And yet this limited faith in Jehovah as the God of the Jews, as a God

more powerful than the gods of the heathen, as a God above all gods,

betrays itself again and again in the history of the Jews. The idea of

many gods is there, and wherever that idea exists, wherever the plural

of god is used in earnest, there is polytheism. It is not so much the

names of Zeus, Hermes, &c., which constitute the polytheism of the

Greeks; it is the plural [Greek: theoi], gods, which contains the

fatal spell. We do not know what M. Renan means when he says that

Jehovah with the Jews 'n'est pas le plus grand entre plusieurs dieux;

c'est le Dieu unique.' It was so with Abraham, it was so after Jacob

had been changed into Israel, it was so with Moses, Elijah, and

Jeremiah. But what is the meaning of the very first commandment, 'Thou

shalt have no other gods before me?' Could this command have been

addressed to a nation to whom the plural of God was a nonentity? It

might be answered that the plural of God was to the Jews as revolting

as it is to us, that it was revolting to their faith, if not to their

reason. But how was it that their language tolerated the plural of a

word which excludes plurality as much as the word for the centre of a

sphere? No man who had clearly perceived the unity of God, could say

with the Psalmist (lxxxvi. 8), 'Among the gods there is none like unto

Thee, O Lord, neither are there any works like unto Thy works.' Though

the same poet says, 'Thou art God alone,' he could not have compared

God with other gods, if his idea of God had really reached that

all-embracing character which it had with Abraham, Moses, Elijah, and

Jeremiah. Nor would God have been praised as the 'great king above all

gods' by a poet in whose eyes the gods of the heathen had been

recognised as what they were--mighty shadows, thrown by the mighty

works of God, and intercepting for a time the pure light of the

Godhead.

We thus arrive at a different conviction from that which M. Renan has

made the basis of the history of the Semitic race. We can see nothing

that would justify the admission of a monotheistic instinct, granted

to the Semitic, and withheld from the Aryan race. They both share in

the primitive intuition of God, they are both exposed to dangers in

framing names for God, and they both fall into polytheism. What is

peculiar to the Aryan race is their mythological phraseology,

superadded to their polytheism; what is peculiar to the Semitic race

is their belief in a national god--in a god chosen by his people as

his people had been chosen by him.

No doubt, M. Renan might say that we ignored his problem, and that we

have not removed the difficulties which drove him to the admission of

a monotheistic instinct. How is the fact to be explained, he might

ask, that the three great religions of the world in which the unity of

the Deity forms the key-note, are of Semitic origin, and that the

Aryan nations, wherever they have been brought to a worship of the One

God, invoke Him with names borrowed from the Semitic languages?

But let us look more closely at the facts before we venture on

theories. Mohammedanism, no doubt, is a Semitic religion, and its very

core is monotheism. But did Mohammed invent monotheism? Did he invent

even a new name of God? (Renan, p. 23.) Not at all. His object was to

destroy the idolatry of the Semitic tribes of Arabia, to dethrone the

angels, the Jin, the sons and daughters who had been assigned to

Allah, and to restore the faith of Abraham in one God. (Renan, p. 37.)

And how is it with Christianity? Did Christ come to preach a faith in

a new God? Did He or His disciples invent a new name of God? No,

Christ came not to destroy, but to fulfil; and the God whom He

preached was the God of Abraham.

And who is the God of Jeremiah, of Elijah, and of Moses? We answer

again, the God of Abraham.

Thus the faith in the One living God, which seemed to require the

admission of a monotheistic instinct, grafted in every member of the

Semitic family, is traced back to one man, to him 'in whom all

families of the earth shall be blessed' (Genesis xii. 3, Acts iii. 25,

Galatians iii. 8). If from our earliest childhood we have looked upon

Abraham, the friend of God, with love and veneration; if our first

impressions of a truly god-fearing life were taken from him, who left

the land of his fathers to live a stranger in the land whither God

had called him, who always listened to the voice of God, whether it

conveyed to him the promise of a son in his old age, or the command to

sacrifice that son, his only son Isaac, his venerable figure will

assume still more majestic proportions when we see in him the

life-spring of that faith which was to unite all the nations of the

earth, and the author of that blessing which was to come on the

Gentiles through Jesus Christ.

And if we are asked how this one Abraham possessed not only the

primitive intuition of God as He had revealed Himself to all mankind,

but passed through the denial of all other gods to the knowledge of

the one God, we are content to answer that it was by a special Divine

Revelation. We do not indulge in theological phraseology, but we mean

every word to its fullest extent. The Father of Truth chooses His own

prophets, and He speaks to them in a voice stronger than the voice of

thunder. It is the same inner voice through which God speaks to all of

us. That voice may dwindle away, and become hardly audible; it may

lose its Divine accent, and sink into the language of worldly

prudence; but it may also, from time to time, assume its real nature,

with the chosen of God, and sound into their ears as a voice from

Heaven. A 'divine instinct' may sound more scientific, and less

theological; but in truth it would neither be an appropriate name for

what is a gift or grace accorded to but few, nor would it be a more

scientific, i. e. a more intelligible word than 'special revelation.'

The important point, however, is not whether the faith of Abraham

should be called a divine instinct or a revelation; what we wish here

to insist on is that that instinct, or that revelation, was special,

granted to one man, and handed down from him to Jews, Christians, and

Mohammedans, to all who believe in the God of Abraham. Nor was it

granted to Abraham entirely as a free gift. Abraham was tried and

tempted before he was trusted by God. He had to break with the faith

of his fathers; he had to deny the gods who were worshipped by his

friends and neighbours. Like all the friends of God, he had to hear

himself called an infidel and atheist, and in our own days he would

have been looked upon as a madman for attempting to slay his son. It

was through special faith that Abraham received his special

revelation, not through instinct, not through abstract meditation, not

through ecstatic visions. We want to know more of that man than we do;

but, even with the little we know of him, he stands before us as a

figure second only to one in the whole history of the world. We see

his zeal for God, but we never see him contentious. Though Melchisedek

worshipped God under a different name, invoking Him as Eliun, the Most

High, Abraham at once acknowledged in Melchisedek a worshipper and

priest of the true God, or Elohim, and paid him tithes. In the very

name of Elohim we seem to trace the conciliatory spirit of Abraham.

Elohim is a plural, though it is followed by the verb in the singular.

It is generally said that the genius of the Semitic languages

countenances the use of plurals for abstract conceptions, and that

when Jehovah is called Elohim, the plural should be translated by 'the

Deity.' We do not deny the fact, but we wish for an explanation, and

an explanation is suggested by the various phases through which, as

we saw, the conception of God passed in the ancient history of the

Semitic mind. Eloah was at first the name for God, and as it is found

in all the dialects of the Semitic family except the Phenician (Renan,

p. 61), it may probably be considered as the most ancient name of the

Deity, sanctioned at a time when the original Semitic speech had not

yet branched off into national dialects. When this name was first used

in the plural, it could only have signified, like every plural, many

Eloahs, and such a plural could only have been formed after the

various names of God had become the names of independent deities, i.

e. during a polytheistic stage. The transition from this into the

monotheistic stage could be effected in two ways--either by denying

altogether the existence of the Elohim, and changing them into devils,

as the Zoroastrians did with the Devas of their Brahmanic ancestors;

or by taking a higher view, and looking upon the Elohim as so many

names, invented with the honest purpose of expressing the various

aspects of the Deity, though in time diverted from their original

purpose. This is the view taken by St. Paul of the religion of the

Greeks when he came to declare unto them 'Him whom they ignorantly

worshipped,' and the same view was taken by Abraham. Whatever the

names of the Elohim, worshipped by the numerous clans of his race,

Abraham saw that all the Elohim were meant for God, and thus Elohim,

comprehending by one name everything that ever had been or could be

called divine, became the name with which the monotheistic age was

rightly inaugurated,--a plural, conceived and construed as a singular.

Jehovah was all the Elohim, and therefore there could be no other God.

From this point of view the Semitic name of the Deity, Elohim, which

seemed at first not only ungrammatical but irrational, becomes

perfectly clear and intelligible, and it proves better than anything

else that the true monotheism could not have risen except on the ruins

of a polytheistic faith. It is easy to scoff at the gods of the

heathen, but a cold-hearted philosophical negation of the gods of the

ancient world is more likely to lead to Deism or Atheism than to a

belief in the One living God, the Father of all mankind, 'who hath

made of one blood all nations of men, for to dwell on all the face of

the earth; and hath determined the times before appointed, and the

bounds of their habitation; that they should seek the Lord, if haply

they might feel after Him, and find Him, though He be not far from

every one of us: for in Him we live, and move, and have our being; as

certain also of your own poets have said, For we are also His

offspring.'

Taking this view of the historical growth of the idea of God, many of

the difficulties which M. Renan has to overcome by most elaborate and

sometimes hair-splitting arguments, disappear at once. M. Renan, for

instance, dwells much on Semitic proper names in which the names of

the Deity occur, and he thinks that, like the Greek names Theodorus or

Theodotus, instead of Zenodotus, they prove the existence of a faith

in one God. We should say they may or may not. As Devadatta, in

Sanskrit, may mean either 'given by God,' or 'given by the gods,' so

every proper name which M. Renan quotes, whether of Jews, or Edomites,

Ishmaelites, Ammonites, Moabites, and Themanites, whether from the

Bible, or from Arab historians, from Greek authors, Greek

inscriptions, the Egyptian papyri, the Himyaritic and Sinaitic

inscriptions and ancient coins, are all open to two interpretations.

'The servant of Baal' may mean the servant of the Lord, but it may

also mean the servant of Baal, as one of many lords, or even the

servant of the Baalim or the Lords. The same applies to all other

names. 'The gift of El' may mean 'the gift of the only strong God;'

but it may likewise mean 'the gift of the El,' as one of many gods, or

even 'the gift of the Els,' in the sense of the strong gods. Nor do we

see why M. Renan should take such pains to prove that the name of

Orotal or Orotulat, mentioned by Herodotos (III. 8), may be

interpreted as the name of a supreme deity; and that Alilat, mentioned

by the same traveller, should be taken, not as the name of a goddess,

but as a feminine noun expressive of the abstract sense of the deity.

Herodotos says distinctly that Orotal was a deity like Bacchus; and

Alilat, as he translates her name by [Greek: Ouranie], must have

appeared to him as a goddess, and not as the Supreme Deity. One verse

of the Koran is sufficient to show that the Semitic inhabitants of

Arabia worshipped not only gods, but goddesses also. 'What think ye of

Allat, al Uzza, and Manah, that other third goddess?'

If our view of the development of the idea of God be correct, we can

perfectly understand how, in spite of this polytheistic phraseology,

the primitive intuition of God should make itself felt from time to

time, long before Mohammed restored the belief of Abraham in one God.

The old Arabic prayer mentioned by Abulfarag may be perfectly genuine:

'I dedicate myself to thy service, O God! Thou hast no companion,

except thy companion, of whom thou art absolute master, and of

whatever is his.' The verse pointed out to M. Renan by M. Caussin de

Perceval from the Moallaka of Zoheyr, was certainly anterior to

Mohammed: 'Try not to hide your secret feelings from the sight of

Allah; Allah knows all that is hidden.' But these quotations serve no

more to establish the universality of the monotheistic instinct in the

Semitic race than similar quotations from the Veda would prove the

existence of a conscious monotheism among the ancestors of the Aryan

race. There too we read, 'Agni knows what is secret among mortals'

(Rig-veda VIII. 39, 6): and again, 'He, the upholder of order,

Varu_n_a, sits down among his people; he, the wise, sits there to

govern. From thence perceiving all wondrous things, he sees what has

been and what will be done.'[104] But in these very hymns, better than

anywhere else, we learn that the idea of supremacy and omnipotence

ascribed to one god did by no means exclude the admission of other

gods, or names of God. All the other gods disappear from the vision of

the poet while he addresses his own God, and he only who is to fulfil

his desires stands in full light before the eyes of the worshipper as

the supreme and only God.

[Footnote 104: 'History of Ancient Sanskrit Literature,' by M. M., p.

536.]

The Science of Religion is only just beginning, and we must take care

how we impede its progress by preconceived notions or too hasty

generalizations. During the last fifty years the authentic documents

of the most important religions of the world have been recovered in a

most unexpected and almost miraculous manner. We have now before us

the canonical books of Buddhism; the Zend-Avesta of Zoroaster is no

longer a sealed book; and the hymns of the Rig-veda have revealed a

state of religion anterior to the first beginnings of that mythology

which in Homer and Hesiod stands before us as a mouldering ruin. The

soil of Mesopotamia has given back the very images once worshipped by

the most powerful of the Semitic tribes, and the cuneiform

inscriptions of Babylon and Nineveh have disclosed the very prayers

addressed to Baal or Nisroch. With the discovery of these documents a

new era begins in the study of religion. We begin to see more clearly

every day what St. Paul meant in his sermon at Athens. But as the

excavator at Babylon or Nineveh, before he ventures to reconstruct the

palaces of these ancient kingdoms, sinks his shafts into the ground

slowly and circumspectly lest he should injure the walls of the

ancient palaces which he is disinterring; as he watches every

corner-stone lest he mistake their dark passages and galleries, and as

he removes with awe and trembling the dust and clay from the brittle

monuments lest he destroy their outlines, and obliterate their

inscriptions, so it behoves the student of the history of religion to

set to work carefully, lest he should miss the track, and lose himself

in an inextricable maze. The relics which he handles are more precious

than the ruins of Babylon; the problems he has to solve are more

important than the questions of ancient chronology; and the

substructions which he hopes one day to lay bare are the world-wide

foundations of the eternal kingdom of God.

We look forward with the highest expectations to the completion of M.

Renan's work, and though English readers will differ from many of the

author's views, and feel offended now and then at his blunt and

unguarded language, we doubt not that they will find his volumes both

instructive and suggestive. They are written in that clear and

brilliant style which has secured to M. Renan the rank of one of the

best writers of French, and which throws its charm even over the dry

and abstruse inquiries into the grammatical forms and radical elements

of the Semitic languages.

_April, 1860._

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Chips from a German Workshop, Volume 1 Essays on the Science of Religion · 第 27 / 27 段