THE BRITISH WITHDRAWAL AND GERMAN ATTACK, 28th MARCH, 1918.
By the end of December, 1917, rumours began to circulate regarding a
great German offensive. Everyone had to sleep with their clothes on,
all troops, even in the reserve billets in Arras, had to "stand to"
before sun rise every morning until orders to "stand down" were
received from Brigade. Sleeping in your clothes is never comfortable
or refreshing. Practically every night large working parties had to be
sent up to the trenches, often not returning till the early hours, so
that shortly after the men had got comfortably settled down they had
to get up again and "stand to" fully equipped ready to move. This
"stand to" often lasted several hours. The advantage, therefore, which
was supposed to be had in the rest billets was much discounted.
We were fated once again to spend our New Year in the trenches, but on
the 2nd of January we were relieved by 2nd Guards Brigade. We had done
our best to make the trenches as clean as possible in order that they
might take over a system worthy of the Guards. It is satisfactory to
know that the G.O.C. Guards Division informed the G.O.C. 15th Division
that he had never had such a satisfactory take over as on this
occasion from the 15th (Scottish) Division. It was doubtful if some of
the men appreciated the hard fighting qualities of the Guards Brigade,
looking upon them as show troops. This is exemplified by a story of a
rather dirty Jock who was baling mud out of a trench. One of the
splendid clean Guardsmen, who had come up as orderly with some
officers, tried to get into conversation with him by remarking that
they were coming up to relieve them. The muddy Jock asked him, "Who
are ye?" and he replied, "Oh, we are the Guards," and the Jock,
proceeding with his digging, rejoined: "Ah! weel! ye can write hame
an' tell yer mither ye've seen the sodjers."
On relief the Battalion went into billets in the Ecole des Jeunes
Filles. Here on the 9th and 10th the Battalion had their Christmas
dinners, which were a great success and much enjoyed. During the
proceedings the C.O. addressed the troops and gave a brief review of
the operations which the Battalion had taken part in during the past
year, also the new honours they had won for the regiment. He wished
them all the best of luck for the coming year. We must record the very
great kindness and assistance shewn us by Mademoiselle G. Marmier, who
always did all she could to add to the comforts of the troops. On this
occasion she made many fine paper flowers to decorate the Christmas
dinner tables with. After the dinners the men were entertained in the
theatre, where "the Jocks," our Divisional troupe, performed the
pantomime "Robinson Crusoe."
The weather was now very cold, in fact when we handed over to the
Guards the ground was deep in snow. On the 23rd February we carried
out a small raid on the enemy's trenches at 3.30 a.m. The party
consisted of 28 other ranks of "A" Company under command of 2nd Lieut.
A. R. M'Donald. The raid proved a success. The German trenches were
found to be unoccupied, but 4 men were caught in a sap head, one of
whom was killed and 3 brought back as prisoners, so we succeeded in
getting the identification which was required. Our casualties were
nil. For this we received the congratulations of both the Corps and
Brigade Commanders.
We now fully expected an attack by the Boche, and everyone was kept on
the strain, working hard in preparing belts of wire and improving
trench systems. For many weeks neither officers nor men had their
clothes off, and the work in the reserve area was almost as strenuous
as in the front line. We knew that the Germans had been successful
further south, and we were holding what was becoming an acute salient.
One can quite understand the nervousness of those behind the line, but
those in the front areas were confident of their powers to resist the
Boches and in the strength of the defensive systems. On the occasion
when the Guards relieved us one of their officers was much impressed
with the serious spirit with which he found the Staff behind the line
treating the matter. After going round the front line, however, he
remarked that the cheerfulness of the troops had put new heart into
him.
Indeed, the front line troops (probably in their ignorance) treated
the anxiety of those behind with a good deal of levity. An amusing
method of dealing with the rumours flying around called the
Thermometer game was invented. This consisted in assigning so many
degrees or marks to the person reporting a "windy" story according to
its source. Whoever got 100 degrees first won. For instance, a
terrible story from the cook's mate or transport men was valued at
about 10 points; from a brigade-major about two, and a higher staff
officer about one.
The Staff, it is to be feared, did not appreciate this chaff, and
orders were issued that Regimental Officers were not to refer to the
Staff as having the "wind up," as they were only taking necessary
precautions. However, it shewed the troops were in good spirits.
On the evening of the 22/23rd of March we were surprised to receive an
order that we were to withdraw with all stores to the Army line, the
movement to be completed by 3 a.m. The Battalion happened to be
occupying La Fosse Farm with the caves below, and also the strong
points. We had, therefore, a considerable amount of ammunition, etc.,
in the part of the line held by us. Further, we were instructed to
guard our right flank carefully. As we knew that the enemy had driven
in the line further south of us, this warning was appreciated. "D"
Company, who were occupying Fork, Spade, and Gordon Trenches, were to
be left behind to fight the rear guard actions when the Boche
discovered we had withdrawn. O.C. "D" Company also had orders to
destroy the Headquarters dug-out at Crater Subway, and the electric
lighting plant in the Fosse Farm was to be rendered unworkable. Over
and above this, R.E.'s were to blow a mine placed under the Cambrai
Road.
As soon as it was dark motor lorries and vehicles of all descriptions
were brought up to the farm, and we at once started loading them.
Luckily for us there was a Y.M.C.A. Canteen in the caves, the officers
in charge of which left it when they heard we were retiring. The C.O.,
taking advantage of this, allowed every man who brought down a box of
ammunition from the strong points to help himself to cigarettes. With
this encouragement, men carrying ammunition came back in quick
succession, and by the time we finally retired, about 3.30 a.m., all
ammunition trench stores, etc., with the exception of a few gum boots,
had been loaded and withdrawn.
It was difficult to understand how the Boche did not hear the noise of
the retiral. If he had done so, and had trained his guns on the
Cambrai Road, he would have caused endless confusion and casualties.
The road was simply packed with motor lorries, guns and vehicles of
all descriptions, with the retiring infantry dodging in and out
between them. The congestion was extremely bad at the cross roads at
Tilloy, where the different streams of traffic met. While recognising
that this movement was necessary from a military point of view, still
it was hard to persuade the men to see this, almost as difficult as it
is for anyone who was not there to realise their disappointment and
surprise. They had worked hard for months in preparing this position.
They had carried up tons of wire and constructed belts of it many
yards wide. They now felt all this work had gone for nothing.
Supremely confident that they would have held this position against
all odds, they regretted that they had not an opportunity of proving
it. They evidently did not appreciate the dangers of an exposed flank.
We got into our new position shortly before sunrise, and from there we
could see our artillery, in the morning light, still getting back
their guns, but the enemy was not even then aware of the movement.
We knew that an attack by the Germans was almost inevitable. All
preparations possible were being made, and it was easy to understand
the importance of the orders that the ground we held must be "held at
all costs." While it is true that there were many defensive lines
behind us, right back almost to the sea, yet we believed that there
were practically no troops in our immediate support to man them, so
that, if the Boche once more broke through us, it was likely to prove
a disaster. Furthermore, if our position was lost the enemy would
outflank Vimy Ridge, which would probably necessitate our withdrawing
from it. We had gone through a long spell of hard work in the
trenches, and had been kept in a state of suspense for several months
without a chance of ever getting our clothes off. The men, however,
were in good fettle, but the Battalion contained a number of young
lads from 18½ to 19, who had been sent out in drafts in the early
Spring. They had not been proved in battle or seen any action, and it
was impossible to say how they might act, although we had every
confidence in them.
On the evening of the 27th March the Brigadier visited our Battalion
Headquarters with the joyful news that it looked as if the Boche had
given up the idea of attacking us meantime, as he was moving his guns
from their battery positions, presumably with the intention of taking
them somewhere else. Unfortunately this conclusion proved wrong, for
in reality they must have been taking their guns out to move them into
position for the attack. When the Brigadier left, the C.O. went round
the front line with the good news. He remained in the front line till
about 2 a.m. Just as he was leaving, a post reported that a short time
earlier they had discovered a party of Boche in front of our wire,
apparently cutting it. They had been driven off with a Lewis gun, and
had not been seen since. On examining the wire, which was a fairly
broad belt, there were certainly signs that this had been their
intention.
About 3 a.m. on the 28th, the enemy opened an intense bombardment on
our front and immediate support lines, using gas shells on the left
Company's front, south of Cambrai Road. This had lasted for about half
an hour, when the bombardment was moved on to the back area, including
the town of Arras. It was learnt afterwards that this was largely
composed of gas shells. About 4 a.m. the bombardment of the front line
having become less, the officer on duty patrolled the whole of the
left Company's front up to the Cambrai Road, afterwards returning to
the right, when he reported that the whole Company were standing to.
There had been a fair number of casualties. Once again our front was
heavily bombarded, mostly with trench mortars. This bombardment was
exceedingly severe, especially on the left, south of the Cambrai Road.
The N.C.O. who was on duty (the officer on duty having been killed)
stated afterwards that he had again tried to patrol his front, but
found the trenches so flattened that it was hard to say where they had
been, and the ground resembled a ploughed field. He believed nearly
everyone in this sector was either killed, buried or wounded.
At 5.15 a.m. the enemy again put down a very intense trench mortar
barrage on the left, which probably killed any men left in the front
trench south of the Cambrai Road. At the same time the enemy could be
seen jumping from shell-hole to shell-hole in front of Le Fosse Farm.
We now fired S.O.S. signals, and opened rapid fire on the enemy. On
the centre of our front line the enemy were about 100 yards away in
front of the wire. The men in this part of the line afterwards stated
that they were still confident that they could hold them up. Suddenly,
however, it was seen that the enemy were working round our flank. An
attempt was at once made to form a flank defence, but the casualties
had been so great that this was found impossible, and practically no
officers were left. Those remaining, therefore, had to fall back
rapidly. So quickly did the enemy come round the flank that the
signallers and others in the advance Battalion Headquarters (old 44th
Brigade) were not able to get out in time to escape.
The extreme right of the Battalion had also been severely shelled
along with the left of the 3rd Division. Here, too, the enemy broke
through. From the Battalion Headquarters we now saw the lines of the
3rd Division front being driven back, and shortly afterwards our own
men were seen retiring. The officer on the right had thrown back a
platoon to try and form a flank defence, but soon found the enemy
working round his rear and forcing him to withdraw. The withdrawal was
carried out in an orderly fashion, a covering fire being kept up with
Lewis guns and rifles, the men behaving splendidly, which says a lot
for their morale, as by this time most of the officers had been
killed, and it must be remembered that many of the men were young
recruits who had just come through their first experience of a
hurricane bombardment.
At no time was the shelling so severe on the centre of our line as it
was on the flanks. It is more than probable that the bombardment was
so withering that the men on the flanks were wiped out before the
enemy attacked. This seems to be proved by the fact that no officer or
man belonging to the three platoons on the left or the platoon on the
right, and only 1 man of the next two platoons, returned; in other
words, only 7 men returned out of 6 platoons. The smoke and dust were
such, however, that no one could see more than a few yards, and in any
case it was impossible for us to see what was occurring to the north
of the Cambrai Road, as at this point it is raised by an embankment.
The front line Companies Headquarters were in machine gun nest
dug-outs in front of our wire. They were rushed early in the attack.
No-man's-land certainly was a bad place for Company Headquarters, but
there was no better location available. By 8.15 a.m. we had formed a
new front line running north along the switch line, being in touch
with the 8/10th Gordons on our right and the 6th Camerons on our left.
By this time there were probably not more than 150 other ranks and 3
Company officers remaining. As, however, the 6th Camerons were on our
left, some of the men naturally got intermixed with them. The
Battalion Headquarters were by this time in the front line, and all
the Headquarter officers and men were used in the defence of the line.
It was one of the advantages of having the Battalion Headquarters
worked more or less on the principle of a Company, that this was so
easily carried out: each Headquarter officer had his own section of
men, and the men knew under whose command they had to place themselves.
The C.O. now consulted with Captain Wood, commanding the Company of
the 8/10th Gordons, who at once took in hand the collection of
ammunition, which was rather short in the new trench, from the dump at
Shamrock Corner and the old trench systems. This distribution was
successfully carried out. It is only right that we should refer to the
splendid assistance given to us by Captain Wood. He was one of the few
remaining officers who came out with the Division. He therefore had a
wide experience in fighting, and shewed as usual that coolness,
disregard for danger, and sound judgment with which we all associate
him.
After the consultation the C.O. decided to try and counter-attack the
enemy and establish a line along the old support trench in the Brown
Line. We sent off messages asking for artillery support for 9.30 a.m.,
when we proposed making the counter-attack. We could not get Brigade
on the 'phone, the wires having probably been cut. We sent off
pigeons, but the bombardment had been too much for them, and it was
only after considerable amount of stone throwing that we got them to
fly at all. We sent messages also with the buzzer set, but the
annoying thing about both pigeon and power buzzer messages is, that
one never knows whether they have been received or not. The artillery
support never came, and we held back the counter attack till 10.30, as
we did not wish to advance in case we should walk into our own fire.
As a matter of fact not one of our messages ever got through.
About 10.30 a.m. the C.O. received a message from the O.C. "A" Company
6th Camerons, who were on our left, stating that his flank was now in
the air, and that the enemy were as far back as Feuchy Chapel
Crossroads on his left and rear, and he asked what he should do.
Instruction were sent him to try to form a flank defence so as to get
in touch on his left, but to hold his ground at all costs whatever
happened. This information definitely decided us to give up the idea
of counter-attacking. In order to get a clear idea of the situation,
the C.O. went along the front line to the 6th Camerons, and found they
were holding the front in good strength. There was not much doing in
their immediate front, but evidently some of the enemy had penetrated
along the Cambrai Road to their left rear. Three Vickers gun teams
which were in the trench were instructed to get into position where
they could defend the flank, if necessary. On returning to the
Battalion he ordered a certain number of men to get back into the
strong points directly behind the line, and thus increased the depth
of our defence.
About 1 p.m., as the line was now well organised, the Headquarters
were withdrawn to those of the 8/10th Gordons. The instructions issued
previously were that if the front line went the Headquarters were to
withdraw immediately. As it turned out, however, it was not possible
to withdraw the Headquarters earlier, as they had to be used in the
defence of the line. Almost as soon as we arrived (1.30 p.m.) orders
were received that the whole line was to be withdrawn to the "Army"
line, and instructions were sent forward accordingly. Orders
afterwards came through that we were to hold the position we had, but
by the time they arrived we had already moved back. The Headquarters
were again withdrawn to those of the Reserve Battalion (8th
Seaforths), and shortly afterwards we withdrew the Battalion to some
old trenches. Lieut. Gibb, however, and a few men remained with the
8/10th Gordons, and during the afternoon this party accounted for many
casualties amongst the enemy by sniping them with the Lewis gun which
had been attached to Headquarters. At 1 o'clock in the morning we
received orders that what remained of the Battalion were to go back
and join the Transport at Wanquetim. We could not muster more than 30.
Only one Company Officer got back. Some more men came in next morning,
but the total number that returned from the fight never reached 100.
Luckily, several officers and men who had been left out at the
transport line form a nucleus round which to reconstruct the Battalion.
To sum up: the enemy's barrage fire successfully annihilated our right
and left flank, the evident intention being to surround those left in
the centre. All the officers of the front Company being casualties,
the line was methodically withdrawn under N.C.O.'s. The support
Companies had more or less the same experience. No officer or other
rank returned from the platoons on the flanks, and out of the 4
Companies 1 officer and about 150 other ranks returned to the switch
line. The men at all times shewed a good fighting spirit. The rapid
fire, together with the subsequent sniping which was brought to bear
on the enemy must have caused him heavy casualties. It was noticed
early in the fight that the enemy brought up a light gun with pack
animals. He also mounted several machine guns, which caused heavy
casualties when the line was withdrawn from the switch line. The total
casualties for the day were:--
Officers, 3 killed, 3 wounded, 10 missing.
Other Ranks, 1 killed, 72 wounded, 299 missing.
The number of officers and other ranks returned as killed and wounded
is small, but most of the missing turned out afterwards to be either
killed or wounded.
During this fighting our Medical Officer, Captain A. C. Bateman, M.C.,
was killed. Among personalities connected with the Battalion there was
none more striking or lovable than "the Doc." Posted in the early
months of 1916, he served continuously with us until the fateful 28th
March, 1918, when he was reported as having been wounded and taken
prisoner by the enemy. As no more was heard of him after that date it
can only be inferred that he succumbed to his injuries, and gave up
his brave life in the service of his country. As a Battalion Medical
Officer he was unrivalled, and his ability in diagnosis and treatment
was widely commented on by all ranks. Sympathetic and kindly to "lame
dogs," and to the "nervy," he was a terror to "lead-swingers."
Providence seemed to have endowed him with a special faculty for
discovering these. In a battle he was ever in the thick of things
doing his duty, and more than his duty. It therefore gave high
satisfaction in all quarters when he was awarded the Military Cross in
recognition of the gallantry and efficiency he displayed at Ypres in
July, 1917.
But all who knew him will think of him first as the best of
comrades--a very prince of good fellows. His rich Hibernian humour,
his infectious laugh, his droll ways were unfailing medicaments for
weary men, and in every social gathering he was the life and soul of
the company. One wonders if the French War Office has it on record how
two British doctors who had been enjoying Paris leave, and were in
danger of being late in rejoining their units, solemnly presented
their compliments to the Minister of War, along with a polite request
that they might without delay have the use of a car to take them to
Albert. On the request being acceded to that dignitary was warmly
shaken by the hand, and assured that no want of his, if made known to
them, would go unsupplied! Such was Bateman. Irrepressibly gay when
all around him was dismal and difficult, he brought sunshine into our
lives, and as often as men of the 7th Battalion meet together his name
is sure to be mentioned in terms of affectionate praise.
The engagement was probably the heaviest fight the Battalion ever took
part in. One realised the difference between attacking and being
attacked. We felt all the horrible uncertainty as to what would be the
result of the next move by the enemy. We believed there was
practically no one between us and the sea, and that we had to hold the
position at all costs. Nobly did the officers and men carry out these
instructions. Unfortunately, as was proved later, practically all the
missing were never heard of again, only some 50 or 60 were accounted
for as prisoners, and most of these were wounded.
We know now, through General Ludendorf's _Memoirs_, that it was the
failure of the German Divisions at Arras that brought their big
offensive to a standstill. It is interesting to read his description
and to note how it coincides with our experience. He states:--
"At the shortest range the artillery was to be supplemented by trench
mortars. After a short artillery bombardment, lasting only a few
hours, the infantry should advance to the assault. This short
artillery preparation was expected to paralyze the enemy's artillery
by means of gas spread over a large area and to keep his infantry in
their dug-outs. At the beginning of the assault the artillery, while
continuing to keep down that of the enemy, was to put down a barrage
in front of the infantry and pave a way for it like a giant roller.
The infantry had to keep close up to this wall of projectors. The
enemy, who would come out of his dug-out after the barrage had
passed, would be, surprised by our infantry, assisted by 'auxiliary'
or companion arms under the protection of artillery.... We had 20 to
30 more Divisions than the enemy. We thought of carrying out the
attack with 50 or 60 Divisions. The Army had thrown off its
depression. Morale was completely restored, and we intended starting
a War movement. If the blow at the centre succeeded the strategic
results might indeed be enormous, as we should separate the bulk of
the English Army from the French and crowd it up with its back to the
sea.... The 17th Army was to capture the decisive heights East and
North of Arras. I attached the greatest importance to this attack, to
have the high ground in our possession was bound to be decisive in
any fighting in the plain of the Lys. In spite of employing
extraordinary masses of artillery and ammunition, the attack of the
17th Army on both banks of the Scarpe was a failure."
To shew the amount of artillery sometimes used, apart from trench
mortars, he states in another place:--
"In the offensive battle it was necessary to bring up a 100 guns to
each kilometre (1100 yards) of front."
The following day the C.O. received the following letters:--
"MY DEAR COLONEL,
"A hurried line to tell you that, while I feel most keenly your heavy
losses, I cannot sufficiently express to you my humble thanks for the
gallantry and devotion shewn by your Battalion yesterday under your
leadership. If you have a moment, let me know any details of losses.
I cannot come to see you, or, needless to say, I would. I may say
that the Corps C.O. says the Division has, it is hoped, saved Arras,
and I know that the 7th Cameron Highlanders bore the hardest share of
the fight.
"Yours ever,
"H. L. REED."
From the G.O.C. 44th Brigade:--
"MY DEAR COLONEL,
"I wish to send my sincerest congratulations and to thank you, and
all ranks under your leadership, for the grand work done during the
whole of this last tour of two months, which culminated in the
gallant fight put up by your Battalion on the 28th, and I consider
that it was entirely due to this fight that the 15th Division was
practically saved from destruction, or, at any rate, an ignominous
retreat. I would like you to convey to all ranks of your Battalion my
sincerest sympathy with them in the great struggle. The Divisional
Commander to-day, in expressing his thanks for the work of the 44th
Brigade, in all sincerity told me that your work has saved Arras.
"Yours very sincerely,
"EDWARD HILLIAM."
Copy telegram G.O.C. XVII. Corps to G.O.C. 15th Division, dated 29th
March:--
"I knew you could be relied on to stick it out to the end. There are
fresh troops now in support of you, but I want the honour of holding
Arras to be yours alone."
The Battalion was now reduced in numbers to one Company, made up
mostly from the reserves at the Transport lines which had been left
out of the trenches. Consequently we had one Company of the 9th
Gordons attached to us, and three days later (1st April) we were again
holding the trenches in rear of the intermediate Army line, which we
started to put in a state of defence. We soon received drafts, which
began to increase our strength, but there were no officers with them.
One fully realises the difficulties with which the Staff had to
contend, and the last thing anyone wants to do is to reflect in any
way on their hard work and wonderful organisation. At the same time,
we feel that the system of posting officers and men at the Base was
not the best that could have been devised. This was brought home to us
on this occasion. We were very short of officers, and on the Division
asking for drafts we were informed that there were no Cameron officers
available, and that if we insisted on having officers we would have to
take them from other units, a thing the C.O. always objected to.
Within a few days we received a letter from an officer with the home
Battalion who was anxious to try and get re-posted to the 7th. In his
letter he stated that there was such an enormous number of officers
with the Reserve Units they could hardly find room to put them all up!
The letter was brought to the notice of the Division, and the result
was that in a very short time we had a draft of Cameron officers on
their way to us.
On the 26th the Brigade was relieved by the 176th Brigade, and we
withdrew to Berneville, via Dainville and Warlus, in motor lorries. We
were now leaving the 17th Corps area, and the following communication
was received from the Corps Commander addressed to the C.O.C. 15th
Division:--
"I wish to express to you and all ranks in the Division my great
regret at your departure from the 17th Corps, in which you have been
incorporated for many months, and I had hoped that we might have seen
the battle through together. That, however, is not to be, and I only
hope that the fortune of war may some day bring us together again.
The Division has a great reputation, and may well be proud of it. I
know that the honour of Scotland is safe in its keeping, and that
those now serving will prove themselves worthy of those men who have
won glory for the Division in the past. I wish you all good luck and
success from the bottom of my heart.
"CHARLES FERGUSON,
"Lieut.-General Commanding 17th Corps."
On the 26th we moved by motor bus to Auchel. On the 1st May the G.O.C.
inspected the Battalion and presented medals. In a short address to
the Brigade he thanked all ranks for their work and devotion to duty
while in the Arras sector, and dwelt particularly on their splendid
work on the 28th in repelling the German attack. The following was
sent from the G.O.C. 44th Brigade to O.C. 7th Camerons:--
"I wish to thank you and all ranks of your Battalion for their
excellent behaviour and smart appearance the whole time we have been
in billets in Auchel. I think it will be very gratifying to you to
know that the Divisional Commander, during the parade yesterday, told
me that he considered the 44th Brigade the best command in France,
and that he had never seen smarter or cleaner men in any village
during the war than the 7th Cameron Highlanders. I would like you to
notify all ranks of the Divisional Commander's high appreciation of
their successful efforts to keep up the credit of the 44th Brigade.
"EDWARD HILLIAM,
"Brigadier-General."