purpose. We can scarce think him serious, when he would urge the
testimony of Hierocles, Celsus, and Julian, the avowed and virulent
opposers of Christianity[66], as an evidence of a general contempt
of miracles in the heathen world. Nor has he better luck with his
philosophers. For, is the opinion of a few atheistical speculatists[67],
and perhaps one or two more of better fame, of the least weight in
deciding this matter; especially when it is plain, from the very passage
referred to[68], that they saw through the imposture of the heathen
miracles; and rejected them _merely_ on that account? Can his Ægyptian
Gymnosophists, piqued, as they were, at the reputation of the Indian
miracles[69], and yet, in effect, confessing their esteem of them by
pretending to work such themselves, can these witnesses be thought
deserving the least credit? Above all, is the wonder-working _Apollonius_
brought in to disclaim miracles, and that too in a passage intended
only to express his contempt of some fooleries in witchcraft[70]? But
what the _philosophers_ could not do for him, the _law-givers_ he
resolves shall, and therefore brings in a long list of sages[71], all
of them, as he thinks, concurring to establish this point. But how?
Why, in his _negative_ way of witnessing, _in their making no pretence
to miracles_—that is, as every body sees, in their making no pretence
to what they _durst not_ counterfeit, or _did not_ want; and when it
is certain they _did pretend_ to them in the only safe way of a secret
intercourse and communication[72]. But the cause is growing still more
desperate. For, are the Christian Apologists to be charged with this
_evil principle_[73]? and that only for maintaining, in their occasional
disputes with the heathens; what the ablest Divines have ever done, and
still continue to maintain, the insufficiency of miracles _alone_, and
if taken _by themselves_, to establish the divinity of any revelation?
an opinion founded, as it should seem, on the express testimony of Jesus
Christ[74]; or, if _false_, which has not been made appear, excusable
enough in their situation, when _real_ miracles were owned to be in the
power of evil spirits, or when at least the general prevalency of this
persuasion amongst their heathen adversaries might render it expedient
for the Christian writers to argue on the concession of it. But, ill as
this treatment is, the venerable Apologists have no cause of complaint.
They share but the same fate, as ONE much their better. For, the
_dignity_ of the writer’s witnesses, whatever becomes of their _evidence,
is still increasing_[75]; and having made free with the _Fathers_ of the
Church (for I say nothing of his _Jews_, not only because he confesses
them nothing to his purpose[76], but because, if their evidence has
any weight at all, it _determines_ the contrary way[77]), having, as I
said, made free with the _Fathers_ of the Church, he next claims the
sanction of an _Apostle_. Has then the Inquirer one _sure_ and _certain_
retreat? And is his novelty at last, all spent and wearied as it is,
to elude our hopes by finding refuge in the sacred writings[78]? So
indeed he would persuade himself or his readers. And this, it must be
owned, is _no novel practice_. It is ever the last expedient of a sinking
cause, when forsaken of all human help, and fearing the just vengeance
of indignant reason, to strive to support itself by laying hold on the
altar. But the Scriptures are no _sanctuary_ for falshoods. We shall
therefore esteem it no irreverence to approach the holy place, and, as
we are instructed in a like case, to take the _fugitive_ from it. The
case appears to have been this: In the Apostle’s design of breaking
an unchristian faction in the Church of Corinth, which had arose, it
seems, from a vain ostentation of human science, his business was to
discredit their misapplied learning with the people, and to check the
arrogance of these _perverse disputers_ themselves. To this end, he sets
himself to shew that it was not on account of any advantage of skill in
human learning or eloquence that God was pleased to make choice of the
preachers of the Gospel; but that, on the other hand, he rather chose
the _foolish_, i. e. the illiterate and uneducated, the better to expose
the weakness of human wisdom, and to display, with greater force, the
power and excellency of the _Cross of Christ_[79]. And this, he proceeds
to observe, is but agreeable to the general œconomy of God’s providence,
which doth not conform itself to our views of fitness or expediency; but
most commonly by the choice of such instruments and means as to us seem
_unfit_ or _inexpedient_, _destroys the wisdom of the wise, and brings
to nothing the understanding of the prudent_[80]. A remarkable example
of which method of dealing with mankind, continues the Apostle[81], we
have in the dispensation of the Gospel, _introduced_ in such a manner,
and _established_ by such means, as both to _Jew_ and _Gentile_ appear
absurd and unaccountable. _For the Jews ask after a sign_, i. e. look
for an outward ostentatious display of worldly power and pre-eminence
going along with, and attending on the Messiah; and, under the influence
of such prepossession, make that a _sign_ or test of his coming, and
even refuse to acknowledge his Divine mission without it[82]. Whilst the
Greeks, on the contrary, seduced by the charms of a studied eloquence,
or inslaved to the tenets of a conceited philosophy, require the Gospel
to be preached in agreement to their notions and prejudices; and reject a
Redeemer, whose method of salvation is not conformable to the conclusions
of their schools, and whose doctrine is unadorned by the graces of their
learning. Whereas, in fact, proceeds the Apostle, our commission is
to publish, in all plainness, a religion to the world, fundamentally
opposite to the prejudices of both. For its main doctrine, and on which
hangs all the rest, is that of a _crucified Saviour_; which therefore,
as being offensive to the fond hopes and expectations of the Jew, and
not suited to his ideas of the _Divine power_ and greatness, is to him a
_stumbling-block_: And being a method of salvation neither agreeing to
their conceptions of the Divine _wisdom_, nor set off with the colours
of heathen wit, is to the Greeks _foolishness_. Though yet it is to both
these _Jews and Greeks_, when rightly instructed in the ways of God’s
Providence, _both the power of God and the wisdom of God_[83]. Thus we
see, at length, what the writer’s sacred authority is come to; which,
having no foundation but in the groundless comment a mistaken passage is
thus easily overturned and confuted. For from hence it appears, that the
Apostle, far from attesting his whimsy of _the low opinion of miracles
amongst the heathens_, does not so much as of Miracles at all: or, if he
must be made an evidence in the cause, gives judgment against him; as
plainly enough expressing his opinion, that it was not a _contempt of
miracles_, but the _conceit of wisdom_, which made the great difficulty
to converting the Pagan world.
And now having dispersed his _cloud of witnesses_ (which, unlike the
_sacred_ one it would seem to resemble, instead of illustrating and
reflecting a fuller light on the _fact_ it surrounds, serves only to
obscure and conceal it) having shewn, I say, if not the falshood of his
_fact_, at least the insufficiency of his _evidence_ to support it, I
might fairly dismiss the remainder of his book without any confutation;
the following chapters, as he tells us, being intended to account for
this fact, which he presumes to have fully established. But, as he
appears unwilling to rest the whole of his cause on the merit of so
slight an evidence, and has therefore engaged for a further confirmation
of it in the following pages[84], it will be proper to collect in a few
words, what additional evidence may arise from that quarter: And in doing
this, I shall think it sufficient to examine, not his premises, but
conclusion; and so, leaving him in full possession of his _facts_, to
argue with him, in agreement to the design of these slight sheets, on the
weight and force of his deductions. And here,
1. Allowing him to have proved _the vanity of the heathen pretensions
to miracles_, c. iv. v. vi. in the fullest sense he can wish; and
that no _real wonder_ was ever wrought, or _oracle_ delivered, by any
of the numerous pretenders to either, what will the author say is the
proper inference from it?—That therefore the heathens _could_ not but
have a low opinion of miracles? That, indeed, would be to his purpose;
but nothing can be less supported. For were not such miracles and
oracles at least generally believed? Or, if several impostures were
detected, does the author imagine that such detection would utterly
sink the credit of all future miracles[85]? A writer, so skilled in the
workings of superstition, and who appears to have taken much pains to
pry into the dark corners of humanity, ought to know, that the passion
for wonder is a foible too _intimately_ connected with our nature to be
thus easily driven out from it. And the history of mankind gives the
strongest confirmation of this, in relating, as it does, notwithstanding
the presumed effect of such discoveries, the very ready reception,
which Miracles have ever met with. The truth is, the Inquirer might as
well have set himself to prove _the vanity of the Popish pretension
to miracles_, and then have inferred, from the frequent detection of
impostures amongst them, that therefore the Papists cannot but have
_a very low opinion of miracles_. This, I say, had been as logically
inferred; and yet, I believe the first traveller from Rome, or next
account he should look into of Italy, or Spain, would infallibly spoil
the argument, and confute his conclusion. And, to do the author justice,
he seems not unconscious of this, when, after all the learned pains he
had taken to establish this point, he allows, _that though his argument
had shewn, what little reason the heathens had to think, that miracles
had ever been wrought amongst them at all, yet it does not of consequence
follow, that they would certainly make use of the light, that was held
out to them_; but observes, _that whether they did or not, their esteem
of miracles will be but little increased; for if ever they were alarmed
by an appearance, which they could not tell how to account for, or
over-borne by the weight of such testimony, as they could not tell how to
invalidate, the principle of magic was one general recourse_.
2. His strong-hold, then, we see, at last, is Magic. We shall follow
him therefore one step further, and try if we cannot dislodge him
from it. The fact conceded to him is, _that the persuasion was pretty
general in the heathen world, that by means of magic, that is, of certain
superstitious rites, and sacrifices, and by certain words and invocations
of dæmons, many things could be done exceeding the power of man; and that
accordingly many seeming miracles, wrought amongst them, were imputed
to this power of magic_. But then to infer from hence, as the Inquirer
would have us, that therefore the heathens under the persuasion of these
principles, must necessarily entertain a very low opinion of _all_
miracles, is sure concluding too fast. For, though I could admit this
to be a tolerable reason for the rejection of _some Pagan_ miracles,
it does not, we see, at all affect the _Christian_; which _only_ are,
or ought to be, the concern of his book. So that the argument, fairly
stated, confutes itself. For it stands thus: The heathens conceived
many miraculous appearances, produced for some _trifling_ or _noxious_
purpose, to be in the power of certain persons, acting under the power of
_bad dæmons_[86], and by the means of certain _magical, and superstitious
rites_.—THEREFORE they of necessity entertained a low opinion of _all_
miracles, though wrought by pawns, claiming their power and pretensions
from _God_ himself, for purposes the most _momentous_ and _benevolent_,
and without the interposition of _any_ sacrificial or superstitious
rites[87]. But this is not all: We learn from the history of the
propagation of Christianity, that in certain places (and who can doubt
in all where the pretended powers of magic were opposed to the genuine
workings of the Spirit of God?) such methods were used by Christ and his
Apostles, as were sufficient to manifest the difference of their miracles
from those of magicians, and to assert the divinity of their mission, in
the very judgment of the magicians themselves[88]. And this, as it seems,
always with such illustrious evidence, as to render it inexcusable in
those, who had the opportunity of seeing and examining the difference, to
remain unsatisfied of it. For I cannot but think it worthy the Inquirer’s
regard, though no _novelty_, that the Heathen charge of _magic_, was
but in other words the Jewish accusation of _Beelzebub_; either of them
the genuine result of pure unallayed malice, and, concerning which, our
Saviour’s determination is well known. And therefore when the learned
writer contends, that the Heathens had a low opinion of miracles in
general, on account of the supposed power and efficacy of charms, and
magical incantations, he might with equal reason here have taken upon him
to shew, that the Jews also had it low opinion of miracles in general on
account of the supposed power of their diviners, and sorcerers, of which
we likewise bear much amongst them, and from their ascribing, as we know
they did, many miraculous effects and operations to them: an opinion,
which, I presume, the learned writer will not find it to his purpose to
maintain.
3. As to the author’s argument from the _multiplication of the Heathen
Gods_ (which is the only remaining part of his book I think myself
concerned in[89]) if he means to conclude from it, that in consequence
of the multitude of pretended miracles, flowing from such belief,
miracles themselves must of necessity _lose their force, and sink in
their esteem_[90], it is very frivolous, and admits an easy answer. For,
besides its inherent weakness of bad logic, in concluding from a cause
of possible efficiency to a _certain_ effect, it has the misfortune, in
common with his other reasonings on this subject, to be confuted by plain
matter of fact. And, for his satisfaction in this point, I refer him once
more to the case of the Romanists; who, notwithstanding the multiplicity
of their saints, all of them dealers in miracles, and swarming in such
numbers as to equal, if not exceed, the rabble of Pagan divinities,
do not yet appear to have contracted from thence and disrelish, or
disesteem for miracles. The truth is, the whole additional evidence
arising from the main of his book in confirmation of his pretended
fact, _that the Heathens entertained a low opinion of miracles_, is so
very inconsiderable, that, as we now see, it hardly amounts to a bare
probability. For, after all, the reader will perhaps incline to think,
contrary to what the learned writer directs him, that such prevalency
of magic, and multiplicity of gods, is no bad proof of the esteem and
credit, that miracles were in amongst them. At least, ’tis no unfair
presumption, that a people could not be so averse to miracles, as the
author pretends, nor generally be possessed by a thorough contempt of
them, when, notwithstanding the frequent detection of _false_ miracles,
and more than one degrading solution at hand for the _true_, they
should yet be able to maintain their ground, and take such footing in
the popular belief, as to be continually affording fresh occasion to
imposture, and fresh encouragement to the dealers in this traffic to
practise on the wonder and credulity of mankind.
2. And whoever sets out with this surmise, (which is apparently not
ill-founded) will find it greatly strengthened in observing, that of all
the reproaches cast upon the Heathen world, and of all the prejudices
objected to them by the first propagators of Christianity, this of the
contempt of miracles was not so much as once mentioned, there not being
the least hint, or remotest intimation in the sacred writings of their
labouring under any peculiar prepossession of this kind. A circumstance
perfectly unaccountable, if what the Inquirer contends for be true, since
such prepossession could not but greatly obstruct the Apostolic labours,
and make it necessary for them to bend their first care and application
that way.
3. And it raises the wonder still higher to observe, that whilst the
Heathens escape uncensured in this respect, the Jews are severely rebuked
for their incredulity and disregard miracles[91]; where too, by the very
cast and turn of the reproof, the Heathens are to be understood as less
chargeable on this head, than the Jews.
4. But, what has still the worst aspect on the writer’s scheme, is, that
whilst the Apostles are quite silent as to this charge upon the Gentile,
nor appear once to rank it in the list of such impediments, as retarded
the conversion of the Pagan world, they are at the same time very express
in declaring to us, what the chief of those _impediments_ were. They
in part have been already suggested[92], and were, if St. Paul may be
credited, in reality, these: 1. _A conceit of superior wisdom_ amongst
the men of letters and education[93]. And, 2. _The corruptions and gross
idolatries_ of the people at _large_[94].
5. But what! it will after all be asked, Is there then no truth in
what the leaned writer has advanced concerning the Heathen contempt
of miracles; and in particular, is his long detail of principles and
circumstances, concurring, as it should seem, to produce such contempt,
utterly without all force or meaning?
This has no where been said; and the contrary is what I am now ready to
affirm. For, to do the Inquirer justice, it was upon the basis of a good,
old truth, that this wondrous novelty was erected. A fine writer[95]
will tell us what it was. “We may observe,” (says he, in accounting for
the silence of Pagan writers in respect of our Saviour’s history) “that
the ordinary practice of MAGIC in those times, with the many pretended
PRODIGIES, DIVINATIONS, APPARITIONS, and LOCAL MIRACLES amongst the
Heathens, made them less attentive to such news from Judæa, till they had
time to consider the NATURE, the OCCASION, and the END of our Saviour’s
Miracles, and were awakened by many surprizing events to allow them
any consideration at all.” We see here the ground-work of our author’s
performance, and have determined to our hands with great accuracy, how
far his general position is true, and to what extent the particular
circumstances and situation of the Heathens would in _reality_ affect
their opinion of miracles. Had the learned writer confined himself within
these limits, he would, I conceive, have had reason and history on his
side, and, whatever alarm he may be in _from the froward and contentious
spirit of party in religion_, no _enemies_ to oppose him. But then this,
it must be owned, had been saying nothing _new_: The world had lost the
benefit of a discovery, and the author, what of all things he would most
regret, the glory of INVENTION.
THE
OPINION
OF AN
EMINENT LAWYER, &c.
FIRST PRINTED IN 1751.
THE
OPINION
OF AN
EMINENT LAWYER,
CONCERNING
THE RIGHT OF APPEAL
FROM THE VICE-CHANCELLOR OF CAMBRIDGE,
TO THE SENATE;
Supported by a short historical Account of
the JURISDICTION of the UNIVERSITY.
In Answer to a late Pamphlet, intitled,
“_An Inquiry into the Right of Appeal from
the Chancellor or Vice-Chancellor of the
University of Cambridge_,” &c.
_Is ne erret, moneo, et desinat lacessere._
_Habeo alia multa, nunc quæ condonabitur;_
_Quæ proferentur post, si perget lædere._
BY A FELLOW OF A COLLEGE.
THE OPINION OF AN EMINENT LAWYER[96], &c.
The dispute _concerning Appeals_, which at present engages the attention
of the University of _Cambridge_, is apparently of such importance to the
peace and welfare of that great body; that it could not but be expected
from any one, who proposed to deliver his thoughts upon it to the world,
that he should at least have taken care to inform himself perfectly of
the merits of the question, before he presumed, in so public a manner, to
concern himself in it.
It must, therefore, surprize the reader of a late _Inquiry into the Right
of Appeal, &c._ to find, that the writer of it, whoever he be (for as
he chuses to conceal name, I shall not take the liberty to conjecture of
it) should adventure to treat a matter of this consequence, without any
distinct knowledge of the state of the case itself, or indeed without
appearing to possess one single qualification, which is required to do
justice to it. For the question, discussed, is of such a nature, that it
cannot be determined, nor indeed tolerably treated by any one, who hath
not a pretty exact knowledge of the _History_, _Customs_, and _Statutes_,
of the University; and who is not, besides, at least competently skilled
in the _Civil and Ecclesiastical Laws_. And yet this writer, as though
nothing else was required of him, besides a confident face, and willing
mind, boldly undertakes to decide upon it, under a perfect incapacity in
all these respects. Instead of an accurate acquaintance with the Practice
and Usages of the University, it appears he had no further knowledge
of them, than what a few hasty and ill-considered extracts from the
Register had supplied him with. So far is he from being conversant in the
Statutes of the University, that he blunders in every attempt to explain
the very easiest of them. And, as to his _Law_, he has only skimmed the
surface of it for a few frothy terms, without giving the least proof of
his being possessed, in any degree, of the sense and substance of it.
This utter inability to discuss a point, he had voluntarily undertaken,
must be thought the more extraordinary in a person, who, throughout the
whole, assumes an air of authority; and though he professes modestly in
his title page to _enquire_, yet, in effect, _prescribes and dictates_
from one end of his _pamphlet_ to the other. The tone of this disputer,
whatever becomes of his reasoning, is all along decisive; and he _does
and must insist_, as if he thought his very word of force enough to bear
down all the reason and argument, that could be opposed to him.
Indeed the superior airs he gives himself, on all occasions, are not
without their use. For persons unacquainted, as the generality of his
readers must needs be, with the question itself, are readily enough
inclined to believe, that a person so _assured_, cannot be so entirely
_ignorant_ of the merits of it, as in fact he is. And they who know
better, cannot but apprehend somewhat from the assumed authority of a
writer, who talks so big; however his total insufficiency might, in other
respects, provoke their contempt. For my own part, I could not help
considering him as a person of eminent dignity in the University; whose
rank in it might give him a right to dictate to the school-boys of the
place; for so he gives us to understand, he conceives of _the Members
of the University Senate_[97]. In pursuing my conjectures further about
him, I was sometimes inclined to think, from the very reverend regard he
every where professeth for the Heads of colleges, that he must, himself,
be one of that illustrious body and was led to excuse the superiority
of his manner from reflecting, that a habit of governing absolutely in
his own college (for so he thinks Heads of colleges have a right to
govern[98]) had insensibly inspired that despotic style and language,
which were so disgustful, and had looked so ungracefully, in any other.
But then, again, my profound respect and esteem of that venerable order,
and my actual knowledge of the great talents, with which these reverend
personages so worthily preside in their high places, would not suffer me
to imagine, that any of their number could be _so_ unqualified to treat
a matter of a merely academical nature, as this writer had shewn himself
to be; and especially, as it immediately concerned their own authority,
which they so assiduously study, and so perfectly understand. On the
whole, I was forced to dismiss this conjecture, as having no reasonable
foundation to rest upon, and, in perfect civility and good manners
towards a set of men, for whom I have so sincere an honour, could only
conclude him, at last, to be some weak and shallow pedant; unknown and
uncountenanced by _them_; whose vanity had done him an ill turn; and
thrust him unadvisedly on a weighty office, which he had no warrant, as
he had no abilities, to discharge.
Under this opinion, both of the writer and his performance, which, as
the reader sees, I took not up upon slight grounds, it was not likely I
should ever think of giving myself the least trouble about either; much
less that I should believe it worth the while to undertake in form, the
examination of a foolish pamphlet, which indeed, I had hardly patience
enough to peruse. The truth is, it had lain for ever unnoticed by me
among the rubbish, which of late hath so oppressed the publick, on the
subject of our academical disputes; or, at least, had been left for
some future ACADEMIC to discourse of, at his leisure; had it not been
for the _Opinions_ of two truly learned and respectable Lawyers; which
the _Inquirer_ had thought fit to intersperse, as a little needful
seasoning, in his insipid performance; and which, indeed, give it all the
real weight and authority, it can possibly carry with it to men of sense.
The _Inquirer_, as supposing these gentlemen to afford some countenance
to the good cause, he is maintaining, thinks fit, on the mention of
their names, to drop his crest a little; and, in a lower tone of voice
than usual, affects to treat them even with some appearance of respect.
Yet this he does in so aukward a manner, as shews it was not usual or
familiar to him, to descend to such submissions; for, as the height of
that civility, which he was willing to express towards them, he chuses
to distinguish them only by the title of the _Gentlemen of the_ LONG
ROBE. What impression the idea of a sweeping train may possibly make on
the phantasy of this writer, I know not; but I, who am more concerned
about the _heads_ than the _tails_ of these learned gentlemen, should
have thought it an apter compliment to have turned our attention the
other way. Unless, perhaps, he was secretly conscious, that by a little
unfair dealing in the proposal of the _Queries_, in relation to which
their opinions were asked, their Answers themselves did no real honour
to the more essential part of a great lawyer, and so far willing to pin
the credit of them intirely on their _gowns_. In plain truth this was
the very case, as will appear from the _Queries_ themselves, and the
_Answers_; together with a few observations, which I shall beg leave to
subjoin to them.
“After stating the _42d_ and _48th_ of Queen _Elizabeth’s_ Statues, some
circumstances of Mr. _A—’s_ behaviour, and that an appeal of the same
nature with his was not quite unprecedented, the two following Queries
were put, [_Inq. p. 28._]
“Qu. I. Whether, in this case, the Vice-Chancellor and his
assessors have not acted solely under the _42d_ Statute; _de
Cancellarii Officio_; and whether any appeal can lie against
the suspension of _A._ by virtue of that Statute? or whether
this case must be deemed one of the _causæ forenses_, and
of consequence subject to an appeal by virtue of the _48th_
Statute, _de Causis Forensibus_?
“Qu. II. Whether, if in the case above stated, the said _A—_
hath a right to appeal from his suspension; the same right
of appeal will not follow to every delinquent scholar, who
shall be punished a trifling mulct or piece of exercise by the
Vice-Chancellor?”
_After stating_, says he, _the 42d_ and _48th Statutes_, &c. Whence it
appears, that no other evidence was laid before the Lawyers, with regard
to the right of appeals, than certain extracts from Q. _Elizabeth’s_
Statutes: Which was not the most certain method of obtaining an accurate
decision. For, though the Queen’s Statutes alone, as we apprehend, afford
_sufficient_ evidence of our right, yet they are by no means, as will
presently be seen, the _whole_ evidence.
But, waving this consideration, let us come directly to the _Queries_
themselves. The _first_ is a master-piece in its kind, and may be of use
to instruct future querists, how to propose their doubts in the most
convenient manner.