Then, as to the _plainness_ and _openness of mind_ which is said to make

a part in the composition of a man of letters, you will tell them that

this is the very foible you most lament, and most wish them to correct:

that it exposes them to much censure and many other inconveniencies; that

this frankness of disposition makes them bestow their praises on those

whom the world has no such esteem for, or whom it would rather see left

in obscurity and oblivion; that they often disgust their betters by this

proceeding, who have their reasons for desiring that a cloud may remain

on the characters of certain obnoxious and dangerous writers; that by

such warm and unmanaged commendations they become partners, as it were,

of their ill deserts; that they even make themselves answerable for their

future conduct; which is a matter of so very nice a consideration, that

the great master of life, though he had not the virtue always to act

up to his own maxim, delivers it for a precept of special use in the

commerce of the world,

QUALEM COMMENDES ETIAM ATQUE ETIAM ADSPICE.

For it signifies nothing in the case before us, whether the

recommendation be to a patron or the public.

For all these reasons you will assure them that this ill habit of

speaking their mind on all occasions, just as nature and blind friendship

dictate, is that which more than any thing else exposes them to the

contempt of knowing and considerate men.

_Lastly_, with regard to that other frivolous plea taken from the

_malignity of mankind_ and even those of their own family and profession,

you will convince them that this is totally a mistake, that the world

is ready enough to take notice of superior eminence in letters, that

it is even apt to grow extravagant in its admiration, and that this

humour of the public is itself a reason for that reserve with which their

friends, if they truly merit that name, ought to conduct themselves

towards them: that this splendour of reputation, which is so generally

the consequence of distinguished learning, requires to be allayed and

softened by the discrete management of those who wish them well, lest it

not only grow offensive to weak eyes, but dazzle their own with too fond

an imagination of their own importance, and so relax the ardour of their

pursuits, or betray them into some unseemly ostentation of their just

merits. You will farther suggest, that great atchievements in letters

are sufficiently recompenced by the silent complacency of self-esteem

and of a good conscience; while lesser services demand to be brought out

and magnified to public eye, for the due encouragement and consolation

of those who would otherwise have but small reason to be satisfied with

themselves. You might even observe, that silence itself is often a full

acknowledgment of superior desert, especially when personal obligations,

as well as other reasons, might provoke them to break through it. In such

cases it is to be understood, that, if a friend be sparing of his good

word, it is in violence to his inclination, and that nothing but the

tender apprehension of pushing an acknowledged merit too far, withholds

him from giving a public testimony to it. But, in conclusion, you will

not omit to set them right with regard to one material mistake in this

matter; that whereas they complain of the superior estimation in which

the professors of verbal criticism are held amongst us, whom with a

strange malignity they affect to represent as the very lowest retainers

to science, you, and all true scholars, on the other hand, maintain that

the _study_ of words is the most useful and creditable of all others; and

that this genuine class of learned men have reason to pride themselves in

their objected, but truly glorious character of VERBAL CRITICS.

And now, Sir, having seen how little can be said in justification of that

offensive custom which the learned have somehow taken up, of directly

applauding one another, I come to the more immediate purpose of this

address, which was to shew how singularly happy you have been in avoiding

this great vice, and to take occasion from the example you have now set

us to recommend the contrary virtue to the imitation of others.

I am sensible there are some difficulties to be encountered at setting

out. A generous mind will probably feel some reluctance, at first, to the

scheme of suppressing his natural feelings, and of withholding from his

friend that just tribute of praise which many others perhaps are but too

willing should be withheld from him. But all scruples of this sort will

be got over when the full merit of your example hath been considered; I

mean, when the inducements you had to give into the common weakness on

this occasion come to be fairly drawn out; by which it will be clearly

seen that you have the glory of setting a precedent of the most heroic

magnanimity and self-denial, and that nothing can possibly be urged in

the _case_ of any other, which you have not triumphantly gotten the

better of in your own.

I observe it to your honour, Sir, you have ventured on the same ground

in this famous Dissertation, which hath been trodden by the most noted,

at least, of our present writers. But this is not enough. It will be

of moment to consider a little more particularly the _character_ of

the person whom you chuse to follow, or rather nobly emulate, in this

route. And lest you should think I have any design to lessen the merit

of your conduct towards him by giving it in my cool way, take it from

one of those _warm_ friends who never balk their humour in this sort of

commendations. Upon asking him what he thought of the learned person’s

character, and telling him the use I might perhaps make of his opinion in

this address to you, he began in a very solemn way.

“The author of the D. L.” says he, “is a writer whose genius and learning

have so far subdued envy itself (though it never rose fiercer against any

man, or in more various and grotesque shapes), that every man of sense

now esteems him the ornament, and every good man the blessing, of these

times.”

Hold, said I, my good friend, I did not mean to put your eloquence to

the stretch for this panegyric on his _intellectual_ endowments, which

I am very ready to take upon trust, and, to say the truth, have never

heard violently run down by any but very prejudiced or very dull men. His

_moral_ qualities are those I am most concerned for.

“His _moral_,” resumed he hastily, “shine forth as strongly from all

his _writings_ as the other, and are those which I have ever reverenced

most. Of these, his love of letters and of virtue, his veneration of

great and good men, his delicacy of honour in not assuming to himself, or

depressing, the merit of others, his readiness to give their due to all

men of real desert whose principles he opposes, even to the fastidious,

scoffing Lord SHAFTESBURY and the licentious BAYLE, but above all, his

zeal for religion and for truth, these are qualities which, as often as

I look into his volumes, attract my admiration and esteem. Nor is this

enumeration, though it be far from complete, made at random. I could

illustrate each of these virtues by various instances, taken from his

works, were it not that the person you mean to address is more conversant

in them, and more ready, I may presume, to do him justice on any fitting

occasion than myself. The liberty indeed he takes of dissenting from many

great names is considerable, as well as of speaking his free thoughts of

the writers for whom he hath no esteem. But the _one_ he doth with that

respect and deference, and the _other_ with that reason and justice, and

_both_ with that ingenuous openness and candour, the characteristics of a

truly great mind, that they, whom he opposes, cannot be angry, and they

whom he censures are not misused. I mention this the rather on account of

the clamour which has so frequently been raised against the freedom and

severity of his pen. But there is no mystery in the case. No dead writer

is so bad but he has some advocates, and no living one so contemptible

but he has some friends. And the misfortune is, that, while the present

generation is too much prejudiced to do him right, posterity, to whom

the appeal of course lies, are not likely to have it in their power to

re-judge the cause: the names and writings, he most undervalues, being

such as are hastening, it seems, to that oblivion which is prepared for

such things.

“These,” continued he, “are some of the obvious qualities of the WRITER;

and for the personal virtues of the MAN—But here I may well refer you

to Dr. JORTIN himself, who will take a pleasure to assure you, that his

private character is not less respectable than his public; or, rather,

if the one demands our veneration, that the other must secure our love.

And, yet, why rest the credit of ONE, when ALL of his acquaintance agree

in this, that he is the easiest in his conversation, the frankest and

most communicative, the readiest to do all good offices, in short the

friendliest and most generous of men.”

Thus far our zealous friend. And, though I know how much you agree with

him in your sentiments, I dare say you cannot but smile at so egregious

a specimen of the high _complimentary manner_. But, though one is not

to expect an encomiast of this class will be very sensible of any

defects in the person he celebrates, yet it cannot be disowned that this

magnified man hath his foibles as well as another. I will be so fair as

to enumerate some of them.

As he is conscious of _intending_ well, and even greatly, in his learned

labours, he is rather disposed to think himself injured by malicious

slanders and gross misrepresentations. And then, as he hath abundantly

too much wit, especially for a great divine, he is apt to say such things

as, though dull men do not well comprehend, they see reason enough to

take offence at. Besides, he doth not sufficiently consult his ease or

his interest by the observance of those forms and practices which are in

use amongst the prudent part of his own order. This, no doubt, begets a

reasonable disgust. And even his friends, I observe, can hardly restrain

their censure of so great a singularity. “He is so much in his study,

they say, that he hardly allows himself time to make his appearance at

a levee. Not considering that _illud unum ad laudem cum labore directum

iter qui probaverunt prope jam soli in_ SCHOLIS _sunt relicti_.” These

infirmities, it must be owned, are very notorious in him; to which it

might be added, that he is very indiscreet, sometimes, in the topics and

turn of his conversation. His zeal for his FRIEND is so immoderate, that

he takes fire even at the most distant reflection he hears cast upon him.

And I doubt no consideration could withhold him from contradicting any

man, let his quality and station be what it would, that should hazard a

joke or an argument, in his company, against RELIGION.

I thought it but just to take notice of these weaknesses; and there may,

perhaps, be some others, which I do not now recollect. Yet, on the whole,

I will not deny that he may fairly pass for an able, a friendly, and even

amiable man.

This person then, such as he is, such, at least, as the zealots represent

and you esteem him, you have the pleasure to call your FRIEND. Report

says, too, that he has more than a common right to this _title_: that

he has won it by many real services done to yourself. How doth the

consciousness of all this fire you! and what pains do I see you take to

restrain that impatient gratitude, which would relieve itself by breaking

forth in the praises of such a friend!

And yet—in spite of all these incitements from _esteem_, from

_friendship_, and from _gratitude_, which might prompt you to some

extravagance of commendation, such is the command you have of yourself,

and so nicely do you understand what belongs to this intercourse of

learned friends, that, in the instance before us, you do not, I think,

appear to have exceeded the modest proportion even of a temperate and

chaste praise.

I assure you, Sir, I am so charmed with the beauty of this conduct, that,

though it may give your modesty some pain, I cannot help uniting the

several parts of it, and presenting the entire image to you in one piece.

I meddle not with the argument of your elaborate dissertation. It is

enough that your readers know it to be the same with that of another

famous one in the D. L. They will know, then, that, among the various

parts of that work, none was so likely as this to extort your applause.

For it is universally, I suppose, agreed that, for a point in classical

criticism, there is not the man living who hath a keener relish for it

than yourself. And the general opinion is, that your honoured friend hath

a sort of talent for this kind of writing. Some persons, I know, have

talked at a strange rate. One or two I once met with were for setting

him much above the modern, and on a level, at least, with the best of

the old, critics. But this was going too far, as may appear to any that

hath but attentively read and understood what the judicious Mr. UPTON and

the learned Mr. EDWARDS have, in their various books and pamphlets, well

and solidly, and with great delight to many discerning persons, written

on this subject. Yet still I must needs think him considerably above

MINELLIUS and FARNABY, and almost equal to old SERVIUS himself, except

that, perhaps, one doth not find in him the singular _ingenuity_[118] you

admire in the last of these critics.

But be this as it will, it seems pretty well agreed, that the learned

person, though so great a divine, is a very competent judge, and no mean

proficient in classical criticism. There are many specimens of his

talents in this way dispersed through the large and miscellaneous work of

the D. L. But the greatest effort of his genius, they say, is seen in the

explanation of the Sixth Book of the Ænëis. And, with all its defects,

I can easily perceive you were so struck with it, that it was with

the utmost reluctance you found yourself obliged, by the regard which

every honest critic owes to truth, and by the superior delicacy of your

purpose, to censure and expose it.

Another man, I can easily imagine, would have said to himself before

he had entered on this task, “This fine commentary, which sets the

most finished part of the Ænëis, and indeed the whole poem, in so new

and so advantageous a light, though not an essential in it, is yet a

considerable ornament of a justly admired work. The author, too, is my

particular friend; a man, the farthest of all others from any disposition

to lessen the reputation of those he loves. The subject hath been well

nigh exhausted by him; and the remarks I have to offer on his scheme are

not, in truth, of that consequence as to make it a point of duty for

me to lay aside the usual regards of friendship on their account: and,

though HE hath greatness of mind enough not to resent this liberty, his

impatient and ill-judging friends will be likely to take offence at it.

The public itself, as little biassed as it seems to be in his favour, may

be even scandalized at an attempt of this nature, to which no important

interest of religion or learning seem to oblige me.”

After this manner, I say, would a common man have been apt to reason with

himself. But you, Sir, understand the _rights_ of literary freedom, and

the _offices_ of sacred friendship, at another rate. The _one_ authorize

us to deliver our sentiments on any point of literature without reserve.

And the _other_ will not suffer you to dishonour the man you love, or

require you to sully the purity of your own virtue, by a vicious and

vulgar complaisance.

Or, to give the account of the whole matter in your own memorable words:

The Sixth Book of the Ænëis, you observe, though the most finished part

of the twelve, is certainly obscure. “Here then is a field open for

criticism, and all of us, who attempt to explain and illustrate Virgil,

have reason to HOPE that we may make some _discoveries_, and to FEAR

that we may fall into some _mistakes_; and this should induce us to

conjecture with _freedom_, to propose with _diffidence_, and to dissent

with _civility_. Ἀγαθὴ δ’ ἔρις ἥδε βροτοῖσι, quoth old Hesiod[119].”

Which shall I most admire, the dignity, the candour, or the prudence,

that shine forth in this curious paragraph, which stands as a sort of

preface to the refutation, as no doubt you designed it, of your friend’s

work? “_You have reason to hope that_, after the unsuccessful efforts

of the author of the D. L., _you may make some discoveries_.” In this

declaration some may esteem you too sanguine. But I see nothing in it

but a confidence very becoming a man of your talent at a _discovery_,

and of your importance in the literary world. You add, indeed, as it

were to temper this boldness, that “_you have reason to fear too that

you may fall into some mistakes_.” This was rather too modest; only it

would serve, at the same time, to intimate to your friend what he had to

expect from the following detection of his errors. But you lead us to the

consequence of these principles. “_They should induce us_, you say ”TO

CONJECTURE WITH FREEDOM.” Doubtless. And the dignity of your character

is seen in taking it. For, shall the authority or friendship of any man

stand in the way of my conjectures?

——scilicet, ut non

Sit mihi prima fides; et verè quod placet, ut non

Acriter elatrem!

—“TO PROPOSE WITH DIFFIDENCE.” Certainly very _prudent_, especially for

one sort of _free-conjecturers_; and, by the way, no bad hint to the

person you glance at, whose vice it is thought to be, above that of most

other writers, never to trouble himself with composing a book on any

question, of whose truth he is not previously and firmly convinced——“AND

TO DISSENT WITH CIVILITY.” A _candid_ insinuation, which amounts to this,

“That, when a writer hath done his best to shew his learning or his wit,

the man at whose expence it is, especially if he be a friend, is, in

consideration of such services, not to take it amiss.”

I have been the freer to open the meaning of this introductory paragraph,

because it lets us into the spirit with which you mean to carry yourself

in this learned contention. For a _contention_ it is to be, and to good

purpose too, if old Hesiod be any authority. Ἀγαθὴ δ’ ἔρις ἥδε βροτοῖσι,

quoth old Hesiod. Though to make the application quite pat the maxim

should have run thus, Ἀγαθὴ δ’ ἔρις ἥδε φιλοῖσι, which I do not find in

old Hesiod.

However the reason of the thing extends to both. And as _friends_ after

all are but _men_, and sometimes none of the best neither, what need for

standing on this distinction?

Yet still the question returns, “Why so cool in the entrance of this

friendly debate? Where had been the hurt of a little amicable parlying

before daggers-drawing? If a man, in the true spirit of ancient chivalry,

will needs break a lance with his friend, he might give him good words

at least and shake hands with him before the onset. Something of this

sort might have been expected, were it only to save the reputation of

_dissenting with civility_.”

Now in answer to this question, which comes indeed to the point, and

which I hear asked in all companies, I reply with much confidence,

_first_, that the very foundation of it is laid in certain high fantastic

notions about the duties of friendship, and in that vicious habit of

civility that hath so long been prevalent among learned friends; both

which props and pillars of the cause I may presume with great modesty to

have entirely overturned.

But _secondly_ and chiefly I say that the whole is an arrant

misrepresentation; for that you have indeed proceeded in this affair,

with all that civility and even friendliness that could in reason be

expected from you: I mean so far as the sobriety and _Retenuë_, as the

French term it (it is plain the virtue hath not been very common amongst

us from our having no name to call it by) of a true critical friendship

will allow.

Now there are several ways by which a writer’s civility to his friend may

appear without giving into the formal way of _address_: just as there are

several ways of expressing his devotion to his patron, without observing

the ordinary forms of _dedication_; of which, to note it by the way,

the latest and best instances I have met with, are, “A certain thing

prefatory to a learned work, entitled, _The Elements of Civil Law_,” and

“Those curious two little paragraphs prefixed to _The Six Dissertations

on different Subjects_.”

You see the delicacy of the learned is improving in our days in more

respects than one. And take my word for it, you have contributed your

share to this good work. For as you began, so you conclude your volume

with a master stroke of address, which will deserve the acknowledgment

and imitation of all your brethren, as I now proceed distinctly and with

great exactness of method to unfold.

THE FIRST way of distinguishing a learned friend, without incurring the

guilt of downright compliment, is by _writing on the same subject with

him_. This is an obvious method of paying one’s court to a great writer.

For it is in effect telling him that the public attention is raised

to the argument he hath been debating; and that his credit hath even

brought it into such vogue that any prate on the same subject is sure

of a favourable reception. This I can readily suppose to have been your

first motive for engaging in this controversy. And the practice is very

frequent. So when a certain edition of SHAKESPEAR appeared, though it had

been but the amusement of the learned editor, every body went to work, in

good earnest, on the great poet, and the public was presently over-run

with editions and criticisms and illustrations of him. Thus too it fared

with the several subjects treated in the D. L. Few were competent judges

of the main argument, or disposed to give it a candid interpretation.

But every smatterer had something to say to this or that occasional

disquisition. Thus SYKES, and STEBBING grew immortal, and, as the poet

says truly, _in their own despite_. And what but some faint glimmering

of this _bright reversion_, which we will charitably hope may be still

kept in reserve for them, could put it into the heads of such men as

WORTHINGTON, H. G. C.[120] and PETERS, to turn critics and commentators

on the book of JOB?

SECONDLY, Though I acknowledge the full merit of this way of treating

a learned friend, I am rather more taken with another, which is that

_of writing against him_. For this demonstrates the esteem one hath of

the author’s work, not only as it may seem to imply a little generous

rivalry or indeed envy, from which infirmity a truly learned spirit is

seldom quite free, but as it shews the answerer thought it worth _writing

against_; which, let me assure you, is no vulgar compliment; as many

living writers can testify, who to this hour are sadly lamenting that

their ill fortune hath never permitted them to rise to this distinction.

Now, in this view of the matter, I must take leave to think that

you have done a very substantial honour to the author of the famous

_Discourse on the_ VIth _book of Virgil_, in levelling so long and so

elaborate a disputation against him. And HE, of all other men, ought to

be of my mind, who to my certain knowledge hath never done thus much

for one in a hundred of those learned persons whose principal end in

commencing writers against him was to provoke him to this civility.

The works of Richard Hurd, volume 8 (of 8) · 第 10 / 19 段