BATTLE OF ARRAS, 1917.
Our rest was not for long, however, as we started once more to move
north on the 15th February, leaving the Somme area for good. All will
look back upon the Somme as a sort of horrible nightmare of mud and
water, of scarcity of fresh meat rations, fuel, etc., of long and
weary marches up to Le Sars and back again to the camps in "Scots
Redoubt" and Metz Wood, where the conditions were almost as bad as in
the front line. Not a place where the men could be entertained, not a
Y.M.C.A. or other hut within miles of the front line, not a civilian
to be seen. The Lewis Gunners had a specially hard time of it pulling
their hand carts through the mud and shell-holes. The design was
selected at home, doubtless with great care, but they must have been
tested on the Guards' Parade or other sound ground. For the work in
hand it would be difficult to imagine a worse pattern than that of
these carts with their thin iron wheels set close in to the side of
the cart and without any guiding pole or shafts. Luckily they were
soon abandoned. The cold in the line during the winter was intense.
Owing to the muddy conditions the men could not take their great coats
with them, but they were now so hardy that this exposure did not
affect their health.
Now and then an officer was able to "lorry jump" back to Amiens, and
spend the evening round Charlie's Bar, or dine at a most excellent
restaurant, where the dinners and wines were good and the waitresses
pleasing to look upon. In fact, the sight of a woman, however ugly,
was a delight. We fitted up at Albert a house which acted as a kind of
rest billet for those suffering from slight ailments. The Town Major
was always threatening to turn us out, but we contrived to keep
sufficiently in his favour to prevent this catastrophe. We managed to
fit up a long passage as a drying room, with the assistance of some
water pipes which the R.E.'s kindly dumped in the square in front of
the house, and which we quietly appropriated during the night. This
house proved of the greatest value, as the temporarily sick were
employed in washing socks and hose tops, which were dried in this
room, so that every night we were able to send up a supply of dry
socks, etc., to the men in the line in exchange for their dirty wet
ones. No doubt this rest had an excellent effect on the men's health,
and saved many from having to go to hospital.
The transport were generally in lines about La Boiselle Crater.
Sometimes those in the front line imagined that the transport had a
"cushy" time. But one is rather apt to think that the "other man" has
the best of a bargain. No doubt they did not suffer the casualties of
front-line troops, but their hours were long and weary. By night they
struggled up with the rations, etc., often through shell fire, their
carts up to the axles in mud, and the mules sometimes being nearly
drowned by falling into shell-holes, out of which it was a long and
weary business to extricate them. During the day they had to clean and
feed their animals and collect the rations from the "train." They thus
were working practically night and day, in all weathers and during all
hours. It was wonderful how the men and animals were able to carry on.
We left Contay with regret. This was the first place where we had seen
any sort of civilian life for months; and we had just settled down and
begun to make friends with the inhabitants when we had to move on. The
Mayor came and expressed his regret that we were going away, and told
us that the inhabitants had greatly appreciated the good conduct and
kindness of the men. We marched to Moucheaux, via Beauval,
Gazaincourt, Bouquemaison and Crosiette. Here we settled down once
more to train, as we learned that we were to take part in a big
attack. This attack was delayed, as it could not take place until the
new railway line from Doullens to Arras was completed. We soon
received orders that practically the whole of the Battalion was to
move to Milly under Major Macleod, to form a working-party on the
railway cutting there. The men thoroughly enjoyed this change of
employment, which consisted of three shifts of eight hours each per 24
hours, digging at the cutting. There is nothing a soldier appreciates
more than to know the number of hours he will be employed and how long
he is going to get to himself. He hates being messed about. There was
also an element of competition in the work, as the total earth
excavated by each shift was duly recorded, and the rivalry between
Battalions and "shifts" to reach highest out-put was very keen.
At first we had great difficulty with our rations. By some mistake no
arrangements had been made for these. The D.A.Q.M.G., when appealed
to, said he would indent for us, but that according to the regulations
they could not be supplied for 3 days. After the Major had ridden
round the country for some hours he found a Railhead Officer, who,
realising the situation, and not being quite hidebound to the
Regulations, gave us some tins of bully beef and biscuits. Next day
the hunt commenced again, and finally Corps H.Q. put the matter right.
Theoretically, there is no difference between rations of Corps and
other troops, but there is no doubt we never got rations anything like
those we received when acting as Corps troops.
On 24th February, 1917, the Battalion Headquarters moved to Maizeres,
the working party returning from Milly on 2nd March. On the 6th, the
Brigade was inspected by the Commander-in-Chief at Ambrine. The
Brigade was drawn up in quarter column in fighting dress. The
Commander-in-Chief expressed himself highly pleased with the
appearance and steadiness of the Brigade, and gave directions that
this should be communicated to all ranks.
On the 11th March the 44th Brigade relieved the 45th Brigade in
support in Arras, the route being by Penin, Tilloy, Hermaville, St.
Pol-Arras Road. The sheer destruction of the Boche was very apparent.
Before the war the great straight roads had been lined with splendid
trees. These for miles he had cut down and left on the road side. Even
the fruit trees, for which this district was famous, had all been
ruthlessly destroyed. As the Battalion got near Arras the roads became
very congested with traffic, and the men had to move off the highway
or dodge between traffic in order to get on. By the time we passed
under the Baudimont Gate the hour when the troops were allowed out of
billets had arrived. The streets were absolutely packed with men and
vehicles. Although Arras was practically in the front line the
inhabitants remained in their shops, and though shutters were up and
no lights could be shown a brisk trade was still carried on inside the
shops. One of the peculiar things was that the Boche seldom shelled
the town after daylight. If he had done so he would certainly have
caused heavy casualties, and as he must have heard the roar of heavy
traffic, it is difficult to understand why he did not take this
opportunity of doing serious damage.
Our first experience in the line at Arras was in the cemetery
defences, a somewhat gruesome place, and subject to the usual
attentions of the Boches to such a place. One man went to hospital
with what seemed to be a small piece of shell in his cheek, but when
the M.O. extracted it, it was discovered to be a tooth, apparently
belonging to one of the rightful inhabitants! Good shelter was to be
had inside some of the tombs.
On 18th March "D" Company carried out a raid on the enemy's lines. The
zero hour was 2.50 a.m., and Captain W. D. Stuart was in command,
along with Lieut. Semple and Lieut. Morton. The 9th and 12th Division
co-operated by similar raids on their fronts. The object of the raid
was to destroy enemy dug-outs, and to obtain identifications and
information regarding the enemy's lines.
The raiding party took up position along tapes which had been
previously laid out by Captain Stuart. The raiders advanced in two
parties (each two platoons) through separate gaps in the enemy's wire.
They met with no difficulty in forming up, although an enemy party of
about 40 strong had been seen working in front of their wire shortly
before. An enemy machine gun kept firing through the gaps in the wire,
but this was luckily put out of action by a direct hit from a shell.
Both parties succeeded in getting through the wire and entering the
enemy's trenches without encountering the enemy. The fire trench was
found to be badly damaged, and the control trench, a few yards in the
rear, was discovered to be very wide and deep (about 10 feet). The
party working to the north came across six dug-outs. Voices were heard
in them all. Each dug-out was bombed by means of Stoke shells. Wire
frames acting as blocks had been erected in both the fire and
communication trenches, and these made movement along the trenches
difficult. In most cases the parties had to climb out of the trenches
and go round the top.
The party working south found ten dug-outs; two entrances had been
blown in by the artillery bombardment, the remainder were destroyed
with Stoke shells. No dead were found in the trenches, but all
dug-outs were still occupied by the enemy. A machine gun in an
emplacement was destroyed. No gas cylinders were seen nor
identifications obtained. A party of 30 or 40 Boches were seen and
fired at as they retired through our box barrage. This was thought to
be the wiring party which had been seen earlier in the evening. One of
the dug-outs which we destroyed caught fire. The majority of the party
returned to our trenches at 3.25 a.m., though one officer and a Lewis
gunner, who were carrying a wounded man, did not return till later.
The enemy barrage did not come down till 3 a.m., when the support
line--Islington Street--and the cemetery were heavily shelled. The
enemy put up the usual number of lights, those well behind the line
bursting into golden rain. Our casualties amounted to 1 killed, 1
missing believed to be killed, and 35 wounded. Two died of wounds.
The following special orders were issued:--
"The G.O.C. 15th Division wishes to convey his appreciation to all
ranks who took part in this morning's raid, and his congratulations
on the success achieved.
"The Corps Commander wishes to congratulate all concerned in the
preparation, execution and success of the raid carried out by the 7th
Cameron Highlanders."
The C.O. issued a special order congratulating Captain W. G. Stuart,
M.C., 2nd Lieuts. Semple and Morton, Sergeant A. M'Donald,
Lance-Corporal J. Kelly and Privates G. M'Lean and W. Marston on the
gallant and conspicuous part they took in the raid. A special order
was also issued by the Army Commander congratulating the 44th and 46th
Brigades on the successful raids carried out during the month.
From the 3rd to the 7th of April the Battalion was billeted in the
cellars of the Grand Place, Arras, preparatory to the battle. The
shelling by the enemy was now considerable, but we only suffered two
casualties. Before the attack the Padre held a Communion Service in
one of the large cellars, in which many of the officers and men
partook. It was indeed a unique and solemn Service. Every now and then
the sound of a shell bursting amongst the houses above, or in the
Grand Place, would drown the words of the Padre and shake the cellar.
At 11.30 p.m. on the 8th the Battalion moved from the cellars down
into sewers, along which they travelled to the communication trenches,
and so to their assembly trench in front of the cemetery. The
Battalion headquarters were in the cellars of a house in Rue de Douai.
At 3.20 a.m. on the 9th the Battalion was reported in position ready
for the attack. The zero hour was 5.30 a.m. The attack commenced with
the 8/10th Gordons on the right, the 9th Black Watch on the left, and
the 7th Camerons in support. The advance was carried out behind an
intense barrage. The German's first system was gained with slight
loss, the Camerons occupying "O.G.1" and "O.G.2." At 7.30 a.m. the
attack upon the second objective was commenced. The 9th Black Watch on
the left were for a time held up at the Railway Triangle, where there
was heavy fighting, and this also prevented the Gordons from reaching
their objective. The Camerons were then ordered to support the
assaulting battalions, and with their assistance all objectives were
gained. About 3 p.m. the Camerons were ordered to relieve the Black
Watch on the left. The Battalion was re-organised, "B" and "D"
Companies moving forward, two platoons to "Hecq Trench," and two
platoons to "Helle Trench." "A" and "B" Companies moved to "Cable
Trench," which they started to consolidate about 1 p.m. Orders were
then received to proceed eastwards to Feuchy, in support of the 45th
Brigade. This move was carried out and completed by 4 p.m. Later it
was arranged that the position occupied by us was to be taken over by
the 6th Camerons (45th Brigade), and we were to move back to the
trenches we had previously occupied. So ended the first phase of the
battle.
At 12.45 a.m. on the 11th we heard that the attack was to be continued
at 5 a.m. At 3 a.m. orders came through from Brigade to move into a
position occupying part of the "Brown" line which had been captured
previously by the 46th Brigade. This position was occupied by "A"
Company on the right, "C" Company on the left, "B" Company right
support, and "D" Company left support. At 11 a.m. the Companies
attacked in artillery formation, moving half-right for "Orange Hill."
As soon as the crest of the hill was reached we came under heavy
machine gun and shrapnel fire, which for a time delayed the advance,
but the Battalion finally worked forward and occupied a system of
trenches about H29 central. About 2.54 p.m. a message reached us that
the barrage was to again commence at 2.50 p.m., and the Brigade was to
attack at 3. This gave only a few minutes to get the necessary orders
issued, but about 3 p.m. the Battalion commenced the attack. Once
again they came under exceptionally heavy machine gun and shrapnel
fire, but they succeeded in reaching a position running roughly
between Lone Copse and Monchy. Here word was brought about 4.40 p.m.
that the enemy was reported to be preparing a counter attack, and at
once everyone was busy putting the trenches in a state of defence.
However, it was stated shortly afterwards that the counter attack was
no longer to be expected.
A great portion of the Battalion entered Monchy, where they were
placed under command of a Colonel of the Essex Yeomanry, who was in
charge of the troops there. No one who was in Monchy is likely to
forget the sight. The casualties had been heavy amongst both men and
horses, some of the latter being literally blown to pieces. Later,
orders were issued to O.C. Companies to withdraw and link up with the
Gordons from a line about 100 yards in front of the sunken road. This
movement being completed about 3 a.m. On the 12th, the Battalion was
relieved by a Company of the Worcester Regiment, and moved back into
"Helle Trench," which was reached about 5.30 a.m. There it remained
till 3 p.m., when it was finally relieved and moved into billets in
Arras. The strength of the Battalion taking part in these operations
was 23 officers and 521 other ranks; of these 12 officers and 175
other ranks became casualties. The officer casualties were:--
_Killed._--Lieuts. P. G. Jenkins, G. R. Morton, M.C., R. W. B.
Semple, M.C., J. F. Smith, J. B. Ronaldson, and 19 other ranks.
_Wounded._--Captain G. A. C. Davy, Lieuts. S. C. Russell, J. A.
Symon, D. M. Brown, J. K. M'Millan, E. F. Forrest, and 128 other
ranks.
We have also to record the death of C.S.M. Cameron and Sergt.
Dalgleish, two splendid N.C.O.'s.
We all felt very sorry for Lieuts. Semple and Morton, as these two
splendid young officers had only on the day before the attack been
awarded the Military Cross for their conspicuous gallantry in the raid
which had taken place a few days previously. They were killed while
the sincere congratulations of all ranks still sounded in their ears.
A special order was issued by the Commander-in-Chief:--
"My warmest congratulations on the important success achieved by you
yesterday. The manner in which the operations were carried out
reflects the greatest credit on Commander, staff and troops. Please
convey to all employed my appreciation of the great skill and
gallantry shown by them."
The Corps Commander also issued a special order, expressing his
appreciation and thanks for the splendid work done both in the
preparation for, and execution of, the attack. He was particularly
gratified by the energy displayed by all ranks after the third
objective was captured.
The Divisional Commander issued the following special order:--
"15th Divisional Commander feels sure that this generous
acknowledgment of the work of the Division will be highly valued by
all. He wishes to add his own thanks. He is proud to have under his
command a Division in which officers, N.C.O.'s and men are inspired
with so fixed a determination to do their duty. The task given to the
15th Division in the Battle of Arras was a very heavy one, entailing
hard work in preparation and great gallantry in attack. The
difficulties of the operation only inspired all ranks to greater
effort, and brilliant success has been achieved. The crushing defeat
of the enemy on 9th April was due to the discipline, hard work,
untiring energy, and magnificent gallantry of all ranks. Another page
of honour has been added to the glorious record of the Division. The
Divisional Commander wishes to thank every officer, N.C.O. and man,
and he feels that it is indeed an honour to command the victorious
15th Division."
The signallers and runners during the battle of Arras had a severe
time, owing to the heavy shell and machine gun fire. The system of
deep buried cable had not yet been developed, all wires being laid
over the open. They were therefore being constantly cut by shell fire,
and the signallers had to be out continually, both night and day,
repairing them. This also necessitated the use of runners to carry
messages during the periods of the heavy bombardment. Signallers and
runners were picked men, as the work was not only arduous and
dangerous, but required both judgment and commonsense. We were lucky
with the men chosen, as they on this and all other occasions did their
work well, showing courage and devotion to duty.
At the close of this phase of the battle, Lieut.-Colonel Crichton went
down the line sick, the command of the Battalion being taken over by
Major MacLeod. The Battalion was billeted in Arras up till the 23rd
April, re-organising and absorbing fresh drafts. They also practised
the attack in open order, and did a certain amount of rifle practice
in the "butte de tir." We left our billets in Grand Place on the night
of the 22nd, relieving the 8/10th Gordons. We were to attack the enemy
on the 23rd, the first objective being the "Blue" line. At 3.20 a.m.
the Battalion was in position, "D" Company being on the left, "A"
Company on the right, "B" and "C" Companies in support. On our right
were the Seaforths, on the left the Argyll and Sutherland Highlanders
(45th Brigade).
The zero hour was 4.45 a.m., when the Battalion commenced to attack
under a heavy barrage. The enemy almost at once opened a barrage on
our front line, and also an intense machine gun fire from an
emplacement on our immediate front and from the high ground on the
south side of Scarpe River. The machine gun emplacement on our front
was to have been knocked out by our trench mortars, which were to open
rapid fire on it half a minute before we attacked; but this scheme was
not carried into effect, and we suffered very heavy casualties when
the men got over the top and rushed the gun at the point of the
bayonet. The fact that Lieut. Anderson, the trench mortar officer, was
killed probably accounted for the failure of the trench mortar to
knock out the machine gun. Lieut. Anderson was a most skilled and
gallant officer, beloved by all, and his death must have had a
disconcerting effect on his men. He was a cheery individual, and had
often rendered very valuable service in the attack. We missed him both
as a soldier and as a man. After rushing the gun at the point of the
bayonet, our right was held up by machine gun fire. Our left, in the
meantime, pushed on to Bullet Trench, seizing the south end of it,
taking about 40 prisoners and capturing a machine gun. Here about 5.30
a.m., finding they were out of touch both on their left and right,
they dug themselves in. The centre of the Battalion for a time had
been held up by the machine gun fire, but succeeded finally in
advancing and fortifying a post about the sunken road (5.45 a.m.) A
small party on the right, with the assistance of Captain Morrison of
the Black Watch, formed another post in the sunken road. By 10.30 a.m.
those who were holding the post in Bullet Trench had managed, with the
assistance of a few stokes and rifle grenades, to clear the trench up
to the Cambrai Road, three posts being formed in the trenches.
For a time our right was insecure, as the Black Watch, who had
attacked the village of Guemappe, had not succeeded in holding it, and
had been driven out by the enemy. About 12 mid-day a new barrage was
formed, under which we pushed forward the posts in the sunken road,
advancing to a part of "Hammer Trench." These posts, being on high
ground slightly in front of the village, spotted the enemy forming up
for a counter attack against the Black Watch, and our Lewis Gunners
were able to do considerable execution before the counter attack was
broken up. The 46th Brigade advanced through the 44th, and again our
Lewis gunners were able to do good work in firing on the enemy as he
retired from the trenches on the right. After re-organising the
Battalion moved back to behind the "Brown" line about 2 a.m. on the
24th.
Everyone believed we were now done with fighting for the time being,
as our casualties had been heavy, and we were all congratulating each
other on being the lucky ones who had got through it. Next day,
however, the Commanding Officer received orders that we were to go
back into the line in order to take Cavalry Farm on the 26th, as
another Battalion had failed to do so. No doubt it was necessary, as
there were no fresh troops available, but no one, unless he has done
it, can realise the feelings of a Commanding Officer when he has to
order the men to turn round and go back into the fight under such
circumstances. But he was proud of his men who, tired as they were,
once more turned back and faced the enemy without a grumble.
[Illustration: Lieut. Colonel NORMAN MACLEOD, C.M.G., D.S.O.,
commanded from 23rd April, 1917, to 10th June, 1918.]
Owing to casualties in the previous fighting, we had now only three
Company Officers left, besides the Commanding Officer and Lieut.
Legate, who was acting as Adjutant. A request was made to be allowed
to bring up fresh officers from the transport lines, but this was
refused. Unfortunately, just as the Battalion was moving off, one of
the three officers became a casualty, leaving only two, neither of
whom had been in action before the previous day's fighting. When we
reached the lines and found that the Battalion was to carry out the
attack on Cavalry Farm, the Commanding Officer suggested to Brigade
that he would go forward to Company Headquarters, as the Battalion had
been practically reduced to the strength of a Company, especially in
officers. However, the Brigade would not agree to this.
The intention was that the Battalion was to take Cavalry Farm and the
trenches to the east of it. The 45th Brigade were to attack to the
north of Cambrai Road, and take a German strong point so as to protect
our left, while the Black Watch were to advance on our right and form
a line of posts. As soon as the Battalion had captured the farm, the
9th Pioneer Gordons were to make a communication trench up to it. The
attack commenced at 11 p.m. We managed to capture the farm, but on
getting past it we found the trench to the east strongly held by the
enemy. These we attacked, but almost immediately found ourselves
between two fires, coming from the trenches in front and from machine
guns close on our left rear, situated in the strong point which the
45th Brigade had failed to capture. The result was that we had to fall
back on the farm. In the meantime the Gordons, having heard that we
had taken the farm, came up to commence their trench. They also came
under the same heavy cross fire as was holding up our advance, and had
to withdraw. The Major in Command and many others become casualties.
This information being received at the Battalion Headquarters, the
Commanding Officer decided to go forward and try to re-organise the
attack. The communication trench was filled with 9th Gordons, and it
became necessary to advance over the open, which was a slow process,
as the ground was being swept by machine guns. On reaching the front
line it was found crowded with troops, in consequence of the
Seaforths, who were in support, having moved forward into the front
line when our Battalion had advanced to the attack. They were now
mixed up with our men who had come back. The Seaforths were ordered to
withdraw to the support line, with the exception of one Company which
was retained to assist us in holding the front line. It was
practically impossible to take the trenches east of the farm unless
the strong point on the north side of the road was attacked and
captured. Having therefore formed posts in the farm and to the right,
to link up with the Black Watch, he proceeded to the 45th Brigade
Company, who had failed to capture the strong point on the north side
of the road, and from which position the enemy were able to fire into
our rear when we had gone forward. They informed him that they did not
intend to attack the strong point again. This made it impossible for
us to continue the attack beyond the farm with any chance of success.
That evening the Battalion was relieved by the Seaforths, and moved
into support. The next day the Battalion was occupied in burying dead.
This work was difficult, as the enemy, seeing the movement, kept up
intermittent shelling. However, we managed to collect 64 bodies of
Camerons, which we buried in one grave. The Commanding Officer took
the service, but had to limit the number of men present owing to the
danger of casualties from shelling.
In order to save space, the majority of men were buried lying on their
side. A touching feature was the fact that someone had taken each
man's arm and put it round the body lying next to him. From the top of
the trench one could imagine that the men were sleeping, embraced in
each other's arms, more especially as they were buried in their kilts
just as they had fought, no blankets or other covering being
available. Altogether it was a most moving scene. The machine gun,
which has already been referred to, and which should have been knocked
out before the attack, had taken its toll, as most of these bodies
were found round about its emplacement. One could well appreciate the
desperate gallantry of the men who rushed it. We had the satisfaction,
however, of knowing that many of the enemy's gun crew had been
bayoneted by our men.
A good example of the grit of the young officer and also the
difficulty of obtaining accurate information regarding casualties was
experienced. Lieut. Mackay was missing, and though several men were
certain that they had seen him dead in a certain shell-hole, his body
could not be found. One reliable N.C.O. was so certain of its position
that he guaranteed, if he were allowed to go out, he would return
directly with the body. His re-request was granted, but proved a
failure. As a matter of fact, Mackay was found dead a considerable
distance further on. He had been severely wounded where the men saw
him, and they had been wrongly convinced that he was dead. He had been
killed finally by a direct hit. He must have suffered severe wounds
first of all, as his right hand, which had been blown off, and other
wounds, had been dressed. Such wounds would have more than justified
anyone going back to the dressing station, but this brave young
officer, although stunned and wounded to such an extent that his own
men thought he was dead, had evidently advanced with the remainder of
the Battalion as soon as he had regained consciousness.
If the Battalion on our left had succeeded in obtaining their
objective, or had at least silenced the enemy, the attack on the farm
would probably have proved a success. On the night of the 28/29th of
April the Battalion was relieved by the 3rd London Regiment, and
withdrew into billets in the Grand Place. The fighting had been long
and severe, and if fresh troops had been available to go through on
the completion of the first "phase" the success might have been even
greater. At the close of the fighting at that time one was able to
move a considerable distance forward at night without encountering the
enemy, who must have been holding his line very lightly and far back.
He had recovered himself, however, when the second phase started. It
is interesting to read with what surprise and despondency General
Ludendorf, the Chief of the German Staff, writes concerning the
battle. He says:--
"On that day (9th April) I celebrated my birthday. I looked forward
to the expected offensive with confidence, and was now deeply
depressed. Was this to be the result of all our care and trouble
during the past half year? A day like April the 9th threw all
calculations to the winds."
Such an expression of opinion is high praise to the troops whose
vigour and bravery brought such a disaster to the enemy.
It may be remembered that at that time the latter part of the battle
of Arras was almost over-shadowed in the press by the very gallant and
successful attack by the Canadians when they took Vimy Ridge. It is
instructive, however, to read in General Ludendorf's Memoirs the
statement:--
"On the 11th they took Monchy, and during the following night we
evacuated the Vimy Ridge."
So ends the battle of Arras.