CHAPTER XII_The Lost Fruits of Waterloo

A FEDERATION OF NATIONS

Taking into consideration the obstacles and the advantages summarized

in the two preceding chapters what are we going to do when the war

comes to an end? The easiest and most likely thing is to adjust

ourselves as quickly and quietly as possible to the peace that is given

to us, take up the old problems of living as nearly as we can where

we left them in 1914--or in 1917, when the war began for the United

States--and trust to our good stars to guide us to a happy haven. But

if there is one thing this war has shown, it is that trusting to stars

is not a safe protection against war. The only thing sensible people

ought to count on in these days is the judgment of their capable and

efficient minds. And it seems that the suggestion of the men who wish

to obtain peace by coöperation is worthy of the most careful debate by

men who have the best interest of humanity at heart.

When the war ends it may be that the world will not have arrived

at the time when such a scheme can be adopted, but we should not be

hasty in saying so. It is not a scheme to be disposed of by newspaper

editors, who rarely have time to weigh the conditions of such a serious

matter, or of senators and representatives, whose views arise out of

party interests, or of high officials as a class, who are usually

overburdened with administrative matters. It is a thing for all the

people to consider, and in order that it may have the fairest and

most conspicuous hearing, there should be a great world congress, not

composed of theorists merely, but of the most practical statesmen, who

will take up the matter in a spirit of friendliness, with the intention

of adopting the scheme if it can be received in a manner that warrants

the hope of success.

Every nation in the world has reason to desire the establishment of an

enduring peace; but the United States has a larger interest in such

an issue of the war than any other nation. Since we became a nation

we have gone on developing along peaceful lines. Having had no reason

to fear our neighbors and being so remote from Europe that we were

not likely to be molested from that part of the world, we formed

our institutions on the basis of peace. Our public ideals, our sense

of citizenship, the aims of our law-making have all been such as are

natural for a nation that has nothing to fear from external enemies.

One result of the present war is to relegate these ideals into the

junk-heap of institutions, unless we can be assured that peace is a

certainty. Under a system of competition between states we cannot

afford to be less ready for war than any other great nation. We must

have a large navy and a great army ready to meet the blows of any

power that feels that it has reason to interfere with our peaceful

development. We must become a militaristic republic, a thing which

seems against nature. When such an attempt has been made in the past,

the result has been an oligarchy. In the United States it would

probably lead to a sad clash of social classes mingled with vicious

party politics and timidity in the national legislature. And yet, under

a continuation of the old system it would be folly to endeavor to get

along without an army and navy large enough to protect us from the

initial swoop of some powerful adversary.

If from this fate the advocate of coöperation can offer an escape, it

behooves us to listen to his scheme. We should weigh it carefully and

be willing to take some kind of a chance to secure its adoption, if in

it there is the possibility of successful operation.

To be perfectly fair to those who suggest leagues or federations we

should remember that we are not dealing with the ideas of pacifists, as

such. The schemes that are set forth by the friends of lasting peace

come from men who are giving all their energies to the prosecution of

the war. They believe, as much as any of us, that the war should be

pressed with every ounce of the nation’s strength. They are fighting as

hard as any one in the country, and they desire the defeat of Germany

as much as any soldier or statesman in the world. They are fighting to

establish a basis on which the peace of the world can be built. They

are not cranks, and even if they are mistaken, they are honestly trying

to call mankind to the better way.

One of their suggestions is a league of peace, to be composed of the

civilized nations. As we have seen, it is loosely organized and does

not allow the central authority of the league enough power to punish

a state that tries to withdraw from the league. Nor does it grant the

central authority the right to punish a state which, after submitting

its case to the proposed tribunal of arbitration and losing the

decision, decides to go to war in defiance of the tribunal’s judgment.

What would Germany do, for example, if she had lost such a judgment and

did not wish to accept her defeat? Strong and well prepared for war,

she might disregard all respect for the opinion of the world, if she

felt that her future was at stake, and we can hardly doubt that her own

people would support her.

Connected with the idea of a league is the plan, advocated by those

who place respect for law above all other considerations, for creating

a high court of judicature, with judges selected from all nations,

which shall have authority to try and give judgment on all disputes

of nations. As a part of a strongly organized federation such a court

would have great influence, but if it existed under a league it could

hardly have enough authority to secure the obedience of the great

states. As for the small states, they never give trouble any how,

except as they act in association with some great state, or as they

are threatened by some great power. No union for peace can accomplish

its object that does not deal with the great states, and any scheme

suggested may leave the small states out of consideration. On the other

hand, the small states are deeply interested in forming such a union,

since it would give them a safety they could hardly get otherwise.

The proposed plans for a league of peace and for an international

court of arbitration were announced before the war or in its early

stages. They were made with an eye to the most that the nations could

be induced to give up of their control over their own actions. It is

possible that their authors would not follow the same plans if they

were forced to make them today. The war has shown us several things.

It has revealed Germany’s reason for opposing steadily all the real

peace plans at the Hague conferences. It has shown us what fate

awaits the world after the war, unless there is a return to reason

and coöperation. It is possible that in writing out a plan for peace

today the gentlemen who met in Carpenters’ Hall, Philadelphia, in June,

1915, would feel justified in supporting a stronger proposition.

Mr. H. N. Brailsford, in a book called _A League of Nations_, London,

1917, announces the outline of a working scheme, which he hopes

the friends of peace will consider. Its chief features are: 1. An

international court of justice to consider and pass on justiciable

cases, with a council of conciliation to pass on non-justiciable cases,

and a pledge by the states that they will not make war nor mobilize

their troops until the court or council has within a stipulated time

passed on the several matters in dispute. 2. An executive of the league

to take steps, military or economic, to enforce the obligations of

the members of the league. 3. The guarantee of the right of secession

together with the possibility of expelling a state. 4. A consideration

of disarmament on land and sea. 5. An international commission to

see that all the signatory powers have access to raw material in

manufactures, with a pledge to permit trading among themselves without

discrimination and to follow the “open door” policy in trade with the

undeveloped regions of the world.

In this scheme we see the influence of the war. The author is brought

to see that some form of central authority to coërce a state is

necessary. On the other hand, he does not allow his league to become

a law-making body, an omission that goes far to weaken the united

efforts of the league. Guaranteeing the right of secession, also shows

that the author of the plan is unwilling to merge the nations into

a great state, in which they will each give up a portion of their

sovereignty. His plan is a little stronger than the American plan but

it nevertheless falls short of being a federation.

If we are to make a serious attempt to obtain enduring peace by

coöperation it behooves us to start on the basis of sufficient force to

insure that the attempt will be worth while. If that cannot be done,

it is unwise to make the attempt, since to trust ourselves at this

juncture to that which we have good reason to believe insufficient

only lulls us to a false sense of security and dissipates resolution

that might with better effect be used in an opposite direction. If we

do not have peace through coöperation we must maintain a sharp state

of preparation for war. Furthermore, no people can be rallied to a

scheme which seems insufficient to them. Give them that which they

can trust and they can perhaps be made to support it, in spite of the

inconveniences they find in it.

Probably it is not too much to say that the only form of united action

that can be relied on is a federation with enough cohesive force to

guard against secession, repress any constituent state that defies

the united will, make laws that concern the purposes for which the

federation is formed, exercise the right of interpreting those laws

by a system of federal courts, and maintain an executive that can

make itself obeyed. It need not have these extensive functions for

all the areas of government, but it should have them for those things

that concern the declaration of war and the preservation of peace. It

means that to escape an era of conflict ending, perhaps, in a world

united through conquest as the Roman Empire was united, we establish

by agreement a world united through federation, as the United States

of America were united. A league of nations, under the plans suggested

above, would be only a half-way house that would lead to rupture and

failure or to some future struggle out of which a world taught by

experience might possibly form “a more perfect union.”

Some of the fundamental ideas of a federation were embodied, as we have

seen, in the plans of the Abbé St. Pierre and the philosopher, Kant.

Living at a time when the state was conceived as the seat of power,

they trusted to force to execute the will of the suggested government

that was to provide peace. Bentham, however, was deeply impressed

with morality as a force for good government, and he was willing to

trust his proposed system to the reasonable impulses of men. To him it

is possible to reply that if men were so reasonable that they would

respect an agreement to settle disputes by arbitration, they would

be reasonable enough to avoid the differences which run into such

disputes. In our modern world reason thrives best when it is reënforced

by authority.

The attempt of Alexander I, of Russia, to obtain some practical

realization of the principle of a federated Europe in behalf of peace

followed these lines as closely as could be expected, but, it must be

confessed, in a very lame way. The failure of his efforts has been

taken as proof that the idea is impracticable. But it does not follow

that it is impracticable to the same extent and in the same way today

as in 1815. No Metternich now controls the policy of the majority of

the European courts. Republican institutions exist to an appreciable

extent in most of them. The mind of Europe is more nearly a unit today

than a century ago, and commerce, travel, and international sympathy

bind nations together as never before. Moreover all these unifying

forces are growing rapidly. When the feeling engendered by the war

subsides, and it always does subside after a war, the nations will

be more conscious of one another and less willing to challenge one

another than before they engaged in the present appalling struggle.

In these things there is a hope that the federation of Europe for the

preservation of peace would be more possible than in the times of

Metternich. I do not mean that all obstacles are removed, but they are

fewer than formerly.

Considering these things I find myself driven, in closing my essay,

to a serious examination of the possibility of creating a world

federation out of the chaos that now floats over the globe--not an

integrated world empire, with power over all phases of political

action, but a federation that will have authority to regulate the

forces that make for war. If such a thing could be created and accepted

by the states of the world, it would make the present struggle, with

all its horrors, the best and most fortunate event that has come to

humanity since the beginning of the Christian era. If the war should

result in the thorough defeat of the present régime in Germany,

followed by the creation of a world federation into which Germany

should be forced to come, with her pride so reduced that she could be

kept obedient to the federation until the virus of world power should

get out of her system, the world would have passed a milestone in

civilization, and for our part in it future generations would thank us

to the end of time.

The organization of the American Union in 1787-1789 was a similar

process on a smaller scale. So many of its features are analogous to

conditions that suggest themselves in connection with the proposition

of a world federation that it is worth while to recall them. If we are

not led to conclude that a similar step should be taken at this time

in the larger sphere, we shall at least have a clearer idea of what

such a federation would mean, and it may happen that we shall conclude

that it is not so difficult a thing to establish as appears on first

sight.

Before the war for independence the American colonies it is true,

were not as separate as the present European states, but they were so

distinct in their ideals and purposes that no one thought their union

possible. When Franklin proposed a very mild sort of concentration in

1754 his suggestion was rejected in the colonies because it involved

the surrender of some of the colonial separateness. Had no pressure

come from the outside it is difficult to see what would have forced the

thirteen colonies to come together.

The external pressure was the conviction that Great Britain was about

to adopt a policy by which the interests of the colonies would be

subservient to the interests of British traders, thus destroying their

partially avowed hope of a distinctly American policy. Then came seven

years of war and four years of fear lest Great Britain should recover

through American dissension what she had lost in the trial of arms.

Under such conditions the newly liberated states were willing to form

the American union.

A similar pressure on the nations will exist in the burden of

preparedness and the danger of a renewal of the present struggle. The

last three years of conflict are more burdensome to the world than the

seven years of the American revolution to the states engaged against

Great Britain. Moreover, the danger of chaotic conditions in the future

is as great as the danger that confronted the Americans in 1787. Every

period is a critical period in history, but that which follows the

present struggle is especially important.

When our revolution ended a majority of our people thought the old

system good enough. The men--and there were many of them--who pointed

out the advantages to the western world of a great federated state

were pronounced idealists. “Practical” men meant to go on living in a

“practical” way. But the idealists were led by Washington, Madison,

and Hamilton, and the logic of events came to their aid. Dissensions

appeared, taxes were not paid, and the national debt seemed on the

verge of repudiation. Then the country was willing to listen to the

idealists; and the American federated state was established.

It was received with derision by the publicists of Europe. They could

not believe that republican government would succeed in an area as

large as that of the thirteen states. Their fears were not realized

and today most of their descendants live under republican government

of some form or other. We should not blame them too much. They had

never seen republican government operated on a large scale, and they

were not able to imagine that it could operate on a large scale. If

they could have seen it working with their mind’s eye, they would have

had confidence in its operation. The Americans were accustomed to

using their imagination, and seeing the “experiment” working in their

imagination, they could adopt it and make it work.

The greatest obstacle to “federation” in the American constitutional

convention was the jealousy of small states toward the large states.

Since it would have been unwise to leave any state out of the proposed

system, the small states were in a position to make demands. When they

were allowed equality in the senate they became quite reasonable. This

obstacle could hardly exist in the formation of a great federation for

the elimination of war; for the small states would probably be the

first to accept such a plan, as our small states were most willing to

adopt our constitution, once it was prepared. It would give them as

perfect security as they could desire, and without such a guaranty

their continued existence is always precarious.

Next to the fears of the small states was the unwillingness of many

people in the states to give up the idea that only a state should

control the happiness of its citizens, and that the union, if formed,

would destroy or lessen individual liberty. This idea inhered in

whatever idea of state sovereignty the people of the day held. To form

a federation to enforce peace would undoubtedly limit to some extent

the sovereignty of the present states of Europe. But sovereignty in

itself is worth nothing. It exists to give in general some forms

of life and dignity to states. If a surrender of part of a state’s

sovereignty will give that state immunity from wars perpetually, is it

not sovereignty well exchanged? No American state suffered because

it gave up control over its right to make war, but, on the contrary,

it gained immensely. Such a right is a costly necessity, a thing to

be held tenaciously as long as we are in a condition which makes wars

necessary, but to be given up as quickly as we can do without it.

To enter a federation would mean that individual nations would give

up the right to expand their territories. Germany could not acquire

more territory under such a system, unless she got it by agreement of

the parties concerned. The British empire could become no larger by

any forceful process. But this would not be a hardship. The only real

justification of expansion is to enlarge trade areas. A federation

to eliminate war would necessarily adopt a policy which allowed all

states an “open door” in trade. This was one of the essential things in

the formation of our union; for we read that no state shall interfere

within its borders with the rights of the citizens of other states to

trade there. Under such circumstances territorial expansion becomes

useless.

When the American states were trying to form that simple kind of union

that was expressed in the articles of confederation, Maryland long

refused to join. She was jealous of the great size of her neighbors and

especially of Virginia, whose claim to the Northwest was in general not

disputed. Experience showed that her fears were groundless. Virginia

not only never became a menace to Maryland, but she soon realized

that her wide boundaries were worthless to her under a system which

guaranteed her against quarrels with her neighbors, and as a result she

surrendered her Northwestern lands. Under a federation an undeveloped

part of Asia or Africa would be open as freely to Germans as to others

for trade, settlement, and the happiness of life, just as our Northwest

was open to Virginians, Pennsylvanians, and New Englanders alike. The

only thing that Virginia gave up in relinquishing her lands was the

right to call herself a big state, that is, self-glorification, a thing

the nations would have to give up in a federation. But might it not be

well exchanged for the right to call themselves safe from warfare?

When the American constitution was being debated the small states

declared they would not “federate” unless they were given privileges

which guaranteed them against absorption by the large states, while the

large states declared they would not “federate” unless it was arranged

that the small states should not have the power to defeat measures that

were for the common good. Each side was very honest in suspecting the

other, and great patience and persistence were necessary to bring them

together in a compromise which gave neither what it at first demanded.

For us it is interesting to observe that in actual practice there has

never been a time when the large states seemed to threaten to devour

the small states, nor a time when the small states placed their welfare

against any measure that concerned the general good of the country. The

union formed, the people began to debate questions that had nothing

to do with this or that state, general policies that cut across great

sections of the federation, without regard to the states as such.

It seems that if a federation of Europe were once formed a development

might be expected of a somewhat similar nature. At least, it is not

unlikely that the clashes predicted by the doubters would not be as

violent as they fear. It seems certain that at once a new class of

issues would engage the minds of the politicians, issues that would

spring from the general interests that were conceived essential to

life in the new grouping. It is not possible to say what clashes might

grow out of these general issues, but it is probable that the genius

of man would be as competent to take care of them as to direct the

issues that will arise if the world goes on under a system like that

now in use; for clashes we must have in any event. After all, humanity

has to manage its own problems, and there will never be a government

under which it will not have all it can do to make the doubts of today

resolve themselves into the confidence of tomorrow.

In our American constitution-making one often heard the question,

“What will become of the liberties of the citizen of the state under

the federation?” The answer was well made at the time: “Will not the

citizen of the state still be the citizen of the state, and will not

the state continue to guarantee him all that it can now guarantee

him? Does he not also pass under the protection of the federation as

truly as the citizens of any of the states? All that the federation

proposes to do is to take charge of the functions that concern the

things for which the federation is founded, and these are things to

which the states are not so well adjusted as a united government.” And

so it proved in practice. No American has ever had reason to think

his liberty lessened because the union was formed; and he has been

immensely stronger in all his rights on the high seas, in traveling

abroad, in being safe from the burdens of foreign wars, and in his

rights of trade in the uttermost parts of the earth; for he has been

the citizen of a great federation of small states.

Applying the analogy to the suggested federation of the world it

appears that under such a system the citizen of France, Great Britain,

Russia, or the United States would in nowise lose his rights under

his own government, and he would gain vastly in relief from burdens.

He would no longer have to think of wars, his trade relations would

be adjusted in such a way that no other man could have what he did

not have. In short, for all the purposes for which the federation was

founded he would stand on equal footing with any other man, and for the

purposes for which his own state existed he would have all the rights

he had before. His only losses would be in casting off the burdens

that grow out of international rivalry under the present system.

One of the things for which the American union was created was the

payment of the revolutionary debts. Compared with the debts the colony

had incurred individually before the revolution, and compared with

their ability to pay them at the time, these debts were large, although

they proved, under the union, a very small burden. It was the sense of

security under a government which had eliminated the possibility of

interstate wars that made the burden light.

The amount of indebtedness that the several nations in the present

war have contracted seems appalling. It would become a comparatively

light burden, if we could feel that for the future the world had

nothing to do but to pay it. The waste of interstate rivalry, the

burden of preparations for future wars, the loss to industry through

uncertainties on account of wars, all these things would disappear from

the consideration of the financiers, the credit of a federated world

would become excellent, and bonds that are likely to be quoted very low

when the artificial stimulus they get from patriotism is taken away

would be considered better investments than any bonds ever offered

under the existing system of states. The capitalists of the world,

like the American capitalists of 1787-1789, should be the most earnest

supporters of federation.

In the United States a great deal has been said about “entangling

alliances.” As the term was used a century ago it meant an alliance

that was likely to make us parties to the quarrels of European states,

one against the other. Into such a maze of selfish maneuvers it would

never be well for us to enter. But to take our place in a federation to

preserve peace would be quite another thing. That it would pledge us to

the discharge of a duty is not to be doubted; but we should be entering

no intrigue. We should be doing the most patriotic thing possible; for

the very essence of the act would be to protect ourselves from the

possibility of being drawn into “entangling alliances” with Europe.

Let us suppose that the old system is continued, and that Germany has

a mind to pay off what she may consider an old score. Suppose she

tries to set Mexico up against us, or to induce Japan to attack the

Philippines, or to interfere with any weaker American government in

such a way as to threaten the integrity of the Monroe doctrine, have

we not an “entangling alliance” on hand? If Germany emerges from the

present war strong enough to threaten the world as before the war,

when other nations found it necessary to form _ententes_ against her,

we shall not dare remain outside of some kind of alliance that will

be formed to check her pretensions. World federation is the guaranty

against the formation of “entangling alliances” on the part of the

United States.

In drawing the parallels between the formation of our union and the

possible creation of a federation of nations, it is hard to avoid the

inference that the two systems lead to the same end, federated general

government. And yet they are not the same. Our union was created to

take over a large area of government which the individual states could

not conduct successfully. It has a direct bearing on the citizens of

the states, it even has its own citizenship, although it was a long

time after 1787 before it was defined. It has popular elections, a

postal system, and hundreds of other things which no one would allot

to the kind of federation discussed here. It has been cited only for

the argument that can legitimately be derived from analogous conditions

relating to the difficulties of forming the union.

A world federation, on the other hand, could have only one main

purpose, the preservation of peace. No other bonds should knit it

together except those which exist for that purpose. They would be

strong enough for the strain that would be put upon them, and no

stronger. They would be made for a specific object by persons who would

be careful that they were properly made. A federation of this kind

could not be adopted until it was approved by the authorities in the

constituent nations, which would guarantee that it did not sacrifice

the individuality of those nations. In fact, so great would be the

obstacles at this point that it is safe to say that there would be more

danger that the federation would be too weak rather than that it would

be too strong.

* * * * *

Here ends this statement of the arguments for the only possible plan

of coöperation that will, if adopted, give the world enduring peace.

It would be easier to form a league to enforce peace by arbitration

and moral suasion than to form a federation with power sufficient

to enforce its decrees. But a league would in all probability be

flouted by the states as often as their interests seemed to them to

make it advisable. Reverting to the analogy of our own formative

period in national government, a league would be like our articles of

confederation, weak and insufficient because they did not authorize the

central government to coërce a recalcitrant state. As a step toward a

more desirable end the articles of federation were worth while: as a

similar step a league of nations might be better than nothing, but it

would not lead to the end to which the world is looking.

The idea of a federation of nations has been behind many a

philosopher’s dream. Jesus looked forward to it when he offered the

world “my peace,” and many another has held that somewhere in the

shadowy future a millennial era of super-government and peace will fall

upon the earth. It would be a great thing if at this day we could take

a step toward the realization of an ideal whose universality attests

its desirability. The “fruits of Waterloo” were lost a century ago by

a wide margin, due to the less perfect comprehension the world then had

of the advantages of federated peace. If they are lost at the end of

this war it will be by a smaller discrepancy. Some time they will be

secured, not because men have dreamed of them; but because, in such a

case at least, dreams are but “suppressed desires.”

The writer of a book can do no more than raise his voice to the people

who do things. To that large class who make things happen he can only

give impulse and hope. His cry goes to those who govern, to those who

direct the press, and to all citizens who feel responsibility for the

formation of good public opinion. If he speaks to them faithfully and

without prejudice or mere enthusiasm, he has done all he can do. The

results are on the knees of the gods.

INDEX

Adams, John Quincy, and the Monroe Doctrine, 79.

Agadir, 171.

Aix-la-Chapelle, Conference of, 66.

Albania, in the Balkan war of 1912-1913, 89, 125, 126;

origin of, 106, 108, 121.

Alexander I, of Russia, 155;

his peace plans, 36, 45-63;

his personal qualities, 46;

his education, 46-48;

and the Treaty of Tilsit, 49;

eyes opened to Napoleon, 50;

his friendship for France, 51;

“grouped” by Castlereagh, 52;

signs treaty of Chaumont, 52;

enters Paris in 1814, 54;

at Congress of Vienna, 55;

and Poland, 56;

and the Holy Alliance, 59-64;

and Baroness Krüdener, 60;

and the Conference of Aix-la-Chapelle, 66;

at Conference at Troppau, 68-70;

his change of policy, 70;

and the Greek war of independence, 77;

and a federation of nations, 263.

Algeciras, Conference at, 168

Alliance, the Treaty of, 65;

the Quadruple, 65, 66, 67;

the Quintuple, 66, 67, 68, 69, 79;

disruption of, 69.

See Holy Alliance.

Alsace and Lorraine, 92.

American Peace Society, 37.

Armageddon, 1-5, 15.

Austria and the Greek war of independence, 77;

and the revolution of 1848, 86;

and Congress of Berlin, 89, 113, 114;

and Balkan War of 1912-1913, 89;

and the Triple Alliance, 93;

acquires rights in Bosnia and Herzegovina, 115;

and the revolt in Crete, 119;

takes over Bosnia and Herzegovina, 120;

interest in the Balkan War of 1912-1913, 124-126, 128.

See Metternich.

Austria-Hungary, see Austria.

Autocracy, an obstacle to permanent peace, 216-224;

qualities of, 217;

in Germany, 219, 220-222;

in Russia, 219;

future bearing of German finances on, 242-246.

Balance of Power, 90;

under Bismarck’s policy, 93;

after Bismarck, 96;

affected by the _Entente Cordiale_, 99;

by the Triple _Entente_, 100, 101.

Balance of Power, failure of the theory, 157, 162;

breaks down in practice, 234-236.

Balkan States, history of, 103-131;

Turkish rule over, 104;

spirit of nationality in, 108;

growing power of, 119;

a “tinder-box,” 120;

the war against Turkey, 122-127;

The Balkan League, 122.

Balkan War of 1912-1913, 89.

Belgium, and the revolution of 1830, 79.

Bentham, Jeremy, on perpetual peace, 32-34;

and a federation of nations, 263.

Berlin, Congress of, 89.

Bethman-Hollweg, and the Moroccan question, 171.

Bismarck, builder of the German Empire, 91;

policy towards France, 92, 93;

and the Three Emperors’ League, 93;

and the Triple Alliance, 93-94;

his retirement, 95, 143;

his German policy, 140-143;

not for Pan-Germanism, 148;

his foreign policy, 157.

Boer war, Germany’s attitude in, 97, 99.

Bosnia, 108;

Austria acquires rights in, 115;

taken over by Austria, 120, 121.

Brailsford, H. N., his idea of a league of nations, 260.

Bryce, Lord, attitude toward federated peace, 15.

Bulgaria, origin of, 105, 106;

its position under Turkey, 108;

national feeling in, 109;

at the Conference of Paris, 110;

in the war of 1877, 113;

“Big Bulgaria,” 114;

acquires East Rumelia, 117;

growing power of, 119;

declares complete independence, 120;

in the Balkan War of 1912-1913, 122-127.

Bülow, Chancellor von, 171.

Canning, George, and the Spanish Colonies, 78;

and the Monroe Doctrine, 79;

welcomes end of the Alliance, 83.

Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, 38.

Cartels, compared with trusts, xiii-xvi.

Castlereagh, Lord, 154;

his relations with Alexander I, 51;

and treaty of Chaumont, 52;

goes to Paris, 55;

his idea of the Concert of Europe, 65;

and the Treaty of Alliance, 65-67;

at Troppau, 68, 69;

his relation to the Concert of Europe, 74;

his object, 81.

Chaumont, Treaty of, 52-53;

Castlereagh on the application of, 69.

“Christian Republic” of Henry IV, 24, 25.

Concentration, laws of, in society, xii-xvi;

progress of, 247-251.

Concert of Europe, theory of, 49, 53, 65;

its character, 81;

its condition after the end of the Alliance, 84;

and the struggle of Mehemet Ali, 85;

and the Crimean War, 86;

and other mid-century wars, 88;

and Congress of Berlin, 89;

and the Balkan War of 1912-1913, 89, 124-127;

its new meaning, 90;

and the revolution of the Greeks, 107;

and the Crimean War, 110;

defied by Moldavia and Wallachia, 111;

and the Congress of Berlin, 114, 116;

and Crete, 118;

defied by Balkan League, 123;

incompetent to deal with the situation of 1913-1914, 130;

and the Moroccan incidents, 167-173;

failure of, in 1914, 180-182, 201, 234-236.

Conference of Paris, see Paris.

Congo, French, given up, 172.

Congress of Berlin, 89, 113.

Congress of Vienna, disappointments of the, 55;

cause of its failure, 58.

Congress of London on Balkan situation, 1913, 124.

Contract theory of the origin of the state, 232-234.

Crete, revolt in, 118.

Crimean War, 86, 109.

Cuza, John, 111.

Cyprus, handed over to Great Britain, 116.

Debt, public, makes for federation, 238-242.

Delcassé, Théophile, his foreign policy, 98, 100, 101, 163-168;

and the Fashoda incident, 162;

building up French colonial power, 163-168;

dismissed at the demand of Germany, 167.

Democracy, not an absolute safeguard against recurring wars, 223.

Dual Alliance, 95, 96.

Dueling, how abolished, 232.

Dum-dum bullets, 3, 5.

Economic competition as an obstacle to peace, 206-211.

Economic laws not unchangeable, 210;

sometimes opposed to nationality, 216.

England, see Great Britain.

“Entangling alliances” and a federation, 276.

_Entente Cordiale_, The, formed, 99, 162.

Fashoda Incident, the, 98, 162.

Federation, definition of, 23.

Federation of Nations, why it would now have better chance of success

than in 1815-1818, 72-76;

discussion, 261-264;

why a federation is better than a league, 261-273;

analogy with the American constitution, 267-276;

differences pointed out, 277;

the idea held up, 278-280;

arguments for, 229-253.

Ferdinand, Crown Prince of Austria, 178, 180.

Fez, the French in, 171.

Finances, national debts make for federation, 238-242, 275.

France, attitude toward federated peace, 15;

Alexander I’s friendship for, 51-53;

and the Spanish colonies, 78;

the revolution of 1830, 79;

and the wars of Mehemet Ali, 85;

and the revolution of 1848, 86;

and the Crimean War, 86;

War against Prussia, 188;

in Franco-Prussian War, 91;

later relations with Germany, 91;

new attitude towards Great Britain, 97;

influence of Delcassé, 98;

and _Entente Cordiale_, 99;

and Triple _Entente_, 100;

and the revolution of the Greeks, 107;

extends rule over Tunis, 116;

in Franco-Prussian War, 141;

military training in, 147;

foreign policy under Delcassé, 163-168;

in Morocco, 164, 166-173;

gives up the Congo for Morocco, 172;

her position after war with Prussia, 201;

future relations with Great Britain, 250.

Francis Joseph, of Austria, 178.

Franco-Prussian War, 88;

and the Balance of Power, 90.

Franklin, Benjamin, his proposal for union, 266.

Frederick William III and the Holy Alliance, 62.

Freedom of the seas, 159.

Gentz, Frederick von, on the Congress of Vienna, 55-57, 58.

George, Lloyd, attitude toward federated peace, 15.

Gerard, James W., xiii.

Germany, attitude of, toward federated peace, 13;

opposed plans of Hague Conference, 38;

and the revolutions of 1848, 86;

under Bismarck’s policy, 93-95;

under his successors, 95;

policy during the Boer War, 97;

growing antagonism toward Great Britain, 97;

later relations with Austria, 91;

and Three Emperors’ League, 93;

his influence for peace, 94, 95;

under his successors, 94;

attitude during the Boer War, 99;

gets nothing at the Congress of Berlin, 117;

and the Balkan War of 1912-1913, 125, 128;

ideals and organization of, 132-153;

her broken faith, 132-134;

and Mittel-Europa, 134;

a better Germany, 134, 136, 146-148;

development of pernicious ideals in, 136-138;

under the heel of Napoleon, 138;

re-making the army of Prussia, 139;

under Bismarck’s lead, 140-143;

_Kultur_ of, 144;

and Militarism, 146-148;

the work of intellectual leaders, 148-152;

national egotism, 153;

peaceful attitude under Bismarck, 157;

under Wilhelm II, 158;

growth of manufactures, 158;

building a navy, 159;

growing military power of, 160;

Pan-German hopes, 161;

isolated by Delcassé during the Boer War, 162;

eyes turned to Turkey, 165;

in the Moroccan incidents, 166-173;

attempt to win over Great Britain, 174;

alarmed by growing power of rivals, 176;

her plans in beginning the Great War, 177;

short-sighted policy in war, 182, 183;

a mild treatment after her defeat, 194, 196-202;

economic reasons for engaging in war, 209;

autocracy in, 219, 220-222, 224;

parties in, 225;

influence of munition makers, 226;

influence of the military men, 227;

future influences on surrounding nations, 235-240;

future relations with Austria, 237-239;

influences of finances, 238-242;

autocracy threatened, 242-246;

in a possible league of peace, 258;

reasons for opposing, 259.