Though no language can adequately condemn the base subserviency of
Henry's parliament, it may be reasonably doubted whether his reign
was, in its ultimate consequences, injurious to public liberty. The
immense revolutions of his time in property, in religion, and in the
inheritance of the crown, never could have been effected without the
concurrence of parliament. Their acquiescence and co-operation in the
spoliation of property, and the condemnation of the innocent, tempted
him to carry all his purposes into execution, through their means.
Those who saw the attainders of queens, the alteration of an
established religion, and the frequent disturbance of the regal
succession, accomplished by acts of parliament, considered nothing as
beyond the jurisdiction of so potent an assembly.[4] If the supremacy
was a tremendous power, it accustomed the people to set no bounds to
the authority of those who bestowed it on the king. The omnipotence of
parliament appeared no longer a mere hyperbole. Let it not be
supposed, that to mention the good thus finally educed from such
evils, is intended or calculated to palliate crimes, or to lessen our
just abhorrence of criminals. Nothing, on the contrary, seems more to
exalt the majesty of virtue than to point out the tendency of the
moral government of the world, which, as in this instance, turns the
worst enemies of all that is good into the laborious slaves of
justice. Of all outward benefits, the most conducive to virtue as well
as to happiness is, doubtless, popular and representative government.
It is the reverse of a degradation of it to observe, that its
establishment among us was perhaps partially promoted by the
sensuality, rapacity, and cruelty of Henry VIII. The course of affairs
is always so dark, the beneficial consequences of public events are so
distant and uncertain, that the attempt to do evil in order to produce
good is in men a most criminal usurpation.
[4] The observations of Nathaniel Bacon, or rather of Selden
from whose MS. notes he is said to have written his book,
deserve serious consideration. Bacon on the Laws and
Government of England, chap. 27.
Some direct benefits the constitution owes to this reign. The act
which established a parliamentary representation in so considerable a
territory as Wales may be regarded as the principal reformation in the
composition of the House of Commons since its legal maturity in the
time of Edward I. That principality had been divided into twelve
shires: of which eight were ancient,[5] and four owed their origin to
a statute of Henry's reign.[6] Knights, citizens, and burgesses were
now directed to be chosen and sent to parliament from the shires,
cities, and burghs of Wales.[7] A short time before, the same
privileges were granted to the county palatine of Chester, of which
the preamble contains a memorable recognition and establishment of the
principles which are the basis of the elective part of our
constitution.[8] Nearly thirty members were thus added to the House of
Commons on the principle of the Chester bill: that is disadvantageous
to a province to be unrepresented; that representation is essential to
good government; and that those who are bound by the laws ought to
have a reasonable share of direct influence on the passing of laws. As
the practical disadvantages are only generally alleged, and could
scarcely have been proved, they must have been inferred from the
nature of a House of Commons. The British constitution was not thought
to be enjoyed by a district till a popular representation was bestowed
on it. Election by the people was regarded, not as a source of tumult,
but as the principle most capable of composing disorder in territories
not represented.--_Cabinet Cyclopaedia_, vol. xix. _Sir James
Mackintosh's History of England_, vol. ii.
[5] Glamorgan, Carmarthen, Pembroke, Cardigan, Flint,
Carnarvon, Anglesea and Merioneth.
[6] Radnor, Brecknock, Montgomery, and Denbigh, 27 Henry 8 c.
26.
[7] 34 and 35 Henry 8. c. 26. s. 50.
[8] 34 and 35 Henry 8. c. 13.--"That the said county have
hitherto been excluded from the high court of parliament, to
have any knights and burgesses within the said court, by
reason whereof the inhabitants have sustained manifold damages
in their lands, goods, and bodies, as well as in the good
governance of the commonwealth of their said country; and for
as much as they have been bound by the acts of the said court,
and yet have had no knights and burgesses therein, for lack
whereof they have been often touched and grieved by the acts
of the said parliament, prejudicial to the commonwealth,
quietness, rest, and peace of your highness's bounden
subjects, inhabiting within the said county," &c.
* * * * *