinion that a successful understanding would bring about in the
course of time the Anschluss by evolutionary means in some form.
The last time I spoke to von Papen was in January 1938 in
Garmisch where I met him by chance.” (_3425-PS_)
Seyss-Inquart contributed his efforts to revive the Austrian Nazi Party
after the unsuccessful “putsch” of July 25, 1934, and to provide relief
for the families of arrested and condemned Nazis. He has described these
activities in the following words:
“The effect of the ‘Putsch’ was a complete catastrophe to the
National Socialist Camp. Not merely the leaders, but party
members were arrested in so far as they did not escape; the
confiscation of their fortunes was announced; the revolt which
led to military actions in Steiriermark, Karnten and
Oberoesterreich did cost victims; the political management was
seriously compromised by the Nazis and above all, a most
sinister looking situation was created in regard to foreign
politics. In any case, the idea of a union had suffered a severe
setback. I was in agreement about the effect with Dr. Neubacher,
and it was our desire to assist easing the tension. Following
this situation I felt urged to take up politics beyond the
question of the ‘Anschluss.’ * * * The former National delegate
to the ‘Langoth’ in Linz was working with Rheintaller. Dr.
Neubacher and myself contacted this circle and met there some
other men whose names I have forgotten, but who later did not
play a particular role. After some time, the lawyer applicant
from Linz, Dr. Kaltenbrunner, joined this circle. He was said to
be an SS man. The main activities consisted in organizing an
institution to succor the needy families of those arrested and
condemned Nazis. * * * As matters calmed down, the Austrian
National Socialists collected themselves again into an illegal
party, the organization was built up for better or worse
according to the old schedule, those who returned from the Reich
were considered to be more ‘in the know’ and authoritative. The
institution of succor, ‘Langoth,’ remained outside the party
organization. But here were also men in the Nazi circles who
considered an absolute dependence on the Reich as politically
wrong and endeavored for an independent Austrian National
Socialist Party. In effect, Dr. Rainer from Karnten belonged to
those, and by his influence the future Gauleiter Klausner who is
now dead; also Globotschnigg was in it, though I doubt he was
sincerely convinced, and also others. Dr. Neubacher took a
keener interest in political affairs and entered into
relationship with the proper Party circles.” (_3254-PS_)
The defendant submitted his plans to Hitler, Hess, and Goering for their
approval, and contacted other German Nazis.
“After my appointment as State Councillor, Wilhelm Keppler, the
German Secretary of State for Austrian affairs, arranged a visit
for me with Hess and Goering. I explained my intentions and
plans to them, namely, the attainment of the legal activity for
the Austrian National Socialist, independent of the Reich Party.
Hess expressed his interest and said to me among other things:
he regretted that I was not one of the original ‘old fighters.’
I believe that at that time Goering had already established
direct connections with the Austrian State Secretary, Guido
Schmid. After my appointment as Minister of Interior and
Security of Austria, I went to Berlin to visit Hitler. I arrived
in Berlin on 17-2-1938 where I was met by Keppler who took me to
Himmler. This visit was not anticipated in my program. Himmler
wanted to talk over police matters, I informed him, however,
that I was not conversant to speak about them. I did not follow
the suggestions which he made. I greeted Hitler with raised
hand—permissible after the agreement of 12-2—advised him,
however, immediately that as Austrian Minister, my
responsibility lay with Austria. I explained to Hitler my plans,
namely: I was to be the living guaranty for Dr. Schuschnigg of
the evolutionary way. The Austria National Socialists must only
conduct their activities according to the Austrian Constitution
and on those lines find their way to the Reich; they must not
make any totalitarian claim nor conduct a cultural struggle. The
leadership of the Austrian National Socialists must be
independent of the Reich and remain responsible to Austria. I
would have, as Minister of Security, to oppose any kind of
illegal activity. Against this the Austrian National Socialist
would be permitted full freedom of activity to work for the
closest cooperation of Austria and Germany. Hitler agreed to my
plans but expressed certain doubts whether Dr. Schuschnigg would
be willing to go so far. During my conference with Hitler,
Keppler and Ribbentrop waited in the ante-room of Hitler’s
office.” (_3425-PS_)
Seyss-Inquart’s fellow Nazi conspirators regarded his position as
Councillor of State in the Austrian Government as most important to
them, because he had a mandate from the German Nazis in power, which he
was attempting to carry out. Because his negotiations with Chancellor
Schuschnigg seemed to be running aground, Seyss-Inquart sent a report of
that fact to Keppler by courier, stating that he felt compelled to
return his mandate, and expressing a desire to discuss the matter before
acting accordingly. Keppler immediately sought advice from Goering in a
letter dated 6 January 1938. On that same day Goering’s secretary was
instructed to telephone instructions to Keppler to do anything to avoid
the resignations of Councillor of State Dr. Seyss-Inquart and State
Minister Glaise von Horstenau. Keppler received this telephone message
on 7 January 1938, and on 8 January 1938 wrote a letter to Seyss-Inquart
informing him of Goering’s instructions and relaying Goering’s request
not to give up the mandate under any circumstances without discussing
the matter with Goering. (_3473-PS_; _3397-PS_)
Despite assertions, in statements since his arrest and indictment, to
the effect that he desired a union of Austria and Germany in an
evolutionary manner and by legal means, Seyss-Inquart has on other
occasions made statements to the contrary. His letter of 14 July 1939 to
Goering is particularly illuminating on this point:
“I told myself in July 1934 that we must fight this clerical
regime on its own ground in order to give the Fuehrer a chance
to use whatever method he desires. I told myself that this
Austria was worth a mass. I have stuck to this attitude with an
iron determination because I and my friends have had to fight
against the whole political church, and Free Masonry, the Jewry,
in short, against everything in Austria. The slightest weakness
which we might have displayed would undoubtedly have led to our
political annihilation; it would have deprived the Fuehrer of
the means and tools to carry out his ingenious political
solution for Austria as became evident in the days of March
1938. I have been fully conscious of the fact that I am
following a path which is not comprehensible to the masses and
also not to my party comrades. I have followed it calmly and
would without hesitation follow it again because I am satisfied
that at one point I could serve the Fuehrer as a tool in his
work, even though my former attitude, even now, gives occasion
to very worthy and honorable Party comrades to doubt my
trustworthiness. I have never paid attention to such things
because I am satisfied with the opinion which the Fuehrer and
the men close to him have of me.” (_2219-PS_)
Another statement of the defendant, which throws some light on this
point, is found in his letter to Himmler dated 19 August 1939:
“On November 8, 1938, the Fuehrer invited several political
leaders for supper. The Fuehrer asked me to be next to him. We
discussed the situation in Ostmark. I told him that in
accordance with his order, we started to dissolve the competence
of the Austrian government by giving the powers partly to the
Gauen and partly to the central leaders. But there still would
remain certain affairs which would be common for all Gauen.”
(_3271-PS_)
Furthermore, Seyss-Inquart has made the following statement:
“I was happy that the Anschluss of Austria with the German Reich
had come at last after so many vain endeavors since 1918 because
I was in favor of the Anschluss of Austria with the Reich under
many conditions. I was aware at least to a certain extent of the
harshness of the National Socialist regime, but I was of the
opinion that these two German countries belonged together and
that the German people should solve their own internal affairs
and difficulties. I was convinced that the harshness of the
National Socialist regime chiefly because of its achievement of
the National aim—cancellation of discriminatory peace treaties
and achievement of the right of self-determination—would in
time be surmounted.” (_3425-PS_)
The subversive machinations of the Austrian Nazis to bring about the
absorption of Austria by the Greater German Reich was described in
detail by Dr. Friedrich Rainer, a leading Austrian Nazi and a
collaborator of Seyss-Inquart who became one of Hitler’s Gauleiters, in
a report prepared by him and forwarded to Buerckel. A copy of this
report accompanied by a letter of transmittal was later sent to
Seyss-Inquart by Dr. Rainer. In substance, the report related how the
Nazi party lost a parliamentary battle in 1933, continued its efforts to
force admission of its representatives into the Austrian government, and
finally flowered into the unsuccessful “Putsch” of July 1934, which, in
effect, destroyed the Nazi organization. Following the unsuccessful
“Putsch”, Hitler liquidated the first stage of the battle, and
instructed Franz von Papen to restore normal relationships between the
two countries. Accordingly, a new method of political penetration was
adopted. The result was that Hinterleitner, an Austrian Nazi got in
touch with the lawyer Seyss-Inquart, who had connections with Dr.
Wachter originating from Seyss-Inquart’s support of the July uprising.
Seyss-Inquart also had a good position in the legal field and especially
well established relations with Christian Social politicians. Dr.
Seyss-Inquart came from the ranks of the “Styrian Heimatschutz” and had
become a Nazi party member when the entire “Styrian Heimatschutz” was
incorporated in the NSDAP. The reason for utilizing Seyss-Inquart
appears in the following excerpt from the covering letter which
accompanied Dr. Rainer’s report to Reich Commissar Gauleiter Josef
Buerckel, dated 6 July 1939:
“I think the main reason for the fact that the person of Dr.
Seyss-Inquart seemed to Hitler and to public opinion to have
stepped in the limelight in those March days, was that no
position existed in the party which one might have presented
oneself to the public, and that there was no man who had the
guts to let himself be presented. The actual reason was that the
party leadership had to remain secret during the whole illegal
fight, secret even from the Reich German public.” (_812-PS_)
Thus it is clear why Seyss-Inquart was surreptitiously a member of the
Austrian Nazi Party after it was declared illegal in 1934.
Dr. Rainer goes on to report that full recognition of the party
leadership was given by Seyss-Inquart and also that the defendant was in
permanent contact with Captain Leopold, who became a member of the staff
of Hess. After Hinterleitner was arrested, Dr. Rainer became his
successor as leader of the Austrian Nazi Party, and, on 16 July 1936,
Dr. Rainer and Globocnik visited Hitler at Obersalzburg, where they
received a clear explanation of the situation and the wishes of the
Fuehrer. Subsequently, on 17 July 1936, all illegal Gauleiters met in
Anif near Salzburg, where they received a complete report from Dr.
Rainer on the statement of the Fuehrer and his political instructions
for carrying out the fight. After the agreement between Germany and
Austria on 11 July 1936, Hitler appointed Wilhelm Keppler as Chief of a
mixed commission to supervise the execution of the agreement. At the
same time Keppler was given full authority for the Nazi Party in
Austria. (_812-PS_)
(6) _The activities of Seyss-Inquart and his fellow Nazi conspirators
and collaborators forced the then Austrian government into a critical
situation and a struggle for survival._ As the result of the plans,
maneuvers, and disturbances created by the Nazis in Austria,
Schuschnigg, Chancellor of Austria, accompanied by his State Secretary,
Guido Schmid, conferred with Hitler at Berchtesgaden on 12 February
1938. Dr. Muehlmann was also present but not as a member of the
Schuschnigg delegation. At this meeting the possibilities for military
action by Germany against Austria were demonstrated to the Chancellor.
The ultimate result was that Chancellor Schuschnigg had no choice but to
accept the demands of Hitler that the Austrian Nazi Party be legalized;
that amnesty be granted to Austrian Nazis already convicted for illegal
activities; and that Seyss-Inquart be appointed Minister of the Interior
and Security in the Austrian cabinet, (_2995-PS_; _3254-PS_; _3425-PS_;
_2469-PS_; _2464-PS_)
A few days after the Berchtesgaden meeting of Hitler and Schuschnigg,
and immediately after his appointment as Minister of the Interior and
Security of Austria, Seyss-Inquart went to Berlin for a conference with
Hitler. Upon arrival in Berlin he was met by Keppler, Hitler’s special
delegate on Austrian affairs, who took him to Himmler. After a short
conference with Himmler, the defendant was conducted to Hitler, to whom
he gave the Nazi salute and with whom he had a conference lasting two
hours and ten minutes. Foreign Minister von Ribbentrop and Keppler
waited in the ante-chamber during the conference. Seyss-Inquart first
offered Hitler an explanation for greeting him with the Hitler salute,
by saying: “I consider him as the Fuehrer of the German people who led
us out of the discriminations of the peace treaties.” During the
conference, he rendered a report to Hitler concerning the Austrian
situation since June of 1934 and presented his own program for Hitler’s
approval. Hitler expressed his approval of the plan but told
Seyss-Inquart that he doubted whether Chancellor Schuschnigg would be
willing to go so far. It seems clear that Hitler’s doubt concerning
Schuschnigg’s approval of the Seyss-Inquart plan referred solely to
Seyss-Inquart’s proposal to allow Austrian Nazis to “conduct their
activities according to the Austrian Constitution and on those lines
find their way to the Reich,” because all other portions of his plan had
previously been adopted as a result of the Berchtesgaden Agreement.
(_3254-PS_; _3425-PS_; _2484-PS_)
Seyss-Inquart has asserted that, upon his return to Vienna after his
conference with Hitler, he reported to Chancellor Schuschnigg the
content of his discussion and urged the Chancellor to make a decision
about the Austrian National Socialist question. He then attended rallies
of the Austrian National Socialists held in various places in Austria to
inform them of the content of his conference with Hitler. Two of the
principal meetings were held at Graz and Linz (_3425-PS_; _3254-PS_).
Considerable doubt is cast upon the truth of Seyss-Inquart’s assertions
that he reported the contents of his conference with Hitler to
Chancellor Schuschnigg and in public meetings of the Austrian Nazis, by
a statement contained in a letter written by Seyss-Inquart to Himmler on
19 August 1939. The statement is as follows:
“I had a conversation of over two hours with the Fuehrer on
February 17, 1938, in which I explained to him my point of view.
I would only be able to make statements about the content of
this conversation if the Fuehrer would grant me permission. I
left this discussion as a very sincere man and with a feeling of
great happiness to be of help to the Fuehrer.” (_3271-PS_)
(7) _Finally Chancellor Schuschnigg determined to go before the people
for a decision on the question of Austrian independence._ Chancellor
Schuschnigg planned to hold a plebiscite on that precise question and
fixed 13 March 1938 as a date upon which the plebiscite would be held.
The Chancellor took Seyss-Inquart into his confidence and discussed the
matter of the plebiscite with him. The Chancellor requested
Seyss-Inquart to keep the matter a secret until noon of the next day,
and the defendant promised to do so. Thereafter, Seyss-Inquart prepared
a letter to Schuschnigg objecting to the plebiscite on constitutional
grounds and alleging that the manner in which the plebiscite was to be
held would not allow the Austrians to express their own desires.
Seyss-Inquart admits that a copy of his letter was delivered to Hitler
in Berlin by Globotschnigg. (_3254-PS_; _3425-PS_)
On 9 March 1938, a meeting of the Austrian Nazis was held because they
had learned, through an illegal information service, that a plebiscite
was to be held. Dr. Rainer describes this meeting in the following
language:
“The ‘_Landesleitung_’ received word about the planned
plebiscite through illegal information services on 9 March 1938
at 10 a. m. At the session, which was called immediately
afterwards, Seyss-Inquart explained that he had known about this
information only a few hours, but that he could not talk about
it because he had given his word to keep silent on this subject.
But during the talks he made us understand that the illegal
information we received was based on truth, and that in view of
the new situation, he had been cooperating with the
‘_Landesleitung_’ from the very first moment. Klausner, Jury,
Rainer, Globotschnigg, and Seyss-Inquart were present at the
first talks which were held at 10 a. m. There it was decided
that first, the Fuehrer had to be informed immediately;
secondly, the opportunity for the Fuehrer to intervene must be
given to him by way of an official declaration made by Minister
Seyss-Inquart to Schuschnigg; and thirdly, Seyss-Inquart must
negotiate with the government until clear instructions and
orders were received from the Fuehrer. Seyss-Inquart and Rainer
together composed a letter to Schuschnigg, and only one copy of
it was brought to the Fuehrer by Globocnik, who flew to him on
the afternoon of 9 March 1938.” (_812-PS_).
Seyss-Inquart himself admits that he attended this meeting, which was
held at the Regina Hotel, Vienna (_3425-PS_; _3254-PS_). The defendant
was informed at this meeting that he would receive a letter from Hitler
by messenger the next morning. (_3425-PS_; _3254-PS_).
Early on the morning of 11 March 1938, Seyss-Inquart received Hitler’s
letter. He describes it as having contained several erroneous statements
and containing a demand that a decision should be arrived at before
noon; that in case of rejection the Reich Government would denounce the
agreement of 12 February 1938 and military action must be understood.
According to Seyss-Inquart, Hitler also gave expression to his belief
that there would be disturbances in Austria if Chancellor Schuschnigg
would not relent and that the Reich would come to the help of Austria if
Austria demanded so. Glaise-Horstenau arrived by plane in Vienna early
that same morning with the information that Berlin was greatly excited
and that military steps were in preparation. (_3254-PS_; _3425-PS_)
(8) _Seyss-Inquart then proceeded to carry out Hitler’s orders and to
fulfill the plans made by himself and his fellow Nazi conspirators._ Dr.
Rainer in his report to Reich Commissar Gauleiter Josef Buerckel, and in
his covering letter dated 6 July 1939, related his version of the
sequence of events during this period and described the precise role of
Seyss-Inquart, as he viewed it. He complained about the fact that Hitler
and the general public seemed to give Seyss-Inquart all the credit for
the annexation of Austria by Germany. The following quotation from this
letter and report is significant:
“Soon after taking over in Austria, Klausner, Globocnik, and I
flew to Berlin to report to Hitler’s deputy, Hess, about the
events which led to our taking over the government. We did this
because we had the impression that the general opinion, perhaps
also Hitler’s own, was that the liberation depended more on
Austrian matters of state rather than the Party. To be more
exact, Hitler especially mentioned Dr. Seyss-Inquart alone; and
public opinion gave him alone credit for the change and thus
believed him to have played the sole leading role.” (_812-PS_)
Dr. Rainer then proceeded to describe just what happened in those
critical days, and outlined the final instructions given by him for
Friday, 11 March 1938. He explained that three situations might develop
within the following days:
“1st Case: The plebiscite will not be held. In this case, a
great demonstration must be held.
“2nd Case: Schuschnigg will resign. In this case, a
demonstration was ordered in taking over the government power.
“3rd Case: Schuschnigg will take up the fight. In this case, all
party leaders were ordered to act upon their own initiative,
using all means to capture the position of power.” (_812-PS_)
Dr. Seyss-Inquart took part in these talks with the Gauleiters.
“On Friday, 11 March, the Minister Glaise-Horstenau arrived in
Vienna after a visit with the Fuehrer. After talks with
Seyss-Inquart he went to see the chancellor. At 11:30 a. m. the
‘_Landesleitung_’ had a meeting at which Klausner, Rainer,
Globocnik, Jury, Seyss-Inquart, Glaise-Horstenau, Fishboeck and
Muehlmann participated. Dr. Seyss-Inquart reported on his talks
with Dr. Schuschnigg which had ended in a rejection of the
proposal of the two ministers.
“In regard to Rainer’s proposal, von Klausner ordered that the
government be presented with an ultimatum, expiring at 1400
hours, signed by legal political, ‘Front’ men, including both
ministers and also State Councillors Fishboeck and Jury, for the
establishment of a voting date in three weeks and a free and
secret ballot in accordance with the constitution.
“On the basis of written evidence which Glaise-Horstenau had
brought with him, a leaflet, to be printed in millions of
copies, and a telegram to the Fuehrer calling for help, were
prepared.
“Klausner placed the leadership of the final political actions
in the hands of Rainer and Globocnik. Schuschnigg called a
session of all ministers for 2:00 p. m. Rainer agreed with
Seyss-Inquart that Rainer would send the telegram to the Fuehrer
and the statement to the population at 3:00 p. m. and at the
same time he would start all necessary actions to take over
power unless he received news from the session of the ministers’
council before that time. During this time all measures had been
prepared. At 2:30 Seyss-Inquart ’phoned Rainer and informed him
that Schuschnigg had been unable to take the pressure and had
recalled the plebiscite but that he had refused to call a new
plebiscite and had ordered the strongest police measures for
maintaining order. Rainer asked whether the two ministers had
resigned, and Seyss-Inquart answered: ‘No.’ Rainer informed the
‘Reichskanzlei’ through the German Embassy, and received an
answer from Goering through the same channels that the Fuehrer
will not consent to partial solutions and that Schuschnigg must
resign. Seyss-Inquart was informed of this by Globocnik and
Muehlmann; talks were had between Seyss-Inquart and Schuschnigg:
Schuschnigg resigned. Seyss-Inquart asked Rainer what measures
the party wished taken. Rainer’s answer: Reestablishment of the
government by Seyss-Inquart, legalization of the party, and
calling up of the SS and SA as auxiliaries to the police force.
Seyss-Inquart promised to have these measures carried out, but
very soon the announcement followed that everything might be
threatened by the resistance of Miklas. Meanwhile word arrived
from the German Embassy that the Fuehrer expected the
establishment of a government under Seyss-Inquart with a
national majority, the legalization of the party, and permission
for the legion to return, all within the specified time of 7:30
p. m.; otherwise, German troops would cross the border at 8:00
p. m. At 5:00 p. m. Rainer and Globocnik, accompanied by
Muehlmann, went to the Chancellor’s office to carry out this
errand.
“Due to the cooperation of the above-mentioned people with group
leader Keppler and other officials of the Reich and due to the
activities of other contact-men in Austria, it was possible to
obtain the appointment of Seyss-Inquart as ‘_Staatsrat_’
[councillor of State] in July 1937. Due to the same facts, the
Chancellor Dr. Schuschnigg was forced to take a new so-called
‘satisfactory action’. Through all this a new and stronger
political position was won in the Austrian system. The
National-Socialist Party became acceptable again in the
political field and became a partner with whom one had to
negotiate, even when it was not officially incorporated into
internal Austrian political developments. This complicated
political maneuver, accompanied by the steadily increasing
pressure from the Reich, led to talks between the Fuehrer and
Schuschnigg at the Obersalzberg. Here Gruppenfuehrer Keppler
presented the concrete political demands of the fighting
underground movement, which he estimated according to his
personal experiences and the information he received. The
results of these talks were the right of a free acknowledgment
of the National Socialist movement on the one hand and the
recognition of an independent Austrian state on the other hand,
as well as the appointment of Seyss-Inquart as Minister of
Interior and Public Safety, as a person who will guarantee to
both sides the proper carrying out of the agreements. In this
way Seyss-Inquart occupied the key position and was in the
center of all obvious political actions. A legal base in the
government was won for the party. This resulted in a paralysis
of the ‘system apparates’ [Schuschnigg government] at a time
when a revolution needed to be carried out. Through this, the
basis for a new attack on the Schuschnigg government was won.
“Situation: Miklas negotiated with Ender for the creation of a
government which included, blacks, reds and National Socialists,
and proposed the post of Vice-Chancellor to Seyss-Inquart. The
latter rejected it and told Rainer that he was not able to
negotiate by himself because he was personally involved, and
therefore a weak and unpleasant political situation might
result. Rainer negotiated with Zernette. Director of the cabinet
Huber, Guido Schmid, Glaise-Horstenau, Legation Councillor
Stein, Military Attache General Muffe, and the ‘Gruppenfuehrer’
Keppler, who had arrived in the meantime, were also negotiating.
At 7:00 Seyss-Inquart entered the negotiations again. Situation
at 7:30 p. m.: Stubborn refusal of Miklas to appoint
Seyss-Inquart as Chancellor; appeal to the world in case of a
German invasion.
“Gruppenfuehrer Keppler explained that the Fuehrer did not yet
have an urgent reason for the invasion. This reason must first
be created. The situation in Vienna and in the country is most
dangerous. It is feared that street fighting will break out any
moment because Rainer ordered the entire party to demonstrate at
3 o’clock. Rainer proposed storming and seizing the government
palace in order to force the reconstruction of the government.
The proposal was rejected by Keppler but was carried out by
Rainer after he discussed it with Globocnik. After 8:00 p. m.
the SA and SS marched in and occupied the government buildings
and all important positions in the city of Vienna. At 8:30 p. m.
Rainer, with the approval of Klausner, ordered all Gauleiters of
Austria to take over power in all eight ‘gaus’ of Austria, with
the help of the SS and SA and with instructions that all
government representatives who try to resist should be told that
this action was taken on order of Chancellor Seyss-Inquart.
“With this, the revolution broke out, and this resulted in the
complete occupation of Austria within three hours and the taking
over of all important posts by the party * * *.
“The seizure of power was the work of the party supported by the
Fuehrer’s threat of invasion and the legal standing of
Seyss-Inquart in the government. The national result in the form
of the taking over of the government by Seyss-Inquart was due to
the actual seizure of power by the party on one hand, and the
political efficiency of Dr. Seyss-Inquart in his territory on
the other; but both factors may be considered only in the
relation to the Fuehrer’s decision on 9 March 1938 to solve the
Austrian problem under any circumstances and the orders
consequently issued by the Fuehrer.” (_812-PS_)
Seyss-Inquart’s own story of the events on 11 March 1938 is not
fundamentally different, although he does show a marked tendency to
minimize his role in the planning, precipitating, and accomplishment of
the annexation of Austria by Germany, in a statement signed by him after
his arrest and indictment:
“At 10 o’clock in the morning Glaise-Horstenau and I went to the
Bundes Chancellery and conferred for about two hours with Dr.
Schuschnigg. We told him of all that we knew, particularly about
the possibility of disturbances and preparations by the Reich.
The Chancellor said that he would give his decision by 1400
hours. While I was with Glaise-Horstenau and Dr. Schuschnigg, I
was repeatedly called to the telephone to speak to Goering. He
informed me, (the demands of the Reich steadily increasing) that
the agreement of 12-2 had been cancelled, and demanded Dr.
Schuschnigg’s resignation and my appointment as Chancellor. I
delivered this information verbally to Dr. Schuschnigg and
withdrew from the conference.
“In the meantime Keppler arrived from Berlin and had a
conference in the Bundes Chancellery, I believe also with
President Miklas. The latter refused to concede to the demands
and sought to find various other solutions. When Keppler arrived
from Berlin he showed me the contents of a telegram which I, as
leader of the provisional Austrian Government, was to send to
Hitler and in which I was to request sending of German troops to
Austria to put down disorders. I refused as I did not want to
establish myself as head of a provisional government, and there
were no disorders in Austria. Keppler repeatedly urged me about
the telegram. Around 6 p. m. I told him that he knew my
standpoint and should do what he wished with Berlin. Keppler, as
I have been able to confirm from records available, understood
my answer and did not send off the telegram at that time. Around
7:30 p. m. a frontier police post announced that German troops
were crossing the frontier. Thereupon Dr. Schuschnigg gave his
well known farewell speech over the radio. Upon requests from
various sides I followed with a speech over the radio, stating
that I was still functioning as Minister of Interior and
Security, requesting preservation of peace and order, and gave
directions that no resistance should be offered the German
troops.
“As I am able to gather from the records available, I was again
requested about 10 p. m. to give my sanction to another somewhat
altered telegram, about which I informed President Miklas and
Dr. Schuschnigg. Finally President Miklas appointed me
Chancellor and a little while later he approved of my proposed
ministers.” (_3425-PS_)
However, Seyss-Inquart displayed undue modesty in this statement. His
letter to Himmler indicates how active he was on 11 March 1938, and
reveals that he was not satisfied with making demands upon Chancellor
Schuschnigg, but also handed an ultimatum to President Miklas:
“It is only possible that Buerckel made a statement that in the
critical hours it was hard to find me. After I had handed an
ultimatum to Miklas which was respited until 5:45 p. m. I took a
recess of about a half hour to catch some fresh air. I conceded
that I was, in a way, exhausted from the things which happened
just a few hours before that and I tried to find recreation in
the fresh air. Besides that I planned to take a look at the
situation on the streets. Furthermore, I wanted to make a phone
call to Berlin, not from the Chancellery, but from some other
place. Phone calls from the Chancellery were always tapped
whereas they were only sometimes tapped from other places. I was
sure they didn’t need me until 5:30 p. m., because the men of
the old system would not make a decision a second earlier than
they had to.” (_3271-PS_)
A stenographic transcript of Goering’s telephone conversation with
Seyss-Inquart confirms the fact that Seyss-Inquart was ordered to demand
Chancellor Schuschnigg’s resignation and the appointment of himself as
Chancellor. (_2949-PS_)
This stenographic record of Goering’s conversations also reveals that
Seyss-Inquart had an agent keep in contact with Goering during the
negotiations with Chancellor Schuschnigg. Seyss-Inquart was given an
order by Goering through this agent to report by 7:30 p. m., 11 March
1938, that he had formed a new government. He was informed that the
foreign political aspect would be handled exclusively by Germany and
that Hitler would talk with him about this matter at a future date.
(_2949-PS_)
In addition the stenographic transcript of these telephone conversations
show that the selection of individual members of the cabinet of the new
government to be established by Seyss-Inquart was to be made by the Nazi
conspirators in Berlin. (_2949-PS_)
At 1726 hours on the night of 11 March 1938, Seyss-Inquart reported to
Goering by telephone as ordered. He reported that President Miklas had
accepted the resignation of Chancellor Schuschnigg but wanted to appoint
a man like Ender to the Chancellorship. He further reported his
suggestion to the President that the Chancellorship be entrusted to
him—Seyss-Inquart—and also reported that “We have ordered the SA and
the SS to take over police duties.” Thereupon Goering ordered
Seyss-Inquart to go with Lt. Gen. Muff to President Miklas and inform
him that if the demands were not met immediately German troops, already
advancing to the frontier, would invade Austria that night and Austria
would cease to exist. An audience with the President was to be demanded.
The invasion would be stopped only if President Miklas entrusted
Seyss-Inquart with the Chancellorship. Seyss-Inquart was also instructed
to call out the National Socialists of Austria all over the country,
because Austrian Nazis should even then be in the streets. Seyss-Inquart
was to report again at 7:30 p. m. (_2949-PS_)
The telegram, already prepared, asking Hitler to send German troops into
Austria, over the defendant Seyss-Inquart’s signature, was transmitted
as ordered and agreed upon. (_2463-PS_)
Even before Seyss-Inquart received his appointment as Chancellor of
Austria he dispatched a telegram using that title. An affidavit of
August Eigruber states as follows:
“On the evening of 11 March 1938 at between 8 and 9 o’clock p.
m. he received two telegrams; one of which came from Dr.
Seyss-Inquart, as Bundes Chancellor of Austria, and the other
from one Dr. Rainer; that the telegram from Dr. Seyss-Inquart
appointed the affiant as temporary _Landeshauptmann_ in Upper
Austria; and that the telegram from Dr. Rainer appointed the
affiant temporary leader of the National Socialist Party in
Upper Austria.” (_2909-PS_)
Schuschnigg presented his resignation, which was accepted by President
Miklas. The appointment of Seyss-Inquart as Chancellor came late on the
evening of 11 March 1938. (_2465-PS_)
(9) _Having infiltrated into the Austrian Government of Chancellor
Schuschnigg according to plan, Seyss-Inquart exploited his opportunities
to carry out the plan to its ultimate conclusion, i.e. German annexation
of Austria._ The first act of Seyss-Inquart as the new Chancellor of
Austria was to hold a telephone conversation with Hitler early in the
morning of 12 March 1938. He has described the substance of this
telephone conversation as follows:
“During the morning of 12 March I held a telephone conversation
with Hitler in which I suggested that while German troops were
entering Austria, Austrian troops as a symbol should march into
the Reich. Hitler agreed to this suggestion and we agreed to
meet in Linz, Upper Austria, later on that same day.”
(_3425-PS_)
Thereafter, on 12 March 1938, Seyss-Inquart greeted Hitler on the
balcony of the City Hall of Linz, Upper Austria. In his ensuing speech,
Seyss-Inquart announced that Article 88 of the Treaty of St. Germain,
which provided that “the independence of Austria is inalienable
otherwise than with the consent of the Council of the League of
Nations,” was no longer operative.
“I then flew to Linz with Himmler, who had arrived in Vienna
from Berlin. I greeted Hitler on the balcony of the City Hall,
and said that Article 88 of the Treaty of St. Germain was now
inoperative.” (_3425-PS_; _L-231_)
In his memorandum entitled “The Austrian Question” Seyss-Inquart
describes his meeting with Hitler as follows:
“In the afternoon, I flew with Himmler to Linz and drove then to
meet Hitler. Hitler entered Linz in the evening. I never saw
such an enthusiasm. The welcome was spontaneous and of no
precedence. In my (welcome) speech I declared that Article 88 of
the St. Germain Treaty was no longer binding.” (_3254-PS_;
_2485-PS_)
Seyss-Inquart then drove back to Vienna on the morning of 13 March 1938.
His Secretary of State for Security begged that he be allowed to resign,
a decision he reached as a result of a conversation with Himmler, which
had caused him to fear for his own personal welfare. Seyss-Inquart then
nominated Kaltenbrunner for State Secretary for Security, and the
nomination was accepted by President Miklas. About noon State Under
Secretary Stuckart of the German Reich Ministry of the Interior brought
a proposal for a reannexation act uniting Austria to Germany, and
announced Hitler’s wish for prompt execution of it. Seyss-Inquart then
called a meeting of his Council of Ministers, and on his proposal the
council adopted the act. (_3254-PS_)
Seyss-Inquart, realizing that if the President of Austria resigned his
office, then he, Seyss-Inquart, would be the successor, went to
President Miklas with the information about the action of the Council of
Ministers. Seyss-Inquart describes this meeting with President Miklas as
follows:
“In the case where the Bund President would, for any reason,
either have resigned his functions or be, for some time, impeded
in fulfilling them, his prerogatives were to go over to the Bund
Chancellor, I went to the Bund President with Dr. Wolff. The
President told me that he did not know whether this development
would be of welfare to the Austrian Nation, but that he did not
wish to interfere and preferred to resign his functions, so that
all rights would come into my hands, according to the
Constitution. The possibility of my dismissal or resignation
were only slightly mentioned and recognized as inopportune in
the prevailing situation.” (_3254-PS_)
President Miklas then resigned and Seyss-Inquart succeeded to his
office. (_2466-PS_)
Thereafter Seyss-Inquart signed the Act uniting Austria with Germany and
hurried back to Linz to report this news to Hitler:
“Then there were some letters exchanged between the Bund
President and myself, confirming our conversation and his
retirement. Thereafter I drove to Linz, where I arrived around
mid-night and reported to the Fuehrer the accomplishment of the
Anschluss Law. Hitler was very much impressed by it; for a while
he remained quiet, then tears dropped from his eyes down his
cheeks. He said then that he was especially happy because his
Motherland had achieved her annexation to the Reich without any
shedding of blood.” (_3254-PS_)
On 14 March 1938 Hitler entered Vienna. On 15 March 1938 there was a
public demonstration in Vienna and Hitler introduced Seyss-Inquart as
“Reich _Statthalter_ for Austria.” Hitler then put him in charge of the
Civil Administration of Austria, while political matters were assigned
to Gauleiter Josef Buerckel, who shortly thereafter was made Reich
Commissar for the Anschluss. (_3425-PS_)
(10) _Despite Seyss-Inquart’s modesty since arrest and indictment, his
fellow Nazi conspirators recognized the importance of his part in the
Austrian Anschluss._
Goering made a speech in Vienna on 26 March 1938 in which he said:
“At this moment [announcement of the plebiscite in Austria] it
has been established that now the decision really came. A
complete unanimity between the Fuehrer and the N. S. confidants
inside of Austria existed. According to their opinion also the
hour of action had come, but they thought they could not use any
more democratic methods in negotiations and they took the law of
action in their own strong hands and forced the others to
retreat. If the N. S. rising succeeded so quickly and thoroughly
without bloodshed, it is first of all due to the intelligent and
decisive firmness of the present Reichsstatthalter Seyss-Inquart
and his confidants. But this too proved the correctness of the
previous continued politics because if our confidants had not
been in the government, this whole course of events would not
have been possible.” (_3270-PS_)
According to Dr. Rainer, Hitler and the general public gave
Seyss-Inquart credit for playing the leading role in the annexation of
Austria by Germany. This is evidenced by the covering letter written by
Dr. Rainer, dated 6 July 1939, to Reich Commissar Gauleiter Josef
Buerckel:
“We had the impression that the general opinion, perhaps also
Hitler’s own, was that the liberation depended more upon
Austrian matters of state rather than the Party. To be more
exact, Hitler especially mentioned Seyss-Inquart alone; and
public opinion gave him alone credit for the change and thus
believed him to have played the sole leading role.” (_812-PS_)
In his report to Reich Commissar Buerckel, Dr. Rainer said:
“But as a result of the agreement at Berchtesgaden and the
statement of the Fuehrer made to him during his state visit to
Berlin, Seyss-Inquart was the personal trustee of the Fuehrer
and directly responsible to him for the illegal NSDAP in Austria
within the confines of his political sphere. * * * The seizure
of power was the work of the party supported by the Fuehrer’s
threat of invasion and the legal standing of Seyss-Inquart in
the government.
“The national result in the form of the taking over of the
government by Seyss-Inquart was due to the actual seizure of
power by the Party on one hand and the political efficiency of
Dr. Seyss-Inquart in his territory on the other.” (_812-PS_)
Hans Frank recognized the importance of the services rendered by
Seyss-Inquart to the Nazi cause in Austria. When Seyss-Inquart was about
to leave Poland to become Reich commissar of the Occupied Netherlands
Territories, Frank extolled him as follows:
“But your name without that is shining like a light through the
history of the Third Reich, since you are the creator of the
National Socialist Austria.” (_3465-PS_)
(11) _The Nazi conspirators within the German Reich evidenced their
intentions of annexing Austria in many ways._ Hitler, on the first page
of Chapter 1 of _Mein Kampf_, said:
“Today it seems to me providential that Fate should have chosen
Braunau on the Inn as my birthplace. For this little town lies
on the boundary between two German states which we of the
younger generation at least have made it our life work to
reunite by every means at our disposal.
“German-Austria must return to the great German Mother Country,
and not because of any economic considerations. No, and again
no: even if such a union were unimportant from an economic point
of view; yes, even if it were harmful, it must nevertheless take
place. One blood demands one Reich. Never will the German Nation
possess the moral right to engage in Colonial politics until, at
least, it embraces its own sons within a single state. Only when
the Reich borders include the very last German, but can no
longer guarantee his daily bread, will the moral right to
acquire foreign soil arise from the distress of our own people.
Their sword will become our plow, and from the tears of war the
daily bread of future generations will grow.”
Seyss-Inquart devoted his efforts to legalize the sale and circulation
of _Mein Kampf_ in Austria. His letter to Keppler, German Secretary of
State for Austrian Affairs, contained the following passage.
“The _Teinfaltstrasse_ is very well informed even if not in
detail about my efforts regarding the re-permission of the book
‘Mein Kampf’.” (_3392-PS_)
Goering and Schacht both told an American diplomat that it was Germany’s
determination to annex Austria and Sudetenland to the Reich. (_L-151)_
One of the missions of von Papen, as German Ambassador to Austria, was
to effect a change in the personnel of the Austrian Cabinet headed by
Chancellor von Schuschnigg and to eliminate anti-Nazi opposition,
particularly in the Ministry of Interior and Security. (_2246-PS_)
The German Reich applied economic pressure upon Austria. One of the
means adopted was the law of 24 March 1933, which required payment of
1,000 Reichs Marks by every German crossing the border into Austria
(_3467-PS_). Kurt von Schuschnigg, former Chancellor of Austria, in his
affidavit of 19 November 1945, described this economic pressure upon
Austria by Germany in the following words:
“* * * During my tenure of office as Federal Chancellor of
Austria, more particularly on the 11th day of July, 1936, I
negotiated with the then existing government of the German
Reich, and with Adolf Hitler, an Agreement more particularly
known as the Agreement of 11 July 1936.