Our army efforts on the frontier of Canada had been great failures.
In the very beginning of the war General William Hull, Governor of
Michigan, had been obliged to surrender his small army at Detroit
for the simple reason that he was faced by starvation. He was tried
and sentenced to death, but was reprieved by President Madison. But
the fault was not wholly Hull’s. It was, along with Hull’s age and
inefficiency, the ineptitude of our own administrative and legislative
authorities in Washington. Our northern defence was thus to fall upon
the navy.
There was in 1813 no vessel of war on Lake Erie, and but one, the
_Oneida_, of 116 tons, built four years before the war, on Ontario.
The British had long had a force on this lake, and in 1812 there were
six vessels, carrying in all about 80 guns; the largest was the _Royal
George_, of 22. Had the British commander been competent he could
easily have controlled the lake. He attacked Sackett’s Harbor in July,
but Lieutenant Woolsey, commanding the _Oneida_, landed his guns, and
with the batteries thus formed beat him off. Commodore Isaac Chauncey
was now, in August, 1812, sent to command both lakes. Guns, officers,
shipwrights, and stores were transported from New York, and by November
a small fleet was ready. Before this, however, Lieutenant L. D. Elliot,
who had been sent to Buffalo to look after Lake Erie, had made a
brilliant expedition against the _Detroit_, which had been surrendered
at the time of Hull’s disaster, and another vessel, the _Caledonia_.
Both were captured on the Canada side of the lake at Fort Erie by
boarding, a small army detachment assisting. The _Detroit_ was burned.
On November 8th Chauncey made a spirited attack on the harbor of
Kingston, and kept up his activities until navigation was closed by
ice early in December. The winter was spent in building. A new ship,
however, named the _Madison_, had already (November 24th) been launched
at Sackett’s Harbor. Nine weeks before her timber had stood in the
forest.
By the opening of navigation in 1813 each combatant had a considerable
fleet on Lake Ontario, though nearly all were but mere gunboats.
The British, recognizing the immense importance of control of the
lakes, had selected an able officer, Sir James L. Yeo, to command. The
outcome of the season’s operations, however, for the detail of which
one should look to larger books, was that the Americans were left in
naval control. In the course of the summer the hostile squadrons were
three times engaged. Chauncey’s courage and spirit have received,
and deserved, high praise for “the rapidity and decision with which
he created a force, as it might be in a wilderness, the professional
resources which he discovered in attaining this great end, and the
combined gallantry and prudence with which he manœuvred before the
enemy ... while the intrepidity with which he carried his own ship
into action off York has always been a subject of honest exultation in
the service to which he belongs.” This high praise from one so able to
judge as Fenimore Cooper, himself in early life a naval officer, holds
to this day.
What Chauncey did on Lake Ontario, Perry was to do, and much more, on
Erie. He had been reared in Preble’s school at Tripoli, but by 1806
he was at Newport superintending the building of some of Jefferson’s
absurd gunboats, and to duty such as this he was kept for six years,
an inglorious inaction for such a spirit. No attention was paid by
a nerveless Secretary of the Navy for his application for the lakes
until it was pressed by Chauncey, on which he was ordered to report at
Sackett’s Harbor with his best men. Receiving his orders on February
17th, fifty men were on their way before sunset; a hundred more
followed, and Perry himself on the 22d. He reached Sackett’s Harbor on
March 3d, and, after two weeks, was ordered to Erie. Sailing-master
Dobbins and Noah Brown, master shipwright, already had three gunboats
well under way and keels laid for two brigs. The timber for their
construction had been but a few days before trees in the forest.[36]
But nothing had been provided in the way of armament, cordage, stores,
men, or officers. These dribbled in through the appeals and constant
personal work of Perry. In five months he had his little fleet fairly
ready. On August 10th he went in search of the British. He had the
brigs _Lawrence_ and _Niagara_, of 20 guns each, and eight schooners
carrying, one three, the others two and one guns each. The British
commodore, Barclay, had the ship _Detroit_, of 19 guns; the _Queen
Charlotte_, of 17; the _Lady Prevost_, a schooner of 13, and three
small craft of 10, 3, and 1. Perry had in all 416 men fit for duty;
Barclay 440. On September 10th they met.
The action began at 11:45. How Perry fought his ship unsupported by the
_Niagara_ until the _Lawrence_ was a wreck and but 20 of his 100 men
were left unhurt; how he fired himself the last heavy gun from his ship
with the help of the purser and chaplain, and then jumped into a small
boat, pulled by his brother and four seamen, boarded the _Niagara_,
took personal command, and carried her to victory, make a story of
courage and resource unsurpassed in any of the sea fights of history.
Never did one man more personify a victory.
The British flag was struck at 3:00 P.M., after a most gallant
struggle. Twenty-nine Americans were killed or mortally wounded and
94 wounded. The British lost 41 killed and 94 wounded. The moral
effect throughout the country, which covered itself with bonfires
and rejoicings, was almost equal to that of the victory of the
_Constitution_. But besides this there was the great concrete result
of the evacuation of Detroit and Michigan by the British and their
occupancy by the Americans. To Perry’s victory and Chauncey’s success
on Lake Ontario is due that we preserved our northwestern frontier in
the coming peace.
The winter of 1813-1814 was passed on Lake Ontario by both antagonists
in building ships for the next campaign. The largest put afloat at
Sackett’s Harbor by the Americans, the arming and equipping of which
was under enormous difficulties of transportation through the then
almost roadless forest, was the _Superior_, of 62 guns; but the British
built a much larger, the _St. Lawrence_, of 112 guns. But it was not
until October 15th that she was in service, too late in the season to
affect the situation. Had the war continued, the lakes would have been
the scene of naval operations greater than any carried on by us upon
the sea, aided curiously enough by the British blockade of our coast,
which caused the transfer to the lakes of the crews of the blockaded
frigates. We shall hear a little later of still another momentous
battle on our inland waters. For the moment we turn again to the ocean.
* * * * *
It may be remembered that the _Essex_, under Captain David Porter,
was to form part of Bainbridge’s command when the latter left Boston
October 26, 1812, with the _Hornet_. Porter was then in Delaware River.
He left on October 28th, but when he reached the rendezvous appointed
his consorts had gone. On his way thither a British brig transport,
the _Nocton_, was captured, with $55,000 in specie, which in the
circumstances to come was to be a most valuable aid. The prize was sent
with a crew of seventeen men to the United States, but was overhauled
by a frigate and captured after passing Bermuda. Porter continued on to
the second rendezvous off Cape Frio, where he arrived December 25th,
four days before the capture of the _Java_. Porter remained on the
Brazilian coast until near the end of January, 1813, when, hearing no
news of his consorts, he started for the Pacific, where for a full year
he was to cruise at will, capturing nearly every British whaler in that
ocean, arming some, destroying others, and recapturing and protecting
our own. British commerce was swept from what was then called the South
Sea. The story of this cruise in which the captain of the _Essex_
showed a surpassing boldness, energy, and resource is one of the most
romantic in history.
After nearly a year of continuous success in crippling the enemy’s
commerce, during which the _Essex_ supported herself and armed her
consorts entirely from her prizes, Porter was desirous of meeting
a British man-of-war, and hearing of the dispatch of the frigate
_Phoebe_, of 36 guns, to the Pacific, he went to Valparaiso to await
her coming. But instead of one ship came two, the _Cherub_ accompanying
the former. This cruising in couples was the outcome of one of the most
remarkable orders ever issued by the British Admiralty; its issuance
was the highest compliment ever paid any navy. The order in full cannot
be omitted, it read:
“My Lords Commissioners of the Admiralty having received intelligence
that several American ships-of-war are now at sea, I have their
lordships’ commands to acquaint you therewith, and that they do not
conceive that any of his Majesty’s frigates should attempt to engage,
single-handed, the larger class of American ships, which, though
maybe called frigates, are of a size, complement, and weight of metal
much beyond that class and more resembling line-of-battle ships.
“In the event of one of his Majesty’s frigates under your orders
falling in with one of these ships, his captain should endeavor in
the first instance to secure the retreat of his Majesty’s ship; but
if he finds that he has an advantage in sailing, he should endeavor
to manœuvre, and keeping company with her, without coming to action,
in the hope of falling in with some other of his Majesty’s ships,
with whose assistance the enemy might be attacked with a reasonable
hope of success.
“It is their lordships’ further directions that you make this known
as soon as possible to the several captains commanding his Majesty’s
ships.”[37]
There is a delightfully ingenuous recognition of the alarm that had
been inspired by our victories in the hope that we might be attacked
by two together, “with a reasonable hope of success.” It was absurd to
compare our frigates with line-of-battle ships. They were undoubtedly
heavier than the usual frigate, though some then in the British navy
were quite as powerful. But the fact that our ships were as good as any
of their class and better than most was all the more to the credit of
their designers. But the _Constitution_, one of our best, was “but very
little more than _one half_ the force of one of the smallest _true_
liners England possessed!”[38]
The _Essex_ thus anchored at Valparaiso on January 12, 1814. She had
in company one of her captured merchantmen, renamed the _Essex Junior_
with 60 men, ten long 6’s, and ten 18-pound carronades. She was of
course wholly unfit to meet a regular cruiser. On February 8th the
_Phoebe_, 36, Captain Hillyar, and the _Cherub_, 18, Captain Tucker,
appeared. There was an evident design on the part of Hillyar to run
aboard the _Essex_, but a very near approach revealed the latter’s
crew at her guns, and he backed his yards, inquiring, meanwhile, of
Captain Porter’s health. Porter politely replied, but warned Hillyar
not to fall foul, adding later, “You have no business where you are;
if you touch a rope-yarn of this ship I shall board instantly.” It
had been well had the two ships fought then and there, for later
the _Essex_ was to be taken at a much greater disadvantage. The two
British ships established a blockade, and on Porter’s endeavor to
fight the _Phoebe_ singly on February 27th she ran down and joined
her consort. On March 28th, however, Porter, who had already decided
to go to sea, parted his port cable in a gale of wind and dragged
his other anchor in the deep roadstead and very difficult anchorage,
under the best of circumstances, at Valparaiso. He had, by several
trials, assured himself of the superior speed of the _Essex_, and now,
under way, was sure of getting clear of his enemies. In rounding the
outermost headland of the bay, his ship was struck by a heavy squall,
which careened her to the gunwale and carried away the maintopmast.
The _Essex_ attempted to regain the harbor, but an adverse wind and
her crippled condition prevented this. She thus stood northward and
anchored three miles north of the town and half a mile from a small
Chilean battery. She was within pistol shot of the shore and far within
neutral waters. But our British kindred have never recked of such small
matters as neutrality unless such stickling served their purpose. Both
British ships thus stood in with flags and mottoes at every masthead,
deliberately took position out of range of the short-range carronades
of the _Essex_ (which carried but about 300 yards), and opened fire.
The time was 4:00 P.M. Now was made apparent the justice of Porter’s
demand for a battery of long-range guns which he had made before
leaving the United States, but which was refused him. He thus had to
fight the action with but his six long 12-pounders. The result was
the loss of the ship, but never was ship more gallantly fought. Near
the end she caught fire and a quantity of powder exploded below. Many
men were knocked overboard and some, jumping into the water to swim
ashore when the ship had become a total wreck, succeeded. At 6:20 the
ship was surrendered. Of the 255 of the crew 58 had been killed, 66
wounded, and 31 drowned; 24 reached the shore. The _Phoebe_ had lost
4 killed, including her first lieutenant, and 7 wounded; the _Cherub_
1 killed and 3 wounded. Such were the benefits of being able to fight
at long taw. Captain Hillyar is not to be blamed for so doing; his
business was to capture the _Essex_, and he did this with as little
loss to himself and consort as might be. But all the honors were with
the American. Hillyar’s flagrant violation of the neutrality of Chile
was in British eyes but an easily condoned incident, and he received
all the praise and regard which would have been due for taking the
_Essex_ in fairest fight. He gave at least every credit to the brave
defenders of our ship. As usual in modern British accounts of this
notable battle, no reference is made to the crippled state of the
_Essex_, nor to her being in neutral waters, nor to the fact that she
had a battery incomparably inferior in range, nor that two ships were
employed against one to do the work. The “American frigate _Essex_ was
captured by the British frigate _Phoebe_,” and British self-respect
thereby saved.
One officer who did his duty bravely and well in the _Essex_, as did
all, was later to achieve fame as the most brilliant naval officer of
his time: David Glasgow Farragut, then aged twelve years and eight
months. Farragut continued his battle even after the surrender in a
stand-up fight aboard the _Phoebe_ for the preservation of his pet
young pig, Murphy, an animal always a favorite of sailors. He won.
The _Constellation_, of noble record, was a victim of the blockade,
and, beyond aiding in the defence of Norfolk, had to remain passive.
The _Adams_, after a successful cruise so far as affecting the enemy’s
trade very seriously, had to be burned while careened in the Penobscot
to escape capture by an overwhelming force. The _Peacock_, of 11 guns,
captured the British brig _Epervier_, of 9, with $118,000 in specie
aboard, on April 29, 1814. The _Wasp_, 22, in a daring and successful
cruise of destruction in the English Channel, met and captured on June
28th the British _Reindeer_, 18, of considerably less force, in an
action which was honorable to the captains and crews of both ships. On
September 1st, after a brilliant night action, she captured the _Avon_,
of 18 guns. The _Wasp_ was driven off by the approach of three new
antagonists, who had to go to the assistance of the _Avon_, which sank
after the removal of several of her crew. The _Wasp_, after taking a
number of prizes, spoke on October 4th a Swedish brig and received from
her Lieutenant McKnight and Master’s Mate Lyman, both on their way home
from the _Essex_. This was the last ever heard of her and her brilliant
and lamented captain. The last memento of her, besides that of October
9th in the journal of the Swedish brig, the _Adonis_, was a prize,
the _Atlanta_, which reached Savannah November 4th under Midshipman
Geisinger.