The ending of the war with France was but to find, shortly, another on
our hands, for which the former, however, was an admirable preparation
at a minimum cost; for it had caused provision of the absolute
essentials to meet the new emergency: ships, officers, and men. The
lesson to be learned was, however, largely to be disregarded by those
now to come into political power.
Fenimore Cooper began the seventeenth chapter of his classic history
of the navy by some words of political wisdom which are applicable to
this day, and apparently always will be: “Every form of government,”
he says, “has evils peculiar to itself. In a democracy there
exists a standing necessity for reducing everything to the average
comprehension, the high intelligence of a nation usually conceding as
much to its ignorance as it imparts. One of the worst consequences in
a practical sense, of this compromise of knowledge, is to be found in
the want of establishments that require foresight and liberality to be
well managed, for the history of every democracy has shown that it has
been deficient in the wisdom which is dependent on those expenditures
that foster true economy, by anticipating evils and avoiding the waste
of precipitation, want of system, and a want of knowledge.” In every
epoch of difficulty--the French spoliations, the British impressments,
the War of 1812, the Mexican War, our Civil War, and the Spanish
War--this truth has been painfully apparent in the want of foresight
and preparation of an adequate army and navy. It has cost us dear.
In 1801 came into power a new political school of which Jefferson
was the great exponent. With strong French sympathies, he had not
favored the naval war with France, and his party was bent upon naval
economy. Thus an early act of his administration, which began March 4,
1801, was to carry into effect a law passed toward the close of the
Congress which had just expired, it is true, but which had been elected
under the new political inspiration. The law referred to empowered
the President to sell all or any of the vessels of the navy with the
exception of thirteen frigates, and obliged him to reduce the list
of officers to nine captains, thirty-six lieutenants, and one hundred
and fifty midshipmen. The selling of twenty of the smaller ships was
not so great an evil in itself, as new ordnance was coming into use
and small guns of light calibre, carrying balls from six to nine and
twelve pounds, were being superseded by carronades--short guns with
thin walls and very small charges. They were of two calibres, 32 and 24
pounders. The former with a powder charge of two pounds had a range of
about 300 yards. It is evident that at long range the long gun with a
much heavier charge had a great advantage. The carronade was only fit
for close quarters. This change required vessels of much stouter build
than the light sloops-of-war such as most of those sold were. But the
mistake was that they were not replaced. The law of 1798 had authorized
the building of six ships-of-the-line to carry 74 guns each. This was
now unhappily suspended; an error bitterly to be repented.
It was a period of utmost world unrest when we were to be ground
between the upper and nether millstones of Napoleonic authority and
British arrogance. Depredations upon our commerce were constant, not
only by Barbary corsairs but by highly civilized France and England
which latter also for years impressed our seamen at will. It was
a period when true statesmanship demanded a powerful naval force;
when but a mere fraction of the losses by seizure of our merchant
marine and of the cost of the War of 1812 would have built a fleet
of ships-of-the-line and would have saved us both the spoliation and
the war. But Jefferson, though he had taken the finer stand as to the
Barbary outrages, seemed incapable of understanding that his views as
to these were of universal application, and that they held good against
Britain and France as well as against Algiers and Tripoli. He seemed
obsessed with an enmity to any naval force. He expressed the view that
a navy was “a ruinous folly.”[21] And in his annual message of December
15, 1802, advised “to add to our navy yard at Washington a dock within
which our vessels may be laid up dry and under cover from the sun.”
Perhaps no more extraordinary views as to national defence ever came
from any one with a claim to be a statesman.
Jefferson’s election had only just been preceded by one of the most
extraordinary incidents of our naval history: the impressment in 1800
of the frigate _George Washington_ by the Dey of Algiers to carry a
shipload of tribute to the Sultan of Turkey. This ship, commanded
by Captain William Bainbridge, one of the most capable officers of
our service, had been sent with our own tribute to Algiers, where he
arrived September, 1800. The Dey had got into disfavor by making peace
with France while Turkey was at war with that country on account of
the occupancy of Egypt by Bonaparte. Hence the desire of the Dey for
restoration to favor. He threatened instant war against the United
States in case of Bainbridge’s refusal. The _George Washington_ lay
under the guns of the port and escape was extremely doubtful; there was
the strong probability of the seizure of the ship, the slavery of the
officers and crew, and the consequent subjection of our large commerce
in the Mediterranean to destruction. Bainbridge, gallant man as he was,
esteemed it his duty to sacrifice, possibly, his good name and comply.
Our consul advised his so doing and he finally yielded, though in
bitterness of spirit, aggravated by the attitude of the Dey, who said:
“You pay me tribute by which you become my slaves. I have therefore a
right to order you as I please.” The situation was but the outcome of
years of compliance with such a system.
Bainbridge sailed on October 19, 1800, for Constantinople with a mixed
cargo: an ambassador and suite of a hundred, a hundred negro women and
children, four horses, a hundred and fifty sheep, twenty-five cattle,
four lions, four tigers, four antelopes, twelve parrots, and funds and
specie and presents amounting to nearly a million dollars; all this in
a small ship with accommodations for a crew of 131. An element of humor
in the situation was the necessity of laying the ship’s head to point
to Mecca at the frequent times of prayer, one being stationed at the
compass to insure correctness of direction. The fact that the ship was
named _George Washington_ added to the incongruity of the situation.
Death had saved Washington himself from the pain of knowledge. The
cruise, however, had one benefit, in making known our flag and country
to the Turks. During his stay in Constantinople, Bainbridge’s personal
qualities and the excellent order of his ship made a deep impression
and were of lasting benefit to his country.
Throughout the year 1800 the attitude of the Dey of Tripoli had become
steadily more threatening, and by February, 1801, he was demanding
a new treaty with a payment of $250,000 and an annual tribute of
$20,000. On May 10, 1801, he declared war, and about June 1st Captain
Richard Dale (Paul Jones’s first lieutenant in the _Bonhomme Richard_)
sailed from Hampton Roads with three frigates: the _President_,
_Philadelphia_, and _Essex_, and the schooner _Enterprise_, to
protect our commerce by blockade of Tripoli and Tunis if necessary. A
humiliating element of the situation was the carrying of $30,000 which
it was hoped the Dey of Tripoli would accept as a compensation for the
annuity of naval stores.
Dale’s arrival off Tripoli caused much disturbance in the mind of the
Dey, but nothing occurred until on August 1st, when the _Enterprise_
captured a Tripolitan vessel of 14 guns and 80 men, after an action of
three hours, which was returned to Tripoli an empty hulk, Dale’s orders
not allowing him to take prizes, but to sink, burn, or destroy. This
curious phase of things arose from the extraordinary views of President
Jefferson as to his constitutional powers. War, as he saw things, could
not exist except by declaration of Congress, however active the enemy
in seizing American ships and making slaves of American citizens and
seamen. The situation was remedied by Congress on February 6, 1802,
which gave the President full powers to act, and was practically a
declaration of war.
Dale had orders to sail for home in October if things should become
peaceful, and was to leave the Mediterranean in any case by December
1st. For this there were two reasons: it was deemed unsafe to cruise in
the Mediterranean in winter, and the crews were enlisted for but one
year. Meanwhile, however, and despite the extraordinary views of the
President, Dale carried out his semi-peaceful, semi-warlike orders, so
far as to blockade Tripoli and capture ingoing vessels. In one of these
were twenty Tripolitan soldiers and an officer, who were exchanged
for three American prisoners. Dale completed his orders so far as to
return in December with two ships only, leaving the _Philadelphia_ and
_Essex_; the first to watch Tripoli from Syracuse as a base, the second
to observe two Tripolitan vessels blockaded at Gibraltar.
A new squadron was now formed with crews enlisted for two years.
Commodore Morris was ordered to the command with his broad-pennant in
the _Chesapeake_ of such later ill-fortune. The other ships were the
_Constellation_, _New York_, _John Adams_, _Adams_, and _Enterprise_.
It is not often that a family finds itself so honored as was the
Adams family in this instance, with two ships of the name in the same
squadron. Isaac Chauncey commanded the _Chesapeake_, John Rodgers the
_John Adams_, Isaac Hull was first lieutenant of the _New York_, and
Oliver Hazard Perry was a midshipman in the _Adams_. All of these were
to rise to high distinction.
The ships of the new squadron sailed as they could be got ready, the
_Chesapeake_ on April 27, 1802, the _John Adams_ not until September
19th. There is no special need to follow the blockade of Tripoli by
Morris’s squadron: the many attacks upon the galleys, generally so
close in shore as to make it difficult to absolutely destroy them; the
rough experiences and dangers on such a coast from heavy weather. There
were conspicuous cases of gallantry and of conduct which went far to
form the character of the service yet in its infancy. Lieutenant David
Porter particularly gave evidence of his coming fame. Morris, relieved
temporarily by Commodore Rodgers, went home in October, 1803, to meet
undeserved charges of want of vigor in his command, which ended in
wrongful dismissal from the service.
By the middle of 1803 a new squadron was formed of the _Constitution_,
_Philadelphia_, and of five brigs and schooners, the _Argus_, _Siren_,
_Nautilus_, _Vixen_, and _Enterprise_. Edward Preble was the commodore
in command.
It is a habit with some to call Paul Jones or John Barry the “father
of the navy” as race sentiment or particular inclination may rule,
but neither has a claim of the sort. Jones never served in the newly
established service or had anything to do with its organization.
The ephemeral navy of the Revolution had entirely passed away; the
navy of 1794 was not a reconstitution; it was a new birth, and with
this Barry’s connection was without special distinction. Jones was a
Scot by birth; Barry was an Irishman. Both are in the first rank as
naval officers, but neither did anything to form the new navy. This
was the work of Edward Preble, American by long descent, tradition,
and training. Born in Portland, Maine, August 15, 1761, he ran away
when seventeen to go to sea in a privateer; he was shortly made a
midshipman in the _Protector_, the largest ship of the Massachusetts
state navy; was in several actions, and when the _Protector_ was
captured became a prisoner in the prison ship _Jersey_, at New York.
When released he was immediately again at sea, this time in the state
privateer _Winthrop_, and was of the party which cut out an armed
British brig from under the British fort in Penobscot Bay. When the
United States navy came to life again he was commissioned one of the
first five lieutenants. In 1799 he was promoted to captain and in
command of the _Essex_ convoyed fourteen valuable merchantmen to China.
His high temper and strict discipline were, in the early part of his
Mediterranean service, to make him somewhat unpopular, but his great
qualities soon brought an admiration and regard which have come down
as a cherished tradition of the service, as warm to-day as a hundred
years since. It is to him should be given the credit of establishing
the character of the little navy which fought the War of 1812, covering
itself with fame, and bringing a new respect to our country which owes
his memory every honor, and continues to owe it in much greater measure
than ever paid.
The _Philadelphia_ was one of the first of the new squadron to arrive
abroad. Her haste brought good fortune. Hearing at Gibraltar of
Tripolitan vessels off Cape de Gatt, the southeastern corner of Spain,
Captain Bainbridge at once left, and, on the night of August 26th,
came in contact not with Tripolitans but with a Moorish ship, the
_Meshboha_, of twenty-two guns with a crew of 120 men, and a captured
brig from Boston, the _Celia_. We were not at war with Morocco, but the
Moorish captain said that he had made the capture anticipating war. The
_Philadelphia_ secured her prizes at Gibraltar and went to her station
off Tripoli.
When the _Constitution_ reached Gibraltar, Preble of course learned at
once of the occurrence mentioned, and with his flagship and three other
vessels, one of which was the _John Adams_, flying the broad-pennant of
Commodore Rodgers, who, though the senior officer, cheerfully gave his
services to the new commander-in-chief, went to Tangier and demanded
satisfaction. The result was the complete disavowal by Morocco of the
hostile action.