CHAPTER IV

It was not until February, 1776, that what may be termed a strictly

naval event took form in the sailing of the little fleet in command of

Commodore Esek Hopkins, under orders which were sufficiently explicit

in primary meaning, viz.: to proceed to Chesapeake Bay and destroy the

powerful flotilla which the royal governor of Virginia had gathered

together and with which he was harassing the Chesapeake shores. Hopkins

was then to proceed to the Carolinas and act in like manner against

the enemy’s forces, after which he was to go to Rhode Island. A final

phrase, however, left a loophole for other action: “if bad winds or

stormy weather” or any other accident should prevent, he was to use his

own judgment.

Hopkins flew his broad-pennant in the _Alfred_, in which also was then

hoisted by the hands of Lieutenant John Paul Jones a Continental flag

which bore a rattlesnake and a motto, “Don’t tread on me,” on a yellow

ground. The exact date of this incident is unknown. The other vessels

of the squadron were the ship _Columbus_, 20; the brig _Andrew Doria_,

14; brig _Cabot_, 14; brig _Providence_, 12; sloop _Hornet_, 10;

schooner _Wasp_, 8; schooner _Fly_, 8. The number of men was about 880.

Hopkins, instead of going to the Chesapeake, directed his course,

on the plea of bad weather, to New Providence in the Bahamas, where

there were considerable stores of powder and cannon of which the newly

formed Continental army was in utmost need. Though blamed later by

enemies, Hopkins took the wiser course. His advent there on March 3d

was a complete surprise: 250 men were landed and possession taken of

the little town and forts without resistance. Two weeks was spent in

getting aboard the guns, of which there were seventy-one, from 9 to 32

pounders. There were also fifteen brass mortars and twenty-four barrels

of powder. The governor, unfortunately, had succeeded in sending away

150 of the latter. The guns, however, were an extremely important

prize, and to carry these and other public property seized, a sloop was

impressed. Hopkins sailed north on March 17th, carrying the governor,

lieutenant-governor, and another official. By this time Newport,

Rhode Island, was occupied by a British force, and New London was

selected instead as a port of return. When off Block Island the British

man-of-war _Glasgow_, of 20 guns and 150 men, was sighted, and a

running action took place, in which the _Glasgow_, though much injured,

escaped into Newport. The explanation of the American commander was

that the firing must bring aid from Newport to the _Glasgow’s_ rescue,

and in fact two vessels in the harbor did get under way to go out. The

force in Newport, however, which was only the small frigate _Rose_, of

20 guns, the _Nautilus_ and _Swan_, of 16 each, and several tenders,

was no more than an equal match for our own. As far as one can read

into this event, there was not the energy shown by our people which

should have been. Giving up the action, the American squadron reached

New London with all its prize intact. The Commodore’s practical

disobedience of orders was fully condoned by Congress, and he received

a letter of congratulation from President John Hancock.

The British squadron, suffering a good deal from fire from batteries on

shore, had left Newport on April 5th, and Hopkins entered Narragansett

Bay, going to Providence on April 25th. So many of his men had sickened

on the cruise from the poor food, bad water, and want of general

hygiene aboard ship at that period, that he had landed 200 at New

London. He now found it impossible to get men. Some soldiers who had

been temporarily lent from the army were demanded back by Washington,

and there ensued a painful period for the unhappy Commodore. Great

complaints of ill-treatment went to Congress. Hopkins’ manners to his

officers were severely criticised, and the whole ended in an official

inquiry which included his disobedience of orders, his allowing the

_Glasgow_ to escape, and his inactivity since his return. He was not

entirely cleared on the first two charges, but the prevalent sickness

among his men and the impossibility of getting new crews on account

of the active fitting out of privateers were certainly sufficient to

exonerate him from the third. Notwithstanding, and although he was

energetically defended by John Adams, he received a formal censure

from Congress, but was allowed for the moment to retain his command.

In regard to the question of roughness toward his subordinates which

was involved in the charges, it must be considered that all officers

of the period had entered the Continental service from the rough life

of the merchantman of the time; many had served in privateers; the

officers of the British navy itself were themselves not altogether

lamblike, if we are to believe Smollet, who had personal experience as

a surgeon’s mate. It was in many ways a rough age afloat and ashore

and in every society, and such charges as were brought against Hopkins

cannot justly be judged from our present standpoint. Certainly John

Paul Jones, his first lieutenant, wrote him at this time a kindly

and sympathetic letter regarding this trial. Though Hopkins remained

yet some time in the service, it was not for long. His enemies, and

apparently they were not few, again brought charges against him. As a

result, Congress on March 26, 1777, resolved that he be suspended from

his command, and on January 2, 1778, he was dismissed from the service.

That the service suffered thereby can hardly be said, as he was now

sixty years old, an old age for that period, and was scarcely equal

to the exercise of vigorous command, but the fact remains that he met

unduly harsh treatment.

Hopkins’s squadron was now broken up, though the several ships had

remained under his general orders until his dismissal. They cruised

chiefly “down East” off New England and Nova Scotia, making a number

of prizes, one of which, the _Mellish_, taken by the _Alfred_,

now commanded by Jones, carried a cargo of soldiers’ clothing for

Burgoyne’s army of 13,000 men now in Canada, intended to proceed by

Lake Champlain to New York and thus occupy a line which would separate

New England entirely from the rest of the country.

A considerable fleet chiefly of gunboats had, as mentioned, been built

by the British for service on Lake Champlain. The offset to this, by

the building of a flotilla under Arnold, has also already been noted.

The building of this little fleet was to change history.

The British naval preparations were so delayed that it was not until

October, 1776 (on the 11th and 13th), that the two forces came

together, with the result, after a most gallant contest, of a defeat

to the Americans, who retreated up the lake, destroying all their

vessels but one galley, a sloop, and two small schooners, and the

galley _Washington_, which last was captured. The gallantry of the

American force is all the more to be commended as it was one gathered

from raw material, most of which was unaccustomed to work of the kind

it was called upon to do; the British, on the other hand, were all

men-of-war’s men “detached from his Majesty’s ships and vessels in the

river St. Lawrence to serve on Lake Champlain,” to the number of 670.

As the Americans were about 700, the forces were almost equal in

numbers. It was far otherwise in strength, the British in numbers

of vessels, in size, and in armament far outclassing the Americans.

They were in numbers 29 to 15, and the ship _Inflexible_ alone, which

carried eighteen 12-pounders, was able to look after a large proportion

of the American squadron. The American loss was over eighty; that of

the British did not exceed forty. The former had lost all, but to good

purpose, for this little fleet had delayed the advance southward of

Burgoyne’s army another year, thus giving time to prepare resistance,

and what perhaps was equally to the purpose, so far as the fortunes of

America were concerned, affording time to General Howe to carry out, in

July, 1777, his views as to the necessity of occupying Philadelphia;

for had Burgoyne, as proposed, started from Canada in the summer of

1776, Howe, with his whole large army would have been at New York

within easy support of this movement of so vital moment to the British.

As it was, in 1777, the forces were widely separated, and Burgoyne,

instead of being aided as he had expected, went to his destruction.

Thus “Never,” says Clowes in the great history of “The Royal Navy,”

speaking of this action, “had any force, big or small, lived to better

purpose or died more gloriously.” “That the war spread from America

to Europe, from the English Channel to the Baltic, from the Bay of

Biscay to the Mediterranean, from the West Indies to the Mississippi,

and ultimately involved the remote waters of Hindostan, is traceable,

through Saratoga, to the rude flotilla which in 1776 anticipated its

enemy in the possession of Lake Champlain.”

It was as just mentioned when Burgoyne most needed support in his

advance south the next year (1777) that, Sir William Howe (the British

commander-in-chief in America) embarked 14,000 men, and escorted by

the fleet under command of his brother, Lord Howe, sailed from Sandy

Hook, the expedition numbering 280 ships, including the transports and

men-of-war. Eight thousand men were left at New York under Sir Henry

Clinton. Howe’s objective was Philadelphia. His first intention was to

go up the Delaware, but obstructions in the river being reported by

one of the naval captains, he changed to the very roundabout way of

the Chesapeake Bay. He was not able to land his troops at the head of

the bay until August 25th. He defeated Washington at the battle of the

Brandywine on September 11th, and on the 26th occupied Philadelphia.

The General’s brother, Lord Howe, in command of the fleet, was a good

month returning from the head of the Chesapeake round to and up the

Delaware as far as Chester, where he arrived on October 6th, so slow

and uncertain were the movements of sailing ships in those days. A

small squadron had been sent in advance to clear the channel. This move

on the part of the British to occupy the river was necessary to keep up

the supplies of their army. In this fleet there were eleven vessels,

two of which were 64’s, one 50, and three frigates of 28 to 44 guns.

The total of their armament was 364 guns, 74 of which were 24-pounders,

with somewhat over 2,000 men. To resist this powerful force there were

in the river the new Continental frigate _Delaware_, of twenty-four

12-pounders; the brig _Andrew Doria_, of fourteen 6-pounders; and the

sloop _Hornet_, with twelve 9-pounders; besides six smaller vessels

carrying from four to ten 9-pounders, and twelve galleys with one gun

each, of 18, 24, or 32 pounds. These were assisted by the whole of

the Pennsylvania navy, which consisted of the ship _Montgomery_, of

fourteen 14-pounders, and thirty-eight small craft carrying fifty-one

guns varying from 4 to 18 pounders. The total armament was 175 guns.

The combined Continental and state fleets were under the command

of Commodore John Hazelwood of the latter. To support these there

were Fort Mifflin on an island, with also two small batteries on the

mainland, just below the mouth of the Schuylkill and two miles from

League Island on the Pennsylvania side, and opposite, on the New Jersey

shore, at Red Bank, Fort Mercer; a battery opposite Hog Island, and

three and a half miles below this, another. Obstructions of heavy

timbers, shod at their points with iron, were placed opposite this last

battery and in the channel near Fort Mifflin.

The Delaware River has a somewhat tortuous, and in places a narrow,

channel. Its defensive advantages are thus very strong, and the

Americans had a fair chance of success. The most powerful of the naval

defence was lost in the beginning by the grounding of the _Delaware_

near a British battery on the city front.

Notwithstanding, the Americans made a fine defence of more than six

weeks. It was not until November 10th that the British succeeded in

clearing the river to Philadelphia and then with heavy loss in men and

in ships, two of which, a ship-of-the-line and a sloop-of-war, were

burned. Later, in May, 1778, they invaded the river above Philadelphia.

The frigates _Washington_ and _Effingham_, nearly ready for sea, had to

be burned, and besides these a ship of 18 guns, and brigs, schooners,

and small craft, some fifty-four in all, destroyed; a sad ending to a

long and gallant struggle.

It was in the Delaware that in December, 1777, David Bushnell made a

second trial of his torpedoes (the first having been in the Hudson).

He used kegs of powder fitted with a detonating fuse, which should

have succeeded. No damage was done through, as Bushnell claims, bad

management. The British fleet was alarmed enough, however, to justify

Francis Hopkinson, one of the signers of American Independence, in

producing the well-known poem of the “Battle of the Kegs,” once a

favorite with our fathers.

The _Randolph_, _Hancock_, _Raleigh_, and _Boston_ were the only

frigates at sea in this year. The _Hancock_, Captain Manley, was

captured July 7th, on this her first cruise, by a British forty-four;

the _Raleigh_, under Captain John Barry, during an action with two

British ships, one of which was of 50 guns, ran on a rocky islet near

Penobscot Bay, September 27, 1778. Her crew escaped ashore, but the

ship, though an effort had been made to burn her, was hauled off by the

British. Both the captured ships were taken into the British service.

The _Randolph_, which had been one of the earliest of the new frigates

to get to sea, had, in the period of her sea service, been actively

cruising in our southern waters under the command of Captain Biddle,

and was ordered to France in October, 1777. She remained there but a

short time owing to the protests of the British ambassador against our

ships remaining in French ports, and returned to Charleston, whence she

had sailed. Here a squadron was organized with four other small vessels

of the South Carolina navy, which went to sea February 12, 1778, and

cruised in the vicinity of the Windward Islands. On March 7th was met

the _Yarmouth_, 64. Biddle gallantly engaged the ship twice his force,

but the _Randolph_ after an action of about fifteen minutes blew up.

Only four men were saved, and these were picked up five days after the

explosion, on a piece of wreckage, by the _Yarmouth_, which meanwhile

had been actively cruising. The incident is certainly among the most

extraordinary of happenings even on the sea, so prolific in adventures.

Three hundred and eleven men were lost besides officers. The loss of

Captain Biddle, one of the most promising of our sea officers, was

specially deplored.

The American Navy · 第 4 / 24 章