THE JACOBITE ATTEMPT OF 1719.

+Source.+--_A Fragment of a Memoir of Field-Marshal James Keith,

written by himself, 1714-1734_, p. 35. (Edinburgh: Spalding Club,

1843.)

... To explain the reasons that now carried me to Spain, its necessary

to go back to the month of August of this year,[73] when the English,

without any previous declaration of war, or even any good ground for it,

had attacked the King of Spain's fleet on the coast of Sicily, and

entirely ruined it, which so exasperated the Cardinal Alberoni, who then

governed Spain with the title of first Minister, that he resolv'd to

assist King James, and so revenge himself on the Whigs, who had been the

occasion of the breach of faith he complained of.... One difficulty

still remain'd,--which was to get the chiefs of the King's friends, who

were in France, advertised of this, which the Cardinal desired me to

undertake. The Earl Marischal had brought with him from the Duke of

Ormonde a little billet containing these words--"Pray have entire

confidence in the bearer," and signed Ormond, to be given to him who

should be sent; and with this and about 18,000 crowns, I set out from

Madrid the 19 of February,[74] and three days after arrived at St.

Sebastian, where I deliver'd 12,000 crowns to the Prince Campo Florido,

for the equipment of the frigats destin'd for Scotland, and with the

little money which remain'd entered France privately....

All things being now ready, we embark'd the 19th of March in a small

barck of about 25 tunns, in the mouth of the Seine, and shaped our

course to pass betwixt Dover and Calais, and so round the Orkneys to the

Isle of Lewis, which was our place of rendezvous; but the wind

continuing at east forced us the Friday after, March 24, to alter our

course, and stand away for St. George's Channel, or the back of Ireland,

as we should think best.... From thence we stood for Cape Clear and the

west coast of Ireland, and after favourable but blowing weather, arrived

the 4 of April, N.S. in the isle of Lewis, where we enquired if no ship

had touched there lately from Spain, or if there was no particular news

in the country; but finding them ignorant of any thing that could give

us light into what we wanted to be informed of, we remain'd there some

days, and at last had accounts that two frigats were come to an anchor

on the other side of the island, on which I went with all haste there,

not doubting but it was those we were longing for. I found them already

sailed, but a gentleman of the country informed me that they were the

same, and were gone some miles farther to Stornoway, the only toun or

rather village on all the island. I went the same night there, and found

them in the harbour at an anchor, and the men still aboard....

The Marquesses of Seafort and Tullibardine came and joined us next day,

and in the evening held a council of war to resolve what was to be done.

The Earl Marischal first asked to know what commissions each had, that

the command might be regulated, and Lord Tullibardine not owning his

late commissions, the command remain'd in him as eldest Major General.

It was then disputed whether it was fit to go immediately to the main

land of Scotland, or to continue in the island where we were till we

had advice of the Duke of Ormonde's landing in England. This last party

was much insisted on by Lord Tullibardine and Glenderuel, but all the

rest being against it, because we might easily be block'd up in the isle

by two or three of the enemies ships, it was resolved to follow the

project which the Earl Marischal had proposed to the Cardinal, to land

as soon as possible in Scotland, and with the Spaniards and Highlanders

who should first join us, march straight to Inverness, in which there

were not above 300 of the enemies foot, who would be in no condition to

oppose us, and to remain there till we should be joined by such a body

of horse and foot as should put us in a condition of marching to the

more southern parts of the Kingdom. The council of war being at an end,

the Spanish troops were order'd to debark that they might refraich

themselves after a voyage of 42 days, and it was resolved to sail for

the main land three days after....

We had no sooner debarked the troops and ammunition,[75] than the Earl

Marischal and Brigadier Campbel proposed marching straight to Inverness

with the Spaniards and 500 Highlanders, whom the Marquess of Seafort

promised to give us, to surprise the enemies garison, who as yet had no

accounts of us; but the same demon who had inspired them with the design

of staying in the Lewis, hinder'd them from accepting this proposition.

We were all in the dark what could be the meaning of these dilatory

proceedings, which was discover'd to be the effects of the measures they

had already taken, for before the Earl Marischal's arrival, they (not

knowing but that he might have a commission superior to the Marquess of

Tullibardine's) had wrote letters in a circular manner to most of their

friends, acquainting them that it was the King's intentions that no body

should take arms till the Spanish troops were landed in England; and

therefore the Marquess declared that till then he would not stir from

where he was, nor even allow any detachments to be made; and some days

after, finding that we had still no accounts of the Duke of Ormonde,

nor of any movement in England, he proposed that without further delay

we should embark aboard the same vessels and return to Spain, from which

with great difficulty he was dissuaded.

But the Earl Marischal, fearing that he might renew the same design in

case the news we expected was long a coming, declared to him the day

after that he was resolved to send the two fregats immediately back to

Spain, they being no longer in safety where they were, for being already

discover'd, it was natural to believe that the Government of England

would immediately send ships to block them up, or to intercept them in

their passage home, and in spight of all the arts they used to detain

them, three days after they sailed; and indeed just in time, for not a

week after their departure arrived three English men of war, much

superior to ours both in force and equipage, who, finding we had put

most of our ammunition and provisions into an old castel, situate on the

shore, under the guard of a detachment of 45 Spaniards, immediately

began to batter it from the three ships, and the same night obliged them

to surrender prisoners of war.

Our ships were no sooner sailed than the Marquess of Tullibardine began

to think of other measures. His retrait out of the island was now

impracticable in the manner he had designed it, and now he resolved to

draw what ships he could together, but it was too late; he had given the

enemy time to draw troops not only from the remote parts of the Kingdom,

but even from Holland. The regiments of Kapell, May, and Sturler, were

already arrived, and his circular letters had given those who were not

very willing an excellent excuse, he himself having already wrote to

them that they should not take arms.

Our affairs were in this condition, when we received the news, of the

entire dispersion of the Duke of Ormond's fleet; but at the same time

our friends assured us that all diligence was using in Spain to put it

in a condition to sail again that same spring. This left us still some

hopes, and therefore we order'd the gentlemen who were nearest us to

assemble their vassalls, but this last accident had disheartned them,

that not above a thousand men appeared, and even those seemed not very

fond of the enterprize.

The enemy was by this time within three days march of us, with four

regiments of foot, and a detachment of a fifth, and 150 dragoons, and

waited only for the provisions which was necessary to be carried along

(into a country full of mountains and possessed by the enemy,) to march

to attack us in our post which, by the situation, was strong enough had

it been well defended; our right was cover'd by a rivulet which was

difficult to pass, and our left by a ravine, and in the front the ground

was so rugged and steep that it was almost impossible to come at us.

However, the tenth of June the enemy appear'd at the foot of the

mountain, and after having reconnoitred the ground he attacked a

detachment we had posted on our right on the other side of the rivulet

commanded by Lord George Murray, who not being succour'd as he ought,

was obliged to retire, but without any loss. At the same time our center

was attacked and forced with very little loss on either side; and after

a skirmish of about three hours, in which not above a hundred men were

killed or wounded on both sides, and of distinction only the Marquess of

Seafort wounded, our troops were forced to retire to the top of the

mountain, whose height hinder'd the enemies pursuit.[76] By this time it

was night, which gave the chiefs of our party time to consult what was

to be done in this urgency, and on considering that they had neither

provisions nor ammunition, that the few troops they had had behaved in a

manner not to give great encouragement to try a second action, it was

resolved, that the Spaniards should surrender, and the Highlanders

disperse. Don Nicolas Bolano, who commanded the detachment of the

regiment of Galicia, offer'd to attack the enemy once more; but the

general officers judging the attempt in vain, the first resolution was

followed, and accordingly next morning the Spaniards surrender'd on

condition their baggage should not be plunder'd, and every body else

took the road he liked best. As I was then sick of a feavour, I was

forced to lurck some months in the mountains, and in the beginning of

September having got a ship, I embarcked at Peterhead, and 4 days after

landed in Hollande at the Texel.

The Jacobite Rebellions (1689-1746) (Bell's Scottish History Source Books.) · 第 64 / 160 题