CHAPTER II.

PERSONALITY, OR WHAT A MAN IS.

We have already seen, in general, that what a man _is_ contributes

much more to his happiness than what he _has_, or how he is regarded

by others. What a man is, and so what he has in his own person, is

always the chief thing to consider; for his individuality accompanies

him always and everywhere, and gives its color to all his experiences.

In every kind of enjoyment, for instance, the pleasure depends

principally upon the man himself. Every one admits this in regard to

physical, and how much truer it is of intellectual, pleasure. When we

use that English expression, "to enjoy one's self," we are employing a

very striking and appropriate phrase; for observe--one says, not "he

enjoys Paris," but "he enjoys himself in Paris." To a man possessed of

an ill-conditioned individuality, all pleasure is like delicate wine

in a mouth made bitter with gall. Therefore, in the blessings as well

as in the ills of life, less depends upon what befalls us than upon

the way in which it is met, that is, upon the kind and degree of our

general susceptibility. What a man is and has in himself,--in a word

personality, with all it entails, is the only immediate and direct

factor in his happiness and welfare. All else is mediate and indirect,

and its influence can be neutralized and frustrated; but the influence

of personality never. This is why the envy which personal qualities

excite is the most implacable of all,--as it is also the most

carefully dissembled.

Further, the constitution of our consciousness is the ever present

and lasting element in all we do or suffer; our individuality is

persistently at work, more or less, at every moment of our life: all

other influences are temporal, incidental, fleeting, and subject to

every kind of chance and change. This is why Aristotle says: _It is

not wealth but character that lasts_.[1]

[Greek: --hae gar phusis bebion ou ta chraemata]

[Footnote 1: Eth. Eud., vii. 2. 37:]

And just for the same reason we can more easily bear a misfortune

which comes to us entirely from without, than one which we have drawn

upon ourselves; for fortune may always change, but not character.

Therefore, subjective blessings,--a noble nature, a capable head, a

joyful temperament, bright spirits, a well-constituted, perfectly

sound physique, in a word, _mens sana in corpore sano_, are the first

and most important elements in happiness; so that we should be

more intent on promoting and preserving such qualities than on the

possession of external wealth and external honor.

And of all these, the one which makes us the most directly happy is

a genial flow of good spirits; for this excellent quality is its own

immediate reward. The man who is cheerful and merry has always a

good reason for being so,--the fact, namely, that he is so. There is

nothing which, like this quality, can so completely replace the loss

of every other blessing. If you know anyone who is young, handsome,

rich and esteemed, and you want to know, further, if he is happy, ask,

Is he cheerful and genial?--and if he is, what does it matter whether

he is young or old, straight or humpbacked, poor or rich?--he is

happy. In my early days I once opened an old book and found these

words: _If you laugh a great deal, you are happy; if you cry a great

deal, you are unhappy_;--a very simple remark, no doubt; but just

because it is so simple I have never been able to forget it, even

though it is in the last degree a truism. So if cheerfulness knocks

at our door, we should throw it wide open, for it never comes

inopportunely; instead of that, we often make scruples about letting

it in. We want to be quite sure that we have every reason to be

contented; then we are afraid that cheerfulness of spirits may

interfere with serious reflections or weighty cares. Cheerfulness is a

direct and immediate gain,--the very coin, as it were, of happiness,

and not, like all else, merely a cheque upon the bank; for it alone

makes us immediately happy in the present moment, and that is the

highest blessing for beings like us, whose existence is but an

infinitesimal moment between two eternities. To secure and promote

this feeling of cheerfulness should be the supreme aim of all our

endeavors after happiness.

Now it is certain that nothing contributes so little to cheerfulness

as riches, or so much, as health. Is it not in the lower classes, the

so-called working classes, more especially those of them who live in

the country, that we see cheerful and contented faces? and is it

not amongst the rich, the upper classes, that we find faces full of

ill-humor and vexation? Consequently we should try as much as possible

to maintain a high degree of health; for cheerfulness is the very

flower of it. I need hardly say what one must do to be healthy--avoid

every kind of excess, all violent and unpleasant emotion, all mental

overstrain, take daily exercise in the open air, cold baths and such

like hygienic measures. For without a proper amount of daily exercise

no one can remain healthy; all the processes of life demand exercise

for the due performance of their functions, exercise not only of the

parts more immediately concerned, but also of the whole body. For, as

Aristotle rightly says, _Life is movement_; it is its very essence.

Ceaseless and rapid motion goes on in every part of the organism.

The heart, with its complicated double systole and diastole, beats

strongly and untiringly; with twenty-eight beats it has to drive the

whole of the blood through arteries, veins and capillaries; the lungs

pump like a steam-engine, without intermission; the intestines are

always in peristaltic action; the glands are all constantly absorbing

and secreting; even the brain has a double motion of its own, with

every beat of the pulse and every breath we draw. When people can get

no exercise at all, as is the case with the countless numbers who

are condemned to a sedentary life, there is a glaring and fatal

disproportion between outward inactivity and inner tumult. For this

ceaseless internal motion requires some external counterpart, and the

want of it produces effects like those of emotion which we are obliged

to suppress. Even trees must be shaken by the wind, if they are to

thrive. The rule which finds its application here may be most briefly

expressed in Latin: _omnis motus, quo celerior, eo magis motus_.

How much our happiness depends upon our spirits, and these again upon

our state of health, may be seen by comparing the influence which the

same external circumstances or events have upon us when we are well

and strong with the effects which they have when we are depressed and

troubled with ill-health. It is not what things are objectively and in

themselves, but what they are for us, in our way of looking at them,

that makes us happy or the reverse. As Epictetus says, _Men are not

influenced by things, but by their thoughts about things_. And, in

general, nine-tenths of our happiness depends upon health alone. With

health, everything is a source of pleasure; without it, nothing

else, whatever it may be, is enjoyable; even the other personal

blessings,--a great mind, a happy temperament--are degraded and

dwarfed for want of it. So it is really with good reason that, when

two people meet, the first thing they do is to inquire after each

other's health, and to express the hope that it is good; for good

health is by far the most important element in human happiness. It

follows from all this that the greatest of follies is to sacrifice

health for any other kind of happiness, whatever it may be, for gain,

advancement, learning or fame, let alone, then, for fleeting sensual

pleasures. Everything else should rather be postponed to it.

But however much health may contribute to that flow of good spirits

which is so essential to our happiness, good spirits do not entirely

depend upon health; for a man may be perfectly sound in his physique

and still possess a melancholy temperament and be generally given up

to sad thoughts. The ultimate cause of this is undoubtedly to be

found in innate, and therefore unalterable, physical constitution,

especially in the more or less normal relation of a man's

sensitiveness to his muscular and vital energy. Abnormal sensitiveness

produces inequality of spirits, a predominating melancholy, with

periodical fits of unrestrained liveliness. A genius is one whose

nervous power or sensitiveness is largely in excess; as Aristotle[1]

has very correctly observed, _Men distinguished in philosophy,

politics, poetry or art appear to be all of a melancholy temperament_.

This is doubtless the passage which Cicero has in his mind when

he says, as he often does, _Aristoteles ait omnes ingeniosos

melancholicos esse_.[2] Shakespeare has very neatly expressed this

radical and innate diversity of temperament in those lines in _The

Merchant of Venice_:

[Footnote 1: Probl. xxx., ep. 1]

[Footnote 2: Tusc. i., 33.]

_Nature has framed strange fellows in her time;

Some that will evermore peep through their eyes,

And laugh, like parrots at a bag-piper;

And others of such vinegar aspect,

That they'll not show their teeth in way of smile,

Though Nestor swear the jest be laughable_.

This is the difference which Plato draws between [Greek: eukolos]

and [Greek: dyskolos]--the man of _easy_, and the man of _difficult_

disposition--in proof of which he refers to the varying degrees of

susceptibility which different people show to pleasurable and painful

impressions; so that one man will laugh at what makes another despair.

As a rule, the stronger the susceptibility to unpleasant impressions,

the weaker is the susceptibility to pleasant ones, and _vice versa_.

If it is equally possible for an event to turn out well or ill,

the [Greek: dyskolos] will be annoyed or grieved if the issue is

unfavorable, and will not rejoice, should it be happy. On the other

hand, the [Greek: eukolos] will neither worry nor fret over an

unfavorable issue, but rejoice if it turns out well. If the one is

successful in nine out of ten undertakings, he will not be pleased,

but rather annoyed that one has miscarried; whilst the other, if only

a single one succeeds, will manage to find consolation in the fact

and remain cheerful. But here is another instance of the truth,

that hardly any evil is entirely without its compensation; for the

misfortunes and sufferings which the [Greek: auskoloi], that is,

people of gloomy and anxious character, have to overcome, are, on the

whole, more imaginary and therefore less real than those which befall

the gay and careless; for a man who paints everything black, who

constantly fears the worst and takes measures accordingly, will not be

disappointed so often in this world, as one who always looks upon the

bright side of things. And when a morbid affection of the nerves, or a

derangement of the digestive organs, plays into the hands of an

innate tendency to gloom, this tendency may reach such a height that

permanent discomfort produces a weariness of life. So arises an

inclination to suicide, which even the most trivial unpleasantness may

actually bring about; nay, when the tendency attains its worst form,

it may be occasioned by nothing in particular, but a man may resolve

to put an end to his existence, simply because he is permanently

unhappy, and then coolly and firmly carry out his determination;

as may be seen by the way in which the sufferer, when placed under

supervision, as he usually is, eagerly waits to seize the first

unguarded moment, when, without a shudder, without a struggle or

recoil, he may use the now natural and welcome means of effecting his

release.[1] Even the healthiest, perhaps even the most cheerful

man, may resolve upon death under certain circumstances; when, for

instance, his sufferings, or his fears of some inevitable misfortune,

reach such a pitch as to outweigh the terrors of death. The only

difference lies in the degree of suffering necessary to bring about

the fatal act, a degree which will be high in the case of a cheerful,

and low in that of a gloomy man. The greater the melancholy, the lower

need the degree be; in the end, it may even sink to zero. But if a man

is cheerful, and his spirits are supported by good health, it requires

a high degree of suffering to make him lay hands upon himself. There

are countless steps in the scale between the two extremes of suicide,

the suicide which springs merely from a morbid intensification of

innate gloom, and the suicide of the healthy and cheerful man, who has

entirely objective grounds for putting an end to his existence.

[Footnote 1: For a detailed description of this condition of mind _Cf_

Esquirol, _Des maladies mentales_.]

Beauty is partly an affair of health. It may be reckoned as a personal

advantage; though it does not, properly speaking, contribute directly

to our happiness. It does so indirectly, by impressing other people;

and it is no unimportant advantage, even in man. Beauty is an open

letter of recommendation, predisposing the heart to favor the person

who presents it. As is well said in these lines of Homer, the gift of

beauty is not lightly to be thrown away, that glorious gift which none

can bestow save the gods alone--

[Greek: outoi hapoblaet erti theon erikuoea dora,

ossa ken autoi dosin, ekon douk an tis eloito].[1]

[Footnote 1: _Iliad_ 3, 65.]

The most general survey shows us that the two foes of human happiness

are pain and boredom. We may go further, and say that in the degree in

which we are fortunate enough to get away from the one, we approach

the other. Life presents, in fact, a more or less violent oscillation

between the two. The reason of this is that each of these two poles

stands in a double antagonism to the other, external or objective,

and inner or subjective. Needy surroundings and poverty produce pain;

while, if a man is more than well off, he is bored. Accordingly, while

the lower classes are engaged in a ceaseless struggle with need,

in other words, with pain, the upper carry on a constant and often

desperate battle with boredom.[1] The inner or subjective antagonism

arises from the fact that, in the individual, susceptibility to

pain varies inversely with susceptibility to boredom, because

susceptibility is directly proportionate to mental power. Let

me explain. A dull mind is, as a rule, associated with dull

sensibilities, nerves which no stimulus can affect, a temperament, in

short, which does not feel pain or anxiety very much, however great

or terrible it may be. Now, intellectual dullness is at the bottom of

that _vacuity of soul_ which is stamped on so many faces, a state of

mind which betrays itself by a constant and lively attention to all

the trivial circumstances in the external world. This is the true

source of boredom--a continual panting after excitement, in order to

have a pretext for giving the mind and spirits something to occupy

them. The kind of things people choose for this purpose shows that

they are not very particular, as witness the miserable pastimes they

have recourse to, and their ideas of social pleasure and conversation:

or again, the number of people who gossip on the doorstep or gape out

of the window. It is mainly because of this inner vacuity of soul that

people go in quest of society, diversion, amusement, luxury of every

sort, which lead many to extravagance and misery. Nothing is so good

a protection against such misery as inward wealth, the wealth of

the mind, because the greater it grows, the less room it leaves for

boredom. The inexhaustible activity of thought! Finding ever new

material to work upon in the multifarious phenomena of self and

nature, and able and ready to form new combinations of them,--there

you have something that invigorates the mind, and apart from moments

of relaxation, sets it far above the reach of boredom.

[Footnote 1: And the extremes meet; for the lowest state of

civilization, a nomad or wandering life, finds its counterpart in the

highest, where everyone is at times a tourist. The earlier stage was a

case of necessity; the latter is a remedy for boredom.]

But, on the other hand, this high degree of intelligence is rooted in

a high degree of susceptibility, greater strength of will, greater

passionateness; and from the union of these qualities comes an

increased capacity for emotion, an enhanced sensibility to all mental

and even bodily pain, greater impatience of obstacles, greater

resentment of interruption;--all of which tendencies are augmented by

the power of the imagination, the vivid character of the whole range

of thought, including what is disagreeable. This applies, in various

degrees, to every step in the long scale of mental power, from the

veriest dunce to the greatest genius that ever lived. Therefore the

nearer anyone is, either from a subjective or from an objective point

of view, to one of those sources of suffering in human life, the

farther he is from the other. And so a man's natural bent will lead

him to make his objective world conform to his subjective as much as

possible; that is to say, he will take the greatest measures against

that form of suffering to which he is most liable. The wise man will,

above all, strive after freedom from pain and annoyance, quiet and

leisure, consequently a tranquil, modest life, with as few encounters

as may be; and so, after a little experience of his so-called

fellowmen, he will elect to live in retirement, or even, if he is

a man of great intellect, in solitude. For the more a man has in

himself, the less he will want from other people,--the less, indeed,

other people can be to him. This is why a high degree of intellect

tends to make a man unsocial. True, if _quality_ of intellect could be

made up for by quantity, it might be worth while to live even in the

great world; but unfortunately, a hundred fools together will not make

one wise man.

But the individual who stands at the other end of the scale is no

sooner free from the pangs of need than he endeavors to get pastime

and society at any cost, taking up with the first person he meets, and

avoiding nothing so much as himself. For in solitude, where every one

is thrown upon his own resources, what a man has in himself comes

to light; the fool in fine raiment groans under the burden of his

miserable personality, a burden which he can never throw off, whilst

the man of talent peoples the waste places with his animating

thoughts. Seneca declares that folly is its own burden,--_omnis

stultitia laborat fastidio sui_,--a very true saying, with which may

be compared the words of Jesus, the son of Sirach, _The life of a fool

is worse than death_[1]. And, as a rule, it will be found that a man

is sociable just in the degree in which he is intellectually poor and

generally vulgar. For one's choice in this world does not go much

beyond solitude on one side and vulgarity on the other. It is said

that the most sociable of all people are the negroes; and they are at

the bottom of the scale in intellect. I remember reading once in a

French paper[2] that the blacks in North America, whether free or

enslaved, are fond of shutting themselves up in large numbers in the

smallest space, because they cannot have too much of one another's

snub-nosed company.

[Footnote 1: Ecclesiasticus, xxii. 11.]

[Footnote 2: _Le Commerce_, Oct. 19th, 1837.]

The brain may be regarded as a kind of parasite of the organism, a

pensioner, as it were, who dwells with the body: and leisure, that

is, the time one has for the free enjoyment of one's consciousness or

individuality, is the fruit or produce of the rest of existence, which

is in general only labor and effort. But what does most people's

leisure yield?--boredom and dullness; except, of course, when it is

occupied with sensual pleasure or folly. How little such leisure is

worth may be seen in the way in which it is spent: and, as Ariosto

observes, how miserable are the idle hours of ignorant men!--_ozio

lungo d'uomini ignoranti_. Ordinary people think merely how they shall

_spend_ their time; a man of any talent tries to _use_ it. The reason

why people of limited intellect are apt to be bored is that their

intellect is absolutely nothing more than the means by which the

motive power of the will is put into force: and whenever there is

nothing particular to set the will in motion, it rests, and their

intellect takes a holiday, because, equally with the will, it requires

something external to bring it into play. The result is an awful

stagnation of whatever power a man has--in a word, boredom. To

counteract this miserable feeling, men run to trivialities which

please for the moment they are taken up, hoping thus to engage the

will in order to rouse it to action, and so set the intellect in

motion; for it is the latter which has to give effect to these motives

of the will. Compared with real and natural motives, these are but as

paper money to coin; for their value is only arbitrary--card games and

the like, which have been invented for this very purpose. And if there

is nothing else to be done, a man will twirl his thumbs or beat the

devil's tattoo; or a cigar may be a welcome substitute for exercising

his brains. Hence, in all countries the chief occupation of society is

card-playing,[1] and it is the gauge of its value, and an outward sign

that it is bankrupt in thought. Because people have no thoughts to

deal in, they deal cards, and try and win one another's money. Idiots!

But I do not wish to be unjust; so let me remark that it may certainly

be said in defence of card-playing that it is a preparation for the

world and for business life, because one learns thereby how to make a

clever use of fortuitous but unalterable circumstances (cards, in this

case), and to get as much out of them as one can: and to do this a man

must learn a little dissimulation, and how to put a good face upon a

bad business. But, on the other hand, it is exactly for this reason

that card-playing is so demoralizing, since the whole object of it is

to employ every kind of trick and machination in order to win

what belongs to another. And a habit of this sort, learnt at the

card-table, strikes root and pushes its way into practical life; and

in the affairs of every day a man gradually comes to regard _meum_ and

_tuum_ in much the same light as cards, and to consider that he may

use to the utmost whatever advantages he possesses, so long as he does

not come within the arm of the law. Examples of what I mean are of

daily occurrence in mercantile life. Since, then, leisure is the

flower, or rather the fruit, of existence, as it puts a man into

possession of himself, those are happy indeed who possess something

real in themselves. But what do you get from most people's

leisure?--only a good-for-nothing fellow, who is terribly bored and a

burden to himself. Let us, therefore, rejoice, dear brethren, for _we

are not children of the bondwoman, but of the free_.

[Footnote 1: _Translator's Note_.--Card-playing to this extent is now,

no doubt, a thing of the past, at any rate amongst the nations

of northern Europe. The present fashion is rather in favor of a

dilettante interest in art or literature.]

Further, as no land is so well off as that which requires few imports,

or none at all, so the happiest man is one who has enough in his own

inner wealth, and requires little or nothing from outside for his

maintenance, for imports are expensive things, reveal dependence,

entail danger, occasion trouble, and when all is said and done, are

a poor substitute for home produce. No man ought to expect much from

others, or, in general, from the external world. What one human being

can be to another is not a very great deal: in the end every one

stands alone, and the important thing is _who_ it is that stands

alone. Here, then, is another application of the general truth which

Goethe recognizes in _Dichtung und Wahrheit_ (Bk. III.), that in

everything a man has ultimately to appeal to himself; or, as Goldsmith

puts it in _The Traveller_:

_Still to ourselves in every place consign'd

Our own felicity we make or find_.

Himself is the source of the best and most a man can be or achieve.

The more this is so--the more a man finds his sources of pleasure in

himself--the happier he will be. Therefore, it is with great truth

that Aristotle[1] says, _To be happy means to be self-sufficient_. For

all other sources of happiness are in their nature most uncertain,

precarious, fleeting, the sport of chance; and so even under the most

favorable circumstances they can easily be exhausted; nay, this is

unavoidable, because they are not always within reach. And in old age

these sources of happiness must necessarily dry up:--love leaves us

then, and wit, desire to travel, delight in horses, aptitude for

social intercourse; friends and relations, too, are taken from us by

death. Then more than ever, it depends upon what a man has in himself;

for this will stick to him longest; and at any period of life it is

the only genuine and lasting source of happiness. There is not much to

be got anywhere in the world. It is filled with misery and pain; and

if a man escapes these, boredom lies in wait for him at every corner.

Nay more; it is evil which generally has the upper hand, and folly

makes the most noise. Fate is cruel, and mankind is pitiable. In such

a world as this, a man who is rich in himself is like a bright, warm,

happy room at Christmastide, while without are the frost and snow of

a December night. Therefore, without doubt, the happiest destiny on

earth is to have the rare gift of a rich individuality, and, more

especially to be possessed of a good endowment of intellect; this

is the happiest destiny, though it may not be, after all, a very

brilliant one.

[Footnote 1: Eth. Eud, vii 2]

There was a great wisdom in that remark which Queen Christina of

Sweden made, in her nineteenth year, about Descartes, who had then

lived for twenty years in the deepest solitude in Holland, and, apart

from report, was known to her only by a single essay: _M. Descartes_,

she said, _is the happiest of men, and his condition seems to me much

to be envied.[1]_ Of course, as was the case with Descartes, external

circumstances must be favorable enough to allow a man to be master of

his life and happiness; or, as we read in _Ecclesiastes_[2]--_Wisdom

is good together with an inheritance, and profitable unto them that

see the sun_. The man to whom nature and fate have granted the

blessing of wisdom, will be most anxious and careful to keep open

the fountains of happiness which he has in himself; and for this,

independence and leisure are necessary. To obtain them, he will be

willing to moderate his desires and harbor his resources, all the more

because he is not, like others, restricted to the external world for

his pleasures. So he will not be misled by expectations of office, or

money, or the favor and applause of his fellowmen, into surrendering

himself in order to conform to low desires and vulgar tastes; nay, in

such a case he will follow the advice that Horace gives in his epistle

to Maecenas.[3]

[Footnote 1: _Vie de Descartes_, par Baillet. Liv. vii., ch. 10.]

[Footnote 2: vii. 12.]

[Footnote 3: Lib. 1., ep. 7.]

_Nec somnum plebis laudo, satur altilium, nec

Otia divitiis Arabum liberrima muto_.

It is a great piece of folly to sacrifice the inner for the outer man,

to give the whole or the greater part of one's quiet, leisure and

independence for splendor, rank, pomp, titles and honor. This is what

Goethe did. My good luck drew me quite in the other direction.

The truth which I am insisting upon here, the truth, namely, that the

chief source of human happiness is internal, is confirmed by that most

accurate observation of Aristotle in the _Nichomachean Ethics_[1] that

every pleasure presupposes some sort of activity, the application of

some sort of power, without which it cannot exist. The doctrine of

Aristotle's, that a man's happiness consists in the free exercise

of his highest faculties, is also enunciated by Stobaeus in his

exposition of the Peripatetic philosophy[2]: _happiness_, he says,

_means vigorous and successful activity in all your undertakings_; and

he explains that by _vigor [Greek: aretae]_ he means _mastery_ in any

thing, whatever it be. Now, the original purpose of those forces with

which nature has endowed man is to enable him to struggle against the

difficulties which beset him on all sides. But if this struggle comes

to an end, his unemployed forces become a burden to him; and he has to

set to work and play with them,--to use them, I mean, for no purpose

at all, beyond avoiding the other source of human suffering, boredom,

to which he is at once exposed. It is the upper classes, people of

wealth, who are the greatest victims of boredom. Lucretius long ago

described their miserable state, and the truth of his description may

be still recognized to-day, in the life of every great capital--where

the rich man is seldom in his own halls, because it bores him to be

there, and still he returns thither, because he is no better off

outside;--or else he is away in post-haste to his house in the

country, as if it were on fire; and he is no sooner arrived there,

than he is bored again, and seeks to forget everything in sleep, or

else hurries back to town once more.

[Footnote 1: i. 7 and vii. 13, 14.]

[Footnote 2: Ecl. eth. ii., ch 7.]

_Exit saepe foras magnis ex aedibus ille,

Esse domi quem pertaesum est, subitoque reventat,

Quippe foris nihilo melius qui sentiat esse.

Currit, agens mannos, ad villam precipitanter,

Auxilium tectis quasi ferre ardentibus instans:

Oscitat extemplo, tetigit quum limina villae;

Aut abit in somnum gravis, atque oblivia quaerit;

Aut etiam properans urbem petit atque revisit_.[1]

[Footnote 1: III 1073.]

In their youth, such people must have had a superfluity of muscular

and vital energy,--powers which, unlike those of the mind, cannot

maintain their full degree of vigor very long; and in later years they

either have no mental powers at all, or cannot develop any for want

of employment which would bring them into play; so that they are in a

wretched plight. _Will_, however, they still possess, for this is the

only power that is inexhaustible; and they try to stimulate their

will by passionate excitement, such as games of chance for high

stakes--undoubtedly a most degrading form of vice. And one may say

generally that if a man finds himself with nothing to do, he is sure

to choose some amusement suited to the kind of power in which he

excels,--bowls, it may be, or chess; hunting or painting; horse-racing

or music; cards, or poetry, heraldry, philosophy, or some other

dilettante interest. We might classify these interests methodically,

by reducing them to expressions of the three fundamental powers,

the factors, that is to say, which go to make up the physiological

constitution of man; and further, by considering these powers by

themselves, and apart from any of the definite aims which they may

subserve, and simply as affording three sources of possible pleasure,

out of which every man will choose what suits him, according as he

excels in one direction or another.

First of all come the pleasures of _vital energy_, of food, drink,

digestion, rest and sleep; and there are parts of the world where it

can be said that these are characteristic and national pleasures.

Secondly, there are the pleasures of _muscular energy_, such as

walking, running, wrestling, dancing, fencing, riding and similar

athletic pursuits, which sometimes take the form of sport, and

sometimes of a military life and real warfare. Thirdly, there are the

pleasures of sensibility, such as observation, thought, feeling, or

a taste for poetry or culture, music, learning, reading, meditation,

invention, philosophy and the like. As regards the value, relative

worth and duration of each of these kinds of pleasure, a great deal

might be said, which, however, I leave the reader to supply. But every

one will see that the nobler the power which is brought into play,

the greater will be the pleasure which it gives; for pleasure always

involves the use of one's own powers, and happiness consists in a

frequent repetition of pleasure. No one will deny that in this respect

the pleasures of sensibility occupy a higher place than either of

the other two fundamental kinds; which exist in an equal, nay, in

a greater degree in brutes; it is this preponderating amount of

sensibility which distinguishes man from other animals. Now, our

mental powers are forms of sensibility, and therefore a preponderating

amount of it makes us capable of that kind of pleasure which has to do

with mind, so-called intellectual pleasure; and the more sensibility

predominates, the greater the pleasure will be.[1]

[Footnote 1: Nature exhibits a continual progress, starting from the

mechanical and chemical activity of the inorganic world, proceeding

to the vegetable, with its dull enjoyment of self, from that to the

animal world, where intelligence and consciousness begin, at first

very weak, and only after many intermediate stages attaining its last

great development in man, whose intellect is Nature's crowning point,

the goal of all her efforts, the most perfect and difficult of all her

works. And even within the range of the human intellect, there are a

great many observable differences of degree, and it is very seldom

that intellect reaches its highest point, intelligence properly

so-called, which in this narrow and strict sense of the word, is

Nature's most consummate product, and so the rarest and most precious

thing of which the world can boast. The highest product of Nature

is the clearest degree of consciousness, in which the world mirrors

itself more plainly and completely than anywhere else. A man endowed

with this form of intelligence is in possession of what is noblest

and best on earth; and accordingly, he has a source of pleasure in

comparison with which all others are small. From his surroundings he

asks nothing but leisure for the free enjoyment of what he has got,

time, as it were, to polish his diamond. All other pleasures that are

not of the intellect are of a lower kind; for they are, one and all,

movements of will--desires, hopes, fears and ambitions, no matter to

what directed: they are always satisfied at the cost of pain, and in

the case of ambition, generally with more or less of illusion. With

intellectual pleasure, on the other hand, truth becomes clearer and

clearer. In the realm of intelligence pain has no power. Knowledge is

all in all. Further, intellectual pleasures are accessible entirely

and only through the medium of the intelligence, and are limited by

its capacity. _For all the wit there is in the world is useless to him

who has none_. Still this advantage is accompanied by a substantial

disadvantage; for the whole of Nature shows that with the growth of

intelligence comes increased capacity for pain, and it is only with

the highest degree of intelligence that suffering reaches its supreme

point.]

The normal, ordinary man takes a vivid interest in anything only in so

far as it excites his will, that is to say, is a matter of personal

interest to him. But constant excitement of the will is never an

unmixed good, to say the least; in other words, it involves pain.

Card-playing, that universal occupation of "good society" everywhere,

is a device for providing this kind of excitement, and that, too,

by means of interests so small as to produce slight and momentary,

instead of real and permanent, pain. Card-playing is, in fact, a mere

tickling of the will.[1]

[Footnote 1: _Vulgarity_ is, at bottom, the kind of consciousness in

which the will completely predominates over the intellect, where the

latter does nothing more than perform the service of its master, the

will. Therefore, when the will makes no demands, supplies no motives,

strong or weak, the intellect entirely loses its power, and the result

is complete vacancy of mind. Now _will without intellect_ is the most

vulgar and common thing in the world, possessed by every blockhead,

who, in the gratification of his passions, shows the stuff of which he

is made. This is the condition of mind called _vulgarity_, in which

the only active elements are the organs of sense, and that small

amount of intellect which is necessary for apprehending the data of

sense. Accordingly, the vulgar man is constantly open to all sorts of

impressions, and immediately perceives all the little trifling things

that go on in his environment: the lightest whisper, the most trivial

circumstance, is sufficient to rouse his attention; he is just like an

animal. Such a man's mental condition reveals itself in his face, in

his whole exterior; and hence that vulgar, repulsive appearance, which

is all the more offensive, if, as is usually the case, his will--the

only factor in his consciousness--is a base, selfish and altogether

bad one.]

On the other hand, a man of powerful intellect is capable of taking

a vivid interest in things in the way of mere _knowledge_, with no

admixture of _will_; nay, such an interest is a necessity to him. It

places him in a sphere where pain is an alien,--a diviner air, where

the gods live serene.

_[Greek: phusis bebion ou ta chraematatheoi reia xoontes][1]_

[Footnote 1: Odyssey IV., 805.]

Look on these two pictures--the life of the masses, one long, dull

record of struggle and effort entirely devoted to the petty interests

of personal welfare, to misery in all its forms, a life beset by

intolerable boredom as soon as ever those aims are satisfied and the

man is thrown back upon himself, whence he can be roused again to some

sort of movement only by the wild fire of passion. On the other side

you have a man endowed with a high degree of mental power, leading an

existence rich in thought and full of life and meaning, occupied by

worthy and interesting objects as soon as ever he is free to give

himself to them, bearing in himself a source of the noblest pleasure.

What external promptings he wants come from the works of nature, and

from the contemplation of human affairs and the achievements of the

great of all ages and countries, which are thoroughly appreciated by a

man of this type alone, as being the only one who can quite understand

and feel with them. And so it is for him alone that those great ones

have really lived; it is to him that they make their appeal; the rest

are but casual hearers who only half understand either them or their

followers. Of course, this characteristic of the intellectual man

implies that he has one more need than the others, the need of

reading, observing, studying, meditating, practising, the need, in

short, of undisturbed leisure. For, as Voltaire has very rightly said,

_there are no real pleasures without real needs_; and the need of them

is why to such a man pleasures are accessible which are denied to

others,--the varied beauties of nature and art and literature. To

heap these pleasures round people who do not want them and cannot

appreciate them, is like expecting gray hairs to fall in love. A man

who is privileged in this respect leads two lives, a personal and an

intellectual life; and the latter gradually comes to be looked upon

as the true one, and the former as merely a means to it. Other people

make this shallow, empty and troubled existence an end in itself. To

the life of the intellect such a man will give the preference over

all his other occupations: by the constant growth of insight and

knowledge, this intellectual life, like a slowly-forming work of art,

will acquire a consistency, a permanent intensity, a unity which

becomes ever more and more complete; compared with which, a life

devoted to the attainment of personal comfort, a life that may broaden

indeed, but can never be deepened, makes but a poor show: and yet,

as I have said, people make this baser sort of existence an end in

itself.

The ordinary life of every day, so far as it is not moved by passion,

is tedious and insipid; and if it is so moved, it soon becomes

painful. Those alone are happy whom nature has favored with some

superfluity of intellect, something beyond what is just necessary to

carry out the behests of their will; for it enables them to lead an

intellectual life as well, a life unattended by pain and full of vivid

interests. Mere leisure, that is to say, intellect unoccupied in the

service of the will, is not of itself sufficient: there must be a

real superfluity of power, set free from the service of the will and

devoted to that of the intellect; for, as Seneca says, _otium sine

litteris mors est et vivi hominis sepultura_--illiterate leisure is

a form of death, a living tomb. Varying with the amount of the

superfluity, there will be countless developments in this second life,

the life of the mind; it may be the mere collection and labelling of

insects, birds, minerals, coins, or the highest achievements of poetry

and philosophy. The life of the mind is not only a protection against

boredom; it also wards off the pernicious effects of boredom; it keeps

us from bad company, from the many dangers, misfortunes, losses and

extravagances which the man who places his happiness entirely in the

objective world is sure to encounter, My philosophy, for instance, has

never brought me in a six-pence; but it has spared me many an expense.

The ordinary man places his life's happiness in things external to

him, in property, rank, wife and children, friends, society, and the

like, so that when he loses them or finds them disappointing, the

foundation of his happiness is destroyed. In other words, his centre

of gravity is not in himself; it is constantly changing its place,

with every wish and whim. If he is a man of means, one day it will

be his house in the country, another buying horses, or entertaining

friends, or traveling,--a life, in short, of general luxury, the

reason being that he seeks his pleasure in things outside him. Like

one whose health and strength are gone, he tries to regain by the use

of jellies and drugs, instead of by developing his own vital power,

the true source of what he has lost. Before proceeding to the

opposite, let us compare with this common type the man who comes

midway between the two, endowed, it may be, not exactly with

distinguished powers of mind, but with somewhat more than the ordinary

amount of intellect. He will take a dilettante interest in art, or

devote his attention to some branch of science--botany, for example,

or physics, astronomy, history, and find a great deal of pleasure in

such studies, and amuse himself with them when external forces of

happiness are exhausted or fail to satisfy him any more. Of a man like

this it may be said that his centre of gravity is partly in himself.

But a dilettante interest in art is a very different thing from

creative activity; and an amateur pursuit of science is apt to be

superficial and not to penetrate to the heart of the matter. A man

cannot entirely identify himself with such pursuits, or have his whole

existence so completely filled and permeated with them that he loses

all interest in everything else. It is only the highest intellectual

power, what we call _genius_, that attains to this degree of

intensity, making all time and existence its theme, and striving to

express its peculiar conception of the world, whether it contemplates

life as the subject of poetry or of philosophy. Hence, undisturbed

occupation with himself, his own thoughts and works, is a matter of

urgent necessity to such a man; solitude is welcome, leisure is

the highest good, and everything else is unnecessary, nay, even

burdensome.

This is the only type of man of whom it can be said that his centre of

gravity is entirely in himself; which explains why it is that people

of this sort--and they are very rare--no matter how excellent their

character may be, do not show that warm and unlimited interest in

friends, family, and the community in general, of which others are

so often capable; for if they have only themselves they are not

inconsolable for the loss of everything else. This gives an isolation

to their character, which is all the more effective since other

people never really quite satisfy them, as being, on the whole, of

a different nature: nay more, since this difference is constantly

forcing itself upon their notice they get accustomed to move about

amongst mankind as alien beings, and in thinking of humanity in

general, to say _they_ instead of _we_.

So the conclusion we come to is that the man whom nature has endowed

with intellectual wealth is the happiest; so true it is that the

subjective concerns us more than the objective; for whatever the

latter may be, it can work only indirectly, secondly, and through the

medium of the former--a truth finely expressed by Lucian:--

[Greek: _Aeloutos ho taes psychaes ploutus monos estin alaethaes

Talla dechei ataen pleiona ton kteanon_--][1]

[Footnote 1: Epigrammata, 12.]

the wealth of the soul is the only true wealth, for with all other

riches comes a bane even greater than they. The man of inner wealth

wants nothing from outside but the negative gift of undisturbed

leisure, to develop and mature his intellectual faculties, that is,

to enjoy his wealth; in short, he wants permission to be himself,

his whole life long, every day and every hour. If he is destined to

impress the character of his mind upon a whole race, he has only one

measure of happiness or unhappiness--to succeed or fail in perfecting

his powers and completing his work. All else is of small consequence.

Accordingly, the greatest minds of all ages have set the highest value

upon undisturbed leisure, as worth exactly as much as the man himself.

_Happiness appears to consist in leisure_, says Aristotle;[1] and

Diogenes Laertius reports that _Socrates praised leisure as the

fairest of all possessions_. So, in the _Nichomachean Ethics_,

Aristotle concludes that a life devoted to philosophy is the happiest;

or, as he says in the _Politics,[2] the free exercise of any power,

whatever it may be, is happiness_. This again, tallies with what

Goethe says in _Wilhelm Meister: The man who is born with a talent

which he is meant to use, finds his greatest happiness in using it_.

[Footnote 1: Eth. Nichom. x. 7.]

[Footnote 2: iv. 11.]

But to be in possession of undisturbed leisure, is far from being

the common lot; nay, it is something alien to human nature, for the

ordinary man's destiny is to spend life in procuring what is necessary

for the subsistence of himself and his family; he is a son of struggle

and need, not a free intelligence. So people as a rule soon get tired

of undisturbed leisure, and it becomes burdensome if there are no

fictitious and forced aims to occupy it, play, pastime and hobbies of

every kind. For this very reason it is full of possible danger, and

_difficilis in otio quies_ is a true saying,--it is difficult to keep

quiet if you have nothing to do. On the other hand, a measure of

intellect far surpassing the ordinary, is as unnatural as it is

abnormal. But if it exists, and the man endowed with it is to be

happy, he will want precisely that undisturbed leisure which the

others find burdensome or pernicious; for without it he is a Pegasus

in harness, and consequently unhappy. If these two unnatural

circumstances, external, and internal, undisturbed leisure and great

intellect, happen to coincide in the same person, it is a great piece

of fortune; and if the fate is so far favorable, a man can lead the

higher life, the life protected from the two opposite sources of human

suffering, pain and boredom, from the painful struggle for existence,

and the incapacity for enduring leisure (which is free existence

itself)--evils which may be escaped only by being mutually

neutralized.

But there is something to be said in opposition to this view. Great

intellectual gifts mean an activity pre-eminently nervous in its

character, and consequently a very high degree of susceptibility to

pain in every form. Further, such gifts imply an intense temperament,

larger and more vivid ideas, which, as the inseparable accompaniment

of great intellectual power, entail on its possessor a corresponding

intensity of the emotions, making them incomparably more violent than

those to which the ordinary man is a prey. Now, there are more things

in the world productive of pain than of pleasure. Again, a large

endowment of intellect tends to estrange the man who has it from other

people and their doings; for the more a man has in himself, the less

he will be able to find in them; and the hundred things in which they

take delight, he will think shallow and insipid. Here, then, perhaps,

is another instance of that law of compensation which makes itself

felt everywhere. How often one hears it said, and said, too, with some

plausibility, that the narrow-minded man is at bottom the happiest,

even though his fortune is unenviable. I shall make no attempt to

forestall the reader's own judgment on this point; more especially as

Sophocles himself has given utterance to two diametrically opposite

opinions:--

[Greek: Pollo to phronein eudaimonias

proton uparchei.][1]

he says in one place--wisdom is the greatest part of happiness;

and again, in another passage, he declares that the life of the

thoughtless is the most pleasant of all--

[Greek: En ta phronein gar maeden aedistos bios.][2]

The philosophers of the _Old Testament_ find themselves in a like

contradiction.

_The life of a fool is worse than death_[3]

and--

_In much wisdom is much grief; and he that increaseth knowledge

increaseth sorrow_.[4]

[Footnote 1: Antigone, 1347-8.]

[Footnote 2: Ajax, 554.]

[Footnote 3: Ecclesiasticus, xxii. 11.]

[Footnote 4: Ecclesiastes, i. 18.]

I may remark, however, that a man who has no mental needs, because his

intellect is of the narrow and normal amount, is, in the strict sense

of the word, what is called a _philistine_--an expression at first

peculiar to the German language, a kind of slang term at the

Universities, afterwards used, by analogy, in a higher sense, though

still in its original meaning, as denoting one who is not _a Son of

the Muses_. A philistine is and remains [Greek: amousos anaer]. I

should prefer to take a higher point of view, and apply the term

_philistine_ to people who are always seriously occupied with

realities which are no realities; but as such a definition would be a

transcendental one, and therefore not generally intelligible, it

would hardly be in place in the present treatise, which aims at

being popular. The other definition can be more easily elucidated,

indicating, as it does, satisfactorily enough, the essential nature of

all those qualities which distinguish the philistine. He is defined to

be _a man without mental needs_. From this is follows, firstly, _in

relation to himself_, that he has _no intellectual pleasures_; for, as

was remarked before, there are no real pleasures without real needs.

The philistine's life is animated by no desire to gain knowledge and

insight for their own sake, or to experience that true aeesthetic

pleasure which is so nearly akin to them. If pleasures of this kind

are fashionable, and the philistine finds himself compelled to pay

attention to them, he will force himself to do so, but he will take as

little interest in them as possible. His only real pleasures are of a

sensual kind, and he thinks that these indemnify him for the loss of

the others. To him oysters and champagne are the height of existence;

the aim of his life is to procure what will contribute to his bodily

welfare, and he is indeed in a happy way if this causes him some

trouble. If the luxuries of life are heaped upon him, he will

inevitably be bored, and against boredom he has a great many fancied

remedies, balls, theatres, parties, cards, gambling, horses, women,

drinking, traveling and so on; all of which can not protect a man

from being bored, for where there are no intellectual needs, no

intellectual pleasures are possible. The peculiar characteristic

of the philistine is a dull, dry kind of gravity, akin to that of

animals. Nothing really pleases, or excites, or interests him, for

sensual pleasure is quickly exhausted, and the society of philistines

soon becomes burdensome, and one may even get tired of playing cards.

True, the pleasures of vanity are left, pleasures which he enjoys in

his own way, either by feeling himself superior in point of wealth, or

rank, or influence and power to other people, who thereupon pay

him honor; or, at any rate, by going about with those who have a

superfluity of these blessings, sunning himself in the reflection of

their splendor--what the English call a _snob_.

From the essential nature of the philistine it follows, secondly, _in

regard to others_, that, as he possesses no intellectual, but only

physical need, he will seek the society of those who can satisfy the

latter, but not the former. The last thing he will expect from his

friends is the possession of any sort of intellectual capacity; nay,

if he chances to meet with it, it will rouse his antipathy and

even hatred; simply because in addition to an unpleasant sense of

inferiority, he experiences, in his heart, a dull kind of envy, which

has to be carefully concealed even from himself. Nevertheless, it

sometimes grows into a secret feeling of rancor. But for all that,

it will never occur to him to make his own ideas of worth or value

conform to the standard of such qualities; he will continue to give

the preference to rank and riches, power and influence, which in his

eyes seem to be the only genuine advantages in the world; and his wish

will be to excel in them himself. All this is the consequence of his

being a man _without intellectual needs_. The great affliction of all

philistines is that they have no interest in _ideas_, and that, to

escape being bored, they are in constant need of _realities_. But

realities are either unsatisfactory or dangerous; when they lose their

interest, they become fatiguing. But the ideal world is illimitable

and calm,

_something afar

From the sphere of our sorrow_.

NOTE.--In these remarks on the personal qualities which go to make

happiness, I have been mainly concerned with the physical and

intellectual nature of man. For an account of the direct and immediate

influence of _morality_ upon happiness, let me refer to my prize essay

on _The Foundation of Morals_ (Sec. 22.)

The Essays of Arthur Schopenhauer: the Wisdom of Life · 第 2 / 5 章