Your Lordship orders us to give our judgment whether it be lawful
to make war on the Zambales, in view of the many injuries that they
have been and daily are inflicting upon our people; and, if so be
that the war is lawful and righteous, what measures may be taken to
attain the end proposed therein, security.
In reply to this we say that, according to all the authorities,
divines as well as canonists and jurists, three conditions are required
in a war to make it a righteous one; and on these we will rest the
justification of the war at present under consideration.
The first condition is that he who begins the war shall have authority;
the second, just cause for making war; and third, righteous intention.
The first requires that he who begins the war and by whose order it is
waged be a public person, as St Augustine declares, _Contra Faustum
Manichæum_; cited by Gratian (23 qu. I. c. _Quid culpatur_): _Ordo
naturalis mortalium paci accommodatus hoc poscit, ut susctpiendi
belli authoritas atque consilium penes principes sit_. Whence it
is clear, as St. Thomas says (2a 2æ, q. 40, art. I), [10] that a
private person cannot lawfully make war; for, if he is aggrieved,
he should resort to his superior for satisfaction; and it is as
little within the right of a private individual to collect such a
body of men as is requisite to carry on a war. The difficulty is to
understand what is meant by "public person" or "prince;" for it is
plain that it is not lawful for every prince or judge whatsoever to
wage war. The solution of this difficulty, according to St. Thomas
(_ubi supra_,) and Cajetanus (_ibi_ and in _Summa, ch. Bellum_),
and Castro (_De justa hæreticorum punitione_ lib. 2, c. 4), is that
by "public person" in the present case is understood the one who in
his government depends not on another; such are the kings of Spain
and France, also some free commonwealths, as Venice, Florence, and
Ferrara: these have authority, without recourse to another, to wage
war. But those princes and states whose government is not sovereign
may not levy war without authority from their superior; and so the
lords of Castilla and the viceroys and governors appointed by our
king Philippus may not without a warrant make war.
What is said applies not when war is waged for defense against enemies,
but in other circumstances; for if it is for defense, such war is
permitted to any governor or king, as the authors say, because _vim
vi repellere licet_; [11] and thus the viceroys and governors of the
Indias have authority to levy war against disturbers of the peace and
quiet of the states of which they are in charge, without necessity
of resorting to his Majesty for permission.
The second condition of righteous war is that the cause for which it
is waged shall be a just one, as St. Thomas says: "Those upon whom
war is waged deserve it for the offenses that they have committed,
and the grievances that they have inflicted upon the one who makes
war on them." Thus says St. Augustine (lib. 83. _Quæstionum super
Josue_, 9. 10), and Gratian quotes him (23, q. 2, c. _Dominus noster_):
_Justa autem bella solent definiri quæ ulciscuntur injurias, si gens
vel civitas plectenda est, quod vel vindicare neglexerit quod a suis
improbe factum est, vel reddere quod per injuriam ablatum est_. [12]
And as this injury and grievance may be of many kinds, so too, many
and various are the just causes of war; but we will consider here only
those which make for the matter in hand, confirmed by the authority
of Scripture.
The first ground of a righteous war may exist when one is hindered
from doing what he may by right do. This is matter of natural and
divine law and on this ground Julius Cæsar, as Lucan represents him
(lib. 1), made defense of his conduct in waging war against the Roman
state--viz., that the state had blocked to him, a Roman citizen,
the route to Rome; and so he said, arms in hand, _Omnia dat qui justa
negat_. [13] On this ground, as St. Augustine says (in _Quaest. Num._
q. 43), [14] the children of Israel justly made war on the kings of
the Amorites (_Ut legitimum_, c. 21), for having withstood their
passage through their country when they were on their way to the
promised land, although the Israelites had given assurance that they
would do no damage to the lands, the crops, or the vineyards of the
Amorites. And so says St. Augustine (and he is quoted _ubi supra_,
last chapter), _Notandum est sane quemadmodum justa bella gerebantur
a filiis Israel contra Amoritas: innoxius enim transitus denegabatur
qui jure humanæ societatis aequissimo patere debebat_. [15] Upon
which passage Joannes Andreas in his gloss well says: _Licet enim
transire per alienum agrum jus non sit, tamen quia necessarius et
innoxius erat iste transitus illi prohibere non debuerunt; item quia
via publica erat et nemo prohibetur via publica_. [16]
The second ground, as I said, of a righteous war is the self-defense
of the prince or of his subjects. This ground also is matter of both
natural and divine right; for even as self-defense is a natural
right, on which right is founded the rule of _vim vi repellere_,
so too in the prince is the defense of his subjects--for the care
which the prince has of his subjects is as essential on his part as
is the care which each one of them has for himself; hence, if the
subjects are aggrieved by their enemies, the prince may justly in
their defense make war, and _vim vi repellere_. This is much better
than that the individual should himself avenge the wrong; for the
individual can lawfully defend himself and his property only _in
continente_, as Sylvester declares (_Bellum_, 2 § 3), but he may not
avenge past wrongs, _nec sua repetere_ save by recourse to his judge
and superior. [17] Whatever goes beyond that is contrary to law and
good government and, as Cajetan says, is _extra moderamen tutelæ_,
[18] it being an essential condition of the right _vim vi repellere_
that it be done _cum moderamine_. But the prince and the state have the
same authority with respect to their enemies at whose hands they have
suffered injury, which they have with regard to their own subjects;
and hence not only may they defend themselves lest either they or their
subjects suffer injury, but they may avenge injuries by inflicting
punishment, exact satisfaction for damage done, and take the enemies'
lives, if so the quiet and safety of their subjects require. Under this
head come the many wars waged by King David against the Philistines,
mentioned in the Scriptures; as also the war of the Machabee captains
against the kings Antiochus and Demetrius.
The third cause and ground is rebellion and disobedience of
subjects. This was the ground of David's war with Sheba, son of Bichri,
who raised a revolt, as you may read in II Sam. 20; [19] and this is
what St. Augustine says (_Contra Faustum Manichæum_, I. 22, c. 74):
_Adversus violentiam resistentium sive deo sive aliquo legitimo imperio
jubente gerenda ipsa bella suscipiuntur a bonis ubi eos vel jubere
tale aliquid vel in talibus obedire juste ordo ipse constringit_
(in c. _Quid culpatur, ubi supra_.) [20]
The fourth cause and ground for a righteous war is when there is
default of keeping faith or carrying out agreements; for in such
case the party who has been wronged may lawfully make war on him
who, by not keeping faith, has done him injury. This made Joran
[Jehoram], king of Israel, wage war on Mesa [Mesha], king of Moab,
for his having failed to keep the agreements and to pay the tribute
which he had promised to pay to his suzerain, King Ahab; and that
this war was just is clear, for that he was assisted therein by the
holy and righteous Jehoshaphat, king of Judah, with the approval of
the prophet Elisha--who in the name of the Lord urged them on to war,
and promised them a sure victory--as is seen in II Sam. ch. 3. These
four causes and grounds, or any one of them by itself, justify war;
and there are other grounds also, but these are the most certain and
the most applicable to the matter in hand.
The third condition which, as we have said, must be fulfilled to
make a war righteous is a right intention on the part of him who
wages it; because, failing this, even when the other two conditions
concur--to wit, authority and just cause--a faulty intention may
render and does render the war unjust. This condition is also laid
down by St. Augustine (_Contra Faustum_), and he is quoted by Gratian
(in c. _Quid culpatur_); and as his words are of great weight and
define wherein a bad intention consists, it is well to quote them:
_Quid culpatur in bello? an quid moriuntur quandoque morituri ut
dominentur in pace victuri? Hoc reprehendisse timidorum est non
religiosorum. Nocendi cupiditas, ulciscendi crudelitas, impacatus
atque implacabilis animus, feritas rebellandi, libido dominandi et
si quae sunt similia: haec sunt quae in bellis jure culpantur_. [21]
And what must be the right intention of the prince in levying war
the same Augustine declares in the book _De Verbo Domini_; and the
passage is found in c. _A pud, ubi supra: Apud veros dei cultores et
ipsa bella peccata non sunt quae non cupiditate aut crudelitate sed
pacis studio geruntur ut mali coerceantur et boni subleventur_. [22]
Peace is the end that is to be sought in war, and so saith Aristotle
(lib. 10 _Ethicorum_): _Bellum gerimus ut in pace degamus_. [23]
And Augustine says the same (_Epist. ad Bonifacium_): _Non quaeritur
pax ut bellum exerceatur, sed bellum geritur ut pax acquiratur._ [24]
But here it is to be noted that this right intention which is here
required is a condition no more essential to a righteous war than
to other good works, for in all these it is required, and without it
no work is virtuous; and hence it is that if this right intention be
wanting in the prince who levies war and in those who urge it, he would
sin by wrong intention, but if the other two conditions be fulfilled,
he, as Soto says, will not be held to make amends for the injuries
that may be done in the war. So, too, if a judge orders a robber to
be hanged, granted that _ex odio suspendat_, [25] he will not be held
to restitution, if on the testimony adduced the man deserved hanging.
_Reply_
Having ascertained the conditions required to make a war just, from
them we shall be able clearly to decide whether such is the war against
the Zambales at present under discussion. To this question we will
answer affirmatively: that it is lawful without any scruple whatever,
for in it the three conditions meet which are required for a just war,
as we have already said.
And first, in this war is found the first condition, namely, authority
in the one who wages it, for he is _persona publica_, the governor
of these isles; and also he has a superior who is our king. But since
the cause is self-defense, as will later be proved, he has no need of
other permission to defend his state against enemies who molest it,
as we have proved.
In this war, the third condition, too--we shall speak of the
second later--is fulfilled, namely, right intention; for its end
is the peace and security of the subjects, disturbed by these their
enemies. And this peace it has not been possible to secure by means
of our benevolent efforts, although such means have been tried--as
appears from our labors to that end last year in sending religious
of our order, and persons known to the Zambales, to persuade them to
desist from wrongdoing and be our friends, granting them a general
pardon for the wrongs they had committed against us; and although the
Zambales promised, and made oath in their fashion, they have defaulted
utterly, committing since then many atrocious wrongs against our
people, as appears from the reports on that matter which have been
drawn up. And, forasmuch as nothing has been gained through kindness,
comes now, as a last and drastic remedy, the resolution to win peace
and security for the king's subjects by waging war on his enemies; and
this is the right intention that is required according to Aristotle
and St. Augustine, as before quoted. But even suppose this intention
to be lacking, it is already said and proved above that this condition
is not in such sort essential as to oblige to indemnification.
It remains that we look into the second condition of just warfare,
to wit, that just cause exist for waging it. This condition, in which
might be presented greatest difficulty, is the clearest and plainest
part of the matter before us; for not only are some of the four causes
and grounds pointed out by us, as being any one of them in itself
sufficient, but all the just causes are here concurrent. The first
condition is fulfilled in that these Zambales impede the general
traffic by sea and land of those who go to Pangasin and Ylocos and
Cagayan. And, albeit the traffic works damage neither to them nor to
their lands, but uses a common highway, yet they sally out upon the
highways and kill and rob passengers, as appears from the reports.
Concurs also the second cause; for, although these Zambales are not
molested by our people, they assault and murder them, not only falling
upon them in the highways, as already said, but also seeking them out
in the settlements while they are laboring in the fields; so that
neither in their fields nor their homes are our people safe--which
also is shown in the reports.
Furthermore, after promising obedience to our king and to the governor
on his behalf, they have rebelled and renounced obedience, as we
have said; and this is the third of the reasons which, as we said,
justify the war.
Finally, the war is justified by their failure to keep their word
and their pledges of friendship; for, as is well known, they have
again and again, in the time of previous governors, been reconciled
and have promised friendship, and thus have obtained pardon for
their acts. And in the year just past this was done with greater
formality and more solemn assurances, as appears from the record;
but notwithstanding this, breaking the compact of peace, they have
since then inflicted other and graver injuries--sallying out as
robbers into the public routes by land and by sea, making descents on
our settlements and murdering everyone on whom they can lay hands,
be they Indians or Spaniards, seculars or ecclesiastics. Indeed, it
is well known that last year they murdered a religious of our order,
and they were tracking our provincial and two others, his companions;
but all these, thanks to their own watchfulness, escaped.
From what has been said it stands amply proved that the war to be waged
against the Zambales is a just one, and, beyond all scruple, as well
on the part of him who sets it on foot as of those who take part in it.
But it may be that some one will, in opposition to what has been
said, cite to us certain law texts to the effect that when a number
of persons or a town sins, even if all or most of them are guilty,
yet they should be pardoned. In the _Decretum_ (dist. 50, c. _ut
constitueretur_) St. Augustine says, writing to Bonifacius: _Ubi
per graves dissentionum scissuras non hujus aut illius hominis
periculum sed populorum plurimorum strages jacet, detrahendum est
aliquid severitati ut majoribus sanandis malis charitas syncera
subveníat_. [26] And (1 q. 7 c. _Quoties_) Pope Innocent, as cited by
Gratian, says: _Quoties a populis auta turba peccatur, quia in omnes
propter multitudinem vindicari non potest inultum solet transire_. [27]
Much to the same effect is what is said by Alexander III (c. _Extra,
De clerico excommunicato_), and also by Honorius III (in the
last chapter, _De transact._). And the reason for this is that in a
multitude or in a town are many innocent persons, and it were a grave
injustice to require that they shall suffer the rigorous punishment
awarded to the guilty; while it is certain that in a war one suffers as
much as the other; and hence, lest the innocent be punished, the guilty
should be pardoned. To the objection which cites these testimonies
in proof that _parcendum est multitudini_ [28] Castro makes apt reply
(lib. 2 _De justa haereticorum punitione_ c. 14), that the proposition
is true and applies when the multitude or town purposes amendment,
and there is fair hope of the same; but if the case is otherwise,
and they persist in their evil ways after being admonished, reason
says they shall be punished rigorously. The opposite course would
only give them occasion to go on and become more hardened in their
sin and misdoing, and cause others, after the example of these,
to do the same--that appearing to them to be lawful, when they see
that it is not punished. And such is the teaching of c. _Qui vult,
de Pænitentia_, 3. 6., attributed to St. Augustine: _Cum enim tot sunt
qui labuntur ut pristinam dignitatem ex authoritate defendant et quasi
usum peccandi sibi faciant, rescindenda est spes ista_. [29] Then, as
these Zambales have many times been warned, and have promised and sworn
peace and amends, and have totally defaulted, as we have already said,
and have taken occasion, from the lenity shown them, to do greater
mischiefs with more boldness--mistaking for timidity the kindliness
that we have used toward them--it follows that, numerous though they
are, we ought no longer to dissemble with them, but must punish them
sternly; for the more numerous they are, the more mischief they do.
What we have stated in enforcing our thesis affords us occasion for
explaining here the mode of procedure in this war, and--assuming it
to be a lawful war, as has been sufficiently proved--for inquiring
what considerations may be urged by those who carry on the war. And,
for the sake of brevity and clearness, we will resolve the matter into
a few points, without any arguments, for these points are corollaries
of a just war.
First: If, to attain what is purposed--to wit, to bring the said
Zambales under control--it becomes necessary that we burn their crops,
their houses, and their other properties, and even kill those who
make resistance, even if the presumption be that among them are some
who are guiltless--it is lawful to do all this during war, until
the final victory is won which is purposed. We say "if necessary,"
for unless the purpose of all that is done in the war is the final
victory, such deeds will be impious and tyrannical. And hence the
matter should not be left to the arbitrary will of the soldiers,
but should be directed by the order of him who governs them.
Second: Also, if during the war there be lack of subsistence, or of
other supplies needed for its prosecution, these may be taken from
what the enemy have, even though the owners be guiltless, and this
without obligation to restitution--the reason being that _cum licet
bellum licet apponere media necessaria ad finem victoria_. [30]
Third: _Ex jure gentium_, during the war, all movables taken from
any one of the enemy belong to him who has them, and there is no
obligation to restitution: Sylvester Presbyter (_Bellum_, 1 § 10),
and Cajetan (in _Summa_). I say "during the war," because when it is
ended _non licet ultra praedari_. [31]
Fourth: After they are reduced to subjection, those who are most
guilty may be condemned to death, as also such others as regard for
the security and tranquillity of the land may determine. But it will
not be lawful to kill those of them who are found to be guiltless,
even though it be feared that they may be mischievous in the future;
for no grievance has been suffered at their hands, and means can be
found of holding them securely, as we will show presently. Those of
the inhabitants of a state who are usually deemed guiltless are lads
not yet old enough to bear arms; old men incapacitated by age, save in
the case that heretofore they have been mischievous; and the women,
unless it appear that they too have engaged in war. But it will not
suffice to say with Soto that they supply provisions for their husbands
during the war, for that is a natural right and obligation. All the
rest are deemed guilty, failing proof to the contrary; here strict
investigation is to be made, lest wrong be done.
Fifth: _Ex jure gentium_, those captured in a just war are held as
slaves. Paludanus (in 4. d. 15, q. 3) holds that this is not to be
understood as applying to Christian captives; and such is the truth,
and this provision is observed among Christian kings. But, as these
Zambales are not Christians, they may be dealt with according to the
_jus gentium_, and made slaves. Yet, inasmuch as they are a people
of small mental capacity, and hence do not realize the seriousness
of their crime, they ought not to be treated with the full vigor of
law; and therefore it seems to us that it will be enough to make them
slaves for a limited time, ten or fifteen years.
Sixth: The war ended, his Lordship the governor may exact from the
Zambales all the costs of the war, and indemnification for all the
losses suffered; and he may, by way of chastisement, levy from them
some tribute: for all this is _jus belli_ in the case of a just war,
such as is this, as stands proved.
Seventh: Since it is not enough to punish past crime unless a remedy
is applied for the future; and since a wide experience has shown that
little confidence is to be reposed in the word and the character of
this people; and since to leave them in their mountains would be to
give them occasion and good opportunity for doing mischief and damage
hereafter, as always in the past: it seems to us that inasmuch as
these Zambales are few and have not in their villages or in their
territory any cultivated fields or any fixed settlements, it will be
advisable, as security against their returning to their old ways,
to transplant them from the mountain region to peopled districts,
depriving them of arms, and giving them a village site and lands upon
which, with police control and under a government, they may live and
cultivate their farms. This we deem the ultimate remedy, and as being
necessary for the ends of peace and security at which we aim.
Finally: It seems to us from the experience we have had in this
matter, and from what we have seen, that the expeditions sent against
these Zambales have been ineffective because this method was not
employed. The plan should be carried out chiefly by means of the
Indians of Pampanga and the Zambales of Pangasinan--people who know
the country and its hiding-places and coverts; and who, as being more
agile than Spaniards, bear more easily the toils of the march over the
routes that have to be traversed, owing to the wildness of the region,
which, as is well known, is very great. In payment of the costs to
these Indians, the slaves captured in the war might be apportioned to
them; and in virtue of this compact they will not commit the cruelties
and murders to be apprehended from them. Besides, this will benefit
the state; for, having more field-hands, they will plow and cultivate
more land. Further, as regards the Panpangos, they will in this way
obtain satisfaction for the many and serious wrongs that they have
suffered from the Zambales in the way of both murders and robberies.
Such, with all respect for the better judgment of others, is our
opinion regarding the matter proposed to us by your Lordship,
with command to declare our views. This we do, recommending always
moderation and Christian charity, which should ever be practiced,
and especially in dealing with this people--who, as we have said, do
not realize the gravity of their offense; and on whom, therefore,
the penalties of the law ought not to be inflicted in all its
rigor. And, to signify that this is our judgment, we confirm it with
our names. Given at San Augustin de Manila, the nineteenth day of
January, 1592.
_Fray Joan de Valderrama_, provincial
_Fray Alonzo de Castro_, definitor
_Fray Lorenso de Leon_, definitor
_Fray Joan de Tamayo_, prior
_Fray Antonio Serrano_, prior
_Fray Diego Gutierrez_
_Fray Diego Muñoz_
_Fray Diego Alvarez_
_Fray Alonso de Montalvan_, superior
_Fray Matthias Manrique_
_Fray Alonso de Paz_ [32]
[_Endorsed_: "Opinion of the Augustinian fathers regarding the
Cámbales." "Opinion of the Augustinian fathers upon waging war against
the Zambales."]