CHAPTER I

THE AMERICAN BOOKS

A LIBRARY OF GOOD CITIZENSHIP

“The American Books” are designed as a series of authoritative manuals,

discussing problems of interest in America to-day.

THE AMERICAN BOOKS

THE AMERICAN COLLEGE BY ISAAC SHARPLESS

THE INDIAN TO-DAY BY CHARLES A. EASTMAN

COST OF LIVING BY FABIAN FRANKLIN

THE AMERICAN NAVY BY REAR-ADMIRAL FRENCH E. CHADWICK, U. S. N.

MUNICIPAL FREEDOM BY OSWALD RYAN

AMERICAN LITERATURE BY LEON KELLNER

(TRANSLATED FROM THE GERMAN BY JULIA FRANKLIN)

SOCIALISM IN AMERICA BY JOHN MACY

AMERICAN IDEALS BY CLAYTON S. COOPER

THE UNIVERSITY MOVEMENT BY IRA REMSEN

THE AMERICAN SCHOOL BY WALTER S. HINCHMAN

THE FEDERAL RESERVE BY H. PARKER WILLIS

(_For more extended notice of the series, see the last pages of this

book._)

_The American Books_

The

American Navy

By

Rear-Admiral French E. Chadwick

(_U. S. N., Retired_)

[Illustration]

GARDEN CITY NEW YORK

DOUBLEDAY, PAGE & COMPANY

1915

_Copyright, 1915, by_

DOUBLEDAY, PAGE & COMPANY

_All rights reserved, including that of

translation into foreign languages,

including the Scandinavian_

TO

MY COMRADES OF THE NAVY

PAST, PRESENT, AND FUTURE

BIOGRAPHICAL NOTE

Rear-Admiral French Ensor Chadwick was born at Morgantown, W. Va.,

February 29, 1844. He was appointed to the U. S. Naval Academy

from West Virginia (then part of Virginia) in 1861, and graduated

in November, 1864. In the summer of 1864 he was attached to the

_Marblehead_ in pursuit of the Confederate steamers _Florida_ and

_Tallahassee_. After the Civil War he served successively in a number

of vessels, and was promoted to the rank of Lieutenant-Commander in

1869; was instructor at the Naval Academy; on sea service, and on

lighthouse duty (1870-1882); Naval Attaché at the American Embassy in

London (1882-1889); commanded the _Yorktown_ (1889-1891); was Chief

Intelligence Officer (1892-1893); and Chief of the Bureau of Equipment

(1893-1897).

During the war with Spain he was Admiral Sampson’s Chief of Staff, and

also commanded the flagship _New York_. He participated in all the more

important engagements in the Atlantic during the war; was advanced five

numbers in rank for conspicuous conduct in battle, and was presented

with a sword of honor by citizens of his native state.

From 1900 to 1903 he was President of the Naval War College at Newport;

was promoted Rear-Admiral October 11, 1903, and in 1904 became

commander-in-chief of the South Atlantic squadron. He retired February

28, 1906.

Rear-Admiral Chadwick is one of the most influential friends of the

United States navy; he has written extensively on diplomatic and naval

topics, and is the author of “Causes of the Civil War” in the “American

Nation Series.” He is also much interested in problems of municipal

government, is a member of the Newport Representative Council, a member

of the National Institute of Arts and Letters, corresponding member of

the Massachusetts Historical Society, member of the American Historical

Association, etc.

INTRODUCTION

The navy in all countries has ever been, and, as far as we can now

judge, ever will be, a preëminent instrument of government. It was

through her navy that Greece destroyed the power of Persia; Rome that

of Carthage; the allies at Lepanto that of the Turks; England that of

Holland and later that of France in America; the navy of France, in

turn, caused the relinquishment of Great Britain’s sovereignty over

the thirteen colonies which formed the United States, and a generation

later it was the British navy which made the efforts of the great

Napoleon the “baseless fabric of a vision.”

Coming to days within the ken of many still living, the navy was the

power which made possible the preservation of the Union in our great

Civil War by the cutting off of the Southern Confederacy from its

means of support by sea and reducing its forces thereby to practical

inanition. For had the Confederacy had free access to the sea and

control of the Mississippi River, no armies of the North could have

conquered well-supplied armies of the South. So, too, the control

of the sea decided the outcome of the Spanish War. When Sampson’s

fleet destroyed Spain’s only battle squadron off Santiago de Cuba,

Spain could no longer reinforce her army in Cuba, and surrender was a

necessity. Even as this is written Germany’s every sea outlet is closed

by the British fleet, so superior in number to the German, and German

commerce on the sea is for the time entirely swept away, leaving Great

Britain for the moment navally and commercially supreme upon the ocean.

As one attempts to look into the future the vastness of the possible

changes startles the imagination, but in it all is ever present the

power that goes with the ubiquitous warship, from whose threat no port

of the world is free. Military power fades to insignificance, through

its narrow limits of mobility, when compared with the meaning of a

great fleet. The present sketch of history is to show what the warship

has done for us.

THE AMERICAN NAVY

CHAPTER I

When Great Britain attempted to reduce to obedience the rebellious

colonies which were to form the United States of America she was

dealing with a people who in the North at least had long been

conversant with the building and sailing of ships. A New England built

ship entered the Thames in 1638, only eighteen years after the landing

of the Pilgrims at Plymouth, Massachusetts. The New England men, with a

sterile coast, with limitless fishing grounds and unsurpassed harbors,

turned as naturally to the sea for livelihood as did the South, more

kindly treated by nature, to agriculture. In 1670 it was estimated

that two thirds of the British shipping was employed in the American

trade. The Dutch, who had been great carriers on the sea, were excluded

from this trade by the navigation laws of the period. Scotland was not

admitted to the trade of the American plantations until her union with

England in 1707, and Ireland not until 1780, while in 1670 nothing

could be imported into the American colonies but what was laden in

England in English-built ships. But while none of their products could

be carried anywhere (except to other of the plantations) till they were

first landed in England, the ships built in America were reckoned as

English, and this fact gave great impetus to American shipbuilding.

American shipping prospered amazingly. But while thus prospering, it

was the attempted repression of our commerce afloat and ashore (which

included such things as forbidding the exportation of hats, restricting

the manufacture of iron, and forbidding commerce with the foreign-owned

islands of the West Indies) which did much more to develop the idea of

independence than did the Stamp Act. But the net result of conditions

was to foster shipping, and our competition had so increased by 1725

that in that year “the shipwrights of the river Thames came up to

Whitehall with a complaint that their business had declined and their

workmen emigrated because the plantations furnished England with ships.”

On the register of the underwriters at Lloyd’s for 1775, comprehending

the shipping of the three preceding years, there were 3,908

British-built vessels of 605,545 tons, and 2,311 of American build

with a tonnage of 373,618 tons. The average size of the ship of the

time was about 400 tons displacement. One 100 feet in length and 26

to 28 feet broad was a good-sized ship. They were but cockle boats in

comparison with the vast ships of to-day, many of which are full a

hundred times 400 tons displacement.

The foregoing will show that when there came a time to dispute the sea

with Great Britain there was no difficulty in supplying the ships,

and the many ironworks which had been established, particularly in

Massachusetts and Pennsylvania, despite Great Britain’s restrictions,

could furnish guns in the manufacture of which our foundries were

adepts before the war.

The larger men-of-war of the period were greater in size than the

largest merchantmen. The greater ships-of-the-line (by which expression

is meant those which could take their place in the line of battle,

the formation of which was in a single extended column) varied from

4,000 to 3,000 tons displacement. The larger of these, which carried

guns on three main decks and some light guns on the upper deck, to the

number altogether of 100, or even 120, were 180 to 190 feet on the gun

deck, with about 53 feet beam. The most usual size, however, was the

“74,” carrying nominally that number of guns, but usually six or eight

more, on two main decks (and thus known as a two-decker). This class

was about 168 feet long on the gun deck and 47 feet broad. Below this

class there were many ships of sixty, fifty, or even forty-four guns,

with two gun decks. Such, for a long period, formed part of the line of

battle.

The frigates had but one covered gun deck. They varied in length from

115 to 130 feet on the gun deck, and were from 32 to 36 feet beam,

roughly a fourth of their length. They formed no part of a line of

battle, their duty when accompanying a fleet being to remain clear of

the line and repeat the admiral’s signals. There was also a small class

of ship called a sloop-of-war, which carried guns on only the upper,

or spar, deck as it came to be called. These vessels were ship-rigged;

that is, they had three masts with square sails on each. They were

usually about 100 feet long and about 27 feet beam.

The three-deckers, or 100-gun ships, carried about 900 men; the 74’s

about 600; the frigates about 160. The guns of the period were of

course all smooth-bores and muzzle-loaders. In the large ships, the

heavier guns, usually 32-pounders, were carried on the lower gun

decks to give stability to the ship; 18’s or 24’s were carried on the

middle deck, 9’s and 12’s on the upper, 9’s and 6’s on the quarter

deck, which was the part of the upper deck aft of the mainmast, and on

the forecastle, which was the part of the upper deck forward of the

foremast; the space between the two was called the waist. The larger

frigates usually carried 18’s on the gun deck; the smaller, 12’s or

9’s. The sloops carried 9’s or 6’s. The greatest range of even the

heavier guns was but little over 2,000 yards, as the ports rarely

allowed more than 8° or 9° elevation. Such guns were but toys compared

with modern ordnance, but they were common alike to all nations, and

all were thus on the same footing.

An immense difference between that day and this was in the motive power

which then and for two and a half generations later consisted of lofty

wooden masts, reaching skyward in the greater ships about 200 feet,

crossed by “yards,” the larger of which were about 100 feet long, the

former supported by a great mass of rigging known as shrouds and stays,

the latter moved by “braces” and the sails worked by a maze of running

rigging. All this, of course, was subject to being shot away, and ships

were thus frequently completely dismasted or disabled in action. The

same result was often, too, produced by a gale of wind, it being no

uncommon thing for a fleet to be thus completely incapacitated for the

continuance of a voyage.

Weeks or fortnights were spent in a voyage now done in days. Of

certainty as to time of reaching port, there was none. And amid all

there was the danger from enemies, legal or piratical, for the world

was only slowly ridding itself of the latter; and from the inherent

dangers of the sea itself to the clumsy ships which slowly worked their

way across it. How great these last were, through the ignorance at

that time of the law of storms, may be known by the fate of a great

fleet which in 1782 left the West Indies under Admiral Graves, with ten

line-of-battle ships convoying nearly a hundred merchantmen. Among the

former were six of the prizes taken in Rodney’s great naval battle of

April 12, 1782. Caught in a fierce gale southeast of Nova Scotia, five

of the battleships foundered with nearly all on board. One of those

which went down with every soul was the _Ville de Paris_, which had

been the flagship of the unfortunate Count de Grasse. The total loss

of men was estimated at 3,500.

Such was the setting of the period which saw the birth of the first

American navy, which was to have an existence of but eight short

years, to be succeeded, however, nine years after (1794) by the modest

beginnings which have grown into the great fleet of to-day, and whose

history is one of uninterrupted success and honor.

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