Chapter XXV: Of Discipline In Democratic Armies

It is a very general opinion, especially in aristocratic countries,

that the great social equality which prevails in democracies ultimately

renders the private soldier independent of the officer, and thus

destroys the bond of discipline. This is a mistake, for there are two

kinds of discipline, which it is important not to confound. When the

officer is noble and the soldier a serf--one rich, the other poor--the

former educated and strong, the latter ignorant and weak--the strictest

bond of obedience may easily be established between the two men. The

soldier is broken in to military discipline, as it were, before he

enters the army; or rather, military discipline is nothing but an

enhancement of social servitude. In aristocratic armies the soldier

will soon become insensible to everything but the orders of his superior

officers; he acts without reflection, triumphs without enthusiasm, and

dies without complaint: in this state he is no longer a man, but he is

still a most formidable animal trained for war.

A democratic people must despair of ever obtaining from soldiers

that blind, minute, submissive, and invariable obedience which an

aristocratic people may impose on them without difficulty. The state of

society does not prepare them for it, and the nation might be in danger

of losing its natural advantages if it sought artificially to acquire

advantages of this particular kind. Amongst democratic communities,

military discipline ought not to attempt to annihilate the free spring

of the faculties; all that can be done by discipline is to direct it;

the obedience thus inculcated is less exact, but it is more eager and

more intelligent. It has its root in the will of him who obeys: it rests

not only on his instinct, but on his reason; and consequently it will

often spontaneously become more strict as danger requires it. The

discipline of an aristocratic army is apt to be relaxed in war, because

that discipline is founded upon habits, and war disturbs those habits.

The discipline of a democratic army on the contrary is strengthened in

sight of the enemy, because every soldier then clearly perceives that he

must be silent and obedient in order to conquer.

The nations which have performed the greatest warlike achievements knew

no other discipline than that which I speak of. Amongst the ancients

none were admitted into the armies but freemen and citizens, who

differed but little from one another, and were accustomed to treat

each other as equals. In this respect it may be said that the armies

of antiquity were democratic, although they came out of the bosom

of aristocracy; the consequence was that in those armies a sort of

fraternal familiarity prevailed between the officers and the men.

Plutarch's lives of great commanders furnish convincing instances of the

fact: the soldiers were in the constant habit of freely addressing their

general, and the general listened to and answered whatever the soldiers

had to say: they were kept in order by language and by example, far

more than by constraint or punishment; the general was as much their

companion as their chief. I know not whether the soldiers of Greece and

Rome ever carried the minutiae of military discipline to the same

degree of perfection as the Russians have done; but this did not prevent

Alexander from conquering Asia--and Rome, the world.

Democracy in America — Volume 2 · 第 25 / 27 章