CHAPTER X

OBSTACLES TO AN ENDURING PEACE

By an enduring peace I mean a peace that shall last as long as we can

see into the future. It is such a peace as has in it, so far as we can

see, no fact that would seem to make for its ruin. If we adopt a peace

that has the seed of destruction in its very nature, we cannot hope for

relief from the evils of war. We must, under such a condition, take

account of war as one of the permanent burdens of civilization, with

the full consciousness that it will become increasingly expensive in

life and property, and with the result that at recurring periods an

intelligent world will drop its peaceful tasks to try to reduce its

population to a nullity. From the possibility of such a strife we turn

to ask the question: “Can nothing be done to save humanity from such

madness?”

The answer is very simple: All people are unreasonable to some extent.

In connection with the question now under consideration, each of the

great states of the world, our own included, has its own special

form of unreasonableness, which acts as an obstacle to the formation

of a régime of peace. If the immense disaster by which we are

depressed could serve as a means of bringing us to a state of entire

reasonableness, the present war would be worth all it costs. Whether or

not it can lead to such a result the reader must determine for himself.

An important obstacle to such a result is the economic competition of

nations. Economic competition by individuals has ugly sides, but it is

not dangerous in the sense in which national competition is dangerous.

When two merchants undersell until one breaks down the business of the

other, the victim passes out of sight in the business world, and the

current of trade soon goes on as before. When two corporations, however

great, engage in a business “war” and one is crushed or absorbed by

its competitor, the ripple that was made is soon obliterated, and the

victor serves the human wants with which it has to do without serious

damage to humanity.

But when one nation finds itself in strong competition with another

in the hope of controlling a sphere of trade, it is apt to seek

territorial annexation to gain the desired field of exploitation. The

competitor can only follow the same course. It is the only thing it can

do, if it is not willing to give up the contest. If it is strong enough

to dispute the will of the rival, its very sense of individuality

demands that it shall not tamely yield before the aggression of a

rival. When France acquired Morocco, Italy acquired Tripoli, and Great

Britain acquired the southern part of Persia, economic advantage was

a strong motive, but not the only motive. When Germany laid out the

field of her future expansion in Turkish lands and when she expected to

establish a permanent influence over the Balkans, the extension of her

sphere of commerce was a chief motive.

Probably the fundamental wrong here was the idea, widely held by the

present generation, that a nation has a right to establish bars around

her national territory to keep the trade of other nations out, so that

her own citizens shall have preferential advantages in the exploitation

of the territory. That idea is so firmly held today that one must be

a rash man who attempts to get the nations to give it up. But it is

a fundamental obstacle to permanent peace in the world. Probably it

is not too much to say that as long as the business men of the world

insist on dividing themselves into national groups with these national

preferences, so long may they expect business at recurring intervals to

be burdened with the waste and ruin of war.

Against the existing practice we may place the “open door” policy,

which we have known chiefly in connection with the trade of the

undeveloped nations. It means the free opening of the trade of a given

state to all the nations that may care to have it. We heard much of

the “open door” in China a few years ago, and most of the benevolent

governments approved of the suggestion. To have been perfectly logical

they should have applied the same idea to their own commerce; and if

the world ever comes to a perfect state of international comity, it is

likely that national tariff barriers will be broken down.

It is true, however, that we can have enduring peace and have national

protective tariffs, also. If nations agree that tariffs are one of the

unhappy excrescences of an unreasonable world, they may find it in

their hearts to tolerate such growths. To tolerate them would be, no

doubt, better than going to war. But when a state sets its eyes on a

certain part of the earth which it feels it must acquire in order to

enlarge the territory in which it can trade without fair competition,

the peace of the world is imperiled.

It is probable that this kind of motive played a large part in

Germany’s decision to begin the present war. For a long time her

industries had been developing at a rapid rate. Protected at home by

tariffs they were able to sell goods to the German people at high

prices, while they sold at cheap prices in foreign markets in order

to drive their competitors away. The volume of German trade increased

immensely, factories were multiplied, and large credits were extended

by the banks in order to support this great structure. At last the

situation became unsteady. The expansion of the foreign part of the

national trade at small profits was a clog on the home trade, which

could not be made to yield enough profit to keep the business of the

country in a healthy condition. Then the manufacturers and capitalists

came to the conclusion that it was to their interest for the country

to go into a war of conquest in which new national territory should

be laid at their feet for profitable exploitation. Thus, the large

business interests, usually supporters of peace, swung to the support

of the militarists. It is significant that the liberals, that party in

the Reichstag which speaks especially for the traders, capitalists,

and manufacturers, have been among the most outspoken advocates of

annexation.

In a powerful, if indirect, way the laborers are reached by this

argument. They see that if the manufacturers and transportation

companies expand their business wages are better and employment more

abundant, and this leads them to favor a policy of expansion. To what

extent the remote organs of the business world are thus reached it is

difficult to say. But it is evident that in a phase of human activity

which has been organized most intricately the influence of the initial

idea that a war of annexation helps business is far reaching.

We frequently encounter the assertion that economic laws are

unchangeable; but the statement is not true, as it is made. Many

economic processes that appeared fundamental in their time have changed

as the minds of men have taken new grips on human life. The world

has outgrown the mercantile school of economic ideas. The attitude

toward private property and monopolies, and the view of the right of

individual bargaining have been greatly modified in the process of

time. If a so-called economic law stands in the way of a reasonable

adjustment of human relations, it can be altered, if enough time and

effort be given to the attempt to change it. Although it may seem to be

fundamentally fixed in the minds of business men and laborers that a

war for annexation is in their interests, if reason shows that they are

mistaken, there should be a way of bringing reason to their minds, even

as it has come to ours.

Another obstacle to enduring peace is a false sense of patriotism. If

a man extols his own virtues we say he is a boaster: if he extols the

good qualities of his town, state, or nation, we say he is a patriot.

I am inclined to say that it is not permitted to a man to praise his

country--I do not say love his country--in any sense but that in which

he may praise himself, modestly and with reservations. At any rate, he

should praise and magnify his country in the most restrained spirit

possible. Patriotism does not demand national egotism in the good

citizen. Those writers and teachers who try to create a national spirit

should be careful lest they make men mere chauvinists.

Especially perilous is the doctrine that “self-preservation is the

first law of nature” as applied to nations. Times come when a man

is not justified in preserving his life. So to nations come crises

in which they are not permitted by the rules of morality to save

themselves by what appear to be the only means left. In the present war

Germany asserted that she was justified by this principle in adopting

the ruthless war of the submarine, since it was the only thing that

would save her from destruction. It is better for a state to go to

destruction, just as it is better for a man to go to his death, with

clean hands than to live foully.

It is but an extension of this doctrine for men of normal morality to

say they may do things for the benefit of the state which they may not

do for their own benefit. A statesman has no more right to make his

state steal another state’s lands than he has to take his neighbor’s

watch. It is not a virtue if he lies for his state. The state cannot

speak of itself: it speaks through its agents. It is sullied, even as

a man is sullied in his character, when its only voice, the words and

acts of its servants, is not true. Judged by the standards here set

up, the world’s diplomacy needs amendment, and if amended one of the

obstacles to peace will be removed.

A false sense of patriotism may lead to acts that imperil peace.

When France acquired Morocco her object was not wholly to extend

her economic interests. To increase the national strength was also

a motive. Likewise, Germany’s desire to establish control over the

territory southeast of her was not entirely economic in its origin. She

also wished to increase the glory and strength of the Fatherland. How

much we are to condemn this desire of a citizen for the glory of his

country it is hard to say; but it seems to be clear that such a desire

may manifest itself in such a way as to become a serious obstacle to

peace.

At the end of the present war the victorious nations will be in a

position to abate national glory in the interest of enduring peace.

Our own citizens are supposed to be particularly proud of the

achievements of the United States. If our efforts should contribute as

much as we wish to the triumph of our own side, we should be careful

lest we forget that we entered the war with the modest purpose of

making the world a fit place of habitation for _all_ people. Likewise

we should be justified in using our influence among our allies to see

that the desire of no statesman to enhance the glory of his nation

leads to action which may imperil peace in the future. When we shall

have fought long and suffered greatly our hearts are likely to become

harder than now, in the beginning of the war; and there is danger that

we shall forget early resolutions if we are not firmly committed to

them at the outset.

Another obstacle to enduring peace is the sense of nationality. The

older men of this generation who were students in Germany in their

youth acquired much respect for the passionate desire of Germans to

build up unity among all German speaking people. It was a sacred

idea to young men and imaginative writers. Long had North Germany

been disunited, stumbling forward under the lead of the Hapsburgs.

To be able to form a dominating group among all the Germans in the

world seemed no more than was their just due. We did not realize in

those days to what an end these people who lost so many opportunities

through internal weakness would put their strength when they had at

last developed it. And yet, it was the right of the Germans to unite

themselves into as strong a nation as they might form. The wrong came

in the improper extension of the idea. When men like Treitschke talk

about including Holland in the German Fatherland we may well ask where

nationality’s pretensions are taking us?

It was natural, also, that the sense of nationality should be

manifested in many other European countries. Each of the Balkan states

had its own phase of it. Russia had a large hope of uniting in her

control all the peoples of Slavic blood. Italy demanded Trieste as a

part of the Italian-speaking world. Greece lived for the acquisition

of Macedonia and the Greek Islands, and France never diminished her

pathetic longing for Alsace-Lorraine, where lived French-speaking

peoples.

Often the desire for nationality runs directly counter to economic

laws. For example, what are we to do when we have Austria holding on

to her only great Adriatic seaport as the essential outlet of her

trade to the sea, and nationality proclaiming that this port shall be

handed over to Italy? Moreover, different peoples are so intermixed in

some parts of Europe that it is impossible for any but a scientific

specialist to say which states, or sections of states, are occupied by

a majority of one race and which by a majority of another. If we are to

set out to divide Europe according to nationality we shall have a large

task on our hands. In the United States the principle of nationality

is not to be pleaded, since we are so intimately intermixed that it

would be hopeless to try to range us into racial groups. Moreover, we

get along very well as it is, having once agreed that we shall have to

get along together. Perhaps if the nationalizing propaganda ceased in

Europe race antagonism would subside.

Autocratic classes in society constitute still another obstacle to

peace. We have heard much on this subject of late, and some of the

things that have been said have been so ill-established in truth that

they must make the real autocrats smile. It will probably help us to

understand the situation if we undertake to enumerate the good things

an autocracy can do. For truth never profits by falsehood, and the most

autocratic people in the world have sense enough to know when they are

misrepresented.

Let us remember that under favorable conditions an autocracy is

composed of the more capable people in the community in which it

exists. They are more capable because they have been brought up most

carefully, that is, because they have the best trained minds. There is

no law of nature by which more fools are born in an aristocracy than

in a proletariat. In fact, the tendency is the other way; for since

the aristocrats are in a position to cultivate themselves in a given

generation, it is natural that a comparatively large portion of their

children shall be well endowed mentally. To this gift of nature add the

influence of better educational training, and you see how natural it

is to expect an autocracy to be stronger mentally than those who would

have to replace it if it were overthrown.

Again, an autocracy is not necessarily unpatriotic. Of course, it has

its own idea of what patriotism is, but so have the classes below the

autocracy. Its patriotism usually embraces an honestly held opinion

that the autocratic state is the best form of society. On this basis it

is willing to sacrifice much for the state. We see it putting “lives,

fortunes, and sacred honor” literally at the entire command of the

state. No man can do more than give his all for that which he holds

right.

An autocracy may be composed of men of the best private manners and

principles. They frequently include the best poets, historians,

novelists, philosophers, and teachers of the nation. It is they who

encourage art, and set standards of taste in architecture, landscape

gardening, and general culture. Compared with the leisure class of

a prosperous industrial country they may be more courteous, more

unassuming, and less given to offensive use of their wealth. They are

the kind of men whom any of us could love if we knew them personally.

These words do not, of course, apply to all members of the class, but

to the group as a whole in ordinary conditions.

Of the German autocracy most of these things can be said, and more.

It is a hard working group and generally speaking it is honest. In

the service of the state it has a record of efficient government that

few democratic countries can show. The officials of German towns and

cities, provinces and states, taken from the hereditary upper classes,

are well trained, faithful, and free from the suggestion of corruption.

It will take New York or Chicago many years to develop the state of

good government that exists in Berlin. Moreover, the German autocracy

has the respect of the German people.

Up to last winter the Russian autocracy was an obstacle to peace.

Many who looked forward to a reign of reason wondered how they were

going to make the theory work while the largest _Entente_ nation was

in the hands of an autocracy that was less tolerable than the German

autocracy. Fortunately, fate has settled the question, for the time

at least. So uncertain is the condition of affairs in Russia, that no

one can say what will be the outcome. It is by no means certain that

the peasants, workers, and soldiers, will not make actual war against

the former autocrats, leading to a state of chaos like the worst

phases of the French Revolution. If such a thing happens, a reaction

in favor of the former ruling class may well follow. If the war ends

before the newly established government is firmly seated in power some

such upheaval may be expected. Certainly the time of danger is not yet

passed.

The German autocracy is better than that which ruled Russia. In fact,

it would be less dangerous if it were less serviceable. Its sins are

not the patent sins of peculation, cruelty, laziness, or despotism. It

offends in that it takes away the confidence of nation in nation. It

offends because it is filled with unfortunate purposes. It is possible

to think of an autocracy that would be no menace for the peace of the

world, an autocracy filled with no ambition for world conquest. It is

true that most autocratic governments have not been of this kind, and

they seem militarists by nature, whence arise the ideals with which

they trouble the world.

When Hegel preached the philosophy of war that underlies the German’s

devotion to war, he was largely right from the Prussian standpoint.

He held that the mind becomes sluggish through inactivity and that

war burns up its waste matter and leads to energy of character. This

doctrine would not be essentially true in any normally organized

society; for there are as many opportunities for self-expression in

commerce, finance, manufactures, art, and other peaceful occupations

as in war. But a century ago Prussia was filled, even more than today,

with a mass of small nobles, unaccustomed to any ordinary form of

labor, and with slender incomes. They were just the class that would

fall into the effete vices of an aristocracy. To them the military life

was an avenue of steady and moral employment. They took places in the

great machine, and by 1870 they had been bred into its very spirit. The

process saved the German nobles from vapidity. At the same time, as a

class, they preserved their political privileges, and it has happened

that they, with their official heads, the kaiser, kings, and princes,

have been able to unite political power and military purposes until

they have made of their country the most military state of modern

times. If Germany has fought the present war with great ability, it is

the organized autocracy that deserves the credit.

It is, therefore, the union of the political and military power in

the hands of a privileged class in Germany that now constitutes the

greatest obstacle to peace. It enables a small and efficient portion

of the German population to wield the rest of the people for the ends

they have decided are best. If this union of functions could be broken

up, and if political power could be distributed as in the countries

governed by the people, the obstacle would be reduced in size. It is

not necessary to suppose that it would be removed altogether; for even

if equal suffrage were established in Germany, and if autocracy were

shorn of its preponderating electoral power, the nobles would still be

the most capable class in the empire. Their personality would go a long

way in perpetuating their influence. If they played the game of trying

to lead the people they might remain rulers of Germany for a long time

after losing their present electoral advantages.

It is fair to assume that a democracy will be less likely to go to

war than an autocracy. It is the middle and lower classes that bear

the chief burdens of war. They fight for no promotions. Generally the

happiest thing that can come to one of them is a disabling wound to

send him home with his head safely on his shoulders. Kings and their

sons are rarely killed in battle. When this war began the kaiser was

one of the proud Germans who had five tall sons of military age. After

nearly four years of fighting none of them have been seriously injured.

It would be interesting to know if there is another German father of

five sons who has been so gently treated by fortune. Report says that

fifty thousand schoolmasters were killed in Germany during the first

two years of the war. It would be interesting to learn whether or not

the titled class has given up so large a proportion of its members for

the cause of the Fatherland.

And yet, it must not be thought that wars cannot exist in democratic

countries. When Rome was a republic war was a constant thing. Athens in

her republican days had many wars. In the region that is now the United

States of America have been several wars. The war for independence was

essentially popular. It was organized by that part of the population

which resented British aristocratic institutions, the class we should

today call “the plain people.” In the civil war the demand that slavery

be destroyed did not come from the wealthy men of the North, the class

that stood for the American aristocracy, but from the middle classes,

men who filled the churches and who followed the common impulses of

the heart. It was resisted by the South, as democratically organized

as Germany would be with the Junkers turned out of power, and the

struggle was as bitter as any the world had seen up to the fatal year

1914. Democratic states can fight, and they do fight, but they are less

likely to go to war than autocratic states.

If it seems to any of us a necessary thing that autocracy must be

removed from the earth, it is well to remember that autocracy can be

removed only through the operation of a long and slow process. It can

be reduced by some great catastrophe, but it cannot be smitten out in

a day. Take away its political power, and perhaps its financial power

will be left. Undermine that by raising up a rich bourgeoisie, and its

social influence will perhaps still exist. You do not abolish it by

decree; you banish it only when you have substituted a better thing.

What force exists in Germany with which the autocracy can be

supplanted? Next to the radicals, a small faction at best, we have the

socialists, numerous enough to have great influence, but committed to a

theory of society which cannot be established until humanity has gone

through centuries of development in the principles of equality. Then we

find the national liberals, whose name is likely to mislead liberals

in other parts of the world. They would be called the stand-pat,

capitalistic portion of society in the United States, men who believe

first of all in the protection of their large interests. In the present

struggle they are committed to the Pan-Germany policy since it means

the expansion of markets for German wares. Next come the centrists,

Catholics in their primary interests, and fundamentally opposed to

the doctrines for which the socialists stand. Finally we come to the

conservatives, who believe in the autocracy. What magician can fuse

these parties into a solid movement for the establishment of really

parliamentary government?

Last obstacle of all that I shall mention here is the accumulated

machinery of war that has been built up in modern states. I do not

refer to ideas but to materials and men. Much has been written to show

that munition makers have deliberately fostered a belief in war, so

as to make a market for their products. Probably some exaggeration

exists in most of these arguments and statements. The Krupps and their

brethren have plausible grounds for saying that war is inevitable,

and that they serve it but do not promote it. But giving them as

much benefit of the doubt as they can expect, it must be true that

their very existence, and their fine application of science to their

business, have led states to count on war as a matter of course.

These great aggregations of capital have vast influence in political

circles. They have so many stockholders that they affect a large number

of influential men. So much are they committed to the cause in which

their fortunes and hearts are enlisted that they ought not to have the

opportunity to wield their peculiar influence. When this war is over,

it would be a real service if every munitions factory as such were

taken into government hands and its capital stock closed out as a

business enterprise. It is only the state, and the state in the hands

of the people, that can safely be trusted with this powerful weapon for

the creation of war sentiment.

The professional soldiers are also a part of the war machinery which

stands in the way of an enduring peace. They can hardly be expected to

become pacifists. They are trained to regard war as a necessity. All

their ideas of virtue are wrapped up in the fine qualities of a brave

soldier. Any other standard is strange to them. They may be expected

to throw all their weight of influence in favor of recurring wars. Not

that they wish wars to recur, but that they consider it improper to

contemplate anything else in the natural order of events. This is a

hard problem to deal with. A few professional soldiers may be brought

to set their faces against war; but as to the great majority, I fear

that those who try to abolish war will have to count on the opposition

of the professional warriors until the end of the chapter.

This array of obstacles to enduring peace, is it not formidable?

Economic competition, the actual if false sense of patriotism, the

desire for nationality--which is liable to run into extreme assertions

and sometimes to run counter to the strongest economic interests--the

existence of autocratic government, and the powerful influence of

munition makers and professional warriors--these are some of the

obstacles against which those must contend who try to convince the

world that peace is the better way. They may well appal the stoutest

hearted friend of enduring peace.

The Lost Fruits of Waterloo · 第 10 / 12 章