CHAPTER XI

_The most dangerous aspect of the awakening of the people of the United

States to a realization of their unpreparedness for war, and the appalling

national disasters that might ensue from it, is the danger of creating a

military caste which would gradually absorb to itself an undue control of

Governmental authority and power, leading in the end to a military

despotism._

_Already the danger of this is seen in the assumption of the arbitrary power

over inland waterway development now exercised by the corps of Army

engineers and the Board of Army engineers, and the strong opposition

emanating from them against the adoption of any improved system of river

control that would protect the people from such appalling disasters as

those which overtook the Mississippi Valley in 1912 and again in 1913._

It is a fact capable of absolute demonstration that a large portion of the

damage resulting from those floods was due to the stubborn refusal of the

Army engineers to approve or adopt any plan for flood control that would

supplement the levee system by source stream control of the floods on the

upper tributaries, and by controlled outlets and spillways and auxiliary

flood water channels in the lower valley. It is very doubtful whether the

people of the delta of the Mississippi River will ever succeed in getting

protection against the recurrence of devastating floods until this baleful

influence of the Army engineers can be eliminated.

There are several reasons why this military control of inland waterways is

detrimental to the country. The military caste in the United States has

developed remarkable capacity for turning to their own advantage the

influence which their control over appropriations for river and harbor

improvements has centered in them. The Army engineers are wedded to the

present piecemeal system of appropriations, popularly known as the "Pork

Barrel" System. The reason for this is that it practically vests in them

the autocratic authority to determine whether the demands of the

constituents of any Senator or Congressman for some local river or harbor

improvement shall or shall not be granted. The representatives of the

people, whether they be Congressmen or Senators, must humbly bow to a

higher power and secure its gracious grant of consent or face the

disappointment of their constituents. It ought not to be difficult for

anyone with common sense, and with the most superficial knowledge of the

manipulation of social and political influences in shaping legislation to

understand the evils of this system, or the influence exerted through it by

the military caste which is adverse to the best interest of the people at

large.

The "Pork Barrel" System, with its piecemeal appropriations for local

improvements, without any underlying comprehensive plan, as long as it

prevails, will block the way to all efficient waterway development, or

protection from periodical damage by devastating floods. And it will never

be changed until popular indignation and protest breaks the stranglehold

that the military caste now has upon this class of legislation in Congress.

Their attitude in this whole field of public development is in humiliating

contrast with that of the Samurai of Japan when the whole system of

government of that nation was reconstructed and reorganized. The Samurai,

actuated by a patriotic and self-sacrificing desire to promote the general

welfare, surrendered entirely the privileges and prerogatives that they

held as a military class, and accepted a system which took from them all

power and submerged them in the mass of the people.

The military caste of this country apparently think only of their own

aggrandizement, and persistently oppose any modifications of an evil system

which would in the slightest degree involve a surrender of their autocratic

authority or official prestige and power for the general welfare.

In this stupendous field of national development, where immediate progress

is so vital to the people of the entire country, the stubborn opposition of

the military caste is the most serious obstacle in the way of a complete

coordination of all the departments of the government in the solution of

the whole problem of river regulation and flood control and the upbuilding

of a great inland waterway system.

Aside from that, there is an additional reason why the present system can

never be relied upon for a complete solution of the problem of river

regulation. This further difficulty lies in the system under which the

military caste is organized. The military system which prevails in all

matters administered through the Army, strangles all individual initiative

and opinion. It automatically subordinates every engineer in the military

service to the mental and personal domination of the chief of the Army

engineers, whoever he may be. All original and creative engineering genius

is muzzled or chloroformed as soon as it is born. If by any Caesarian

operation it chances to come into being it is promptly strangled.

Another incurable defect in the military system when applied to civil

construction and internal development of the resources of the country,

lies in the transfer of engineers from one assignment of duty to another

after brief periods of service. This plan is no doubt advisable and

possibly necessary in the military service. Its tendency is to bring all

Army engineers up to a common general level of ability and experience. It

destroys the peculiar originality and genius which can only result from

long experience and training in one of the many special fields for which

engineers must be developed in civil life.

This Army system might not work so badly if applied only to harbors and

harbor improvement work, but it destroys efficiency when applied to such

problems as those presented by a great river system like the Mississippi

River and its tributaries. An army engineer in charge of the Lower

Mississippi River district may have learned something of that problem, but

by the time he has learned it he is transferred to some other part of the

country and given a different problem to study. Another engineer is put in

his place, and by the time he in his turn has partially familiarized

himself with the problem he is likewise transferred. And so it goes on,

ignorance succeeds ignorance as fast as knowledge can be obtained.

A martinet at the head of the Army Engineering corps can stifle and render

useless to the country the most brilliant engineering genius if it blossoms

forth with any new theory or original suggestion. The Army engineer corps

is bound hand and foot by prejudice and pride of caste. The engineering

corps is a unit, arbitrarily dominated, intellectually and professionally,

by the chief of the corps. Nothing original can develop under such an

atmosphere of mental repression. The best engineering talent in the world

is suppressed and rendered valueless by that system of organization. It can

never solve the intricate and novel hydraulic problems presented by the

Mississippi River which, with all its tributaries, must be treated as a

unit in order to control its floods.

The people of the lower Mississippi Valley have for years endeavored to

secure the construction of controlled outlets and spillways, but their

most urgent efforts have fallen dead at the door of the Army engineers or

their associates or subordinates. The contractors profit financially by the

"Levees Only" system. The politicians share the power developed by the

local political machines which control the huge expenditures for levee

construction and maintenance. Both are ardent advocates and devotees of the

military caste system which perpetuates their powers, privileges, and

perquisites. The rest of the people, wherever they dare to entertain an

independent opinion, recognize that the Mississippi Valley can never be

rightly developed so long as the present "Levees Only" system continues to

prevail.

An engineering service composed entirely of engineers in civil life should

be created to take over all the work relating to river regulation, flood

control, and inland waterway construction, operation, and maintenance. The

opposition to such a system for the administration of civil affairs by

civil officials, instead of by the Army, has been based upon the plea that

nobody but army officers can be trusted to be honest in the expenditure of

the funds of the national government. Such an opposition is an insult to

the civil engineering profession of the United States and is completely

refuted by the splendid constructive accomplishments of the United States

Reclamation Service. No one questions the personal honesty of the Army

engineers, but their methods are enormously wasteful and without results

anywhere near commensurate to the amount of their expenditures. The system

championed and supported by them has resulted in the waste of about

$200,000,000. That vast sum, if it had been wisely and economically

expended, would have gone a long way towards creating conditions on our

river systems in which the water that now runs to waste in devastating

floods would have been put into the river at the low water season to float

boats on that would carry our inland commerce.

There never can be any escape from this carnival of waste and extravagance

and impotent and useless expenditure until the whole system of river

control and improvement is changed. Control of it must be taken away from

the Army and vested in civil control. Another reason for divorcing the Army

entirely from control of river work is that it seems impossible for an Army

engineer to recognize or reason back to original causes. He can see in a

flood only something against which he must build a fortification after the

flood has been formed. This is well illustrated by the blind adherence of

the Army engineers, or at least of their chiefs, to the delusion that

floods of the lower Mississippi Valley can be safeguarded against by the

"Levees Only" system of flood protection in that valley. They utterly

ignore the cause of the floods and therefore refuse to consider any system

of source stream control or of controlled outlets, spillways, and

wasteways.

Another illustration of this persistent adherence to mere local protection,

instead of safeguarding against an original cause, is furnished by the work

of the Army engineers in building the Stockton cut-off canal in California.

This canal was built ostensibly to prevent the Stockton channel from being

filled with sediment to the detriment of navigation. In fact it was built

to protect the city of Stockton from overflow and flood damage.

The first big flood that came filled up the cut-off canal and it is now

useless. It would be clearly unavailing to reexcavate it, because it would

fill up again with the next big flood. The sediment which filled the canal

was gathered by the river after it left the foothills and tore its way as a

raging torrent through farms and fertile fields. It washed or caved them

into the river and carried down and deposited the earth material in the

cut-off canal.

The Army engineers, however, or at least their chiefs, had steadfastly set

their faces against reservoir construction for flood control. But for this

they might have built the great Calaveras Reservoir which would have

afforded complete protection for the city of Stockton against floods. By

controlling the flood at its source, storing the flood waters, and letting

them into the river below only in a volume not larger than the channel

would carry, all damage to the valley and to farms lying between the

foothills and the city of Stockton would have been avoided. No sediment

would have been carried into the Stockton channel to impede navigation. The

surplus flood water instead of running to waste would have been conserved

and held back until needed for beneficial use.

Any such plan as this would have been contrary to all the precedents and

theories of the military engineers. All the damages resulting from failure

to adopt it merely illustrate the necessity of escaping from those

precedents and theories, and the pride of opinion which clings to them with

such desperate tenacity. That escape must be accomplished, if we are ever

to get river regulation and flood protection in this country. Stockton will

never get it until the Calaveras Reservoir has been built, and no

flood-menaced section of the country will get protection until it is

afforded to it by engineering and constructive forces dominated by the

civil and not by the military authority of the Government.

The whole training of an Army engineer is wrong, when it comes to dealing

with river problems and the control of floods which can only be safeguarded

against by controlling the remote causes which result in the formation of

the flood. The idea of preventing the formation of floods by controlling

those original causes, preserving forest and woodland cover, preserving the

porosity of the soil, slowing up the run-off from the watershed, or holding

back the flood waters in reservoirs or storage basins, seems to be beyond

the scope of the powers of conception and construction of the military

engineers of the United States Army. They see only results, and seem unable

to comprehend original causes. Not only this, but they also oppose, by all

the political arts in which the Army engineers are so well versed, every

proposition to coordinate the work of the Army engineers in the field of

channel work and local flood defense, with the work of other departments of

the national government. Every department of the national government must

be coordinated which deals with water control, or with any beneficial use

of water that would check rapid run off and hold back the flood water on

the watershed where it originated, and in that way prevent the formation of

a destructive flood.

The entire willingness of the Army engineers to subordinate the welfare of

the people in every flood-menaced valley to the stubborn determination of

the military caste to retain and broaden their own powers and privileges in

this one field of action, shows what might be expected from any increase in

the members of that caste, or any enlargement of their control over the

civil affairs of the country.

The military caste in the United States will never approve any plan for

national defense that does not center in and radiate from them. They will

oppose it unless it broadens their influence and power, and imbeds it more

strongly in the foundations of the Government. A plan such as is advocated

in this book, will never have their cooperation, support, or endorsement,

for the very simple reason that its primary object would be to remove the

original cause of war and to contribute to the lessening of the power and

prestige of the Army. The fact that it would at the same time supply the

first and greatest need in the event of war--the need for toughened and

trained men who could and would fight and dig trenches as well as seasoned

soldiers--would gain no favor for the plan in the eyes of our military

caste. The development of that system and the expenditures to be made for

that purpose and the control of the men enlisted in it would not be vested

in the War Department.

The military caste in this and every country is trained to regard its

profession as one whose duty it is to accomplish results by brute force and

human slaughter. Its only conception of a soldier is a man-killing machine,

whose chief use in time of peace is to serve as a basis for appropriations

to sustain a military establishment with all its multitudinous

expenditures. Their conception of war is that it is an inevitable orgy of

human slaughter, against which humanity is powerless to protect itself.

That a great force should be organized for patriotic service under civil

control instead of military domination, to battle against the destroying

forces of Nature, and subjugate and control them for the advancement of

humanity and all the arts and victories of peace, runs counter to every

fiber of being of the military caste. And yet, none but the most

superficial student of history and humanity can fail to realize the

necessity for such an army of peace in this country. It is certainly true

that wars will never cease until the inspiration and patriotism and

national ideals developed by such a peaceful conquest of the forces of

Nature has been substituted for the tremendous stimulus which the human

race has in the past drawn from armed conflicts between nations. And the

fact must be clearly recognized that in this way a force can be provided

that will be instantly available to take the place of seasoned soldiers at

any moment in the event that this nation should be drawn into a war of

defense or for the maintenance of any great principle of human rights or

justice to humanity.

We might be forced into a war within a year and we might succeed in

preserving the peace forever. No man can tell, because no human mind can

forecast the future or predict what events may occur that may be beyond our

power to control, and which might force us into a war. We do know, however,

that the fight against the floods of the Mississippi River, and the fight

against the great storms from the Gulf of Mexico, must go on year after

year through all the centuries to come during which man continues to

inhabit the Delta of the Mississippi River.

The memory of the great disaster to the city of Galveston, and the memory

of the great floods of the Mississippi River in 1912 and 1913, are still

fresh in the minds of the people. The defense of that part of our common

country against such catastrophes in the future is worthy of the same

patriotic energy and the same adequate expenditure that would be necessary

to defend them against an armed invasion from Mexico or by any nation of

the world.

Were such defense afforded, results would be obtained of such enormous

benefit to the United States in time of peace, without any regard to its

relation to national defense in time of war, that to fail to do it would be

as stupid as it would have been to fail to take the gold from the placer

mines of California.

The gateway from the Gulf of Mexico to the great central valley of this

country opens into a region so vast that the area comprised within the

watershed of the Mississippi and its tributaries embraces 41 per cent of

the entire United States. This gateway opens into a great waterway system

capable of being made continuously navigable all the year around through

20,000 miles of navigable waterways and commerce-carriers.

The gateway from the Gulf opens to a country of greater potential

agricultural wealth than any other section of the earth's surface of the

same area. The lower Mississippi Valley has well been styled the

"Sugar-Bowl" of the continent. The State of Louisiana alone is larger in

area by 10,000 square miles than the combined area of Belgium, Holland, and

Denmark. It is capable of sustaining a larger population and producing

vastly more wealth than those three countries combined.

If you draw a line straight north from the southernmost point of Texas to

the northern line of Oklahoma, and then turn and go straight east,

projecting the northern line of Oklahoma past Cairo, Illinois, to the

Tennessee River, following up the Tennessee River to the northeast corner

of Mississippi, and then follow the eastern boundary line of Mississippi to

the Gulf of Mexico, you have included within these extreme boundaries a

territory as large as the whole German Empire. It is a territory possessing

greater natural wealth and possibility of development than the German

Empire, _provided_ the great problems of water control and river regulation

are solved in such a way as to promote the highest development of this

region for the benefit of humanity, and _provided further_ that the Coast

region of this territory is protected not only from the floods of the

river, but from the storms originating in the Gulf of Mexico. Protection

from those storms requires the construction of a great dike similar to the

dikes of Holland that will hold out the waters of the Gulf not only at

their normal height, but will also hold them back when they attain the

abnormal height which at rare intervals results from the hurricanes or

great storms from the Gulf of Mexico, such as that which overwhelmed

Galveston.

Lafcadio Hearn, in "Chita," has described a Gulf Storm better than it will

ever again be described. He prefaced the story of that storm with a picture

of the havoc wrought by Nature's forces--the ceaseless charging of the

"Ocean's Cavalry," that is quoted because it so clearly portrays the

necessity for bulwarks of defense built in the spirit of military defenses.

"On the Gulf side of these islands you may observe that

the trees--when there are any trees--all bend away from

the sea; and, even of bright, hot days when the wind

sleeps, there is something grotesquely pathetic in

their look of agonized terror. A group of oaks at

Grande Isle I remember as especially suggestive: five

sloping silhouettes in line against the horizon, like

fleeing women with streaming garments and wind-blown

hair--bowing grievously and thrusting out arms

desperately northward as to save themselves from

falling. And they are being pursued indeed;--for the

sea is devouring the land. Many and many a mile of

ground has yielded to the tireless charging of Ocean's

cavalry; far out you can see, through a good glass, the

porpoises at play where of old the sugarcane shook out

its million bannerets; and shark-fins now seam deep

water above a site where pigeons used to coo. Men build

dikes; but the besieging tides bring up their

battering-rams--whole forests of drift--huge trunks of

water-oak and weighty cypress. Forever the yellow

Mississippi strives to build; forever the sea struggles

to destroy;--and amid their eternal strife the islands

and the promontories change shape, more slowly, but not

less fantastically, than the clouds of heaven.

"And worthy of study are those wan battle-grounds where

the woods made their last brave stand against the

irresistible invasion,--usually at some long point of

sea-marsh, widely fringed with billowing sand. Just

where the waves curl beyond such a point you may

discern a multitude of blackened, snaggy shapes

protruding above the water,--some high enough to

resemble ruined chimneys, others bearing a startling

likeness to enormous skeleton-feet and

skeleton-hands,--with crustaceous white growths

clinging to them here and there like remnants of

integument. These are bodies and limbs of drowned

oaks,--so long drowned that the shell-scurf is

inch-thick upon parts of them. Farther in upon the

beach immense trunks lie overthrown. Some look like

vast broken columns; some suggest colossal torsos

imbedded, and seem to reach out mutilated stumps in

despair from their deepening graves;--and beside these

are others which have kept their feet with astounding

obstinacy, although the barbarian tides have been

charging them for twenty years, and gradually torn away

the soil above and beneath their roots. The sand

around,--soft beneath and thinly crusted upon the

surface,--is everywhere pierced with holes made by a

beautifully mottled and semi-diaphanous crab, with

hairy legs, big staring eyes, and milk-white

claws;--while in the green sedges beyond there is a

perpetual rustling, as of some strong wind bearing

among reeds: a marvellous creeping of 'fiddlers,' which

the inexperienced visitor might at first mistake for so

many peculiar beetles, as they run about sideways, each

with his huge single claw folded upon his body like a

wing-case. Year by year that rustling strip of green

land grows narrower; the sand spreads and sinks,

shuddering and wrinkling like a living brown skin; and

the last standing corpses of the oaks, ever clinging

with naked, dead feet to the sliding beach lean more

and more out of the perpendicular. As the sands

subside, the stumps appear to creep; their intertwisted

masses of snakish roots seem to crawl, to writhe,--like

the reaching arms of cephalopods.... Grand Terre is

going: the sea mines her fort, and will before many

years carry the ramparts by storm. Grande Isle is

going,--slowly but surely: the Gulf has eaten three

miles into her meadowed land. Last Island has gone! How

it went I first heard from the lips of a veteran pilot,

while we sat one evening together on the trunk of a

drifted cypress which some high tide had pressed deeply

into the Grande Isle beach. The day had been tropically

warm; we had sought the shore for a breath of living

air. Sunset came, and with it the ponderous heat

lifted,--a sudden breeze blew,--lightnings flickered in

the darkening horizon,--wind and water began to strive

together,--and soon all the low coast boomed. Then my

companion began his story; perhaps the coming of the

storm inspired him to speak! And as I listened to him,

listening also to the clamoring of the coast, there

flashed back to me recollection of a singular Breton

fancy: that the Voice of the Sea is never one voice,

but a tumult of many voices--voices of drowned

men,--the muttering of multitudinous dead,--the

moaning of innumerable ghosts, all rising, to rage

against the living, at the great Witch-call of

storms...."

The defense of the Gulf gateway of the United States of America not only

against Nature's forces, whether coming in the form of an invasion by a

mighty flood from the North, or the invasion of a great destroying storm

wave from the South, must be accomplished by the adoption of a plan for the

protection of that country similar to that proposed for the organization of

a Homecroft Reserve in the Colorado River Valley and in the Sacramento and

San Joaquin Valleys and in the State of Nevada.

The national government should immediately acquire not less than 1,000,000

acres of land bordering on the Gulf of Mexico and lying between Bayou

Lafourche and Atchafalaya Bay and the Atchafalaya River. Then a great dike

should be built by the national government from Barataria Bay, following

the most practicable course along the shores of the Gulf to and along the

eastern shore of the Atchafalaya Bay and River to Morgan City. Thence this

great dike should skirt the northeastern shore of Grand Lake to the

northern end of that lake. From there it should be continued north to the

Mississippi River to a connection with that river near the headwaters of

the Atchafalaya River.

The material necessary for the construction of this great embankment and

protecting levee from the Gulf north to the Mississippi River should be

taken entirely from the eastern side of the embankment, and the channel

thus constructed should be enlarged sufficiently to build an adequate

protecting levee on the east bank of the channel. The artificial channel

thus constructed should be so large as to constitute a controlled outlet

and auxiliary flood channel which, with the ten mile wide Atchafalaya

wasteway, would take off all of the flood flow of the Mississippi River at

that point in excess of the high water level as it rests against the levees

in all ordinary flood years. The purpose of this outlet and wasteway would

be to make it impossible that in any year of unusual floods the levees or

banks should be subjected to any greater hydrostatic pressure than in

ordinary years. The point where this controlled outlet would leave the

river would be approximately the same place where the great Morganza

Crevasse broke through the levee and opened a way for the flood to sweep

with its devastating force through the country between the Mississippi

River and the Gulf of Mexico.

[Illustration: Map of Louisiana, showing the Great Controlled Outlet at Old

River and the Atchafalaya Wasteway, Auxiliary Flood Water Channels and

Canals; and showing also the Spillways and Controlled Wasteways from the

Mississippi River to Lake Pontchartrain and Lake Borgne, and the Great Gulf

Coast Dike.]

Ten miles west of the great north and south embankment above described, on

a north and south line which would pass close to the town of Melville in

Louisiana and follow the west bank of the Atchafalaya River for some

distance below Melville, another great embankment should be built,

paralleling the one previously described. The material for the construction

of this second embankment should be taken from its western side, thus

forming a channel which should be used both as a drainage outlet and a

navigable canal extending from the Bayou Teche to the Red River. At the

point of its junction with the Red River, locks should be constructed which

would prevent any of the floods of the Red River from ever entering or

passing through this navigable drainage canal. From that point another

great embankment should be extended by the most practicable route to the

west or northwest, where a junction could be formed with the high land in

such a way as to turn all the surplus flood drainage from the Red River and

all other rivers to the north into the great ten-mile wide wasteway lying

between the two embankments and running south from the mouth of the Red

River or from Old River to Grand Lake.

The volume of water that would make a flood twenty feet deep in a channel a

mile wide could be carried through this wasteway with a flow of only about

two feet in depth, and two great benefits thereby attained:

First, the cutting power of the water could be controlled and its danger

from that cause obviated.

Second, the sediment carried by the water could be settled across a strip

ten miles wide, which could be thereby brought to a level and its fertility

enormously enriched by these sedimentary deposits which it would receive

only in years of great floods. In the meantime and in other years the land

could be used for meadow, or for the production of crops which could be

grown after the danger of overflow in any season had passed.

This ten-mile wide wasteway, supplemented by the auxiliary flood water

channel paralleling its eastern embankment on the east, would completely

control and carry to the Gulf all the excess flood water in years of

extreme floods, and hold the high water level of the Mississippi River from

Old River to the Gulf at an absolutely fixed level above which the river

would never rise.

The ten-mile wide wasteway could be extended north from the mouth of Red

River to the bluffs at Helena. Then from Helena south the entire

Mississippi Valley would be protected against danger from floods in the

Mississippi River in the extraordinary flood years which may come only once

in a generation, and yet may come in any two consecutive years as they did

in 1912 and 1913. If this ten-mile wide wasteway, with its auxiliary flood

water channel paralleling it, between it and the river, were constructed

from Helena to the mouth of the Red River, and thence to the Gulf of

Mexico, and in turn supplemented by source stream control of the floods of

the Ohio, the Mississippi and the Missouri Rivers, the lowlands of the

Mississippi Valley could be made as safe from overflow or damage by

devastating floods as the highlands of the Hudson River or the dry plains

of eastern Colorado. The entire area of the Mississippi River Valley now

subject to overflow is about 29,000 square miles. This is an area one-third

larger than the entire cultivated area of the Empire of Japan, which

sustains a farming population of 30,000,000 people. The lands of the

Mississippi River Valley are infinitely richer and of greater natural

fertility than the farming lands of Japan. Every acre of the rich

sedimentary soil of the Delta of the Mississippi River would, if

intensively cultivated, produce food enough to feed a family of five, with

a large surplus over for distribution to the world's food markets.

The entire 1,000,000 acres to be acquired by the national government in

Louisiana should be immediately acquired within the area bounded on the

south by the great embankment along the shores of the Gulf of Mexico and on

the west by the great wasteway and auxiliary flood channel to be built from

the mouth of Red River to Atchafalaya Bay and on the north and east by the

Mississippi River.

This entire territory would be so absolutely and completely protected from

all possibility of overflow by the proposed system of protection from

floods or overflow and from Gulf Storms that any part of it could be safely

subdivided into acre-garden-homes or Homecrofts. Every acre would be

adequate for the support of a family when properly reclaimed, fertilized,

and intensively cultivated. The variety of food that would be available for

the people living on these one million Homecrofts would be greater probably

than would be within the reach of people living in any other section of

the world. The mild and equable climate would make practicable a successful

growth of every possible product of garden, orchard, or vineyard, including

oranges and grape-fruit. Proximity to the Gulf and a network of canals that

would lace and interlace the country in every direction would furnish them,

at trifling cost or none at all, with the most delicious sea-foods, fish,

crabs, shrimps, crayfish, and oysters without limit. Every canal and bayou

would furnish its quota of fish and the oyster beds of the Louisiana coast

are capable of almost limitless extension.

In addition to the cultivation of their Homecrofts for food from the

ground, the Homecrofters enlisted in the Louisiana Homecroft Reserve would

be afforded abundant occupation in catching or producing sea-food for

themselves as well as for export. Anyone not familiar with the country can

form no adequate conception of the stupendous possibilities of this bayou

and Gulf coast country along this line of production and development.

More than this, the luggermen of the bayous and the Gulf are the best

coast-wise and shallow sea sailors in the world, and the bays and bayous of

Louisiana, if inhabited by a dense population, would once again breed a

race of seafaring people--sailors and fishermen--to man our navy or

merchant marine.

The complete adoption of the plan advocated for the reclamation and

settlement of these swamp and overflowed lands, and the establishment there

of a perpetual reserve available for military service whenever needed of a

million seasoned and hardened citizen soldiers, involves doing nothing that

has not already been done by other nations of the world.

Holland has built dikes as defenses against the inroads of the ocean

greater even than those proposed in Louisiana, and the plans of Holland for

reclaiming for agriculture vast areas of land now buried beneath the waters

of the Zuyder Zee are much bolder in conception and more difficult of

accomplishment.

Australia and New Zealand have both demonstrated the practicability and

proved the success of a national policy of land acquisition and

colonization. What Australia has done in the reclamation and settlement of

her deserts, we can do not only on our deserts but also in our swamps.

Switzerland and Australia have both proved the practicability of a military

system similar to that which it is proposed to establish for the defense of

the Gulf Gateway of this nation. The plan urged for Louisiana would in many

respects be an improvement upon a plan which made it necessary to call men

from commercial or industrial employment for military service.

Our National Defense: The Patriotism of Peace · 第 11 / 12 章