We have told of the glorious intellectual dawn of Greece and

Alexandria, and how presently the collapse of the slave- holding

civilizations and the clouds of religious intolerance and absolutist

government darkened the promise of that beginning. The light of

fearless thinking did not break through the European obscurity again

effectually until the fifteenth and sixteenth centuries. We have tried

to show something of the share of the great winds of Arab curiosity and

Mongol conquest in this gradual clearing of the mental skies of Europe.

And at first it was chiefly material knowledge that increased. The

first fruits of the recovered manhood of the race were material

achievements and material power. The science of human relationship, of

individual and social psychology, of education and of economics, are

not only more subtle and intricate in themselves but also bound up

inextricably with much emotional matter. The advances made in them

have been slower and made against greater opposition. Men will listen

dispassionately to the most diverse suggestions about stars or

molecules, but ideas about our ways of life touch and reflect upon

everyone about us.

And just as in Greece the bold speculations of Plato came before

Aristotle’s hard search for fact, so in Europe the first political

enquiries of the new phase were put in the form of “Utopian” stories,

directly imitated from Plato’s _Republic_ and his _Laws_. Sir Thomas

More’s _Utopia_ is a curious imitation of Plato that bore fruit in a

new English poor law. The Neapolitan Campanella’s _City of the Sun_

was more fantastic and less fruitful.

By the end of the seventeenth century we find a considerable and

growing literature of political and social science was being produced.

Among the pioneers in this discussion was John Locke, the son of an

English republican, an Oxford scholar who first directed his attention

to chemistry and medicine. His treatises on government, toleration and

education show a mind fully awake to the possibilities of social

reconstruction. Parallel with and a little later than John Locke in

England, Montesquieu (1689-1755) in France subjected social, political

and religious institutions to a searching and fundamental analysis. He

stripped the magical prestige from the absolutist monarchy in France.

He shares with Locke the credit for clearing away many of the false

ideas that had hitherto prevented deliberate and conscious attempts to

reconstruct human society.

The generation that followed him in the middle and later decades of the

eighteenth century was boldly speculative upon the moral and

intellectual clearings he had made. A group of brilliant writers, the

“Encyclopædists,” mostly rebel spirits from the excellent schools of

the Jesuits, set themselves to scheme out a new world (1766). Side by

side with the Encyclopædists were the Economists or Physiocrats, who

were making bold and crude enquiries into the production and

distribution of food and goods. Morelly, the author of the _Code de La

Nature_, denounced the institution of private property and proposed a

communistic organization of society. He was the precursor of that

large and various school of collectivist thinkers in the nineteenth

century who are lumped together as Socialists.

What is Socialism? There are a hundred definitions of Socialism and a

thousand sects of Socialists. Essentially Socialism is no more and no

less than a criticism of the idea of property in the light of the

public good. We may review the history of that idea through the ages

very briefly. That and the idea of internationalism are the two

cardinal ideas upon which most of our political life is turning.

CARL MARX

CARL MARX

_Photo: Linde & Co._

The idea of property arises out of the combative instincts of the

species. Long before men were men, the ancestral ape was a proprietor.

Primitive property is what a beast will fight for. The dog and his

bone, the tigress and her lair, the roaring stag and his herd, these

are proprietorship blazing. No more nonsensical expression is

conceivable in sociology than the term “primitive communism.” The Old

Man of the family tribe of early palæolithic times insisted upon his

proprietorship in his wives and daughters, in his tools, in his visible

universe. If any other man wandered into his visible universe he

fought him, and if he could he slew him. The tribe grew in the course

of ages, as Atkinson showed convincingly in his _Primal Law_, by the

gradual toleration by the Old Man of the existence of the younger men,

and of their proprietorship in the wives they captured from outside the

tribe, and in the tools and ornaments they made and the game they slew.

Human society grew by a compromise between this one’s property and

that. It was a compromise with instinct which was forced upon men by

the necessity of driving some other tribe out of its visible universe.

If the hills and forests and streams were not _your_ land or _my_ land,

it was because they had to be our land. Each of us would have

preferred to have it _my_ land, but that would not work. In that case

the other fellows would have destroyed us. Society, therefore, is from

its beginning a _mitigation of ownership_. Ownership in the beast and

in the primitive savage was far more intense a thing than it is in the

civilized world to- day. It is rooted more strongly in our instincts

than in our reason.

In the natural savage and in the untutored man to-day there is no

limitation to the sphere of ownership. Whatever you can fight for, you

can own; women-folk, spared captive, captured beast, forest glade,

stone-pit or what not. As the community grew, a sort of law came to

restrain internecine fighting, men developed rough-and-ready methods of

settling proprietorship. Men could own what they were the first to

make or capture or claim. It seemed natural that a debtor who could

not pay should become the property of his creditor. Equally natural was

it that after claiming a patch of land a man should exact payments from

anyone who wanted to use it. It was only slowly, as the possibilities

of organized life dawned on men, that this unlimited property in

anything whatever began to be recognized as a nuisance. Men found

themselves born into a universe all owned and claimed, nay! they found

themselves born owned and claimed. The social struggles of the earlier

civilization are difficult to trace now, but the history we have told

of the Roman Republic shows a community waking up to the idea that

debts may become a public inconvenience and should then be repudiated,

and that the unlimited ownership of land is also an inconvenience. We

find that later Babylonia severely limited the rights of property in

slaves. Finally, we find in the teaching of that great revolutionist,

Jesus of Nazareth, such an attack upon property as had never been

before. Easier it was, he said, for a camel to go through the eye of a

needle than for the owner of great possessions to enter the kingdom of

heaven. A steady, continuous criticism of the permissible scope of

property seems to have been going on in the world for the last

twenty-five or thirty centuries. Nineteen hundred years after Jesus of

Nazareth we find all the world that has come under the Christian

teaching persuaded that there could be no property in human beings.

And also the idea that a man may “do what he likes with his own” was

very much shaken in relation to other sorts of property.

But this world of the closing eighteenth century was still only in the

interrogative stage in this matter. It had got nothing clear enough,

much less settled enough, to act upon. One of its primary impulses was

to protect property against the greed and waste of kings and the

exploitation of noble adventurers. It was largely to protect private

property from taxation that the French Revolution began. But the

equalitarian formulæ of the Revolution carried it into a criticism of

the very property it had risen to protect. How can men be free and

equal when numbers of them have no ground to stand upon and nothing to

eat, and the owners will neither feed nor lodge them unless they toil?

Excessively—the poor complained.

To which riddle the reply of one important political group was to set

about “dividing up.” They wanted to intensify and universalize

property. Aiming at the same end by another route, there were the

primitive socialists—or, to be more exact, communists—who wanted to

“abolish” private property altogether. The state (a democratic state

was of course understood) was to own all property.

It is paradoxical that different men seeking the same ends of liberty

and happiness should propose on the one hand to make property as

absolute as possible, and on the other to put an end to it altogether.

But so it was. And the clue to this paradox is to be found in the fact

that ownership is not one thing but a multitude of different things.

It was only as the nineteenth century developed that men began to

realize that property was not one simple thing, but a great complex of

ownerships of different values and consequences, that many things (such

as one’s body, the implements of an artist, clothing, toothbrushes) are

very profoundly and incurably one’s personal property, and that there

is a very great range of things, railways, machinery of various sorts,

homes, cultivated gardens, pleasure boats, for example, which need each

to be considered very particularly to determine how far and under what

limitations it may come under private ownership, and how far it falls

into the public domain and may be administered and let out by the state

in the collective interest. On the practical side these questions pass

into politics, and the problem of making and sustaining efficient state

administration. They open up issues in social psychology, and interact

with the enquiries of educational science. The criticism of property

is still a vast and passionate ferment rather than a science. On the

one hand are the Individualists, who would protect and enlarge our

present freedoms with what we possess, and on the other the Socialists

who would in many directions pool our ownerships and restrain our

proprietory acts. In practice one will find every gradation between

the extreme individualist, who will scarcely tolerate a tax of any sort

to support a government, and the communist who would deny any

possessions at all. The ordinary socialist of to-day is what is called

a collectivist; he would allow a considerable amount of private

property but put such affairs as education, transport, mines,

land-owning, most mass productions of staple articles, and the like,

into the hands of a highly organized state. Nowadays there does seem

to be a gradual convergence of reasonable men towards a moderate

socialism scientifically studied and planned. It is realized more and

more clearly that the untutored man does not co-operate easily and

successfully in large undertakings, and that every step towards a more

complex state and every function that the state takes over from private

enterprise, necessitates a corresponding educational advance and the

organization of a proper criticism and control. Both the press and the

political methods of the contemporary state are far too crude for any

large extension of collective activities.

But for a time the stresses between employer and employed and

particularly between selfish employers and reluctant workers, led to a

world-wide dissemination of the very harsh and elementary form of

communism which is associated with the name of Marx. Marx based his

theories on a belief that men’s minds are limited by their economic

necessities, and that there is a necessary conflict of interests in our

present civilization between the prosperous and employing classes of

people and the employed mass. With the advance in education

necessitated by the mechanical revolution, this great employed majority

will become more and more class-conscious and more and more solid in

antagonism to the (class- conscious) ruling minority. In some way the

class-conscious workers would seize power, he prophesied, and

inaugurate a new social state. The antagonism, the insurrection, the

possible revolution are understandable enough, but it does not follow

that a new social state or anything but a socially destructive process

will ensue. Put to the test in Russia, Marxism, as we shall note

later, has proved singularly uncreative.

SCIENCE IN THE COAL MINE

SCIENCE IN THE COAL MINE

Portable Electric Loading Conveyor

_Photo: Jeffrey Manufacturing Company, Columbus, Ohio_

Marx sought to replace national antagonism by class antagonisms;

Marxism has produced in succession a First, a Second and a Third

Workers’ International. But from the starting point of modern

individualistic thought it is also possible to reach international

ideas. From the days of that great English economist, Adam Smith,

onward there has been an increasing realization that for world-wide

prosperity free and unencumbered trade about the earth is needed. The

individualist with his hostility to the state is hostile also to

tariffs and boundaries and all the restraints upon free act and

movement that national boundaries seem to justify. It is interesting to

see two lines of thought, so diverse in spirit, so different in

substance as this class-war socialism of the Marxists and the

individualistic free-trading philosophy of the British business men of

the Victorian age heading at last, in spite of these primary

differences, towards the same intimations of a new world-wide treatment

of human affairs outside the boundaries and limitations of any existing

state. The logic of reality triumphs over the logic of theory. We

begin to perceive that from widely divergent starting points

individualist theory and socialist theory are part of a common search,

a search for more spacious social and political ideas and

interpretations, upon which men may contrive to work together, a search

that began again in Europe and has intensified as men’s confidence in

the ideas of the Holy Roman Empire and in Christendom decayed, and as

the age of discovery broadened their horizons from the world of the

Mediterranean to the whole wide world.

To bring this description of the elaboration and development of social,

economic and political ideas right down to the discussions of the

present day, would be to introduce issues altogether too controversial

for the scope and intentions of this book. But regarding these things,

as we do here, from the vast perspectives of the student of world

history, we are bound to recognize that this reconstruction of these

directive ideas in the human mind is still an unfinished task—we cannot

even estimate yet how unfinished the task may be. Certain common

beliefs do seem to be emerging, and their influence is very perceptible

upon the political events and public acts of to-day; but at present

they are not clear enough nor convincing enough to compel men

definitely and systematically towards their realization. Men’s acts

waver between tradition and the new, and on the whole they rather

gravitate towards the traditional. Yet, compared with the thought of

even a brief lifetime ago, there does seem to be an outline shaping

itself of a new order in human affairs. It is a sketchy outline,

vanishing into vagueness at this point and that, and fluctuating in

detail and formulæ, yet it grows steadfastly clearer, and its main

lines change less and less.

CONSTRUCTIONAL DETAIL OF THE FORTH BRIDGE

CONSTRUCTIONAL DETAIL OF THE FORTH BRIDGE

_Photo: Baker & Hurtzig_

It is becoming plainer and plainer each year that in many respects and

in an increasing range of affairs, mankind is becoming one community,

and that it is more and more necessary that in such matters there

should be a common world-wide control. For example, it is steadily

truer that the whole planet is now one economic community, that the

proper exploitation of its natural resources demands one comprehensive

direction, and that the greater power and range that discovery has

given human effort makes the present fragmentary and contentious

administration of such affairs more and more wasteful and dangerous.

Financial and monetary expedients also become world-wide interests to

be dealt with successfully only on world-wide lines. Infectious

diseases and the increase and migrations of population are also now

plainly seen to be world-wide concerns. The greater power and range of

human activities has also made war disproportionately destructive and

disorganizing, and, even as a clumsy way of settling issues between

government and government and people and people, ineffective. All

these things clamour for controls and authorities of a greater range

and greater comprehensiveness than any government that has hitherto

existed.

But it does not follow that the solution of these problems lies in some

super-government of all the world arising by conquest or by the

coalescence of existing governments. By analogy with existing

institutions men have thought of the Parliament of Mankind, of a World

Congress, of a President or Emperor of the Earth. Our first natural

reaction is towards some such conclusion, but the discussion and

experiences of half a century of suggestions and attempts has on the

whole discouraged belief in that first obvious idea. Along that line

to world unity the resistances are too great. The drift of thought

seems now to be in the direction of a number of special committees or

organizations, with world-wide power delegated to them by existing

governments in this group of matters or that, bodies concerned with the

waste or development of natural wealth, with the equalization of labour

conditions, with world peace, with currency, population and health, and

so forth.

The world may discover that all its common interests are being managed

as one concern, while it still fails to realize that a world government

exists. But before even so much human unity is attained, before such

international arrangements can be put above patriotic suspicions and

jealousies, it is necessary that the common mind of the race should be

possessed of that idea of human unity, and that the idea of mankind as

one family should be a matter of universal instruction and

understanding.

For a score of centuries or more the spirit of the great universal

religions has been struggling to maintain and extend that idea of a

universal human brotherhood, but to this day the spites, angers and

distrusts of tribal, national and racial friction obstruct, and

successfully obstruct, the broader views and more generous impulses

which would make every man the servant of all mankind. The idea of

human brotherhood struggles now to possess the human soul, just as the

idea of Christendom struggled to possess the soul of Europe in the

confusion and disorder of the sixth and seventh centuries of the

Christian era. The dissemination and triumph of such ideas must be the

work of a multitude of devoted and undistinguished missionaries, and no

contemporary writer can presume to guess how far such work has gone or

what harvest it may be preparing.

Social and economic questions seem to be inseparably mingled with

international ones. The solution in each case lies in an appeal to

that same spirit of service which can enter and inspire the human

heart. The distrust, intractability and egotism of nations reflects

and is reflected by the distrust, intractability and egotism of the

individual owner and worker in the face of the common good.

Exaggerations of possessiveness in the individual are parallel and of a

piece with the clutching greed of nations and emperors. They are

products of the same instinctive tendencies, and the same ignorances

and traditions. Internationalism is the socialism of nations. No one

who has wrestled with these problems can feel that there yet exists a

sufficient depth and strength of psychological science and a

sufficiently planned-out educational method and organization for any

real and final solution of these riddles of human intercourse and

cooperation. We are as incapable of planning a really effective peace

organization of the world to-day as were men in 1820 to plan an

electric railway system, but for all we know the thing is equally

practicable and may be as nearly at hand.

No man can go beyond his own knowledge, no thought can reach beyond

contemporary thought, and it is impossible for us to guess or foretell

how many generations of humanity may have to live in war and waste and

insecurity and misery before the dawn of the great peace to which all

history seems to be pointing, peace in the heart and peace in the

world, ends our night of wasteful and aimless living. Our proposed

solutions are still vague and crude. Passion and suspicion surround

them. A great task of intellectual reconstruction is going on, it is

still incomplete, and our conceptions grow clearer and more

exact—slowly, rapidly, it is hard to tell which. But as they grow

clearer they will gather power over the minds and imaginations of men.

Their present lack of grip is due to their lack of assurance and exact

rightness. They are misunderstood because they are variously and

confusingly presented. But with precision and certainty the new vision

of the world will gain compelling power. It may presently gain power

very rapidly. And a great work of educational reconstruction will

follow logically and necessarily upon that clearer understanding.

LX

THE EXPANSION OF THE UNITED STATES

The region of the world that displayed the most immediate and striking

results from the new inventions in transport was North America.

Politically the United States embodied, and its constitution

crystallized, the liberal ideas of the middle eighteenth century. It

dispensed with state-church or crown, it would have no titles, it

protected property very jealously as a method of freedom, and—the exact

practice varied at first in the different states—it gave nearly every

adult male citizen a vote. Its method of voting was barbarically crude,

and as a consequence its political life fell very soon under the

control of highly organized party machines, but that did not prevent

the newly emancipated population developing an energy, enterprise and

public spirit far beyond that of any other contemporary population.

Then came that acceleration of locomotion to which we have already

called attention. It is a curious thing that America, which owes most

to this acceleration in locomotion, has felt it least. The United

States have taken the railway, the river steamboat, the telegraph and

so forth as though they were a natural part of their growth. They were

not. These things happened to come along just in time to save American

unity. The United States of to-day were made first by the river

steamboat, and then by the railway. Without these things, the present

United States, this vast continental nation, would have been altogether

impossible. The westward flow of population would have been far more

sluggish. It might never have crossed the great central plains. It

took nearly two hundred years for effective settlement to reach from

the coast to Missouri, much less than halfway across the continent.

The first state established beyond the river was the steamboat state of

Missouri in 1821. But the rest of the distance to the Pacific was done

in a few decades.

If we had the resources of the cinema it would be interesting to show a

map of North America year by year from 1600 onward, with little dots to

represent hundreds of people, each dot a hundred, and stars to

represent cities of a hundred thousand people.

For two hundred years the reader would see that stippling creeping

slowly along the coastal districts and navigable waters, spreading

still more gradually into Indiana, Kentucky and so forth. Then

somewhere about 1810 would come a change. Things would get more lively

along the river courses. The dots would be multiplying and spreading.

That would be the steamboat. The pioneer dots would be spreading soon

over Kansas and Nebraska from a number of jumping-off places along the

great rivers.

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