The now unopposed command of the sea by the British navy and the
consequent invasion and overrunning of the South brought darkest gloom
and despondency to the American cause.
It was well that Providence had given America Washington who, when
all things seemed to fail, held firm and carried us to victory.
Without him the nation could not have survived the throes of birth.
Calm and undismayed, he made up for the inefficiency of Congress, the
lethargy of the states, the discontent of all. Whatever our national
shortcomings--past, present, or future--America can ever be proud of
having produced this king of men, the greatest character in history.
He was, in fact, the Revolution personified. The war was fought
without even the semblance of a government, for even the “Articles of
Confederation and Perpetual Union” reported on July 12, 1776, by a
committee appointed on June 10th (the same day as that on which the
committee was appointed to draft the Declaration of Independence), were
not agreed to by Congress until November 17, 1777, and a sufficient
number of states under the conditions of these articles did not ratify
the action of Congress until March 1, 1781. Thus nearly six years
of war passed before we had anything approaching a confederacy, and
even then, as Washington well said, it was “but a shade without a
substance.” “The organized and carefully barricaded impotence of this
scheme of government,” says an able authority, “is probably unequalled
in history, with any nation surviving.” Congress could only “request”
of the several states, and but too often these requests bore no fruit
whatever. Attendance in Congress lagged, interest dwindled, and by 1780
but for Washington, so far as mortal can judge, the Revolution would
have come to a dismal end.
But Washington’s time of cheer was at hand. From February, 1779, to
March, 1780, Lafayette was in France and unceasing in his efforts in
support of the American cause. It was chiefly due to his efforts that
on May 2, 1780, seven line-of-battle ships and three frigates left
Brest under the Chevalier de Ternay, convoying thirty-six transports
carrying 5,027 troops, officers and men, under Lieutenant-General Count
de Rochambeau. The enemy had, on October 25, 1779, withdrawn from
Narragansett Bay to New York fearing an attack by d’Estaing’s great
fleet after its operations against Savannah. The French fleet anchored
at Newport on July 11th.
The death of de Ternay in December, due, in Lafayette’s judgment, to
despondency caused by his hopeless view of things; the treason of
Arnold which came to light in September; the blockade for most of the
coming winter of the French squadron by, now, a superior British force;
the arrival in the West Indies at the end of April, 1781, of the Count
de Grasse with a powerful addition to the French fleet; the information
that he expected to come on to the American coast; the pressing
messages to him from Washington and Rochambeau to hasten his departure;
the reply received on August 14th that he would sail on August 13th
for the Chesapeake with 3,300 troops, artillery, and siege guns, and
1,200,000 livres (francs) in money, determined the move of the small
allied armies to Virginia, where Cornwallis, now some months in that
state, was finally to take up an entrenched position at Yorktown, his
move from Portsmouth being completed on August 22d.
The American and French armies, after a whole year’s inaction, joined
on July 6, 1781, taking position on a line from Dobbs’ Ferry to the
Bronx. The Fates were surely with America. Everything conspired for
the allies’ success; the position taken had convinced Clinton that New
York was to be attacked; he pressed Cornwallis to send him every man
he could spare, but Cornwallis could spare none. Rodney in the West
Indies, misinformed as to De Grasse’s intentions, and thinking he was
to take but half his fleet instead of the whole, detached but fourteen
of his own command to go north under Sir Samuel Hood to reinforce
Admiral Graves at New York. Rodney himself left for England on leave
of absence, carrying four ships with him. The two vessels dispatched
to Graves with information of British intentions never reached him. He
was east with his squadron when one, arriving at New York, was sent on
to him but was driven ashore on Long Island by a superior force and
destroyed; the other and more important one, giving word of Hood’s
departure, was captured. For this reason, though Graves returned to
New York on August 16th, he still remained in the dark as to Hood’s
movements. The whole was a marvel of good fortune for the Americans,
while every move of De Grasse’s fleet and of the allied armies were to
fit with the perfection of mechanism.
Hood left the West Indies on August 10th. On the 25th he looked into
the Chesapeake and, finding nothing, went on to Sandy Hook, where
he arrived August 28th. That same evening word was received that De
Barras (who had arrived from France as the successor of De Ternay) had
sailed from Newport with his whole division of eight of the line, four
frigates, and eighteen transports. It was now known to the British
general that the allied armies were on their way south and that De
Grasse was bound for the Chesapeake. Graves, with five of the line
and a 50-gun ship, all that could be got ready in the time, joined
Hood off Sandy Hook on August 31st and started south. He had nineteen
ships-of-the-line to De Grasse’s twenty-eight. But De Grasse was
already inside the capes, which he had reached on August 30th, and was
at anchor in Lynnhaven Bay, just within Cape Henry. He had at once
landed his troops and had stationed cruisers in James River to prevent
Cornwallis attempting to escape to North Carolina. His dispositions
reduced his available ships to twenty-four of the line. At this moment
Washington “was crossing the Delaware on his way south, with 6,000
regular troops, 2,000 American and 4,000 French, to join Lafayette,”
who now, with the 3,300 French from the fleet, had 8,000 regulars and
militia.
On September 5th Admiral Graves’s fleet was sighted by the French in
the northeast. It was at first thought to be that of De Barras, but,
on discovering the mistake, De Grasse took a course which risked all
by getting under way and going outside the capes to fight a battle. To
get twenty-four heavy sailing ships under way and attempt to get them
in any formation in a reasonable time, even with the ebb tide which was
running, was, with the wind north-northeast, a difficult operation.
Several had to tack in order to clear Cape Henry, and by the time they
reached the open sea the French ships must have been in very straggling
condition. Graves failed to take advantage of such an opportunity.
Instead of crowding sail, with a wind as fair as he could wish, and
pressing down for the French, whom he might have attacked in detail, he
formed a line heading out to sea, to fight a battle, partially under
the old rule of parallel columns with each ship engaging her opposite,
and partially under new ideas of tactics which Graves, just from
England, had imbibed but which most of his captains had scarcely heard
of.
The action began about four o’clock, signals were not understood, and,
taken all in all, the handling of the British fleet was badly botched.
Furthermore, Sir Samuel Hood, who commanded the rear division and was
an officer of highest reputation, showed no initiative such as, in the
circumstances, might have been expected, his division getting scarcely
into gunshot. Thus at sunset, when the battle ceased, the British
were in decidedly the worse plight, with a loss of 90 killed and 246
wounded, against about 200 killed and wounded of the French, and with
several ships very severely injured, one, the _Terrible_, 74, so much
so that she was in sinking condition, and five days later was burned.
Though the two fleets were yet in sight of each other for four days,
neither showed a wish to renew the action. On September 10th, when
morning broke, the French were out of sight. Next day they reëntered
the Chesapeake, capturing near the entrance two frigates sent by
Graves to reconnoitre, one of which was the _Iris_ which had been the
American _Hancock_. They found at anchor within the capes the division
of Barras which the day before had arrived from Newport with the siege
artillery intended for use at Yorktown. On the 13th the British fleet
stood in for the capes and sighted the French at anchor. There was
nothing to do but to return north. On the 19th it was again at Sandy
Hook, and American independence was won.
Washington had not heard until September 5th of De Grasse’s arrival.
“Standing on the river bank at Chester, he waved his hat in the air
as the Comte de Rochambeau approached, and with many demonstrations
of uncontrollable happiness he announced to him the good news.” Had
he known that at that moment De Grasse was under way to go to sea and
fight a battle, he would have been less joyous. For it was only the
want of initiative on the part of the British admiral that saved the
situation. For had the latter at any time in the six days which the
French spent at sea himself entered the Chesapeake, he could have held
the position, and De Grasse’s venture would have gone for nought. It
is highly improbable that in such circumstances de Grasse would have
shown such initiative as to attack New York. It is clear that neither
admiral had a clear sense of the strategy involved, for De Grasse
himself but a little later was again desirous of leaving the Chesapeake
to seek the British fleet, and was only held by the most earnest
remonstrances of Washington. As it was, the army was transported by
September 26th to Williamsburg, and on October 19th Lord Cornwallis
surrendered, thus, virtually, closing the war. De Grasse sailed
November 4th to the West Indies and to ruin; for on April 12, 1782, he
was signally defeated by Rodney and became a prisoner.
The French army was an aid to our success; the French navy was a
necessity. The result completely filled the dictum of Washington,
who foresaw by a hundred years that which is to-day an axiom and one
particularly applicable to our own country: “In any operation and under
all circumstances, a decisive naval superiority is to be considered a
fundamental principle and the basis upon which every hope of success
must ultimately depend.”[10] He would have made a great admiral, a
career he narrowly escaped when it was proposed that he should go
as midshipman under Admiral Vernon. The Fates fortunately decreed
otherwise.
The operations of the Continental navy were now confined to very few
ships. The _Alliance_, under Captain Barry, had left Boston February
11, 1781, carrying Colonel John Laurens and Thomas Paine. The former
bore a letter which, addressed by Washington to Laurens, was to be
shown Vergennes, putting strongly the necessity of money and ships, and
giving the whole logic of the situation in the sentence: “Indeed, it is
not to be conceived how [the British] could subsist a large force in
this country if we had the command of the seas to interrupt the regular
transmission of supplies from Europe.”
The _Alliance_ was unhappy in the character of her crew, which
illustrated the exigencies to which we were now driven. A large number
were British prisoners. These on the return voyage formed a conspiracy
to carry the ship to Ireland, in the suppression of which Barry
exhibited courage and qualities for command of a high order. On the
way he captured two British cruisers, of 16 and 14 guns, the smaller
of which was made a cartel to carry his prisoners, now about 250, into
Halifax. The larger was retaken by a squadron near Cape Cod. The
_Marquis de Lafayette_, a French privateer which had left France at the
same time as the _Alliance_, with a valuable cargo of military stores,
suffered the same fate.
The _Deane_, _Confederacy_, and _Saratoga_ cruised this year in the
West Indies, with small fortune, which was turned into very bad, by the
capture of the _Confederacy_ by a British squadron on April 15th. The
_Trumbull_, at sea on her first cruise, with a mixed crew of wretched
quality, was dismasted in a gale and was taken on August 8th by the
_Iris_ and the _General Monk_, both of which were captured American
ships taken into the British service, one, as just said, being the
_Hancock_, and the latter a privateer, the _General Washington_. The
_Iris_, as but just mentioned above, was taken by the French only a
month later and the _General Monk_ on April 7th of the next year by
the _Hyder Ally_, under Captain Joshua Barney, in one of the notable
actions of the war.
Up to the peace signed September 3, 1783, privateering had continued
active, 383 letters of marque being granted by Congress in 1782, but
the Continental navy had practically disappeared. There were but five
ships remaining: the frigates _Alliance_, _Hague_, and _Bourbon_ (the
last not yet launched), and the ships _General Washington_ and _Duc de
Lauzun_. Only the first two were in commission. Our only line-of-battle
ship, the newly launched _America_, had been given to France to replace
the _Magnifique_, wrecked coming into Boston harbor. The few ships
mentioned gradually disappeared: the _Duc de Lauzun_ was sent to
France as a transport and sold; the _Bourbon_, launched at Middletown,
Connecticut, July 31, 1783, was advertised for sale two months later,
as was the _Hague_ in August; the _General Washington_ was sold the
next year. Sentiment preserved the _Alliance_ until August, 1785, when,
with her sale, the Continental navy passed into history.
* * * * *
To recapitulate some data of the first chapter:
The British navy had at the beginning of the war 270 ships, of which
131 were of the line (from 100 to 60 guns), and but 18,000 seamen. At
the end, January 20, 1783, there were 468 ships, of which 174 were of
the line, and 110,000 seamen. They had lost (taken, destroyed, burned,
foundered, or wrecked) 202 ships carrying 5,130 guns. The Continental
and state navies had lost (taken, destroyed, burned, foundered, or
wrecked) 39 ships, carrying 876 guns. The French had lost (in all the
ways just mentioned) 72 ships, with 2,636 guns; the Spanish 24, with
960 guns; the Dutch 9, with 364 guns.
The British during the war lost 3,087 merchant vessels, taken by
Americans, French, Dutch, and Spanish; 879 of these were retaken
or ransomed. They lost 89 privateers, of which 14 were retaken or
ransomed. They captured 1,135 merchantmen, of which only 27 were
retaken or ransomed, and 216 privateers, of which only one was
retaken.[11] The net result was heavily against them.
The navy of the Revolution, however insufficient and ineffective as
an instrument of real war, served a good purpose. It kept up our
communication with Europe; made many captures of material in ordnance,
ammunition, and stores of utmost importance to our forces, and fought
many gallant actions. But actions between small cruisers and captures
of merchantmen are not the means which bring control of the sea.
The action of greatest moment was that of the little flotilla on
Lake Champlain in 1776, and this, even though defeated, was a main
instrument in gaining the French alliance and thus our independence.
It is the battleship, in that day known as the ship-of-the-line, which
decides the question of command of the world’s highway and thus decides
the outcome of war between powers separated by the ocean. The services
of the small Continental navy thus from the very nature of things could
effect comparatively little so long as the ship-of-the-line could go
and come as it pleased. It was the French battleship in larger numbers
than the English that completely changed the melancholy outlook of
1780 and 1781. In July of the latter year Rochambeau, in a letter to
De Grasse urging him to come north, could use the words: “General
Washington has but a handful of men.... This country has been driven
to bay and all its resources are giving out at once.” He told but the
painful fact. The presence of a dominating fleet gave us victory and
independence; without it the Revolution would have failed. It took us a
hundred years to realize the truth of the principle here stated, and we
have yet to frame a policy in accord with its meaning.
* * * * *
With the passing of the ships passed all semblance of naval
organization. The Board of Admiralty had really consisted of Robert
Morris only, and the Congress of the loosely bound Confederation was
itself almost moribund. The United States found itself free, but it
was the freedom of disorganization, an atrophy of government. The
Revolution had been fought until March, 1781, without an established
government. This is a remarkable fact. We had yet to wait four years
from the peace for a real instrument of government, the Constitution of
1787. The adoption of this on September 13, 1787, was the true birthday
of the Republic rather than the 4th of July, 1776. The Revolution of
1787 was quite as momentous as that of the war just ended.
THE PRINCIPAL SHIPS OF THE CONTINENTAL NAVY
=============+=========+====+===============+=============================
NAME | CLASS |GUNS| ORIGIN | END
-------------+---------+----+---------------+-----------------------------
Alfred |Ship | 24 |Purchased, |Captured, March 9, 1778,
| | | November, | off Senegal, in company
| | | 1775 | with the _Raleigh_, by
| | | | an inferior force.
| | | |
Columbus |Ship | 20 |Purchased, |Chased ashore, March, 1778,
| | | November, | on Point Judith, and
| | | 1775 | burned.
| | | |
Andrew Doria |Brig | 14 |Purchased, |Destroyed, October 7, 1777,
| | | November, | in Delaware River, to
| | | 1775 | prevent capture by
| | | | greatly superior force.
| | | |
Cabot |Brig | 14 |Purchased, |Chased ashore, Nova Scotia,
| | | November, | March, 1777, by British
| | | 1775 | frigate; was got off, and
| | | | taken into British service.
| | | |
Providence |Sloop | 12 |Purchased |Destroyed, August, 1779,
| | | early in | Penobscot Expedition, to
| | | 1776 | prevent capture by greatly
| | | | superior force.
| | | |
Lexington |Brig | 16 |Purchased in |Captured, September 19, 1777,
| | | 1776 | by British cutter
| | | | _Alert_, 10.
| | | |
Reprisal |Brig | 16 |Purchased in |Lost, October, 1777, banks of
| | | 1776 | Newfoundland, on
| | | | return from Europe.
| | | |
Raleigh |Frigate | 32 |Built at |Chased ashore, September,
| | | Portsmouth, | 1778, by greatly superior
| | | N. H., 1776 | force, on Maine coast;
| | | | hauled off, and taken into
| | | | British service.
| | | |
Hancock |Frigate | 32 |Built at |Captured, July, 1777, off
| | | Salisbury, | Cape Sambro, by
| | | Mass., 1776 | _Rainbow_, 44.
| | | |
Washington |Frigate | 32 |Built on the |Destroyed, May, 1778, in
| | | Delaware, | Delaware River, to prevent
| | | 1776 | capture, without getting to
| | | | sea.
| | | |
Randolph |Frigate | 32 |Built on the |Blew up, March 17, 1778, in
| | | Delaware, | action with Yarmouth, 64.
| | | 1776 |
| | | |
Warren |Frigate | 28 |Built at |Destroyed, August, 1779, in
| | | Providence, | Penobscot Bay Expedition.
| | | 1776 |
| | | |
Providence |Frigate | 28 |Built at |Captured, May 11, 1780, on
| | | Providence, | surrender of Charleston.
| | | 1776 |
| | | |
Trumbull |Frigate | 28 |Built at |Captured, August 9, 1781,
| | | Middletown, | by superior force.
| | | Conn., 1776 |
| | | |
Congress |Frigate | 28 |Built at |Destroyed, October, 1777, in
| | | Poughkeepsie,| Hudson, to prevent capture.
| | | N. Y., 1776 |
| | | |
Virginia |Frigate | 28 |Built at |Captured, March 31, 1778, in
| | | Baltimore, | Chesapeake, through
| | | 1776 | grounding.
| | | |
Effingham |Frigate | 28 |Built on the |Destroyed, May, 1778, in the
| | | Delaware, | Delaware, without getting
| | | 1776 | to sea.
| | | |
Boston |Frigate | 24 |Built at |Captured, May 11, 1780, on
| | | Newburyport, | surrender of Charleston.
| | | 1776 |
| | | |
Montgomery |Frigate | 24 |Built at |Destroyed, October, 1777,
| | | Poughkeepsie,| in Hudson, to prevent
| | | N. Y., 1776 | capture; never got to sea.
| | | |
Delaware |Frigate | 24 |Built on the |Captured, September, 1777, at
| | | Delaware, | Philadelphia, by General
| | | 1776 | Howe.
| | | |
Ranger |Ship | 18 |Built at |Captured, May 11th, on
| | | Portsmouth, | surrender of Charleston; a
| | | N. H., 1777 | very successful ship.
| | | |
Confederacy |Frigate | 32 |Built at |Surrendered, April 15, 1781,
| | | Norwich, | to British frigates
| | | Conn., 1778 | _Roebuck_ and _Orpheus_.
| | | |
Pallas |Frigate | 32 |Purchased in |Later history unknown.
| | | France, 1779 |
| | | |
General |Ship | 18 |Built 1778 |Sold.
Gates | | | |
| | | |
Bonhomme |Frigate | 42 |Purchased in |Sunk, September 25, 1779,
Richard | | | France, | after capturing the
| | | Jan., 1779 | _Serapis_.
| | | |
Serapis |Frigate | 44 |Captured, |Sold at Lorient, France,
| | | September | date unknown.
| | | 23, 1779 |
| | | |
Deane |Frigate | 32 |Built in |Sold, August, 1783.
(renamed, | | | France, 1777 |
in 1782, | | | |
the Hague) | | | |
| | | |
Queen of |Frigate | 28 |Built in |Sunk at Charleston, April,
France | | | France, 1777 | 1780, as an obstruction to
| | | | British fleet.
| | | |
Revenge |Cutter | 14 |Purchased in |Sold, March, 1779, after
| | | France, 1777 | having great success as a
| | | | cruiser; refitted as a
| | | | privateer under same
| | | | captain (Conyngham), and
| | | | captured April, 1779.
| | | |
Saratoga |Cutter | 18 |Built 1777 |Lost, 1781, at sea, and never
| | | | heard of.
| | | |
General |Cutter | 20 |Originally a |Captured by British and named
Washington | | | privateer | _General Monk_; recaptured
| | | | by Barney, in Hyder Ally,
| | | | April 8, 1782; bought into
| | | | the Continental service,
| | | | resumed original name, and
| | | | was sold in 1784.
| | | |
Duc de |Cutter | 20 |Purchased 1782 |Sold in France, 1783.
Lauzun | | | |
| | | |
Bourbon |Frigate | 36 |Built at |Sold, September, 1783.
| | | Middletown, |
| | | Conn., |
| | | 1782-1783 |
| | | |
America |Ship-of- | 74 |Laid down, |Presented to France by
|the-line | | May, 1777; | Resolution of Congress of
| | | launched, | September 3, 1782, to
| | | November 5, | replace the _Magnifique_,
| | | 1782 | wrecked, August 13, 1782,
| | | | on Lovell’s Island, near
| | | | Boston.
| | | |
Indian |Frigate | 40 |Built by |Sold to France to escape
| | | Congress in | diplomatic complications;
| | | Holland | hired to South Carolina;
| | | | captured, December 19,
| | | | 1782, by a British
| | | | squadron.
| | | |
Alliance |Frigate | 32 |Built at |Sold, August, 1785. With this
| | | Salisbury, | sale ended the navy of the
| | | Mass., 1778 | Revolution.
-------------+---------+----+---------------+-----------------------------